monitor.c revision 1.127
1/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.127 2013/07/19 07:37:48 markus Exp $ */
2/*
3 * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4 * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5 * All rights reserved.
6 *
7 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * are met:
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15 *
16 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26 */
27
28#include <sys/types.h>
29#include <sys/wait.h>
30#include <sys/socket.h>
31#include <sys/tree.h>
32#include <sys/param.h>
33#include <sys/queue.h>
34
35#include <openssl/dh.h>
36
37#include <errno.h>
38#include <fcntl.h>
39#include <paths.h>
40#include <poll.h>
41#include <pwd.h>
42#include <signal.h>
43#include <stdlib.h>
44#include <string.h>
45
46#include "atomicio.h"
47#include "xmalloc.h"
48#include "ssh.h"
49#include "key.h"
50#include "buffer.h"
51#include "hostfile.h"
52#include "auth.h"
53#include "cipher.h"
54#include "kex.h"
55#include "dh.h"
56#include <zlib.h>
57#include "packet.h"
58#include "auth-options.h"
59#include "sshpty.h"
60#include "channels.h"
61#include "session.h"
62#include "sshlogin.h"
63#include "canohost.h"
64#include "log.h"
65#include "servconf.h"
66#include "monitor.h"
67#include "monitor_mm.h"
68#ifdef GSSAPI
69#include "ssh-gss.h"
70#endif
71#include "monitor_wrap.h"
72#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
73#include "misc.h"
74#include "compat.h"
75#include "ssh2.h"
76#include "jpake.h"
77#include "roaming.h"
78#include "authfd.h"
79
80#ifdef GSSAPI
81static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
82#endif
83
84/* Imports */
85extern ServerOptions options;
86extern u_int utmp_len;
87extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
88extern z_stream incoming_stream;
89extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
90extern u_char session_id[];
91extern Buffer auth_debug;
92extern int auth_debug_init;
93extern Buffer loginmsg;
94
95/* State exported from the child */
96
97struct {
98	z_stream incoming;
99	z_stream outgoing;
100	u_char *keyin;
101	u_int keyinlen;
102	u_char *keyout;
103	u_int keyoutlen;
104	u_char *ivin;
105	u_int ivinlen;
106	u_char *ivout;
107	u_int ivoutlen;
108	u_char *ssh1key;
109	u_int ssh1keylen;
110	int ssh1cipher;
111	int ssh1protoflags;
112	u_char *input;
113	u_int ilen;
114	u_char *output;
115	u_int olen;
116	u_int64_t sent_bytes;
117	u_int64_t recv_bytes;
118} child_state;
119
120/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
121
122int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
123int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
124int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
125int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
126int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
127int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
128int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
129int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
130int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
131int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
132int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
133int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
134int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
135int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
136int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
137int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
138int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
139int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
140int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
141int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
142int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
143int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
144int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
145int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
146int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
147
148#ifdef GSSAPI
149int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
150int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
151int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
152int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
153#endif
154
155static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
156
157static Authctxt *authctxt;
158static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL;	/* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
159
160/* local state for key verify */
161static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
162static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
163static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
164static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
165static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
166static char *auth_method = "unknown";
167static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
168static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
169static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
170static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
171
172struct mon_table {
173	enum monitor_reqtype type;
174	int flags;
175	int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
176};
177
178#define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
179#define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
180#define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
181#define MON_ALOG	0x0020	/* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
182
183#define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
184
185#define MON_PERMIT	0x1000	/* Request is permitted */
186
187struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
188    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
189    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
190    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
191    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
192    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
193    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
194    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
195    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
196    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
197    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
198#ifdef GSSAPI
199    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
200    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
201    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
202    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
203#endif
204#ifdef JPAKE
205    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
206    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
207    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
208    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
209    {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
210#endif
211    {0, 0, NULL}
212};
213
214struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
215    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
216    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
217    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
218    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
219    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
220    {0, 0, NULL}
221};
222
223struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
224    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
225    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
226    {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
227    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
228    {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
229    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
230    {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
231    {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
232    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
233    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
234    {0, 0, NULL}
235};
236
237struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
238    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
