1/* ssl/d1_pkt.c */ 2/* 3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu 4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. 5 */ 6/* ==================================================================== 7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 8 * 9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 11 * are met: 12 * 13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 15 * 16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 19 * distribution. 20 * 21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 22 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 25 * 26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 29 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 30 * 31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 34 * 35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 36 * acknowledgment: 37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 39 * 40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * ==================================================================== 53 * 54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 57 * 58 */ 59/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 60 * All rights reserved. 61 * 62 * This package is an SSL implementation written 63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 65 * 66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 72 * 73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 74 * the code are not to be removed. 75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 76 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 79 * 80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 82 * are met: 83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 89 * must display the following acknowledgement: 90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 97 * 98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 108 * SUCH DAMAGE. 109 * 110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 112 * copied and put under another distribution licence 113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 114 */ 115 116#include <stdio.h> 117#include <errno.h> 118#define USE_SOCKETS 119#include "ssl_locl.h" 120#include <openssl/evp.h> 121#include <openssl/buffer.h> 122#include <openssl/pqueue.h> 123#include <openssl/rand.h> 124 125/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */ 126static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2) 127{ 128 int ret, sat, brw, i; 129 130 if (sizeof(long) == 8) 131 do { 132 const union { 133 long one; 134 char little; 135 } is_endian = { 136 1 137 }; 138 long l; 139 140 if (is_endian.little) 141 break; 142 /* not reached on little-endians */ 143 /* 144 * following test is redundant, because input is always aligned, 145 * but I take no chances... 146 */ 147 if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7) 148 break; 149 150 l = *((long *)v1); 151 l -= *((long *)v2); 152 if (l > 128) 153 return 128; 154 else if (l < -128) 155 return -128; 156 else 157 return (int)l; 158 } while (0); 159 160 ret = (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7]; 161 sat = 0; 162 brw = ret >> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */ 163 if (ret & 0x80) { 164 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) { 165 brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i]; 166 sat |= ~brw; 167 brw >>= 8; 168 } 169 } else { 170 for (i = 6; i >= 0; i--) { 171 brw += (int)v1[i] - (int)v2[i]; 172 sat |= brw; 173 brw >>= 8; 174 } 175 } 176 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */ 177 178 if (sat & 0xff) 179 return brw | 0x80; 180 else 181 return brw + (ret & 0xFF); 182} 183 184static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, 185 int len, int peek); 186static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); 187static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); 188static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, 189 unsigned int *is_next_epoch); 190#if 0 191static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, 192 unsigned short *priority, 193 unsigned long *offset); 194#endif 195static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, 196 unsigned char *priority); 197static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s); 198 199/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ 200static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) 201{ 202 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; 203 204 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; 205 206 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) 207 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); 208 209 s->packet = rdata->packet; 210 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; 211 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); 212 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); 213 214 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ 215 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); 216 217 return (1); 218} 219 220static int 221dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) 222{ 223 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; 224 pitem *item; 225 226 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ 227 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) 228 return 0; 229 230 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA)); 231 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); 232 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { 233 if (rdata != NULL) 234 OPENSSL_free(rdata); 235 if (item != NULL) 236 pitem_free(item); 237 238 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 239 return -1; 240 } 241 242 rdata->packet = s->packet; 243 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length; 244 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); 245 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); 246 247 item->data = rdata; 248 249#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 250 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ 251 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && 252 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A 253 || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) { 254 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, 255 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); 256 } 257#endif 258 259 s->packet = NULL; 260 s->packet_length = 0; 261 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); 262 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); 263 264 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 265 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 266 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL) 267 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); 268 OPENSSL_free(rdata); 269 pitem_free(item); 270 return (-1); 271 } 272 273 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ 274 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { 275 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 276 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL) 277 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf); 278 OPENSSL_free(rdata); 279 pitem_free(item); 280 return (-1); 281 } 282 283 return (1); 284} 285 286static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) 287{ 288 pitem *item; 289 290 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); 291 if (item) { 292 dtls1_copy_record(s, item); 293 294 OPENSSL_free(item->data); 295 pitem_free(item); 296 297 return (1); 298 } 299 300 return (0); 301} 