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4NETWORK WORKING GROUP                                           S. Emery
5Internet-Draft                                          Sun Microsystems
6Updates: 4121 (if approved)                             November 9, 2007
7Intended status: Standards Track
8Expires: May 12, 2008
9
10
11        Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Channel Binding Hash Agility
12              draft-ietf-krb-wg-gss-cb-hash-agility-03.txt
13
14Status of this Memo
15
16   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
17   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
18   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
19   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
20
21   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
22   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
23   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
24   Drafts.
25
26   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
27   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
28   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
29   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
30
31   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
32   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
33
34   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
35   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
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37   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 12, 2008.
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39Copyright Notice
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41   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
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57Internet-Draft        Channel Binding Hash Agility         November 2007
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60Abstract
61
62   Currently, the Kerberos Version 5 Generic Security Services
63   Application Programming Interface (GSS-API) mechanism [RFC4121] does
64   not have the ability to utilize better hash algorithms used to
65   generate channel binding identities.  The current mechanism for doing
66   this is hard coded to use MD5 only.  The purpose of this document is
67   to outline changes required to update the protocol so that more
68   secure algorithms can be used to create channel binding identities.
69   The extensibility of this solution also provides an eventual
70   replacement of identities based solely on hash algorithms.
71
72
73Table of Contents
74
75   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
76   2.  Conventions Used in This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
77   3.  Channel binding hash agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
78   4.  Security considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
79   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
80   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
81   7.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
82   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
83   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1161.  Introduction
117
118   With the recently discovered weaknesses in the MD5 hash algorithm
119   there is a need to move stronger hash alogrithms.  Kerberos Version 5
120   Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface (GSS-API)
121   mechanism [RFC4121] uses MD5 to calculate channel binding identities
122   that are required to be unique.  This document specifies an update to
123   the mechanism that allows it to create channel binding identities
124   based on negotiating algorithms securely.  This will prevent lengthy
125   standardizations in the future when new attacks arise and will allow
126   an incremental update to the protocol so that this will interoperate
127   with older implementations.
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1722.  Conventions Used in This Document
173
174   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
175   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
176   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
177
178   The term "little endian order" is used for brevity to refer to the
179   least-significant-octet-first encoding, while the term "big endian
180   order" is for the most-significant-octet-first encoding.
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2283.  Channel binding hash agility
229
230   When generating a channel binding identifier, Bnd, a hash is computed
231   from the channel binding information.  Initiators MUST populate the
232   Bnd field in order to maintain interoperability with existing
233   acceptors.  In addition, initiators MUST populate the extension
234   field, Exts, with TYPED-DATA as defined in [RFC4120].  The 0x8003 GSS
235   checksum MUST have the following structure:
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237      Octet     Name       Description
238      -----------------------------------------------------------------
239      0..3      Lgth       Number of octets in Bnd field;  Represented
240                            in little-endian order;  Currently contains
241                            hex value 10 00 00 00 (16).
242      4..19     Bnd        Channel binding information, as described in
243                            section 4.1.1.2 [RFC4121].
244      20..23    Flags      Four-octet context-establishment flags in
245                            little-endian order as described in section
246                            4.1.1.1 [RFC4121].
247      24..25    DlgOpt     The delegation option identifier (=1) in
248                            little-endian order [optional].  This field
249                            and the next two fields are present if and
250                            only if GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG is set as described
251                            in section 4.1.1.1 [RFC4121].
252      26..27    Dlgth      The length of the Deleg field in
253                            little-endian order [optional].
254      28..(n-1) Deleg      KRB_CRED message (n = Dlgth + 28) [optional].
255      n..last   Exts       Extensions
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257      where Exts is the concatenation of zero, one or more individual
258      extensions, each of which consists of:
259        type -- big endian order unsigned integer, 32-bits
260        length -- big endian order unsigned integer, 32-bits
261        data -- octet string of length octets
262      in that order
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264   When channel binding is used the Exts MUST include the following
265   extension:
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267      data-type 0x00000000
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269      data-value
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271         The output obtained by applying the Kerberos V get_mic()
272         operation [RFC3961], using the sub-session key from the
273         authenticator and key usage number TBD, to the channel binding
274         data as described in [RFC4121], section 4.1.1.2 (using get_mic
275         instead of MD5).
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284   Initiators that are unwilling to use a MD5 hash of the channel
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3404.  Security considerations
341
342   Initiators do not know if the acceptor had ignored channel bindings
343   or whether it validated the MD5 hash of the channel bindings
344   [RFC4121].
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346   Ultimately, it is up to the application whether to use channel
347   binding or not.  This is dependent upon the security policy of these
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3965.  IANA Considerations
397
398   The IANA is hereby requested to create a new registry of "Kerberos V
399   GSS-API mechanism extension types" with four-field entries (type
400   number, type name, description, and normative reference) and,
401   initially, a single registration: 0x00000000, "Channel Binding MIC,"
402   "Extension for hash function-agile channel binding," <this RFC>.
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404   Registration of additional extensions SHALL be by IESG Protocol
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451
4526.  Acknowledgements
453
454   Larry Zhu helped in the review of this document overall and provided
455   the suggestions of typed data and server acknowledgement.
456
457   Nicolas Williams and Sam Hartman suggested that the Bnd and Exts
458   fields be populated simultaneously.
459
460   Nicolas Williams and Jeffrey Hutzelman had also suggested a number
461   changes to this document.
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5087.  Normative References
509
510   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
511              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
512
513   [RFC3961]  Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
514              Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.
515
516   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
517              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
518              July 2005.
519
520   [RFC4121]  Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
521              Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
522              Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
523              July 2005.
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564Author's Address
565
566   Shawn Emery
567   Sun Microsystems
568   500 Eldorado Blvd
569   M/S UBRM05-171
570   Broomfield, CO  80021
571   US
572
573   Email: shawn.emery@sun.com
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619
620Full Copyright Statement
621
622   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
623
624   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
625   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
626   retain all their rights.
627
628   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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635
636
637Intellectual Property
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660
661
662Acknowledgment
663
664   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
665   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
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