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/linux-master/tools/lib/bpf/ | ||
H A D | libbpf.h | diff 715c5ce4 Wed May 12 17:41:22 MDT 2021 Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> libbpf: Add low level TC-BPF management API This adds functions that wrap the netlink API used for adding, manipulating, and removing traffic control filters. The API summary: A bpf_tc_hook represents a location where a TC-BPF filter can be attached. This means that creating a hook leads to creation of the backing qdisc, while destruction either removes all filters attached to a hook, or destroys qdisc if requested explicitly (as discussed below). The TC-BPF API functions operate on this bpf_tc_hook to attach, replace, query, and detach tc filters. All functions return 0 on success, and a negative error code on failure. bpf_tc_hook_create - Create a hook Parameters: @hook - Cannot be NULL, ifindex > 0, attach_point must be set to proper enum constant. Note that parent must be unset when attach_point is one of BPF_TC_INGRESS or BPF_TC_EGRESS. Note that as an exception BPF_TC_INGRESS|BPF_TC_EGRESS is also a valid value for attach_point. Returns -EOPNOTSUPP when hook has attach_point as BPF_TC_CUSTOM. bpf_tc_hook_destroy - Destroy a hook Parameters: @hook - Cannot be NULL. The behaviour depends on value of attach_point. If BPF_TC_INGRESS, all filters attached to the ingress hook will be detached. If BPF_TC_EGRESS, all filters attached to the egress hook will be detached. If BPF_TC_INGRESS|BPF_TC_EGRESS, the clsact qdisc will be deleted, also detaching all filters. As before, parent must be unset for these attach_points, and set for BPF_TC_CUSTOM. It is advised that if the qdisc is operated on by many programs, then the program at least check that there are no other existing filters before deleting the clsact qdisc. An example is shown below: DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_tc_hook, .ifindex = if_nametoindex("lo"), .attach_point = BPF_TC_INGRESS); /* set opts as NULL, as we're not really interested in * getting any info for a particular filter, but just * detecting its presence. */ r = bpf_tc_query(&hook, NULL); if (r == -ENOENT) { /* no filters */ hook.attach_point = BPF_TC_INGRESS|BPF_TC_EGREESS; return bpf_tc_hook_destroy(&hook); } else { /* failed or r == 0, the latter means filters do exist */ return r; } Note that there is a small race between checking for no filters and deleting the qdisc. This is currently unavoidable. Returns -EOPNOTSUPP when hook has attach_point as BPF_TC_CUSTOM. bpf_tc_attach - Attach a filter to a hook Parameters: @hook - Cannot be NULL. Represents the hook the filter will be attached to. Requirements for ifindex and attach_point are same as described in bpf_tc_hook_create, but BPF_TC_CUSTOM is also supported. In that case, parent must be set to the handle where the filter will be attached (using BPF_TC_PARENT). E.g. to set parent to 1:16 like in tc command line, the equivalent would be BPF_TC_PARENT(1, 16). @opts - Cannot be NULL. The following opts are optional: * handle - The handle of the filter * priority - The priority of the filter Must be >= 0 and <= UINT16_MAX Note that when left unset, they will be auto-allocated by the kernel. The following opts must be set: * prog_fd - The fd of the loaded SCHED_CLS prog The following opts must be unset: * prog_id - The ID of the BPF prog The following opts are optional: * flags - Currently only BPF_TC_F_REPLACE is allowed. It allows replacing an existing filter instead of failing with -EEXIST. The following opts will be filled by bpf_tc_attach on a successful attach operation if they are unset: * handle - The handle of the attached filter * priority - The priority of the attached filter * prog_id - The ID of the attached SCHED_CLS prog This way, the user can know what the auto allocated values for optional opts like handle and priority are for the newly attached filter, if they were unset. Note that some other attributes are set to fixed default values listed below (this holds for all bpf_tc_* APIs): protocol as ETH_P_ALL, direct action mode, chain index of 0, and class ID of 0 (this can be set by writing to the skb->tc_classid field from the BPF program). bpf_tc_detach Parameters: @hook - Cannot be NULL. Represents the hook the filter will be detached from. Requirements are same as described above in bpf_tc_attach. @opts - Cannot be NULL. The following opts must be set: * handle, priority The following opts must be unset: * prog_fd, prog_id, flags bpf_tc_query Parameters: @hook - Cannot be NULL. Represents the hook where the filter lookup will be performed. Requirements are same as described above in bpf_tc_attach(). @opts - Cannot be NULL. The following opts must be set: * handle, priority The following opts must be unset: * prog_fd, prog_id, flags The following fields will be filled by bpf_tc_query upon a successful lookup: * prog_id Some usage examples (using BPF skeleton infrastructure): BPF program (test_tc_bpf.c): #include <linux/bpf.h> #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> SEC("classifier") int cls(struct __sk_buff *skb) { return 0; } Userspace loader: struct test_tc_bpf *skel = NULL; int fd, r; skel = test_tc_bpf__open_and_load(); if (!skel) return -ENOMEM; fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.cls); DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_tc_hook, hook, .ifindex = if_nametoindex("lo"), .attach_point = BPF_TC_INGRESS); /* Create clsact qdisc */ r = bpf_tc_hook_create(&hook); if (r < 0) goto end; DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_tc_opts, opts, .prog_fd = fd); r = bpf_tc_attach(&hook, &opts); if (r < 0) goto end; /* Print the auto allocated handle and priority */ printf("Handle=%u", opts.handle); printf("Priority=%u", opts.priority); opts.prog_fd = opts.prog_id = 0; bpf_tc_detach(&hook, &opts); end: test_tc_bpf__destroy(skel); This is equivalent to doing the following using tc command line: # tc qdisc add dev lo clsact # tc filter add dev lo ingress bpf obj foo.o sec classifier da # tc filter del dev lo ingress handle <h> prio <p> bpf ... where the handle and priority can be found using: # tc filter show dev lo ingress Another example replacing a filter (extending prior example): /* We can also choose both (or one), let's try replacing an * existing filter. */ DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_tc_opts, replace_opts, .handle = opts.handle, .priority = opts.priority, .prog_fd = fd); r = bpf_tc_attach(&hook, &replace_opts); if (r == -EEXIST) { /* Expected, now use BPF_TC_F_REPLACE to replace it */ replace_opts.flags = BPF_TC_F_REPLACE; return bpf_tc_attach(&hook, &replace_opts); } else if (r < 0) { return r; } /* There must be no existing filter with these * attributes, so cleanup and return an error. */ replace_opts.prog_fd = replace_opts.prog_id = 0; bpf_tc_detach(&hook, &replace_opts); return -1; To obtain info of a particular filter: /* Find info for filter with handle 1 and priority 50 */ DECLARE_LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_tc_opts, info_opts, .handle = 1, .priority = 50); r = bpf_tc_query(&hook, &info_opts); if (r == -ENOENT) printf("Filter not found"); else if (r < 0) return r; printf("Prog ID: %u", info_opts.prog_id); return 0; Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> # libbpf API design [ Daniel: also did major patch cleanup ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210512103451.989420-3-memxor@gmail.com diff 715f8db9 Tue Nov 03 04:21:05 MST 2015 Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> tools lib bpf: Fix compiler warning on CentOS 6 CC libbpf.o cc1: warnings being treated as errors libbpf.c: In function 'bpf_program__title': libbpf.c:1037: error: declaration of 'dup' shadows a global declaration /usr/include/unistd.h:528: error: shadowed declaration is here mv: cannot stat `./.libbpf.o.tmp': No such file or directory make[3]: *** [libbpf.o] Error 1 make[2]: *** [libbpf-in.o] Error 2 make[1]: *** [/linux/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.a] Error 2 make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1446549665-2342-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> |