302 303/* 304 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not 305 * processed yet 306 */ 307#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ 308 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ 309 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds)) 310 311/* 312 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, 313 * processed 314 */ 315#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ 316 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ 317 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds)) 318 319static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) 320{ 321 pitem *item; 322 323 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); 324 if (item) { 325 /* Check if epoch is current. */ 326 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) 327 return (1); /* Nothing to do. */ 328 329 /* Process all the records. */ 330 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) { 331 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); 332 if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) 333 return (0); 334 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), 335 s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0) 336 return -1; 337 } 338 } 339 340 /* 341 * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been 342 * processed 343 */ 344 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch; 345 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1; 346 347 return (1); 348} 349 350#if 0 351 352static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) 353{ 354 pitem *item; 355 PQ_64BIT priority = 356 (((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) | 357 ((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off); 358 359 /* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */ 360 if (!SSL_in_init(s)) 361 return 0; 362 363 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records); 364 if (item && item->priority == priority) { 365 /* 366 * Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be a 367 * handshake record, since data records as passed up without 368 * buffering 369 */ 370 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; 371 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records); 372 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; 373 374 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) 375 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); 376 377 s->packet = rdata->packet; 378 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; 379 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); 380 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); 381 382 OPENSSL_free(item->data); 383 pitem_free(item); 384 385 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */ 386 return (1); 387 } 388 389 return 0; 390} 391 392#endif 393 394static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) 395{ 396 int i, al; 397 int enc_err; 398 SSL_SESSION *sess; 399 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 400 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len; 401 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 402 403 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 404 sess = s->session; 405 406 /* 407 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, 408 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet 409 */ 410 rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); 411 412 /* 413 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points 414 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either 415 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into 416 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer 417 */ 418 419 /* 420 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length 421 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. 422 */ 423 424 /* check is not needed I believe */ 425 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { 426 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 427 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 428 goto f_err; 429 } 430 431 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ 432 rr->data = rr->input; 433 434 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); 435 /*- 436 * enc_err is: 437 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. 438 * 1: if the padding is valid 439 * -1: if the padding is invalid 440 */ 441 if (enc_err == 0) { 442 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ 443 rr->length = 0; 444 s->packet_length = 0; 445 goto err; 446 } 447#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 448 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); 449 { 450 unsigned int z; 451 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) 452 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 453 } 454 printf("\n"); 455#endif 456 457 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ 458 if ((sess != NULL) && 459 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { 460 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ 461 unsigned char *mac = NULL; 462 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 463 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 464 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); 465 466 /* 467 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type 468 */ 469 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); 470 471 /* 472 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was 473 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, 474 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount 475 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. 476 */ 477 if (orig_len < mac_size || 478 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ 479 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 480 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { 481 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 482 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 483 goto f_err; 484 } 485 486 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 487 /* 488 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be 489 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in 490 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the 491 * contents of the padding bytes. 492 */ 493 mac = mac_tmp; 494 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); 495 rr->length -= mac_size; 496 } else { 497 /* 498 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals 499 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for 500 * |mac_size| above. 501 */ 502 rr->length -= mac_size; 503 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; 504 } 505 506 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); 507 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL 508 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) 509 enc_err = -1; 510 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) 511 enc_err = -1; 512 } 513 514 if (enc_err < 0) { 515 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ 516 rr->length = 0; 517 s->packet_length = 0; 518 goto err; 519 } 520 521 /* r->length is now just compressed */ 522 if (s->expand != NULL) { 523 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { 524 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 525 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, 526 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 527 goto f_err; 528 } 529 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { 530 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; 531 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 532 goto f_err; 533 } 534 } 535 536 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { 537 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 538 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 539 goto f_err; 540 } 541 542 rr->off = 0; 543 /*- 544 * So at this point the following is true 545 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record 546 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record 547 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte 548 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment 549 * after use :-). 