1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only 2/* 3 * AppArmor security module 4 * 5 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. 6 * 7 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE 8 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. 9 */ 10 11#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> 12#include <linux/moduleparam.h> 13#include <linux/mm.h> 14#include <linux/mman.h> 15#include <linux/mount.h> 16#include <linux/namei.h> 17#include <linux/ptrace.h> 18#include <linux/ctype.h> 19#include <linux/sysctl.h> 20#include <linux/audit.h> 21#include <linux/user_namespace.h> 22#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> 23#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> 24#include <linux/zstd.h> 25#include <net/sock.h> 26#include <uapi/linux/mount.h> 27#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> 28 29#include "include/apparmor.h" 30#include "include/apparmorfs.h" 31#include "include/audit.h" 32#include "include/capability.h" 33#include "include/cred.h" 34#include "include/file.h" 35#include "include/ipc.h" 36#include "include/net.h" 37#include "include/path.h" 38#include "include/label.h" 39#include "include/policy.h" 40#include "include/policy_ns.h" 41#include "include/procattr.h" 42#include "include/mount.h" 43#include "include/secid.h" 44 45/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ 46int apparmor_initialized; 47 48union aa_buffer { 49 struct list_head list; 50 DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(char, buffer); 51}; 52 53struct aa_local_cache { 54 unsigned int hold; 55 unsigned int count; 56 struct list_head head; 57}; 58 59#define RESERVE_COUNT 2 60static int reserve_count = RESERVE_COUNT; 61static int buffer_count; 62 63static LIST_HEAD(aa_global_buffers); 64static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(aa_buffers_lock); 65static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_local_cache, aa_local_buffers); 66 67/* 68 * LSM hook functions 69 */ 70 71/* 72 * put the associated labels 73 */ 74static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) 75{ 76 aa_put_label(cred_label(cred)); 77 set_cred_label(cred, NULL); 78} 79 80/* 81 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials 82 */ 83static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) 84{ 85 set_cred_label(cred, NULL); 86 return 0; 87} 88 89/* 90 * prepare new cred label for modification by prepare_cred block 91 */ 92static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, 93 gfp_t gfp) 94{ 95 set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); 96 return 0; 97} 98 99/* 100 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds 101 */ 102static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 103{ 104 set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(old))); 105} 106 107static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) 108{ 109 110 aa_free_task_ctx(task_ctx(task)); 111} 112 113static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, 114 unsigned long clone_flags) 115{ 116 struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task); 117 118 aa_dup_task_ctx(new, task_ctx(current)); 119 120 return 0; 121} 122 123static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, 124 unsigned int mode) 125{ 126 struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; 127 const struct cred *cred; 128 int error; 129 130 cred = get_task_cred(child); 131 tracee = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ 132 tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 133 error = aa_may_ptrace(current_cred(), tracer, cred, tracee, 134 (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ 135 : AA_PTRACE_TRACE); 136 __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer); 137 put_cred(cred); 138 139 return error; 140} 141 142static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) 143{ 144 struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee; 145 const struct cred *cred; 146 int error; 147 148 tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 149 cred = get_task_cred(parent); 150 tracer = cred_label(cred); /* ref count on cred */ 151 error = aa_may_ptrace(cred, tracer, current_cred(), tracee, 152 AA_PTRACE_TRACE); 153 put_cred(cred); 154 __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee); 155 156 return error; 157} 158 159/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ 160static int apparmor_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, 161 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) 162{ 163 struct aa_label *label; 164 const struct cred *cred; 165 166 rcu_read_lock(); 167 cred = __task_cred(target); 168 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); 169 170 /* 171 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will 172 * initialize effective and permitted. 173 */ 174 if (!unconfined(label)) { 175 struct aa_profile *profile; 176 struct label_it i; 177 178 label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) { 179 struct aa_ruleset *rules; 180 if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) 181 continue; 182 rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, 183 typeof(*rules), list); 184 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, 185 rules->caps.allow); 186 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, 187 rules->caps.allow); 188 } 189 } 190 rcu_read_unlock(); 191 aa_put_label(label); 192 193 return 0; 194} 195 196static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, 197 int cap, unsigned int opts) 198{ 199 struct aa_label *label; 200 int error = 0; 201 202 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); 203 if (!unconfined(label)) 204 error = aa_capable(cred, label, cap, opts); 205 aa_put_label(label); 206 207 return error; 208} 209 210/** 211 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths 212 * @op: operation being checked 213 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) 214 * @mask: requested permissions mask 215 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) 