/linux-master/kernel/time/ | ||
H A D | posix-cpu-timers.c | diff 715eb7a9 Mon Jan 30 20:09:33 MST 2017 Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> timers/posix-timers: Use TICK_NSEC instead of a dynamically ad-hoc calculated version Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485832191-26889-18-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
/linux-master/drivers/cpuidle/governors/ | ||
H A D | menu.c | diff 7024b18c Tue Feb 16 12:19:18 MST 2016 Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> cpuidle: menu: avoid expensive square root computation Computing the integer square root is a rather expensive operation, at least compared to doing a 64x64 -> 64 multiply (avg*avg) and, on 64 bit platforms, doing an extra comparison to a constant (variance <= U64_MAX/36). On 64 bit platforms, this does mean that we add a restriction on the range of the variance where we end up using the estimate (since previously the stddev <= ULONG_MAX was a tautology), but on the other hand, we extend the range quite substantially on 32 bit platforms - in both cases, we now allow standard deviations up to 715 seconds, which is for example guaranteed if all observations are less than 1430 seconds. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> |
/linux-master/net/sctp/ | ||
H A D | input.c | diff 715f5552 Sat Sep 10 09:11:23 MDT 2016 Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> sctp: hold the transport before using it in sctp_hash_cmp Since commit 4f0087812648 ("sctp: apply rhashtable api to send/recv path"), sctp uses transport rhashtable with .obj_cmpfn sctp_hash_cmp, in which it compares the members of the transport with the rhashtable args to check if it's the right transport. But sctp uses the transport without holding it in sctp_hash_cmp, it can cause a use-after-free panic. As after it gets transport from hashtable, another CPU may close the sk and free the asoc. In sctp_association_free, it frees all the transports, meanwhile, the assoc's refcnt may be reduced to 0, assoc can be destroyed by sctp_association_destroy. So after that, transport->assoc is actually an unavailable memory address in sctp_hash_cmp. Although sctp_hash_cmp is under rcu_read_lock, it still can not avoid this, as assoc is not freed by RCU. This patch is to hold the transport before checking it's members with sctp_transport_hold, in which it checks the refcnt first, holds it if it's not 0. Fixes: 4f0087812648 ("sctp: apply rhashtable api to send/recv path") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
/linux-master/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/ | ||
H A D | bcmsysport.c | diff 715a0227 Sun Jun 19 12:39:08 MDT 2016 Philippe Reynes <tremyfr@gmail.com> net: ethernet: bcmsysport: use phydev from struct net_device The private structure contain a pointer to phydev, but the structure net_device already contain such pointer. So we can remove the pointer phydev in the private structure, and update the driver to use the one contained in struct net_device. Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <tremyfr@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
/linux-master/drivers/gpu/drm/qxl/ | ||
H A D | qxl_display.c | diff 715a11fa Mon Feb 27 13:43:16 MST 2017 Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.co.uk> drm: qxl: Consolidate bo reservation when pinning Every attempt to pin/unpin objects in memory requires qxl_bo_reserve/unreserve calls around the pinning operation to protect the object from concurrent access, which causes that call sequence to be reproduced every place where pinning is needed. In some cases, that sequence was not executed correctly, resulting in potential unprotected pinning operations. This commit encapsulates the reservation inside a new wrapper to make sure it is always handled properly. In cases where reservation must be done beforehand, for some reason, one can use the unprotected version __qxl_bo_pin/unpin. Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.co.uk> Reviewed-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170227204328.18761-3-krisman@collabora.co.uk Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> |
/linux-master/net/netfilter/ | ||
H A D | x_tables.c | diff 715cf35a Thu Jan 31 05:49:16 MST 2008 Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> [NETFILTER]: x_tables: netns propagation for /proc/net/*_tables_names Propagate netns together with AF down to ->start/->next/->stop iterators. Choose table based on netns and AF for showing. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
/linux-master/net/sched/ | ||
H A D | cls_u32.c | diff 715df5ec Wed Jan 24 01:54:13 MST 2018 Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> net: sched: propagate extack to cls->destroy callbacks Propagate extack to cls->destroy callbacks when called from non-error paths. On error paths pass NULL to avoid overwriting the failure message. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
/linux-master/kernel/locking/ | ||
H A D | rtmutex.c | diff 715f7f9e Sun Aug 15 15:28:30 MDT 2021 Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> locking/rtmutex: Squash !RT tasks to DEFAULT_PRIO Ensure all !RT tasks have the same prio such that they end up in FIFO order and aren't split up according to nice level. The reason why nice levels were taken into account so far is historical. In the early days of the rtmutex code it was done to give the PI boosting and deboosting a larger coverage. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210815211303.938676930@linutronix.de |