550 */ 551 552 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ 553 s->packet_length = 0; 554 return (1); 555 556 f_err: 557 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 558 err: 559 return (0); 560} 561 562/*- 563 * Call this to get a new input record. 564 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error 565 * or non-blocking IO. 566 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in 567 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 568 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data 569 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes 570 */ 571/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ 572int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) 573{ 574 int ssl_major, ssl_minor; 575 int i, n; 576 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 577 unsigned char *p = NULL; 578 unsigned short version; 579 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; 580 unsigned int is_next_epoch; 581 582 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 583 584 /* 585 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. 586 * This is a non-blocking operation. 587 */ 588 if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0) 589 return -1; 590 591 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ 592 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) 593 return 1; 594 595 /* get something from the wire */ 596 again: 597 /* check if we have the header */ 598 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || 599 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { 600 n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); 601 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ 602 if (n <= 0) 603 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ 604 605 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ 606 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 607 s->packet_length = 0; 608 goto again; 609 } 610 611 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; 612 613 p = s->packet; 614 615 if (s->msg_callback) 616 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, 617 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 618 619 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ 620 rr->type = *(p++); 621 ssl_major = *(p++); 622 ssl_minor = *(p++); 623 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; 624 625 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ 626 n2s(p, rr->epoch); 627 628 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6); 629 p += 6; 630 631 n2s(p, rr->length); 632 633 /* Lets check version */ 634 if (!s->first_packet) { 635 if (version != s->version) { 636 /* unexpected version, silently discard */ 637 rr->length = 0; 638 s->packet_length = 0; 639 goto again; 640 } 641 } 642 643 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { 644 /* wrong version, silently discard record */ 645 rr->length = 0; 646 s->packet_length = 0; 647 goto again; 648 } 649 650 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { 651 /* record too long, silently discard it */ 652 rr->length = 0; 653 s->packet_length = 0; 654 goto again; 655 } 656 657 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ 658 } 659 660 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ 661 662 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 663 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ 664 i = rr->length; 665 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); 666 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ 667 if (n != i) { 668 rr->length = 0; 669 s->packet_length = 0; 670 goto again; 671 } 672 673 /* 674 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == 675 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length 676 */ 677 } 678 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ 679 680 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ 681 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); 682 if (bitmap == NULL) { 683 rr->length = 0; 684 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ 685 goto again; /* get another record */ 686 } 687#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 688 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ 689 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { 690#endif 691 /* 692 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if 693 * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look 694 * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different 695 * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily. 696 */ 697 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && 698 s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH && 699 s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && 700 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { 701 rr->length = 0; 702 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ 703 goto again; /* get another record */ 704 } 705#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 706 } 707#endif 708 709 /* just read a 0 length packet */ 710 if (rr->length == 0) 711 goto again; 712 713 /* 714 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a 715 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be 716 * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while 717 * listening. 718 */ 719 if (is_next_epoch) { 720 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) { 721 if (dtls1_buffer_record 722 (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0) 723 return -1; 724 /* Mark receipt of record. */ 725 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); 726 } 727 rr->length = 0; 728 s->packet_length = 0; 729 goto again; 730 } 731 732 if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) { 733 rr->length = 0; 734 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ 735 goto again; /* get another record */ 736 } 737 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */ 738 739 return (1); 740 741} 742 743/*- 744 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 745 * 'type' is one of the following: 746 * 747 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 748 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 749 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 750 * 751 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 752 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 753 * 754 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 755 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really 756 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. 