239    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
240    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
241    {0, 0, NULL}
242};
243
244struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
245
246/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
247
248static void
249monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
250{
251	while (ent->f != NULL) {
252		if (ent->type == type) {
253			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
254			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
255			return;
256		}
257		ent++;
258	}
259}
260
261static void
262monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
263{
264	struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
265
266	while (ent->f != NULL) {
267		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
268			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
269			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
270		}
271		ent++;
272	}
273}
274
275void
276monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
277{
278	struct mon_table *ent;
279	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
280
281	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
282
283	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
284	close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
285	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
286
287	authctxt = _authctxt;
288	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
289
290	if (compat20) {
291		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
292
293		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
294		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
295		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
296	} else {
297		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
298
299		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
300	}
301
302	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
303	while (!authenticated) {
304		partial = 0;
305		auth_method = "unknown";
306		auth_submethod = NULL;
307		authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
308
309		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
310		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
311			if (!compat20)
312				fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
313				    "with SSH protocol 1");
314			if (authenticated &&
315			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
316			    auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
317				debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
318				    auth_method);
319				authenticated = 0;
320				partial = 1;
321			}
322		}
323
324		if (authenticated) {
325			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
326				fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
327				    __func__, ent->type);
328			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
329			    !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
330				authenticated = 0;
331		}
332		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
333			auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
334			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
335			if (!authenticated)
336				authctxt->failures++;
337		}
338#ifdef JPAKE
339		/* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
340		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
341			if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
342				jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
343				authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
344			}
345		}
346#endif
347	}
348
349	if (!authctxt->valid)
350		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
351	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
352		fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
353
354	debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
355	    __func__, authctxt->user);
356
357	mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
358
359	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
360	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
361		;
362
363	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
364	close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
365	pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
366}
367
368static void
369monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
370{
371	monitor_child_pid = pid;
372}
373
374static void
375monitor_child_handler(int sig)
376{
377	kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
378}
379
380void
381monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
382{
383	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
384	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
385
386	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
387	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
388	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
389	signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
390
391	if (compat20) {
392		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
393
394		/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
395		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
396		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
397		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
398	} else {
399		mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
400		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
401	}
402	if (!no_pty_flag) {
403		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
404		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
405	}
406
407	for (;;)
408		monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
409}
410
411void
412monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
413{
414	if (options.compression) {
415		/* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
416		mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
417	}
418}
419
420static int
421monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
422{
423	Buffer logmsg;
424	u_int len, level;
425	char *msg;
426
427	buffer_init(&logmsg);
428
429	/* Read length */
430	buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
431	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
432	    buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
433		if (errno == EPIPE) {
434			buffer_free(&logmsg);
435			debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
436			close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
437			pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
438			return -1;
439		}
440		fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
441	}
442	len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
443	if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
444		fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
445
446	/* Read severity, message */
447	buffer_clear(&logmsg);
448	buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
449	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
450	    buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
451		fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
452
453	/* Log it */
454	level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
455	msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
456	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
457		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
458		    __func__, level);
459	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
460
461	buffer_free(&logmsg);
462	free(msg);
463
464	return 0;
465}
466
467int
468monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
469    struct mon_table **pent)
470{
471	Buffer m;
472	int ret;
473	u_char type;
474	struct pollfd pfd[2];
475
476	for (;;) {
477		bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
478		pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
479		pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
480		pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
481		pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
482		if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
483			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
484				continue;
485			fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
486		}
487		if (pfd[1].revents) {
488			/*
489			 * Drain all log messages before processing next
490			 * monitor request.