H A D | rwsem.c | diff 5cfd92e1 Mon May 20 14:59:14 MDT 2019 Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> locking/rwsem: Adaptive disabling of reader optimistic spinning Reader optimistic spinning is helpful when the reader critical section is short and there aren't that many readers around. It makes readers relatively more preferred than writers. When a writer times out spinning on a reader-owned lock and set the nospinnable bits, there are two main reasons for that. 1) The reader critical section is long, perhaps the task sleeps after acquiring the read lock. 2) There are just too many readers contending the lock causing it to take a while to service all of them. In the former case, long reader critical section will impede the progress of writers which is usually more important for system performance. In the later case, reader optimistic spinning tends to make the reader groups that contain readers that acquire the lock together smaller leading to more of them. That may hurt performance in some cases. In other words, the setting of nonspinnable bits indicates that reader optimistic spinning may not be helpful for those workloads that cause it. Therefore, any writers that have observed the setting of the writer nonspinnable bit for a given rwsem after they fail to acquire the lock via optimistic spinning will set the reader nonspinnable bit once they acquire the write lock. Similarly, readers that observe the setting of reader nonspinnable bit at slowpath entry will also set the reader nonspinnable bit when they acquire the read lock via the wakeup path. Once the reader nonspinnable bit is on, it will only be reset when a writer is able to acquire the rwsem in the fast path or somehow a reader or writer in the slowpath doesn't observe the nonspinable bit. This is to discourage reader optmistic spinning on that particular rwsem and make writers more preferred. This adaptive disabling of reader optimistic spinning will alleviate some of the negative side effect of this feature. In addition, this patch tries to make readers in the spinning queue follow the phase-fair principle after quitting optimistic spinning by checking if another reader has somehow acquired a read lock after this reader enters the optimistic spinning queue. If so and the rwsem is still reader-owned, this reader is in the right read-phase and can attempt to acquire the lock. On a 2-socket 40-core 80-thread Skylake system, the page_fault1 test of the will-it-scale benchmark was run with various number of threads. The number of operations done before reader optimistic spinning patches, this patch and after this patch were: Threads Before rspin Before patch After patch %change ------- ------------ ------------ ----------- ------- 20 5541068 5345484 5455667 -3.5%/ +2.1% 40 10185150 7292313 9219276 -28.5%/+26.4% 60 8196733 6460517 7181209 -21.2%/+11.2% 80 9508864 6739559 8107025 -29.1%/+20.3% This patch doesn't recover all the lost performance, but it is more than half. Given the fact that reader optimistic spinning does benefit some workloads, this is a good compromise. Using the rwsem locking microbenchmark with very short critical section, this patch doesn't have too much impact on locking performance as shown by the locking rates (kops/s) below with equal numbers of readers and writers before and after this patch: # of Threads Pre-patch Post-patch ------------ --------- ---------- 2 4,730 4,969 4 4,814 4,786 8 4,866 4,815 16 4,715 4,511 32 3,338 3,500 64 3,212 3,389 80 3,110 3,044 When running the locking microbenchmark with 40 dedicated reader and writer threads, however, the reader performance is curtailed to favor the writer. Before patch: 40 readers, Iterations Min/Mean/Max = 204,026/234,309/254,816 40 writers, Iterations Min/Mean/Max = 88,515/95,884/115,644 After patch: 40 readers, Iterations Min/Mean/Max = 33,813/35,260/36,791 40 writers, Iterations Min/Mean/Max = 95,368/96,565/97,798 Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: huang ying <huang.ying.caritas@gmail.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520205918.22251-16-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
/linux-master/drivers/pinctrl/ | ||
H A D | Makefile | diff 3b588e43 Tue Aug 07 15:25:26 MDT 2018 Tomer Maimon <tmaimon77@gmail.com> pinctrl: nuvoton: add NPCM7xx pinctrl and GPIO driver Add Nuvoton BMC NPCM750/730/715/705 Pinmux and GPIO controller driver. Signed-off-by: Tomer Maimon <tmaimon77@gmail.com> [Add back select GPIO_GENERIC] Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> |
H A D | Kconfig | diff 3b588e43 Tue Aug 07 15:25:26 MDT 2018 Tomer Maimon <tmaimon77@gmail.com> pinctrl: nuvoton: add NPCM7xx pinctrl and GPIO driver Add Nuvoton BMC NPCM750/730/715/705 Pinmux and GPIO controller driver. Signed-off-by: Tomer Maimon <tmaimon77@gmail.com> [Add back select GPIO_GENERIC] Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> |
/linux-master/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/ | ||
H A D | enetc.c | diff 715bf261 Tue Sep 27 15:52:02 MDT 2022 Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> net: enetc: cache accesses to &priv->si->hw The &priv->si->hw construct dereferences 2 pointers and makes lines longer than they need to be, in turn making the code harder to read. Replace &priv->si->hw accesses with a "hw" variable when there are 2 or more accesses within a function that dereference this. This includes loops, since &priv->si->hw is a loop invariant. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
/linux-master/include/linux/ | ||
H A D | kprobes.h | diff ef53d9c5 Fri Jul 25 02:46:04 MDT 2008 Srinivasa D S <srinivasa@in.ibm.com> kprobes: improve kretprobe scalability with hashed locking Currently list of kretprobe instances are stored in kretprobe object (as used_instances,free_instances) and in kretprobe hash table. We have one global kretprobe lock to serialise the access to these lists. This causes only one kretprobe handler to execute at a time. Hence affects system performance, particularly on SMP systems and when return probe is set on lot of functions (like on all systemcalls). Solution proposed here gives fine-grain locks that performs better on SMP system compared to present kretprobe implementation. Solution: 1) Instead of having one global lock to protect kretprobe instances present in kretprobe object and kretprobe hash table. We will have two locks, one lock for protecting kretprobe hash table and another lock for kretporbe object. 2) We hold lock present in kretprobe object while we modify kretprobe instance in kretprobe object and we hold per-hash-list lock while modifying kretprobe instances present in that hash list. To prevent deadlock, we never grab a per-hash-list lock while holding a kretprobe lock. 3) We can remove used_instances from struct kretprobe, as we can track used instances of kretprobe instances using kretprobe hash table. Time duration for kernel compilation ("make -j 8") on a 8-way ppc64 system with return probes set on all systemcalls looks like this. cacheline non-cacheline Un-patched kernel aligned patch aligned patch =============================================================================== real 9m46.784s 9m54.412s 10m2.450s user 40m5.715s 40m7.142s 40m4.273s sys 2m57.754s 2m58.583s 3m17.430s =========================================================== Time duration for kernel compilation ("make -j 8) on the same system, when kernel is not probed. ========================= real 9m26.389s user 40m8.775s sys 2m7.283s ========================= Signed-off-by: Srinivasa DS <srinivasa@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jim Keniston <jkenisto@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