757 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 758 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 759 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 760 * Change cipher spec protocol 761 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 762 * Alert protocol 763 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 764 * Handshake protocol 765 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 766 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 767 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 768 * Application data protocol 769 * none of our business 770 */ 771int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) 772{ 773 int al, i, j, ret; 774 unsigned int n; 775 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 776 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; 777 778 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ 779 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 780 return (-1); 781 782 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */ 783 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 784 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || 785 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { 786 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 787 return -1; 788 } 789 790 /* 791 * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting 792 */ 793 if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek))) 794 return ret; 795 796 /* 797 * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. 798 */ 799 800#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 801 /* 802 * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with 803 * SCTP. 804 */ 805 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) || 806 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && 807 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK 808 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) 809 && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2)) 810#else 811 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) 812#endif 813 { 814 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 815 i = s->handshake_func(s); 816 if (i < 0) 817 return (i); 818 if (i == 0) { 819 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 820 return (-1); 821 } 822 } 823 824 start: 825 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 826 827 /*- 828 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 829 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data 830 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read 831 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. 832 */ 833 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 834 835 /* 836 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered 837 * during the last handshake in advance, if any. 838 */ 839 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) { 840 pitem *item; 841 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); 842 if (item) { 843#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 844 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ 845 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { 846 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; 847 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, 848 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); 849 } 850#endif 851 852 dtls1_copy_record(s, item); 853 854 OPENSSL_free(item->data); 855 pitem_free(item); 856 } 857 } 858 859 /* Check for timeout */ 860 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) 861 goto start; 862 863 /* get new packet if necessary */ 864 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { 865 ret = dtls1_get_record(s); 866 if (ret <= 0) { 867 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); 868 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ 869 if (ret <= 0) 870 return (ret); 871 else 872 goto start; 873 } 874 } 875 876 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 877 rr->length = 0; 878 goto start; 879 } 880 881 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 882 883 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 884 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 885 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { 886 /* 887 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely 888 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application 889 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. 890 */ 891 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num) < 892 0) { 893 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 894 return -1; 895 } 896 rr->length = 0; 897 goto start; 898 } 899 900 /* 901 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in 902 * 'peek' mode) 903 */ 904 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { 905 rr->length = 0; 906 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 907 return (0); 908 } 909 910 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or 911 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ 912 /* 913 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are 914 * doing a handshake for the first time 915 */ 916 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 917 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { 918 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 919 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 920 goto f_err; 921 } 922 923 if (len <= 0) 924 return (len); 925 926 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) 927 n = rr->length; 928 else 929 n = (unsigned int)len; 930 931 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 932 if (!peek) { 933 rr->length -= n; 934 rr->off += n; 935 if (rr->length == 0) { 936 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 937 rr->off = 0; 938 } 939 } 940#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 941 /* 942 * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application 943 * data first, so retry. 944 */ 945 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && 946 rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 947 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK 948 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) { 949 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 950 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 951 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 952 } 953 954 /* 955 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered 956 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read 957 * anymore, finally set shutdown. 958 */ 959 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && 960 s->d1->shutdown_received 961 && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { 962 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 963 return (0); 964 } 965#endif 966 return (n); 967 } 968 969 /* 970 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, 971 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). 972 */ 973 974 /* 975 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill 976 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. 977 */ 978 { 979 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; 980 unsigned char *dest = NULL; 981 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; 982 983 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 984 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment; 985 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment; 986 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; 987 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 988 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment); 989 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment; 990 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len; 991 } 992#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 993 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) { 994 dtls1_process_heartbeat(s); 995 996 /* Exit and notify application to read again */ 997 rr->length = 0; 998 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 999 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1000 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1001 return (-1); 1002 } 1003#endif 1004 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ 1005 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1006 /* 1007 * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again 1008 * reading. 