216 * 217 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 218 */ 219static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask, 220 struct path_cond *cond) 221{ 222 struct aa_label *label; 223 int error = 0; 224 225 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 226 if (!unconfined(label)) 227 error = aa_path_perm(op, current_cred(), label, path, 0, mask, 228 cond); 229 __end_current_label_crit_section(label); 230 231 return error; 232} 233 234/** 235 * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond 236 * @op: operation being checked 237 * @path: location to check (NOT NULL) 238 * @mask: requested permissions mask 239 * 240 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 241 */ 242static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask) 243{ 244 vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(path->mnt), 245 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)); 246 struct path_cond cond = { 247 vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid), 248 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode 249 }; 250 251 if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry)) 252 return 0; 253 254 return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond); 255} 256 257/** 258 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry 259 * @op: operation being checked 260 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) 261 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) 262 * @mask: requested permissions mask 263 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) 264 * 265 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 266 */ 267static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir, 268 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, 269 struct path_cond *cond) 270{ 271 struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry }; 272 273 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); 274} 275 276/** 277 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm 278 * @op: operation being checked 279 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) 280 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) 281 * @mask: requested permission mask 282 * 283 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 284 */ 285static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir, 286 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) 287{ 288 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); 289 struct path_cond cond = { }; 290 vfsuid_t vfsuid; 291 292 if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry)) 293 return 0; 294 295 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_idmap(dir->mnt), inode); 296 cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); 297 cond.mode = inode->i_mode; 298 299 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); 300} 301 302/** 303 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create 304 * @op: operation being checked 305 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) 306 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) 307 * @mask: request permission mask 308 * @mode: created file mode 309 * 310 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied 311 */ 312static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir, 313 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode) 314{ 315 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; 316 317 if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry)) 318 return 0; 319 320 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); 321} 322 323static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 324{ 325 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); 326} 327 328static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 329 umode_t mode) 330{ 331 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, 332 S_IFDIR); 333} 334 335static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) 336{ 337 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); 338} 339 340static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 341 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) 342{ 343 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); 344} 345 346static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path) 347{ 348 return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR); 349} 350 351static int apparmor_file_truncate(struct file *file) 352{ 353 return apparmor_path_truncate(&file->f_path); 354} 355 356static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, 357 const char *old_name) 358{ 359 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, 360 S_IFLNK); 361} 362 363static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, 364 struct dentry *new_dentry) 365{ 366 struct aa_label *label; 367 int error = 0; 368 369 if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) 370 return 0; 371 372 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 373 if (!unconfined(label)) 374 error = aa_path_link(current_cred(), label, old_dentry, new_dir, 375 new_dentry); 376 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 377 378 return error; 379} 380 381static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, 382 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, 383 const unsigned int flags) 384{ 385 struct aa_label *label; 386 int error = 0; 387 388 if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry)) 389 return 0; 390 if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && !path_mediated_fs(new_dentry)) 391 return 0; 392 393 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 394 if (!unconfined(label)) { 395 struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(old_dir->mnt); 396 vfsuid_t vfsuid; 397 struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt, 398 .dentry = old_dentry }; 399 struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt, 400 .dentry = new_dentry }; 401 struct path_cond cond = { 402 .mode = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode 403 }; 404 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry)); 405 cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); 406 407 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { 408 struct path_cond cond_exchange = { 409 .mode = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_mode, 410 }; 411 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_backing_inode(old_dentry)); 412 cond_exchange.