H A D | migrate.h | diff 715cbfd6 Fri May 07 13:05:06 MDT 2021 Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> mm/migrate: Add folio_migrate_copy() This is the folio equivalent of migrate_page_copy(), which is retained as a wrapper for filesystems which are not yet converted to folios. Also convert copy_huge_page() to folio_copy(). Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> |
/linux-master/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/ | ||
H A D | syscall_64.tbl | diff ff388fe5 Mon Apr 15 10:35:20 MDT 2024 Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> mseal: wire up mseal syscall Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10. This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel. In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits. Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur. Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type. Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example, such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case. Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal(). The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature: int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags) addr/len: memory range. flags: reserved. mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range. 1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes. 2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location, via mremap(). 3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED). 4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA. 5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect(). 6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API. Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing, which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute (RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime of the process. Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory. For example, with madvise(DONTNEED). However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case, the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow integrity. Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases. The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new protections. In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in shaping this patch: Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the destructive madvise operations. Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization. Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope. Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD. MM perf benchmarks ================== This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made, when any segment within the given memory range is sealed. To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed. [8] The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call, by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have similar results. The tests have roughly below sequence: for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++) create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA) start the sampling for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++) mprotect one mapping stop and save the sample delete 1000 mappings calculates all samples. Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz, 4G memory, Chromebook. Based on the latest upstream code: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104% munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107% munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106% munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107% munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104% munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105% mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106% mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105% mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104% mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103% mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103% mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104% madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109% madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121% madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121% madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119% madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115% madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106% munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108% munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106% munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106% munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108% munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107% mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107% mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106% mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107% mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105% mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105% mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105% madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115% madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120% madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115% madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116% madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113% madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111% Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds 20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA. In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109% munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105% munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103% munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112% munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114% munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99% mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97% mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94% mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103% mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100% mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101% mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103% madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109% madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108% madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105% madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107% madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108% madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105% munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104% munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104% munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102% munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99% munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103% mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112% mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107% mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103% mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103% mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99% mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103% madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108% madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109% madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107% madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109% madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108% madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114% For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30 CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases. It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254% munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316% munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398% munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396% munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352% munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287% mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187% mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335% mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506% mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471% mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465% mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433% madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125% madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122% madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138% madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147% madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145% madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262% munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327% munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419% munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413% munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341% munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303% mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228% mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409% mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504% mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423% mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412% mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415% madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123% madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133% madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151% madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151% madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140% madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142% From 5.10 to 6.8 munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma. mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma. madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma. In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times greater for munmap and mprotect. When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to take this data with a grain of salt. This patch (of 5): Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2] Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com> Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com> Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> |
/linux-master/include/uapi/asm-generic/ | ||
H A D | unistd.h | diff ff388fe5 Mon Apr 15 10:35:20 MDT 2024 Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> mseal: wire up mseal syscall Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10. This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel. In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits. Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur. Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type. Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example, such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case. Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal(). The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature: int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags) addr/len: memory range. flags: reserved. mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range. 1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes. 2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location, via mremap(). 3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED). 4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA. 5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect(). 6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API. Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing, which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute (RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime of the process. Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory. For example, with madvise(DONTNEED). However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case, the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow integrity. Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases. The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new protections. In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in shaping this patch: Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the destructive madvise operations. Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization. Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope. Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD. MM perf benchmarks ================== This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made, when any segment within the given memory range is sealed. To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed. [8] The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call, by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have similar results. The tests have roughly below sequence: for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++) create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA) start the sampling for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++) mprotect one mapping stop and save the sample delete 1000 mappings calculates all samples. Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz, 4G memory, Chromebook. Based on the latest upstream code: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104% munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107% munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106% munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107% munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104% munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105% mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106% mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105% mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104% mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103% mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103% mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104% madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109% madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121% madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121% madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119% madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115% madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106% munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108% munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106% munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106% munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108% munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107% mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107% mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106% mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107% mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105% mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105% mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105% madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115% madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120% madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115% madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116% madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113% madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111% Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds 20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA. In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109% munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105% munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103% munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112% munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114% munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99% mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97% mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94% mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103% mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100% mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101% mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103% madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109% madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108% madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105% madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107% madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108% madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105% munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104% munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104% munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102% munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99% munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103% mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112% mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107% mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103% mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103% mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99% mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103% madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108% madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109% madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107% madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109% madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108% madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114% For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30 CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases. It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254% munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316% munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398% munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396% munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352% munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287% mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187% mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335% mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506% mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471% mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465% mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433% madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125% madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122% madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138% madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147% madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145% madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262% munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327% munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419% munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413% munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341% munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303% mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228% mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409% mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504% mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423% mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412% mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415% madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123% madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133% madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151% madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151% madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140% madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142% From 5.10 to 6.8 munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma. mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma. madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma. In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times greater for munmap and mprotect. When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to take this data with a grain of salt. This patch (of 5): Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2] Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com> Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com> Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> |
/linux-master/sound/usb/ | ||
H A D | pcm.c | diff 715a1705 Tue Sep 18 10:49:46 MDT 2012 Dylan Reid <dgreid@chromium.org> ALSA: usb-audio: set period_bytes in substream. Set the peiod_bytes member of snd_usb_substream. It was no longer being set, but will be needed to resume properly in a future commit. Signed-off-by: Dylan Reid <dgreid@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> |
/linux-master/mm/kasan/ | ||
H A D | report.c | diff c068664c Thu Mar 24 19:13:06 MDT 2022 Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> kasan: respect KASAN_BIT_REPORTED in all reporting routines Currently, only kasan_report() checks the KASAN_BIT_REPORTED and KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT flags. Make other reporting routines check these flags as well. Also add explanatory comments. Note that the current->kasan_depth check is split out into report_suppressed() and only called for kasan_report(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/715e346b10b398e29ba1b425299dcd79e29d58ce.1646237226.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
/linux-master/tools/perf/util/ | ||
