1/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.101 2013/02/06 00:22:21 dtucker Exp $ */
2/*
3 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7 * are met:
8 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13 *
14 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
15 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
16 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
17 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
18 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
19 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
20 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
21 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
22 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
23 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
24 */
25
26#include "includes.h"
27
28#include <sys/types.h>
29#include <sys/stat.h>
30#include <sys/param.h>
31
32#include <netinet/in.h>
33
34#include <errno.h>
35#include <fcntl.h>
36#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
37# include <paths.h>
38#endif
39#include <pwd.h>
40#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
41#include <login.h>
42#endif
43#ifdef USE_SHADOW
44#include <shadow.h>
45#endif
46#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
47#include <libgen.h>
48#endif
49#include <stdarg.h>
50#include <stdio.h>
51#include <string.h>
52#include <unistd.h>
53
54#include "xmalloc.h"
55#include "match.h"
56#include "groupaccess.h"
57#include "log.h"
58#include "buffer.h"
59#include "servconf.h"
60#include "key.h"
61#include "hostfile.h"
62#include "auth.h"
63#include "auth-options.h"
64#include "canohost.h"
65#include "uidswap.h"
66#include "misc.h"
67#include "packet.h"
68#include "loginrec.h"
69#ifdef GSSAPI
70#include "ssh-gss.h"
71#endif
72#include "authfile.h"
73#include "monitor_wrap.h"
74#include "krl.h"
75
76/* import */
77extern ServerOptions options;
78extern int use_privsep;
79extern Buffer loginmsg;
80extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
81
82/* Debugging messages */
83Buffer auth_debug;
84int auth_debug_init;
85
86/*
87 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
88 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
89 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
90 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
91 * listed there, false will be returned.
92 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
93 * Otherwise true is returned.
94 */
95int
96allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
97{
98	struct stat st;
99	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
100	u_int i;
101#ifdef USE_SHADOW
102	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
103#endif
104
105	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
106	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
107		return 0;
108
109#ifdef USE_SHADOW
110	if (!options.use_pam)
111		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
112#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
113	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
114		return 0;
115#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
116#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
117
118	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
119	passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
120#ifdef USE_SHADOW
121	if (spw != NULL)
122#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
123		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
124#else
125		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
126#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
127#endif
128
129	/* check for locked account */
130	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
131		int locked = 0;
132
133#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
134		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
135			 locked = 1;
136#endif
137#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
138		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
139		    strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
140			 locked = 1;
141#endif
142#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
143		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
144			locked = 1;
145#endif
146#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
147		free((void *) passwd);
148#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
149		if (locked) {
150			logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
151			    pw->pw_name);
152			return 0;
153		}
154	}
155
156	/*
157	 * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
158	 * are chrooting.
159	 */
160	if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
161	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
162		char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
163		    _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
164
165		if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
166			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
167			    "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
168			xfree(shell);
169			return 0;
170		}
171		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
172		    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
173			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
174			    "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
175			xfree(shell);
176			return 0;
177		}
178		xfree(shell);
179	}
180
181	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
182	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
183		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
184		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
185	}
186
187	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
188	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
189		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
190			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
191			    options.deny_users[i])) {
192				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
193				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
194				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
195				return 0;
196			}
197	}
198	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
199	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
200		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
201			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
202			    options.allow_users[i]))
203				break;
204		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
205		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
206			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
207			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
208			return 0;
209		}
210	}
211	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
212		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
213		if (ga_init(pw) == 0) {
214			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
215			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
216			return 0;
217		}
218
219		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
220		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
221			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
222			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
223				ga_free();
224				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
225				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
226				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
227				return 0;
228			}
229		/*
230		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
231		 * isn't listed there
232		 */
233		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
234			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
235			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
236				ga_free();
237				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
238				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
239				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
240				return 0;
241			}
242		ga_free();
243	}
244
245#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
246	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
247		return 0;
248#endif
249
250	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
251	return 1;
252}
253
254void
255auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
256    const char *method, const char *submethod, const char *info)
257{
258	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
259	char *authmsg;
260
261	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
262		return;
263
264	/* Raise logging level */
265	if (authenticated == 1 ||
266	    !authctxt->valid ||
267	    authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
268	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
269		authlog = logit;
270
271	if (authctxt->postponed)
272		authmsg = "Postponed";
273	else if (partial)
274		authmsg = "Partial";
275	else
276		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
277
278	authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
279	    authmsg,
280	    method,
281	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
282	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
283	    authctxt->user,
284	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
285	    get_remote_port(),
286	    info);
287
288#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
289	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
290	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
291	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
292	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
293		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
294		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
295# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
296	if (authenticated)
297		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
298		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
299# endif
300#endif
301#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
302	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
303		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
304#endif
305}
306
307/*
308 * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
309 */
310int
311auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
312{
313	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
314	case PERMIT_YES:
315		return 1;
316	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
317		if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
318			return 1;
319		break;
320	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
321		if (forced_command) {
322			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
323			return 1;
324		}
325		break;
326	}
327	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
328	return 0;
329}
330
331
332/*
333 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
334 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
335 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
336 *
337 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
338 */
339char *
340expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
341{
342	char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
343	int i;
344
345	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
346	    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
347
348	/*
349	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
350	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
351	 */
352	if (*file == '/')
353		return (file);
354
355	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
356	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
357		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
358	xfree(file);
359	return (xstrdup(ret));
360}
361
362char *
363authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
364{
365	if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL ||
366	    strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0)
367		return NULL;
368	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
369}
370
371/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
372HostStatus
373check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
374    const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
375{
376	char *user_hostfile;
377	struct stat st;
378	HostStatus host_status;
379	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
380	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
381
382	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
383	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
384	if (userfile != NULL) {
385		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
386		if (options.strict_modes &&
387		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
388		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
389		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
390			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
391			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
392			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
393			auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
394			    user_hostfile);
395		} else {
396			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
397			load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
398			restore_uid();
399		}
400		xfree(user_hostfile);
401	}
402	host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
403	if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
404		error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
405		    found->host);
406	else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
407		debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
408		    found->host, found->file, found->line);
409	else
410		debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
411
412	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
413
414	return host_status;
415}
416
417/*
418 * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
419 * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
420 * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
421 *
422 * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
423 *
424 * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
425 * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
426 * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
427 *
428 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
429 */
430int
431auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
432    uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
433{
434	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
435	char *cp;
436	int comparehome = 0;
437	struct stat st;
438
439	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
440		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
441		    strerror(errno));
442		return -1;
443	}
444	if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
445		comparehome = 1;
446
447	if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
448		snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
449		return -1;
450	}
451	if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
452	    (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
453		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
454		    buf);
455		return -1;
456	}
457
458	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
459	for (;;) {
460		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
461			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
462			return -1;
463		}
464		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
465
466		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
467		    (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
468		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
469			snprintf(err, errlen,
470			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
471			return -1;
472		}
473
474		/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
475		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
476			break;
477
478		/*
479		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
480		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
481		 */
482		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
483			break;
484	}
485	return 0;
486}
487
488/*
489 * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
490 * avoid races.