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); 413 414 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(), 415 label, &new_path, 0, 416 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | 417 AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, 418 &cond_exchange); 419 if (!error) 420 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(), 421 label, &old_path, 422 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | 423 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond_exchange); 424 } 425 426 if (!error) 427 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, current_cred(), 428 label, &old_path, 0, 429 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE | 430 AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE, 431 &cond); 432 if (!error) 433 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, current_cred(), 434 label, &new_path, 435 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR | 436 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); 437 438 } 439 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 440 441 return error; 442} 443 444static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) 445{ 446 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD); 447} 448 449static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) 450{ 451 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN); 452} 453 454static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) 455{ 456 return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); 457} 458 459static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) 460{ 461 struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); 462 struct aa_label *label; 463 int error = 0; 464 465 if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry)) 466 return 0; 467 468 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. 469 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with 470 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to 471 * actually execute the image. 472 * 473 * Illogically, FMODE_EXEC is in f_flags, not f_mode. 474 */ 475 if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) { 476 fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; 477 return 0; 478 } 479 480 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred); 481 if (!unconfined(label)) { 482 struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(file); 483 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); 484 vfsuid_t vfsuid; 485 struct path_cond cond = { 486 .mode = inode->i_mode, 487 }; 488 vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode); 489 cond.uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); 490 491 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, file->f_cred, 492 label, &file->f_path, 0, 493 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); 494 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ 495 fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); 496 } 497 aa_put_label(label); 498 499 return error; 500} 501 502static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) 503{ 504 struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); 505 struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 506 507 spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock); 508 rcu_assign_pointer(ctx->label, aa_get_label(label)); 509 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 510 return 0; 511} 512 513static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) 514{ 515 struct aa_file_ctx *ctx = file_ctx(file); 516 517 if (ctx) 518 aa_put_label(rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label)); 519} 520 521static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask, 522 bool in_atomic) 523{ 524 struct aa_label *label; 525 int error = 0; 526 527 /* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */ 528 if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry) 529 return -EACCES; 530 531 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 532 error = aa_file_perm(op, current_cred(), label, file, mask, in_atomic); 533 __end_current_label_crit_section(label); 534 535 return error; 536} 537 538static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file) 539{ 540 return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file), 541 false); 542} 543 544static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) 545{ 546 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask, false); 547} 548 549static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) 550{ 551 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; 552 553 if (cmd == F_WRLCK) 554 mask |= MAY_WRITE; 555 556 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask, false); 557} 558 559static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, 560 unsigned long flags, bool in_atomic) 561{ 562 int mask = 0; 563 564 if (!file || !file_ctx(file)) 565 return 0; 566 567 if (prot & PROT_READ) 568 mask |= MAY_READ; 569 /* 570 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't 571 * write back to the files 572 */ 573 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) 574 mask |= MAY_WRITE; 575 if (prot & PROT_EXEC) 576 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; 577 578 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask, in_atomic); 579} 580 581static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, 582 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) 583{ 584 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags, GFP_ATOMIC); 585} 586 587static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, 588 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) 589{ 590 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, 