H A D | stat-shadow.c | diff 6859bc0e Mon Mar 15 08:30:47 MDT 2021 Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com> perf stat: Improve readability of shadow stats This adds function convert_unit_double() and selects appropriate unit for shadow stats between K/M/G. $ sudo perf stat -a -- sleep 1 Before: Unit 'M' is selected even the number is very small. Performance counter stats for 'system wide': 4,003.06 msec cpu-clock # 3.998 CPUs utilized 16,179 context-switches # 0.004 M/sec 161 cpu-migrations # 0.040 K/sec 4,699 page-faults # 0.001 M/sec 6,135,801,925 cycles # 1.533 GHz (83.21%) 5,783,308,491 stalled-cycles-frontend # 94.26% frontend cycles idle (83.21%) 4,543,694,050 stalled-cycles-backend # 74.05% backend cycles idle (66.49%) 4,720,130,587 instructions # 0.77 insn per cycle # 1.23 stalled cycles per insn (83.28%) 753,848,078 branches # 188.318 M/sec (83.61%) 37,457,747 branch-misses # 4.97% of all branches (83.48%) 1.001283725 seconds time elapsed After: $ sudo perf stat -a -- sleep 2 Performance counter stats for 'system wide': 8,005.52 msec cpu-clock # 3.999 CPUs utilized 10,715 context-switches # 1.338 K/sec 785 cpu-migrations # 98.057 /sec 102 page-faults # 12.741 /sec 1,948,202,279 cycles # 0.243 GHz 2,816,470,932 stalled-cycles-frontend # 144.57% frontend cycles idle 2,661,172,207 stalled-cycles-backend # 136.60% backend cycles idle 464,172,105 instructions # 0.24 insn per cycle # 6.07 stalled cycles per insn 91,567,662 branches # 11.438 M/sec 7,756,054 branch-misses # 8.47% of all branches 2.002040043 seconds time elapsed v2: o do not change 'sec' to 'cpu-sec'. o use convert_unit_double to implement convert_unit. Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210315143047.3867-1-changbin.du@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> |
/linux-master/net/ipv4/ | ||
H A D | raw.c | diff 715b49ef Wed Jan 18 18:44:07 MST 2006 Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> [PATCH] EDAC: atomic scrub operations EDAC requires a way to scrub memory if an ECC error is found and the chipset does not do the work automatically. That means rewriting memory locations atomically with respect to all CPUs _and_ bus masters. That means we can't use atomic_add(foo, 0) as it gets optimised for non-SMP This adds a function to include/asm-foo/atomic.h for the platforms currently supported which implements a scrub of a mapped block. It also adjusts a few other files include order where atomic.h is included before types.h as this now causes an error as atomic_scrub uses u32. Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org> |
/linux-master/drivers/gpu/drm/ | ||
H A D | drm_connector.c | diff f85d9e59 Sun Oct 10 16:44:59 MDT 2021 Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> drm/connector: fix all kernel-doc warnings Clean up all of the kernel-doc issues in drm_connector.c: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c:2611: warning: Excess function parameter 'connector' description in 'drm_connector_oob_hotplug_event' drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c:2611: warning: Function parameter or member 'connector_fwnode' not described in 'drm_connector_oob_hotplug_event' drm_connector.c:630: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_get_connector_status_name' drm_connector.c:715: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_connector_list_iter_next' drm_connector.c:785: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_get_subpixel_order_name' drm_connector.c:816: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_display_info_set_bus_formats' drm_connector.c:1331: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_mode_create_dvi_i_properties' drm_connector.c:1412: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_connector_attach_content_type_property' drm_connector.c:1492: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_mode_create_tv_margin_properties' drm_connector.c:1534: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_mode_create_tv_properties' drm_connector.c:1627: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_mode_create_scaling_mode_property' drm_connector.c:1944: warning: No description found for return value of 'drm_mode_create_suggested_offset_properties' drm_connector.c:2315: warning: missing initial short description on line: * drm_connector_set_panel_orientation_with_quirk - [The last warning listed is probably a quirk/bug in scripts/kernel-doc.] Fixes: 613051dac40d ("drm: locking&new iterators for connector_list") Fixes: 522171951761 ("drm: Extract drm_connector.[hc]") Fixes: b3c6c8bfe378 ("drm: document drm_display_info") Fixes: 50525c332b55 ("drm: content-type property for HDMI connector") Fixes: 6c4f52dca36f ("drm/connector: Allow creation of margin props alone") Fixes: 69654c632d80 ("drm/connector: Split out orientation quirk detection (v2)") Fixes: 72ad49682dde ("drm/connector: Add support for out-of-band hotplug notification (v3)") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Stanislav Lisovskiy <stanislav.lisovskiy@intel.com> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: Derek Basehore <dbasehore@chromium.org> Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20211010224459.3603-1-rdunlap@infradead.org |
/linux-master/net/bpf/ | ||
H A D | test_run.c | diff a6763080 Wed Feb 02 13:53:20 MST 2022 Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org> bpf: test_run: Fix OOB access in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp Fix the following kasan issue reported by syzbot: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __skb_frag_set_page include/linux/skbuff.h:3242 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x10ac/0x1150 net/bpf/test_run.c:972 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888048c75000 by task syz-executor.5/23405 CPU: 1 PID: 23405 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 __skb_frag_set_page include/linux/skbuff.h:3242 [inline] bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x10ac/0x1150 net/bpf/test_run.c:972 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3356 [inline] __sys_bpf+0x1858/0x59a0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4658 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4744 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4742 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4742 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f4ea30dd059 RSP: 002b:00007f4ea1a52168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4ea31eff60 RCX: 00007f4ea30dd059 RDX: 0000000000000048 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 000000000000000a RBP: 00007f4ea313708d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc8367c5af R14: 00007f4ea1a52300 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Allocated by task 23405: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline] set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:437 [inline] ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:516 [inline] ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:475 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:525 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:586 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:715 [inline] bpf_test_init.isra.0+0x9f/0x150 net/bpf/test_run.c:411 bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x2f8/0x1150 net/bpf/test_run.c:941 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3356 [inline] __sys_bpf+0x1858/0x59a0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4658 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4744 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4742 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4742 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888048c74000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of 4096-byte region [ffff888048c74000, ffff888048c75000) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001231c00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x48c70 head:ffffea0001231c00 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888010c42140 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165 __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389 alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x310 mm/mempolicy.c:2271 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1799 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1944 [inline] new_slab+0x28a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2004 ___slab_alloc+0x87c/0xe90 mm/slub.c:3018 __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3105 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3196 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x2cb/0x360 mm/slub.c:4957 kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:354 [inline] __alloc_skb+0xde/0x340 net/core/skbuff.c:426 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1159 [inline] nsim_dev_trap_skb_build drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:745 [inline] nsim_dev_trap_report drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:802 [inline] nsim_dev_trap_report_work+0x29a/0xbc0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:843 process_one_work+0x9ac/0x1650 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x657/0x1110 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 page last free stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline] free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404 free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline] free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:157 [inline] qlist_free_all+0x6d/0x160 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:176 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x180/0x200 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:283 __kasan_slab_alloc+0xa2/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:447 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:732 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3230 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x202/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3243 getname_flags.part.0+0x50/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:138 getname_flags include/linux/audit.h:323 [inline] getname+0x8e/0xd0 fs/namei.c:217 do_sys_openat2+0xf5/0x4d0 fs/open.c:1208 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1230 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1246 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1241 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x13f/0x1f0 fs/open.c:1241 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888048c74f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888048c74f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888048c75080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888048c75100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Fixes: 1c19499825246 ("bpf: introduce frags support to bpf_prog_test_run_xdp()") Reported-by: syzbot+6d70ca7438345077c549@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/688c26f9dd6e885e58e8e834ede3f0139bb7fa95.1643835097.git.lorenzo@kernel.org |
/linux-master/net/core/ | ||
H A D | net_namespace.c | diff 6af2d5ff Thu Dec 01 18:21:32 MST 2016 Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> netns: fix net_generic() "id - 1" bloat net_generic() function is both a) inline and b) used ~600 times. It has the following code inside ... ptr = ng->ptr[id - 1]; ... "id" is never compile time constant so compiler is forced to subtract 1. And those decrements or LEA [r32 - 1] instructions add up. We also start id'ing from 1 to catch bugs where pernet sybsystem id is not initialized and 0. This is quite pointless idea (nothing will work or immediate interference with first registered subsystem) in general but it hints what needs to be done for code size reduction. Namely, overlaying allocation of pointer array and fixed part of structure in the beginning and using usual base-0 addressing. Ids are just cookies, their exact values do not matter, so lets start with 3 on x86_64. Code size savings (oh boy): -4.2 KB As usual, ignore the initial compiler stupidity part of the table. add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 12/670 up/down: 89/-4297 (-4208) function old new delta tipc_nametbl_insert_publ 1250 1270 +20 nlmclnt_lookup_host 686 703 +17 nfsd4_encode_fattr 5930 5941 +11 nfs_get_client 1050 1061 +11 register_pernet_operations 333 342 +9 tcf_mirred_init 843 849 +6 tcf_bpf_init 1143 1149 +6 gss_setup_upcall 990 994 +4 idmap_name_to_id 432 434 +2 ops_init 274 275 +1 nfsd_inject_forget_client 259 260 +1 nfs4_alloc_client 612 613 +1 tunnel_key_walker 164 163 -1 ... tipc_bcbase_select_primary 392 360 -32 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio 2808 2767 -41 ipip6_tunnel_ioctl 2228 2186 -42 tipc_bcast_rcv 715 672 -43 tipc_link_build_proto_msg 1140 1089 -51 nfsd4_lock 3851 3796 -55 tipc_mon_rcv 1012 956 -56 Total: Before=156643951, After=156639743, chg -0.00% Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
/linux-master/drivers/vhost/ | ||
H A D | net.c | diff db688c24 Tue Apr 24 02:34:36 MDT 2018 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> vhost_net: use packet weight for rx handler, too Similar to commit a2ac99905f1e ("vhost-net: set packet weight of tx polling to 2 * vq size"), we need a packet-based limit for handler_rx, too - elsewhere, under rx flood with small packets, tx can be delayed for a very long time, even without busypolling. The pkt limit applied to handle_rx must be the same applied by handle_tx, or we will get unfair scheduling between rx and tx. Tying such limit to the queue length makes it less effective for large queue length values and can introduce large process scheduler latencies, so a constant valued is used - likewise the existing bytes limit. The selected limit has been validated with PVP[1] performance test with different queue sizes: queue size 256 512 1024 baseline 366 354 362 weight 128 715 723 670 weight 256 740 745 733 weight 512 600 460 583 weight 1024 423 427 418 A packet weight of 256 gives peek performances in under all the tested scenarios. No measurable regression in unidirectional performance tests has been detected. [1] https://developers.redhat.com/blog/2017/06/05/measuring-and-comparing-open-vswitch-performance/ Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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