491			 */
492			monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
493			continue;
494		}
495		if (pfd[0].revents)
496			break;  /* Continues below */
497	}
498
499	buffer_init(&m);
500
501	mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
502	type = buffer_get_char(&m);
503
504	debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
505
506	while (ent->f != NULL) {
507		if (ent->type == type)
508			break;
509		ent++;
510	}
511
512	if (ent->f != NULL) {
513		if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
514			fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
515			    type);
516		ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
517		buffer_free(&m);
518
519		/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
520		if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
521			debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
522			    type);
523			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
524		}
525
526		if (pent != NULL)
527			*pent = ent;
528
529		return ret;
530	}
531
532	fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
533
534	/* NOTREACHED */
535	return (-1);
536}
537
538/* allowed key state */
539static int
540monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
541{
542	/* make sure key is allowed */
543	if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
544	    timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
545		return (0);
546	return (1);
547}
548
549static void
550monitor_reset_key_state(void)
551{
552	/* reset state */
553	free(key_blob);
554	free(hostbased_cuser);
555	free(hostbased_chost);
556	key_blob = NULL;
557	key_bloblen = 0;
558	key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
559	hostbased_cuser = NULL;
560	hostbased_chost = NULL;
561}
562
563int
564mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
565{
566	DH *dh;
567	int min, want, max;
568
569	min = buffer_get_int(m);
570	want = buffer_get_int(m);
571	max = buffer_get_int(m);
572
573	debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
574	    __func__, min, want, max);
575	/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
576	if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
577		fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
578		    __func__, min, want, max);
579
580	buffer_clear(m);
581
582	dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
583	if (dh == NULL) {
584		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
585		return (0);
586	} else {
587		/* Send first bignum */
588		buffer_put_char(m, 1);
589		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
590		buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
591
592		DH_free(dh);
593	}
594	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
595	return (0);
596}
597
598extern AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn;
599
600int
601mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
602{
603	Key *key;
604	u_char *p;
605	u_char *signature;
606	u_int siglen, datlen;
607	int keyid;
608
609	debug3("%s", __func__);
610
611	keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
612	p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
613
614	/*
615	 * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
616	 * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
617	 */
618	if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
619		fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
620
621	/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
622	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
623		session_id2_len = datlen;
624		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
625		memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
626	}
627
628	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
629		if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
630			fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
631	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid)) != NULL &&
632	    auth_conn != NULL) {
633		if (ssh_agent_sign(auth_conn, key, &signature, &siglen, p,
634		    datlen) < 0)
635			fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed", __func__);
636	} else
637		fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
638
639	debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
640
641	buffer_clear(m);
642	buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
643
644	free(p);
645	free(signature);
646
647	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
648
649	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
650	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
651
652	return (0);
653}
654
655/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
656
657int
658mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
659{
660	char *username;
661	struct passwd *pwent;
662	int allowed = 0;
663	u_int i;
664
665	debug3("%s", __func__);
666
667	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
668		fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
669
670	username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
671
672	pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
673
674	authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
675	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
676	free(username);
677
678	buffer_clear(m);
679
680	if (pwent == NULL) {
681		buffer_put_char(m, 0);
682		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
683		goto out;
684	}
685
686	allowed = 1;
687	authctxt->pw = pwent;
688	authctxt->valid = 1;
689
690	buffer_put_char(m, 1);
691	buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
692	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
693	buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
694	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
695	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
696	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
697	buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
698
699 out:
700	buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
701
702#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
703		if (options.x != NULL) \
704			buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
705	} while (0)
706#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
707		for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
708			buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
709	} while (0)
710	/* See comment in servconf.h */
711	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
712#undef M_CP_STROPT
713#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
714
715	/* Create valid auth method lists */
716	if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
717		/*
718		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
719		 * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
720		 * authentication to succeed.