591 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0, 592 false); 593} 594 595#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 596static const char *audit_uring_mask(u32 mask) 597{ 598 if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL) 599 return "sqpoll"; 600 if (mask & AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED) 601 return "override_creds"; 602 return ""; 603} 604 605static void audit_uring_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) 606{ 607 struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va); 608 609 if (ad->request & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) { 610 audit_log_format(ab, " requested=\"%s\"", 611 audit_uring_mask(ad->request)); 612 if (ad->denied & AA_URING_PERM_MASK) { 613 audit_log_format(ab, " denied=\"%s\"", 614 audit_uring_mask(ad->denied)); 615 } 616 } 617 if (ad->uring.target) { 618 audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext="); 619 aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), 620 ad->uring.target, 621 FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); 622 } 623} 624 625static int profile_uring(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, 626 struct aa_label *new, int cap, 627 struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) 628{ 629 unsigned int state; 630 struct aa_ruleset *rules; 631 int error = 0; 632 633 AA_BUG(!profile); 634 635 rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); 636 state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_IO_URING); 637 if (state) { 638 struct aa_perms perms = { }; 639 640 if (new) { 641 aa_label_match(profile, rules, new, state, 642 false, request, &perms); 643 } else { 644 perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); 645 } 646 aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); 647 error = aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, 648 audit_uring_cb); 649 } 650 651 return error; 652} 653 654/** 655 * apparmor_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override 656 * @new: the target creds 657 * 658 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials 659 * to service an io_uring operation. 660 */ 661static int apparmor_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) 662{ 663 struct aa_profile *profile; 664 struct aa_label *label; 665 int error; 666 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, 667 OP_URING_OVERRIDE); 668 669 ad.uring.target = cred_label(new); 670 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 671 error = fn_for_each(label, profile, 672 profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_OVERRIDE_CRED, 673 cred_label(new), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); 674 __end_current_label_crit_section(label); 675 676 return error; 677} 678 679/** 680 * apparmor_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created 681 * 682 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring 683 * kernel polling thread. 684 */ 685static int apparmor_uring_sqpoll(void) 686{ 687 struct aa_profile *profile; 688 struct aa_label *label; 689 int error; 690 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_IO_URING, 691 OP_URING_SQPOLL); 692 693 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 694 error = fn_for_each(label, profile, 695 profile_uring(profile, AA_MAY_CREATE_SQPOLL, 696 NULL, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &ad)); 697 __end_current_label_crit_section(label); 698 699 return error; 700} 701#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ 702 703static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, 704 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) 705{ 706 struct aa_label *label; 707 int error = 0; 708 709 /* Discard magic */ 710 if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) 711 flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; 712 713 flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; 714 715 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 716 if (!unconfined(label)) { 717 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) 718 error = aa_remount(current_cred(), label, path, flags, 719 data); 720 else if (flags & MS_BIND) 721 error = aa_bind_mount(current_cred(), label, path, 722 dev_name, flags); 723 else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | 724 MS_UNBINDABLE)) 725 error = aa_mount_change_type(current_cred(), label, 726 path, flags); 727 else if (flags & MS_MOVE) 728 error = aa_move_mount_old(current_cred(), label, path, 729 dev_name); 730 else 731 error = aa_new_mount(current_cred(), label, dev_name, 732 path, type, flags, data); 733 } 734 __end_current_label_crit_section(label); 735 736 return error; 737} 738 739static int apparmor_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, 740 const struct path *to_path) 741{ 742 struct aa_label *label; 743 int error = 0; 744 745 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 746 if (!unconfined(label)) 747 error = aa_move_mount(current_cred(), label, from_path, 748 to_path); 749 __end_current_label_crit_section(label); 750 751 return error; 752} 753 754static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) 755{ 756 struct aa_label *label; 757 int error = 0; 758 759 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 760 if (!unconfined(label)) 761 error = aa_umount(current_cred(), label, mnt, flags); 762 __end_current_label_crit_section(label); 763 764 return error; 765} 766 767static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, 768 const struct path *new_path) 769{ 770 struct aa_label *label; 771 int error = 0; 772 773 label = aa_get_current_label(); 774 if (!unconfined(label)) 775 error = aa_pivotroot(current_cred(), label, old_path, new_path); 776 aa_put_label(label); 777 778 return error; 779} 780 781static int apparmor_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *lx, 782 u32 *size, u32 flags) 783{ 784 int error = -ENOENT; 785 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); 786 struct aa_label *label = NULL; 787 char *value = NULL; 788 