491 *
492 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
493 */
494static int
495secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
496    char *err, size_t errlen)
497{
498	struct stat st;
499
500	/* check the open file to avoid races */
501	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
502		snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
503		    file, strerror(errno));
504		return -1;
505	}
506	return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
507}
508
509static FILE *
510auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
511    int log_missing, char *file_type)
512{
513	char line[1024];
514	struct stat st;
515	int fd;
516	FILE *f;
517
518	if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
519		if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
520			debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
521			   strerror(errno));
522		return NULL;
523	}
524
525	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
526		close(fd);
527		return NULL;
528	}
529	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
530		logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
531		    pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
532		close(fd);
533		return NULL;
534	}
535	unset_nonblock(fd);
536	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
537		close(fd);
538		return NULL;
539	}
540	if (strict_modes &&
541	    secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
542		fclose(f);
543		logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
544		auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
545		return NULL;
546	}
547
548	return f;
549}
550
551
552FILE *
553auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
554{
555	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
556}
557
558FILE *
559auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
560{
561	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
562	    "authorized principals");
563}
564
565struct passwd *
566getpwnamallow(const char *user)
567{
568#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
569	extern login_cap_t *lc;
570#ifdef BSD_AUTH
571	auth_session_t *as;
572#endif
573#endif
574	struct passwd *pw;
575	struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
576
577	ci->user = user;
578	parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
579
580#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
581	aix_setauthdb(user);
582#endif
583
584	pw = getpwnam(user);
585
586#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
587	aix_restoreauthdb();
588#endif
589#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
590	/*
591	 * Windows usernames are case-insensitive.  To avoid later problems
592	 * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to
593	 * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the
594	 * user database.
595	 */
596	if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) {
597		logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s",
598		    user, pw->pw_name);
599		pw = NULL;
600	}
601#endif
602	if (pw == NULL) {
603		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
604		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
605#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
606		record_failed_login(user,
607		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
608#endif
609#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
610		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
611#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
612		return (NULL);
613	}
614	if (!allowed_user(pw))
615		return (NULL);
616#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
617	if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
618		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
619		return (NULL);
620	}
621#ifdef BSD_AUTH
622	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
623	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
624		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
625		pw = NULL;
626	}
627	if (as != NULL)
628		auth_close(as);
629#endif
630#endif
631	if (pw != NULL)
632		return (pwcopy(pw));
633	return (NULL);
634}
635
636/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
637int
638auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
639{
640	char *key_fp;
641
642	if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
643		return 0;
644	switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) {
645	case 0:
646		return 0;	/* Not revoked */
647	case -2:
648		break;		/* Not a KRL */
649	default:
650		goto revoked;
651	}
652	debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__,
653	    options.revoked_keys_file);
654	switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
655	case 0:
656		/* key not revoked */
657		return 0;
658	case -1:
659		/* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
660		error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
661		    "authentication");
662		return 1;
663	case 1:
664 revoked:
665		/* Key revoked */
666		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
667		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
668		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
669		xfree(key_fp);
670		return 1;
671	}
672	fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
673}
674
675void
676auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
677{
678	char buf[1024];
679	va_list args;
680
681	if (!auth_debug_init)
682		return;
683
684	va_start(args, fmt);
685	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
686	va_end(args);
687	buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
688}
689
690void
691auth_debug_send(void)
692{
693	char *msg;
694
695	if (!auth_debug_init)
696		return;
697	while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
698		msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
699		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
700		xfree(msg);
701	}
702}
703
704void
705auth_debug_reset(void)
706{
707	if (auth_debug_init)
708		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
709	else {
710		buffer_init(&auth_debug);
711		auth_debug_init = 1;
712	}
713}
714
715struct passwd *
716fakepw(void)
717{
718	static struct passwd fake;
719
720	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
721	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
722	fake.pw_passwd =
723	    "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
724	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
725	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
726	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
727#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
728	fake.pw_class = "";
729#endif
730	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
731	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
732
733	return (&fake);
734}
735