1009 */ 1010 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 1011 BIO *bio; 1012 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; 1013 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1014 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1015 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1016 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1017 return (-1); 1018 } 1019 1020 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ 1021 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1023 goto f_err; 1024 } 1025 1026 if (dest_maxlen > 0) { 1027 /* 1028 * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be 1029 * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes 1030 */ 1031 if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) { 1032#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE 1033 /* 1034 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while 1035 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this 1036 * non-existing alert... 1037 */ 1038 FIX ME 1039#endif 1040 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1041 rr->length = 0; 1042 goto start; 1043 } 1044 1045 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1046 for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) { 1047 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++]; 1048 rr->length--; 1049 } 1050 *dest_len = dest_maxlen; 1051 } 1052 } 1053 1054 /*- 1055 * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1056 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. 1057 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 1058 */ 1059 1060 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ 1061 if ((!s->server) && 1062 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && 1063 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && 1064 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { 1065 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1066 1067 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || 1068 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || 1069 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { 1070 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); 1072 goto f_err; 1073 } 1074 1075 /* 1076 * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages 1077 */ 1078 1079 if (s->msg_callback) 1080 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 1081 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, 1082 s->msg_callback_arg); 1083 1084 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1085 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && 1086 !s->s3->renegotiate) { 1087 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; 1088 s->new_session = 1; 1089 ssl3_renegotiate(s); 1090 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { 1091 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1092 if (i < 0) 1093 return (i); 1094 if (i == 0) { 1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, 1096 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1097 return (-1); 1098 } 1099 1100 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1101 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ 1102 BIO *bio; 1103 /* 1104 * In the case where we try to read application data, 1105 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1106 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1107 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world 1108 */ 1109 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1110 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1111 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1112 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1113 return (-1); 1114 } 1115 } 1116 } 1117 } 1118 /* 1119 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try 1120 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for 1121 */ 1122 goto start; 1123 } 1124 1125 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) { 1126 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0]; 1127 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1]; 1128 1129 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0; 1130 1131 if (s->msg_callback) 1132 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, 1133 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1134 1135 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1136 cb = s->info_callback; 1137 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1138 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1139 1140 if (cb != NULL) { 1141 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1142 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1143 } 1144 1145 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { 1146 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1147 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { 1148#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 1149 /* 1150 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data 1151 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so 1152 * that nothing gets discarded. 1153 */ 1154 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && 1155 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { 1156 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1; 1157 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1158 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1159 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); 1160 return -1; 1161 } 1162#endif 1163 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1164 return (0); 1165 } 1166#if 0 1167 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ 1168 /* now check if it's a missing record */ 1169 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { 1170 unsigned short seq; 1171 unsigned int frag_off; 1172 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]); 1173 1174 n2s(p, seq); 1175 n2l3(p, frag_off); 1176 1177 dtls1_retransmit_message(s, 1178 dtls1_get_queue_priority 1179 (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off, 1180 &found); 1181 if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) { 1182 /* 1183 * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); 1184 */ 1185 /* 1186 * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert 1187 * ourselves 1188 */ 1189 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, 1190 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); 1191 } 1192 } 1193#endif 1194 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { 1195 char tmp[16]; 1196 1197 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1198 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, 1200 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1201 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); 1202 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); 1203 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1204 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); 1205 return (0); 1206 } else { 1207 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1209 goto f_err; 1210 } 1211 1212 goto start; 1213 } 1214 1215 