789 switch (attr) { 790 case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT: 791 label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(current_cred())); 792 break; 793 case LSM_ATTR_PREV: 794 if (ctx->previous) 795 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); 796 break; 797 case LSM_ATTR_EXEC: 798 if (ctx->onexec) 799 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec); 800 break; 801 default: 802 error = -EOPNOTSUPP; 803 break; 804 } 805 806 if (label) { 807 error = aa_getprocattr(label, &value, false); 808 if (error > 0) 809 error = lsm_fill_user_ctx(lx, size, value, error, 810 LSM_ID_APPARMOR, 0); 811 kfree(value); 812 } 813 814 aa_put_label(label); 815 816 if (error < 0) 817 return error; 818 return 1; 819} 820 821static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name, 822 char **value) 823{ 824 int error = -ENOENT; 825 /* released below */ 826 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); 827 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); 828 struct aa_label *label = NULL; 829 830 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) 831 label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred)); 832 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous) 833 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous); 834 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec) 835 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec); 836 else 837 error = -EINVAL; 838 839 if (label) 840 error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, true); 841 842 aa_put_label(label); 843 put_cred(cred); 844 845 return error; 846} 847 848static int do_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size) 849{ 850 char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value; 851 size_t arg_size; 852 int error; 853 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, AA_CLASS_NONE, 854 OP_SETPROCATTR); 855 856 if (size == 0) 857 return -EINVAL; 858 859 /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ 860 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { 861 /* null terminate */ 862 largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 863 if (!args) 864 return -ENOMEM; 865 memcpy(args, value, size); 866 args[size] = '\0'; 867 } 868 869 error = -EINVAL; 870 args = strim(args); 871 command = strsep(&args, " "); 872 if (!args) 873 goto out; 874 args = skip_spaces(args); 875 if (!*args) 876 goto out; 877 878 arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value)); 879 if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) { 880 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { 881 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, 882 AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); 883 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { 884 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, 885 AA_CHANGE_TEST); 886 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { 887 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS); 888 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { 889 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST); 890 } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) { 891 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK); 892 } else 893 goto fail; 894 } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) { 895 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0) 896 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC); 897 else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) 898 error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC | 899 AA_CHANGE_STACK)); 900 else 901 goto fail; 902 } else 903 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ 904 goto fail; 905 906 if (!error) 907 error = size; 908out: 909 kfree(largs); 910 return error; 911 912fail: 913 ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 914 if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) 915 ad.info = "current"; 916 else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) 917 ad.info = "exec"; 918 else 919 ad.info = "invalid"; 920 ad.error = error = -EINVAL; 921 aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL); 922 end_current_label_crit_section(ad.subj_label); 923 goto out; 924} 925 926static int apparmor_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx, 927 u32 size, u32 flags) 928{ 929 int rc; 930 931 if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT && attr != LSM_ATTR_EXEC) 932 return -EOPNOTSUPP; 933 934 rc = do_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len); 935 if (rc > 0) 936 return 0; 937 return rc; 938} 939 940static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, 941 size_t size) 942{ 943 int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name); 944 945 if (attr) 946 return do_setattr(attr, value, size); 947 return -EINVAL; 948} 949 950/** 951 * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds 952 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) 953 */ 954static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) 955{ 956 struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label(); 957 struct aa_label *new_label = cred_label(bprm->cred); 958 959 /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ 960 if ((new_label->proxy == label->proxy) || 961 (unconfined(new_label))) 962 return; 963 964 aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files); 965 966 current->pdeath_signal = 0; 967 968 /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */ 969 __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_label); 970} 971 972/** 973 * apparmor_bprm_committed_creds() - do cleanup after new creds committed 974 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) 975 */ 976static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) 977{ 978 /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */ 979 aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current)); 980 981 return; 982} 983 984static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) 985{ 986 struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 987 *secid = label->secid; 988 __end_current_label_crit_section(label); 989} 990 991static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) 992{ 993 struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p); 994 *secid = label->secid; 995 aa_put_label(label); 996} 997 998static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, 999 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) 1000{ 1001 struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 1002 int error = 0; 1003 1004 if (!unconfined(label)) 1005 error = aa_task_setrlimit(current_cred(), label, task, 1006 resource, new_rlim); 1007 __end_current_label_crit_section(label); 1008 1009 return error; 1010} 1011 1012static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo *info, 1013 int sig, const struct cred *cred) 1014{ 1015 const struct cred *tc; 1016 struct aa_label *cl, *tl; 1017 int error; 1018 1019 tc = get_task_cred(target); 1020 tl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(tc); 1021 if (cred) { 1022 /* 1023 * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior 1024 */ 1025 cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); 1026 error = aa_may_signal(cred, cl, tc, tl, sig); 1027 aa_put_label(cl); 1028 } else { 1029 cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); 1030 error = aa_may_signal(current_cred(), cl, tc, tl, sig); 1031 __end_current_label_crit_section(cl); 1032 } 1033 aa_put_label(tl); 1034 put_cred(tc); 1035 1036 return error; 1037} 1038 1039static int apparmor_userns_create(const struct cred *cred) 1040{ 1041 struct aa_label *label; 1042 struct aa_profile *profile; 1043 int error = 0; 1044 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK, AA_CLASS_NS, 1045 OP_USERNS_CREATE); 1046 1047 ad.subj_cred = current_cred(); 1048 1049 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 1050 if (!unconfined(label)) { 1051 error = fn_for_each(label, profile, 1052 aa_profile_ns_perm(profile, &ad, 1053 AA_USERNS_CREATE)); 1054 } 1055 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 1056 1057 return error; 1058} 1059 1060static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) 1061{ 1062 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; 1063 1064 ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags); 1065 if (!ctx) 1066 return -ENOMEM; 1067 1068 sk->sk_security = ctx; 1069 1070 return 0; 1071} 1072 1073static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) 1074{ 1075 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1076 1077 sk->sk_security = NULL; 1078 aa_put_label(ctx->label); 1079 aa_put_label(ctx->peer); 1080 kfree(ctx); 1081} 1082 1083/** 1084 * apparmor_sk_clone_security - clone the sk_security field 1085 * @sk: sock to have security cloned 1086 * @newsk: sock getting clone 1087 */ 1088static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, 1089 struct sock *newsk) 1090{ 1091 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1092 struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk); 1093 1094 if (new->label) 1095 aa_put_label(new->label); 1096 new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); 1097 1098 if (new->peer) 1099 aa_put_label(new->peer); 1100 new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); 1101} 1102 1103static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) 1104{ 1105 struct aa_label *label; 1106 int error = 0; 1107 1108 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1109 1110 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 1111 if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) 1112 error = af_select(family, 1113 create_perm(label, family, type, protocol), 1114 aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label, 1115 OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, 1116 family, type, protocol)); 1117 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 1118 1119 return error; 1120} 1121 1122/** 1123 * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct 1124 * @sock: socket that is being setup 1125 * @family: family of socket being created 1126 * @type: type of the socket 1127 * @ptotocol: protocol of the socket 1128 * @kern: socket is a special kernel socket 1129 * 1130 * Note: 1131 * - kernel sockets labeled kernel_t used to use unconfined 1132 * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or 1133 * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in 1134 * sock_graft. 1135 */ 1136static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, 1137 int type, int protocol, int kern) 1138{ 1139 struct aa_label *label; 1140 1141 if (kern) { 1142 label = aa_get_label(kernel_t); 1143 } else 1144 label = aa_get_current_label(); 1145 1146 if (sock->sk) { 1147 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk); 1148 1149 aa_put_label(ctx->label); 1150 ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); 1151 } 1152 aa_put_label(label); 1153 1154 return 0; 1155} 1156 1157static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, 1158 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 1159{ 1160 AA_BUG(!sock); 1161 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1162 AA_BUG(!address); 1163 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1164 1165 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, 1166 bind_perm(sock, address, addrlen), 1167 aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk)); 1168} 1169 1170static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, 1171 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) 1172{ 1173 AA_BUG(!sock); 1174 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1175 AA_BUG(!address); 1176 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1177 1178 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, 1179 connect_perm(sock, address, addrlen), 1180 aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk)); 1181} 1182 1183static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) 1184{ 1185 AA_BUG(!sock); 1186 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1187 