721		 */
722		debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
723	}
724
725	debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
726	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
727
728	/* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
729	if (!compat20)
730		monitor_permit_authentications(1);
731	else {
732		/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
733		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
734		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
735	}
736
737	return (0);
738}
739
740int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
741{
742	char *banner;
743
744	buffer_clear(m);
745	banner = auth2_read_banner();
746	buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
747	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
748	free(banner);
749
750	return (0);
751}
752
753int
754mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
755{
756	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
757
758	authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
759	authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
760	debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
761	    __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
762
763	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
764		free(authctxt->style);
765		authctxt->style = NULL;
766	}
767
768	return (0);
769}
770
771int
772mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
773{
774	static int call_count;
775	char *passwd;
776	int authenticated;
777	u_int plen;
778
779	passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
780	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
781	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
782	    auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
783	memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
784	free(passwd);
785
786	buffer_clear(m);
787	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
788
789	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
790	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
791
792	call_count++;
793	if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
794		auth_method = "none";
795	else
796		auth_method = "password";
797
798	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
799	return (authenticated);
800}
801
802int
803mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
804{
805	char *name, *infotxt;
806	u_int numprompts;
807	u_int *echo_on;
808	char **prompts;
809	u_int success;
810
811	success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
812	    &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
813
814	buffer_clear(m);
815	buffer_put_int(m, success);
816	if (success)
817		buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
818
819	debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
820	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
821
822	if (success) {
823		free(name);
824		free(infotxt);
825		free(prompts);
826		free(echo_on);
827	}
828
829	return (0);
830}
831
832int
833mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
834{
835	char *response;
836	int authok;
837
838	if (authctxt->as == 0)
839		fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
840
841	response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
842	authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
843	    auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
844	authctxt->as = NULL;
845	debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
846	free(response);
847
848	buffer_clear(m);
849	buffer_put_int(m, authok);
850
851	debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
852	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
853
854	if (compat20) {
855		auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
856		auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
857	} else
858		auth_method = "bsdauth";
859
860	return (authok != 0);
861}
862
863int
864mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
865{
866	Key *key;
867	char *cuser, *chost;
868	u_char *blob;
869	u_int bloblen;
870	enum mm_keytype type = 0;
871	int allowed = 0;
872
873	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
874
875	type = buffer_get_int(m);
876	cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
877	chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
878	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
879
880	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
881
882	if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
883	    (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
884		fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
885
886	debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
887
888	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
889		switch (type) {
890		case MM_USERKEY:
891			allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
892			    user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
893			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
894			auth_method = "publickey";
895			if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
896				auth_clear_options();
897			break;
898		case MM_HOSTKEY:
899			allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
900			    hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
901			    cuser, chost, key);
902			pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
903			    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
904			    cuser, chost);
905			auth_method = "hostbased";
906			break;
907		case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
908			key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
909			allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
910			    auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
911			    cuser, chost, key);
912			if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
913				auth_clear_options();
914			auth_method = "rsa";
915			break;
916		default:
917			fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
918			break;
919		}
920	}
921	if (key != NULL)
922		key_free(key);
923
924	/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
925	monitor_reset_key_state();
926
927	if (allowed) {
928		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
929		key_blob = blob;
930		key_bloblen = bloblen;
931		key_blobtype = type;
932		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
933		hostbased_chost = chost;
934	} else {
935		/* Log failed attempt */
936		auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
937		free(blob);
938		free(cuser);
939		free(chost);
940	}
941
942	debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
943	    __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
944
945	buffer_clear(m);
946	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
947	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
948
949	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
950
951	if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
952		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
953
954	return (0);
955}
956
957static int
958monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
959{
960	Buffer b;
961	char *p, *userstyle;
962	u_int len;
963	int fail = 0;
964
965	buffer_init(&b);
966	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
967
968	if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
969		p = buffer_ptr(&b);
970		len = buffer_len(&b);
971		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
972		    (len < session_id2_len) ||
973		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
974			fail++;
975		buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
976	} else {
977		p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
978		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
979		    (len != session_id2_len) ||
980		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
981			fail++;
982		free(p);
983	}
984	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
985		fail++;
986	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
987	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
988	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
989	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
990	if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
991		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
992		    userstyle, p);
993		fail++;
994	}
995	free(userstyle);
996	free(p);
997	buffer_skip_string(&b);
998	if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
999		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1000			fail++;
1001	} else {
1002		p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1003		if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