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a 1216 * shutdown */ 1217 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1218 rr->length = 0; 1219 return (0); 1220 } 1221 1222 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1223 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; 1224 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; 1225 1226 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); 1227 1228 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1229 ccs_hdr_len = 3; 1230 1231 /* 1232 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly 1233 * what the record payload has to look like 1234 */ 1235 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ 1236 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || 1237 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { 1238 i = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 1240 goto err; 1241 } 1242 1243 rr->length = 0; 1244 1245 if (s->msg_callback) 1246 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1247 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1248 1249 /* 1250 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages 1251 * are still missing, so just drop it. 1252 */ 1253 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) { 1254 goto start; 1255 } 1256 1257 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; 1258 1259 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; 1260 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) 1261 goto err; 1262 1263 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ 1264 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); 1265 1266 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1267 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; 1268 1269#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 1270 /* 1271 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of 1272 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no 1273 * SCTP is used 1274 */ 1275 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); 1276#endif 1277 1278 goto start; 1279 } 1280 1281 /* 1282 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) 1283 */ 1284 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && 1285 !s->in_handshake) { 1286 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; 1287 1288 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ 1289 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); 1290 if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) { 1291 rr->length = 0; 1292 goto start; 1293 } 1294 1295 /* 1296 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client 1297 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. 1298 */ 1299 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { 1300 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) 1301 return -1; 1302 1303 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); 1304 rr->length = 0; 1305 goto start; 1306 } 1307 1308 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && 1309 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { 1310#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences 1311 * are not as expected (and because this is 1312 * not really needed for clients except for 1313 * detecting protocol violations): */ 1314 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) 1315 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1316#else 1317 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1318#endif 1319 s->renegotiate = 1; 1320 s->new_session = 1; 1321 } 1322 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1323 if (i < 0) 1324 return (i); 1325 if (i == 0) { 1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1327 return (-1); 1328 } 1329 1330 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1331 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ 1332 BIO *bio; 1333 /* 1334 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we 1335 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry 1336 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty 1337 * problems in the blocking world 1338 */ 1339 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1340 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1341 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1342 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1343 return (-1); 1344 } 1345 } 1346 goto start; 1347 } 1348 1349 switch (rr->type) { 1350 default: 1351#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS 1352 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ 1353 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { 1354 rr->length = 0; 1355 goto start; 1356 } 1357#endif 1358 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1360 goto f_err; 1361 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1362 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1363 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1364 /* 1365 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of 1366 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not 1367 * happen when type != rr->type 1368 */ 1369 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1371 goto f_err; 1372 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1373 /* 1374 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have 1375 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() 1376 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read 1377 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet 1378 * started), we will indulge it. 1379 */ 1380 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && 1381 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && 1382 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && 1383 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && 1384 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1385 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && 1386 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && 1387 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1388 ) 1389 )) { 1390 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; 1391 return (-1); 1392 } else { 1393 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1395 goto f_err; 1396 } 1397 } 1398 /* not reached */ 1399 1400 f_err: 1401 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1402 err: 1403 return (-1); 1404} 1405 1406int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) 1407{ 1408 int i; 1409 1410#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 1411 /* 1412 * Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading 1413 * belated app data with SCTP. 1414 */ 1415 if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) || 1416 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && 1417 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK 1418 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))) 1419#else 1420 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) 1421#endif 1422 { 1423 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1424 if (i < 0) 1425 return (i); 1426 if (i == 0) { 1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, 1428 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1429 return -1; 1430 } 1431 } 1432 1433 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { 1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); 1435 return -1; 1436 } 1437 1438 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); 1439 return i; 1440} 1441 1442 /* 1443 * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake 1444 * is started. 