Copy head@r302406 to stable/11 as part of the 11.0-RELEASE cycle.
Prune svn:mergeinfo from the new branch, as nothing has been merged
here.

Additional commits post-branch will follow.

Approved by: re (implicit)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

Break up opencrypto/xform.c so it can be reused piecemeal

Keep xform.c as a meta-file including the broken out bits
existing code that includes xform.c continues to work as normal

Individual algorithms can now be reused elsewhere, including outside
of the kernel

Reviewed by: bapt (previous version), gnn, delphij
Approved by: secteam
MFC after: 1 week
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D4674

Use explicitly specified ivsize instead of blocksize when we mean IV size.
Set zero ivsize for enc_xform_null and remove special handling from
xform_esp.c.

Reviewed by: gnn
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D1503

Make IPsec work with AES-GCM and AES-ICM (aka CTR) in OCF... IPsec
defines the keys differently than NIST does, so we have to muck with
key lengths and nonce/IVs to be standard compliant...

Remove the iv from secasvar as it was unused...

Add a counter protected by a mutex to ensure that the counter for GCM
and ICM will never be repeated.. This is a requirement for security..
I would use atomics, but we don't have a 64bit one on all platforms..

Fix a bug where IPsec was depending upon the OCF to ensure that the
blocksize was always at least 4 bytes to maintain alignment... Move
this logic into IPsec so changes to OCF won't break IPsec...

In one place, espx was always non-NULL, so don't test that it's
non-NULL before doing work..

minor style cleanups...

drop setting key and klen as they were not used...

Enforce that OCF won't pass invalid key lengths to AES that would
panic the machine...

This was has been tested by others too... I tested this against
NetBSD 6.1.5 using mini-test suite in
https://github.com/jmgurney/ipseccfgs and the only things that don't
pass are keyed md5 and sha1, and 3des-deriv (setkey syntax error),
all other modes listed in setkey's man page... The nice thing is
that NetBSD uses setkey, so same config files were used on both...

Reviewed by: gnn

Fix XTS, and name things a bit better...

Though confusing, GCM using ICM_BLOCK_LEN, but ICM does not is
correct... GCM is built on ICM, but uses a function other than
swcr_encdec... swcr_encdec cannot handle partial blocks which is
why it must still use AES_BLOCK_LEN and is why XTS was broken by the
commit...

Thanks to the tests for helping sure I didn't break GCM w/ an earlier
patch...

I did run the tests w/o this patch, and need to figure out why they
did not fail, clearly more tests are needed...

Prodded by: peter

Add support for AES modes to IPSec. These modes work both in software only
mode and with hardware support on systems that have AESNI instructions.

Differential Revision: D2936
Reviewed by: jmg, eri, cognet
Sponsored by: Rubicon Communications (Netgate)

Add some new modes to OpenCrypto. These modes are AES-ICM (can be used
for counter mode), and AES-GCM. Both of these modes have been added to
the aesni module.

Included is a set of tests to validate that the software and aesni
module calculate the correct values. These use the NIST KAT test
vectors. To run the test, you will need to install a soon to be
committed port, nist-kat that will install the vectors. Using a port
is necessary as the test vectors are around 25MB.

All the man pages were updated. I have added a new man page, crypto.7,
which includes a description of how to use each mode. All the new modes
and some other AES modes are present. It would be good for someone
else to go through and document the other modes.

A new ioctl was added to support AEAD modes which AES-GCM is one of them.
Without this ioctl, it is not possible to test AEAD modes from userland.

Add a timing safe bcmp for use to compare MACs. Previously we were using
bcmp which could leak timing info and result in the ability to forge
messages.

Add a minor optimization to the aesni module so that single segment
mbufs don't get copied and instead are updated in place. The aesni
module needs to be updated to support blocked IO so segmented mbufs
don't have to be copied.

We require that the IV be specified for all calls for both GCM and ICM.
This is to ensure proper use of these functions.

Obtained from: p4: //depot/projects/opencrypto
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation
Sponsored by: NetGate

When porting XTS-related code from OpenBSD I forgot to update copyright (only
OpenBSD was credited in one of two commits). Fix it.

Reported by: Theo de Raadt <deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org>
Reviewed by: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>

Add support for AES-XTS.

Obtained from: OpenBSD
MFC after: 1 week

Remove redundant space.

MFC after: 1 week

Retire the MALLOC and FREE macros. They are an abomination unto style(9).

MFC after: 3 months

Integrate the Camellia Block Cipher. For more information see RFC 4132
and its bibliography.

Submitted by: Tomoyuki Okazaki <okazaki at kick dot gr dot jp>
MFC after: 1 month

Use newly added defines instead of magic values.

- Fix a very old bug in HMAC/SHA{384,512}. When HMAC is using SHA384
or SHA512, the blocksize is 128 bytes, not 64 bytes as anywhere else.
The bug also exists in NetBSD, OpenBSD and various other independed
implementations I look at.
- We cannot decide which hash function to use for HMAC based on the key
length, because any HMAC function can use any key length.
To fix it split CRYPTO_SHA2_HMAC into three algorithm:
CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC, CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC and CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC.
Those names are consistent with OpenBSD's naming.
- Remove authsize field from auth_hash structure.
- Allow consumer to define size of hash he wants to receive.
This allows to use HMAC not only for IPsec, where 96 bits MAC is requested.
The size of requested MAC is defined at newsession time in the cri_mlen
field - when 0, entire MAC will be returned.
- Add swcr_authprepare() function which prepares authentication key.
- Allow to provide key for every authentication operation, not only at
newsession time by honoring CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT flag.
- Make giving key at newsession time optional - don't try to operate on it
if its NULL.
- Extend COPYBACK()/COPYDATA() macros to handle CRYPTO_BUF_CONTIG buffer
type as well.
- Accept CRYPTO_BUF_IOV buffer type in swcr_authcompute() as we have
cuio_apply() now.
- 16 bits for key length (SW_klen) is more than enough.

Reviewed by: sam

Check key size for rijndael, as invalid key size can lead to kernel panic.
It checked other algorithms against this bug and it seems they aren't
affected.

Reported by: Mike Tancsa <mike@sentex.net>
PR: i386/84860
Reviewed by: phk, cperciva(x2)

just use crypto/rijndael, and nuke opencrypto/rindael.[ch].
the two became almost identical since latest KAME merge.

Discussed with: sam

- use 1/2 space for rijndael context in ipsec
- rijndael_set_key() always sets up full context
- rijndaelKeySetupDec() gets back original protoype

Reviewed by: sam
Obtained from: OpenBSD

/* -> /*- for license, minor formatting changes

Use __FBSDID().

In-kernel crypto framework derived from openbsd. This facility provides
a consistent interface to h/w and s/w crypto algorithms for use by the
kernel and (for h/w at least) by user-mode apps. Access for user-level
code is through a /dev/crypto device that'll eventually be used by openssl
to (potentially) accelerate many applications. Coming soon is an IPsec
that makes use of this service to accelerate ESP, AH, and IPCOMP protocols.

Included here is the "core" crypto support, /dev/crypto driver, various
crypto algorithms that are not already present in the KAME crypto area,
and support routines used by crypto device drivers.

Obtained from: openbsd