1004			fail++;
1005		free(p);
1006		if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
1007			fail++;
1008		buffer_skip_string(&b);
1009	}
1010	buffer_skip_string(&b);
1011	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1012		fail++;
1013	buffer_free(&b);
1014	return (fail == 0);
1015}
1016
1017static int
1018monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
1019    char *chost)
1020{
1021	Buffer b;
1022	char *p, *userstyle;
1023	u_int len;
1024	int fail = 0;
1025
1026	buffer_init(&b);
1027	buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
1028
1029	p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
1030	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1031	    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1032	    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1033		fail++;
1034	free(p);
1035
1036	if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1037		fail++;
1038	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1039	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1040	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1041	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1042	if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
1043		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
1044		    userstyle, p);
1045		fail++;
1046	}
1047	free(userstyle);
1048	free(p);
1049	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* service */
1050	p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
1051	if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
1052		fail++;
1053	free(p);
1054	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkalg */
1055	buffer_skip_string(&b);	/* pkblob */
1056
1057	/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1058	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1059	if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
1060		p[len - 1] = '\0';
1061	if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
1062		fail++;
1063	free(p);
1064
1065	/* verify client user */
1066	p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
1067	if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
1068		fail++;
1069	free(p);
1070
1071	if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
1072		fail++;
1073	buffer_free(&b);
1074	return (fail == 0);
1075}
1076
1077int
1078mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
1079{
1080	Key *key;
1081	u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1082	u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1083	int verified = 0;
1084	int valid_data = 0;
1085
1086	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1087	signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
1088	data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
1089
1090	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1091	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1092		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1093
1094	key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1095	if (key == NULL)
1096		fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
1097
1098	switch (key_blobtype) {
1099	case MM_USERKEY:
1100		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
1101		break;
1102	case MM_HOSTKEY:
1103		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1104		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1105		break;
1106	default:
1107		valid_data = 0;
1108		break;
1109	}
1110	if (!valid_data)
1111		fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
1112
1113	verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
1114	debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
1115	    __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
1116
1117	key_free(key);
1118	free(blob);
1119	free(signature);
1120	free(data);
1121
1122	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
1123
1124	monitor_reset_key_state();
1125
1126	buffer_clear(m);
1127	buffer_put_int(m, verified);
1128	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1129
1130	return (verified == 1);
1131}
1132
1133static void
1134mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1135{
1136	socklen_t fromlen;
1137	struct sockaddr_storage from;
1138
1139	/*
1140	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1141	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1142	 */
1143	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1144	fromlen = sizeof(from);
1145	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
1146		if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
1147		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
1148			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1149			cleanup_exit(255);
1150		}
1151	}
1152	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1153	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1154	    get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1155	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1156}
1157
1158static void
1159mm_session_close(Session *s)
1160{
1161	debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
1162	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1163		debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1164		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1165	}
1166	session_unused(s->self);
1167}
1168
1169int
1170mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
1171{
1172	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1173	Session *s;
1174	int res, fd0;
1175
1176	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1177
1178	buffer_clear(m);
1179	s = session_new();
1180	if (s == NULL)
1181		goto error;
1182	s->authctxt = authctxt;
1183	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1184	s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1185	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1186	if (res == 0)
1187		goto error;
1188	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1189
1190	buffer_put_int(m, 1);
1191	buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
1192
1193	/* We need to trick ttyslot */
1194	if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1195		fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
1196
1197	mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
1198
1199	/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1200	close(0);
1201
1202	/* send messages generated by record_login */
1203	buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
1204	buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
1205
1206	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1207
1208	if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1209	    mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1210		fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
1211
1212	/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1213	if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
1214		fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1215	if (fd0 != 0)
1216		error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
1217
1218	/* slave is not needed */
1219	close(s->ttyfd);
1220	s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1221	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1222	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1223
1224	debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1225
1226	return (0);
1227
1228 error:
1229	if (s != NULL)
1230		mm_session_close(s);
1231	buffer_put_int(m, 0);
1232	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1233	return (0);
1234}
1235
1236int
1237mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
1238{
1239	Session *s;
1240	char *tty;
1241
1242	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1243
1244	tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1245	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1246		mm_session_close(s);
1247	buffer_clear(m);
1248	free(tty);
1249	return (0);
1250}
1251
1252int
1253mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
1254{
1255	BIGNUM *p;
1256	int rsafail;
1257
1258	/* Turn off permissions */
1259	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
1260
1261	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
1262		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1263
1264	buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
1265
1266	rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
1267
1268	buffer_clear(m);
1269	buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
1270	buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
1271
1272	BN_clear_free(p);
1273
1274	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
1275
1276	/* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
1277	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