1445 */ 1446static int 1447have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, 1448 int len, int peek) 1449{ 1450 1451 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 1452 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 1453 { 1454 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment; 1455 unsigned char *dst = buf; 1456 unsigned int k, n; 1457 1458 /* peek == 0 */ 1459 n = 0; 1460 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { 1461 *dst++ = *src++; 1462 len--; 1463 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--; 1464 n++; 1465 } 1466 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 1467 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++) 1468 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 1469 return n; 1470 } 1471 1472 return 0; 1473} 1474 1475/* 1476 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if 1477 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 1478 */ 1479int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) 1480{ 1481 int i; 1482 1483 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); 1484 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1485 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); 1486 return i; 1487} 1488 1489int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 1490 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) 1491{ 1492 unsigned char *p, *pseq; 1493 int i, mac_size, clear = 0; 1494 int prefix_len = 0; 1495 int eivlen; 1496 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 1497 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; 1498 SSL_SESSION *sess; 1499 1500 /* 1501 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 1502 * will happen with non blocking IO 1503 */ 1504 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) { 1505 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ 1506 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); 1507 } 1508 1509 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 1510 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 1511 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 1512 if (i <= 0) 1513 return (i); 1514 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 1515 } 1516 1517 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 1518 return 0; 1519 1520 wr = &(s->s3->wrec); 1521 wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); 1522 sess = s->session; 1523 1524 if ((sess == NULL) || 1525 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) 1526 clear = 1; 1527 1528 if (clear) 1529 mac_size = 0; 1530 else { 1531 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 1532 if (mac_size < 0) 1533 goto err; 1534 } 1535 1536 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */ 1537#if 0 1538 /* 1539 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself 1540 */ 1541 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done 1542 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1543 { 1544 /* 1545 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see 1546 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 1547 */ 1548 1549 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 1550 /* 1551 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this 1552 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these 1553 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual 1554 * payload) 1555 */ 1556 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); 1557 if (prefix_len <= 0) 1558 goto err; 1559 1560 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < 1561 (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { 1562 /* insufficient space */ 1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1564 goto err; 1565 } 1566 } 1567 1568 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 1569 } 1570#endif 1571 p = wb->buf + prefix_len; 1572 1573 /* write the header */ 1574 1575 *(p++) = type & 0xff; 1576 wr->type = type; 1577 /* 1578 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we 1579 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0 1580 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. 1581 */ 1582 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { 1583 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; 1584 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; 1585 } else { 1586 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; 1587 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 1588 } 1589 1590 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ 1591 pseq = p; 1592 p += 10; 1593 1594 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ 1595 if (s->enc_write_ctx) { 1596 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 1597 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 1598 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 1599 if (eivlen <= 1) 1600 eivlen = 0; 1601 } 1602 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 1603 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 1604 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1605 else 1606 eivlen = 0; 1607 } else 1608 eivlen = 0; 1609 1610 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 1611 wr->data = p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ 1612 wr->length = (int)len; 1613 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; 1614 1615 /* 1616 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data 1617 */ 1618 1619 /* first we compress */ 1620 if (s->compress != NULL) { 1621 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { 1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1623 goto err; 1624 } 1625 } else { 1626 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); 1627 wr->input = wr->data; 1628 } 1629 1630 /* 1631 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from 1632 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the 1633 * wb->buf 1634 */ 1635 1636 if (mac_size != 0) { 1637 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0) 1638 goto err; 1639 wr->length += mac_size; 1640 } 1641 1642 /* this is true regardless of mac size */ 1643 wr->input = p; 1644 wr->data = p; 1645 1646 if (eivlen) 1647 wr->length += eivlen; 1648 1649 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1) 1650 goto err; 1651 1652 /* record length after mac and block padding */ 1653 /* 1654 * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! 1655 * SSL_in_init(s))) 1656 */ 1657 1658 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ 1659 1660 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq); 1661 1662 /* XDTLS: ?? */ 1663 /* 1664 * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); 1665 */ 1666 1667 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6); 1668 pseq += 6; 1669 s2n(wr->length, pseq); 1670 1671 if (s->msg_callback) 1672 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, 1673 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1674 1675 /* 1676 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is 1677 * wr->length long 1678 */ 1679 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ 1680 wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 1681 1682#if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */ 1683 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */ 1684 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) 1685 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length, 1686 *((PQ_64BIT *) & (s->s3->write_sequence[0]))); 1687#endif 1688 1689 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])); 1690 1691 if (create_empty_fragment) { 1692 /* 1693 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write 1694 * out anything