1278
1279	return (0);
1280}
1281
1282int
1283mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
1284{
1285	int i;
1286
1287	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1288
1289	if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
1290		fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
1291	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
1292		session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
1293
1294	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
1295	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
1296
1297	return (0);
1298}
1299
1300int
1301mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
1302{
1303	BIGNUM *client_n;
1304	Key *key = NULL;
1305	u_char *blob = NULL;
1306	u_int blen = 0;
1307	int allowed = 0;
1308
1309	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1310
1311	auth_method = "rsa";
1312	if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
1313		if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
1314			fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1315		buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
1316		allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
1317		BN_clear_free(client_n);
1318	}
1319	buffer_clear(m);
1320	buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
1321	buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
1322
1323	/* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
1324	monitor_reset_key_state();
1325
1326	if (allowed && key != NULL) {
1327		key->type = KEY_RSA;	/* cheat for key_to_blob */
1328		if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
1329			fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
1330		buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
1331
1332		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1333		key_blob = blob;
1334		key_bloblen = blen;
1335		key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
1336	}
1337	if (key != NULL)
1338		key_free(key);
1339
1340	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
1341
1342	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
1343	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
1344	return (0);
1345}
1346
1347int
1348mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
1349{
1350	Key *key = NULL;
1351	u_char *blob;
1352	u_int blen;
1353
1354	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1355
1356	if (!authctxt->valid)
1357		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1358	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1359	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1360		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1361	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1362		fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
1363	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1364		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1365	if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
1366		fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
1367	key->type = KEY_RSA1;
1368	if (ssh1_challenge)
1369		BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1370	ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
1371
1372	buffer_clear(m);
1373	buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
1374
1375	debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
1376	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
1377
1378	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
1379
1380	free(blob);
1381	key_free(key);
1382	return (0);
1383}
1384
1385int
1386mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
1387{
1388	Key *key = NULL;
1389	u_char *blob, *response;
1390	u_int blen, len;
1391	int success;
1392
1393	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1394
1395	if (!authctxt->valid)
1396		fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
1397	if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
1398		fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
1399
1400	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
1401	if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
1402		fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
1403	if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
1404		fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
1405	if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
1406		fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
1407	response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1408	if (len != 16)
1409		fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
1410	success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
1411
1412	free(blob);
1413	key_free(key);
1414	free(response);
1415
1416	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
1417
1418	/* reset state */
1419	BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
1420	ssh1_challenge = NULL;
1421	monitor_reset_key_state();
1422
1423	buffer_clear(m);
1424	buffer_put_int(m, success);
1425	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
1426
1427	return (success);
1428}
1429
1430int
1431mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
1432{
1433	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1434	int res, status;
1435
1436	debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
1437
1438	/* The child is terminating */
1439	session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
1440
1441	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1442		if (errno != EINTR)
1443			exit(1);
1444
1445	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1446
1447	/* Terminate process */
1448	exit(res);
1449}
1450
1451void
1452monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1453{
1454	if (compat20) {
1455		set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
1456		set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
1457	} else {
1458		packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
1459		packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
1460		    child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
1461		free(child_state.ssh1key);
1462	}
1463
1464	/* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
1465	packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
1466	free(child_state.keyout);
1467	packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
1468	free(child_state.keyin);
1469
1470	if (!compat20) {
1471		packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
1472		free(child_state.ivout);
1473		packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
1474		free(child_state.ivin);
1475	}
1476
1477	memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
1478	    sizeof(incoming_stream));
1479	memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
1480	    sizeof(outgoing_stream));
1481
1482	/* Update with new address */
1483	if (options.compression)
1484		mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
1485
1486	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
1487		packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
1488		    (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
1489
1490	/* Network I/O buffers */
1491	/* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
1492	buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
1493	buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
1494	memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
1495	free(child_state.input);
1496
1497	buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
1498	buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
1499		      child_state.olen);
1500	memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
1501	free(child_state.output);
1502
1503	/* Roaming */
1504	if (compat20)
1505		roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
1506}
1507
1508static Kex *
1509mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
1510{
1511	Kex *kex;
1512	void *blob;
1513	u_int bloblen;
1514
1515	kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
1516	kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
1517	if (session_id2 == NULL ||
1518	    kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
1519	    timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
1520		fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
1521	kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
1522	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1523	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
1524	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1525	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1526	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
1527	kex->server = 1;
1528	kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1529	kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
1530	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1531	buffer_init(&kex->my);
1532	buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
1533	free(blob);
1534	blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
1535	buffer_init(&kex->peer);
1536	buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
1537	free(blob);
1538	kex->done = 1;
1539	kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
1540	kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1541	kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
1542	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1543	kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1544	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1545	kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1546
1547	return (kex);
1548}
1549
1550/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
1551
1552void
1553mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
1554{
1555	Buffer m;
1556	u_char *blob, *p;
1557	u_int bloblen, plen;
1558	u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
1559	u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
1560
1561	debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
1562
1563	buffer_init(&m);
1564	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
1565	if (!compat20) {
1566		child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
1567		child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
1568		child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
1569		    &child_state.ssh1keylen);
1570		child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
1571		    &child_state.ivoutlen);
1572		child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
1573		goto skip;
1574	} else {
1575		/* Get the Kex for rekeying */
1576		*pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
1577	}
1578
1579	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1580	current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1581	free(blob);
1582
1583	debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
1584	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
1585	current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
1586	free(blob);
1587
1588	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
1589	seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1590	blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1591	packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1592	bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1593	packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1594	seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
1595	blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1596	packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
1597	bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1598	packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
1599
1600 skip:
1601	/* Get the key context */
1602	child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
1603	child_state.keyin  = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
1604
1605	debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
1606	/* Get compression state */
1607	p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1608	if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
1609		fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1610	memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
1611	free(p);
1612
1613	p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
1614	if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
1615		fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
1616	memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
1617	free(p);
1618
1619	/* Network I/O buffers */
1620	debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
1621	child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
1622	child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
1623
1624	/* Roaming */
1625	if (compat20) {
1626		child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1627		child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
1628	}
1629
1630	buffer_free(&m);
1631}
1632
1633
1634/* Allocation functions for zlib */
1635void *
1636mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
1637{
1638	size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
1639	void *address;
1640
1641	if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
1642		fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
1643
1644	address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
1645
1646	return (address);
1647}
1648
1649void
1650mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
1651{
1652	mm_free(mm, address);
1653}
1654
1655void
1656mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
1657{
1658	outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1659	outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1660	outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
1661
1662	incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
1663	incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
1664	incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
1665}
1666
1667/* XXX */
1668
1669#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1670	if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1671		fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1672} while (0)
1673
1674static void
1675monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1676{
1677	int pair[2];
1678
1679	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1680		fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1681	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1682	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1683	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1684	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1685
1686	if (do_logfds) {
1687		if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1688			fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
1689		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1690		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1691		mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1692		mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1693	} else
1694		mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1695}
1696
1697#define MM_MEMSIZE	65536
1698
1699struct monitor *
1700monitor_init(void)
1701{
1702	struct monitor *mon;
1703
1704	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1705
1706	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1707
1708	/* Used to share zlib space across processes */
1709	if (options.compression) {
1710		mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
1711		mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
1712
1713		/* Compression needs to share state across borders */
1714		mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
1715	}
1716
1717	return mon;
1718}
1719
1720void
1721monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1722{
1723	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1724}
1725
1726#ifdef GSSAPI
1727int
1728mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1729{
1730	gss_OID_desc goid;
1731	OM_uint32 major;
1732	u_int len;
1733
1734	goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1735	goid.length = len;
1736
1737	major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1738
1739	free(goid.elements);
1740
1741	buffer_clear(m);
1742	buffer_put_int(m, major);
1743
1744	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1745
1746	/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1747	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1748
1749	return (0);
1750}
1751
1752int
1753mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
1754{
1755	gss_buffer_desc in;
1756	gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1757	OM_uint32 major, minor;
1758	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1759	u_int len;
1760
1761	in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1762	in.length = len;
1763	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1764	free(in.value);
1765
1766	buffer_clear(m);
1767	buffer_put_int(m, major);
1768	buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
1769	buffer_put_int(m, flags);
1770	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1771
1772	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1773
1774	if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1775		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1776		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1777		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1778	}
1779	return (0);
1780}
1781
1782int