here 1695 */ 1696 return wr->length; 1697 } 1698 1699 /* now let's set up wb */ 1700 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; 1701 wb->offset = 0; 1702 1703 /* 1704 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write 1705 * retries later 1706 */ 1707 s->s3->wpend_tot = len; 1708 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; 1709 s->s3->wpend_type = type; 1710 s->s3->wpend_ret = len; 1711 1712 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 1713 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); 1714 err: 1715 return -1; 1716} 1717 1718static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) 1719{ 1720 int cmp; 1721 unsigned int shift; 1722 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; 1723 1724 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); 1725 if (cmp > 0) { 1726 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8); 1727 return 1; /* this record in new */ 1728 } 1729 shift = -cmp; 1730 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) 1731 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ 1732 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift)) 1733 return 0; /* record previously received */ 1734 1735 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8); 1736 return 1; 1737} 1738 1739static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) 1740{ 1741 int cmp; 1742 unsigned int shift; 1743 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; 1744 1745 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num); 1746 if (cmp > 0) { 1747 shift = cmp; 1748 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) 1749 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL; 1750 else 1751 bitmap->map = 1UL; 1752 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8); 1753 } else { 1754 shift = -cmp; 1755 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8) 1756 bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift; 1757 } 1758} 1759 1760int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) 1761{ 1762 int i, j; 1763 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 1764 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; 1765 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0]; 1766 1767 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; 1768 1769 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); 1770 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0]; 1771 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1]; 1772 1773#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE 1774 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { 1775 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr); 1776# if 0 1777 if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) 1778 /* 1779 * waiting for a new msg 1780 */ 1781 else 1782 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */ 1783# endif 1784 1785# if 0 1786 fprintf(stderr, 1787 "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n", 1788 s->d1->handshake_read_seq, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq); 1789# endif 1790 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr); 1791 } 1792#endif 1793 1794 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0); 1795 if (i <= 0) { 1796 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; 1797 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */ 1798 } else { 1799 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL 1800#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE 1801 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE 1802#endif 1803 ) 1804 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1805 1806 if (s->msg_callback) 1807 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 1808 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1809 1810 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1811 cb = s->info_callback; 1812 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1813 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1814 1815 if (cb != NULL) { 1816 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; 1817 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); 1818 } 1819 } 1820 return (i); 1821} 1822 1823static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, 1824 unsigned int *is_next_epoch) 1825{ 1826 1827 *is_next_epoch = 0; 1828 1829 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ 1830 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch) 1831 return &s->d1->bitmap; 1832 1833 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */ 1834 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) && 1835 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 1836 *is_next_epoch = 1; 1837 return &s->d1->next_bitmap; 1838 } 1839 1840 return NULL; 1841} 1842 1843#if 0 1844static int 1845dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, 1846 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset) 1847{ 1848 1849 /* alerts are passed up immediately */ 1850 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) 1851 return 0; 1852 1853 /* 1854 * Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. (this implies that 1855 * Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up immediately) 1856 */ 1857 if (SSL_in_init(s)) { 1858 unsigned char *data = rr->data; 1859 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */ 1860 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || 1861 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1862 unsigned short seq_num; 1863 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; 1864 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; 1865 1866 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1867 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr); 1868 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq; 1869 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off; 1870 } else { 1871 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr); 1872 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq; 1873 *offset = 0; 1874 } 1875 1876 /* 1877 * this is either a record we're waiting for, or a retransmit of 1878 * something we happened to previously receive (higher layers 1879 * will drop the repeat silently 1880 */ 1881 if (seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) 1882 return 0; 1883 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && 1884 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && 1885 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off) 1886 return 0; 1887 else if (seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && 1888 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || 1889 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)) 1890 return 0; 1891 else { 1892 *priority = seq_num; 1893 return 1; 1894 } 1895 } else /* unknown record type */ 1896 return 0; 1897 } 1898 1899 return 0; 1900} 1901#endif 1902 1903void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) 1904{ 1905 unsigned char *seq; 1906 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence); 1907 1908 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { 1909 seq = s->s3->read_sequence; 1910 s->d1->r_epoch++; 1911 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); 1912 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); 1913 } else { 1914 seq = s->s3->write_sequence; 1915 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, 1916 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); 1917 s->d1->w_epoch++; 1918 } 1919 1920 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes); 1921} 1922