1783mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
1784{
1785	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1786	OM_uint32 ret;
1787	u_int len;
1788
1789	gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1790	gssbuf.length = len;
1791	mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
1792	mic.length = len;
1793
1794	ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1795
1796	free(gssbuf.value);
1797	free(mic.value);
1798
1799	buffer_clear(m);
1800	buffer_put_int(m, ret);
1801
1802	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1803
1804	if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1805		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1806
1807	return (0);
1808}
1809
1810int
1811mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
1812{
1813	int authenticated;
1814
1815	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1816
1817	buffer_clear(m);
1818	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
1819
1820	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
1821	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1822
1823	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1824
1825	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1826	return (authenticated);
1827}
1828#endif /* GSSAPI */
1829
1830#ifdef JPAKE
1831int
1832mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
1833{
1834	struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
1835	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
1836	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
1837
1838	if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
1839		fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
1840
1841	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
1842		fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
1843		    __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
1844	authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
1845
1846	jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
1847	    &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
1848	    &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
1849	    &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
1850	    &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
1851
1852	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
1853
1854	buffer_clear(m);
1855
1856	buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
1857	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
1858	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
1859	buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1860	buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1861
1862	debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
1863	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
1864
1865	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
1866	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
1867	free(x3_proof);
1868	free(x4_proof);
1869
1870	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
1871	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
1872
1873	return 0;
1874}
1875
1876int
1877mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
1878{
1879	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1880	char *hash_scheme, *salt;
1881
1882	if (pctx == NULL)
1883		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1884
1885	auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
1886
1887	buffer_clear(m);
1888	/* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
1889	buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
1890	buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
1891
1892	debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
1893	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
1894
1895	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
1896	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
1897	free(hash_scheme);
1898	free(salt);
1899
1900	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
1901
1902	return 0;
1903}
1904
1905int
1906mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
1907{
1908	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1909	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
1910	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
1911
1912	if (pctx == NULL)
1913		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1914
1915	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
1916	    (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
1917		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1918	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
1919	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
1920	pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
1921	x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
1922	x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
1923
1924	jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
1925	    pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
1926	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1927	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1928	    x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
1929	    x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
1930	    &pctx->b,
1931	    &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
1932
1933	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
1934
1935	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
1936	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
1937	free(x1_proof);
1938	free(x2_proof);
1939
1940	buffer_clear(m);
1941
1942	buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
1943	buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1944
1945	debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
1946	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
1947
1948	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
1949	free(x4_s_proof);
1950
1951	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
1952
1953	return 0;
1954}
1955
1956int
1957mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1958{
1959	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
1960	u_char *x2_s_proof;
1961	u_int x2_s_proof_len;
1962
1963	if (pctx == NULL)
1964		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
1965
1966	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
1967		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
1968	buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
1969	x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
1970
1971	jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
1972	    pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
1973	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
1974	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
1975	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
1976	    x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
1977	    &pctx->k,
1978	    &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1979
1980	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
1981
1982	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
1983	buffer_clear(m);
1984
1985	/* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
1986	buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
1987
1988	debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
1989	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
1990
1991	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
1992
1993	return 0;
1994}
1995
1996int
1997mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
1998{
1999	int authenticated = 0;
2000	u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
2001	u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
2002	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
2003
2004	if (pctx == NULL)
2005		fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
2006
2007	peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
2008
2009	authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
2010	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
2011	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
2012	    peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
2013
2014	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
2015
2016	bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
2017	free(peer_confirm_hash);
2018
2019	buffer_clear(m);
2020	buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
2021
2022	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
2023	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
2024
2025	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
2026
2027	auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
2028	return authenticated;
2029}
2030
2031#endif /* JPAKE */
2032