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1188 1189 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, 1190 listen_perm(sock, backlog), 1191 aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk)); 1192} 1193 1194/* 1195 * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept 1196 * has not been done. 1197 */ 1198static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) 1199{ 1200 AA_BUG(!sock); 1201 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1202 AA_BUG(!newsock); 1203 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1204 1205 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, 1206 accept_perm(sock, newsock), 1207 aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk)); 1208} 1209 1210static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, 1211 struct msghdr *msg, int size) 1212{ 1213 AA_BUG(!sock); 1214 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1215 AA_BUG(!msg); 1216 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1217 1218 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, 1219 msg_perm(op, request, sock, msg, size), 1220 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); 1221} 1222 1223static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, 1224 struct msghdr *msg, int size) 1225{ 1226 return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); 1227} 1228 1229static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, 1230 struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) 1231{ 1232 return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); 1233} 1234 1235/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ 1236static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) 1237{ 1238 AA_BUG(!sock); 1239 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1240 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1241 1242 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, 1243 sock_perm(op, request, sock), 1244 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); 1245} 1246 1247static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) 1248{ 1249 return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); 1250} 1251 1252static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) 1253{ 1254 return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); 1255} 1256 1257/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ 1258static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, 1259 int level, int optname) 1260{ 1261 AA_BUG(!sock); 1262 AA_BUG(!sock->sk); 1263 AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); 1264 1265 return af_select(sock->sk->sk_family, 1266 opt_perm(op, request, sock, level, optname), 1267 aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk)); 1268} 1269 1270static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, 1271 int optname) 1272{ 1273 return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, 1274 level, optname); 1275} 1276 1277static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, 1278 int optname) 1279{ 1280 return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, 1281 level, optname); 1282} 1283 1284static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) 1285{ 1286 return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); 1287} 1288 1289#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK 1290/** 1291 * apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk 1292 * @sk: sk to associate @skb with 1293 * @skb: skb to check for perms 1294 * 1295 * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held 1296 * 1297 * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() 1298 * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() 1299 */ 1300static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) 1301{ 1302 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1303 1304 if (!skb->secmark) 1305 return 0; 1306 1307 return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, 1308 skb->secmark, sk); 1309} 1310#endif 1311 1312 1313static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) 1314{ 1315 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1316 1317 if (ctx->peer) 1318 return ctx->peer; 1319 1320 return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); 1321} 1322 1323/** 1324 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer 1325 * @sock: socket that we are trying to get the peer context of 1326 * @optval: output - buffer to copy peer name to 1327 * @optlen: output - size of copied name in @optval 1328 * @len: size of @optval buffer 1329 * Returns: 0 on success, -errno of failure 1330 * 1331 * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan 1332 */ 1333static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, 1334 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen, 1335 unsigned int len) 1336{ 1337 char *name = NULL; 1338 int slen, error = 0; 1339 struct aa_label *label; 1340 struct aa_label *peer; 1341 1342 label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); 1343 peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); 1344 if (IS_ERR(peer)) { 1345 error = PTR_ERR(peer); 1346 goto done; 1347 } 1348 slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, 1349 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | 1350 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); 1351 /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ 1352 if (slen < 0) { 1353 error = -ENOMEM; 1354 goto done; 1355 } 1356 if (slen > len) { 1357 error = -ERANGE; 1358 goto done_len; 1359 } 1360 1361 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, name, slen)) 1362 error = -EFAULT; 1363done_len: 1364 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen))) 1365 error = -EFAULT; 1366done: 1367 end_current_label_crit_section(label); 1368 kfree(name); 1369 return error; 1370} 1371 1372/** 1373 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet 1374 * @sock: the peer socket 1375 * @skb: packet data 1376 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet 1377 * 1378 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent 1379 */ 1380static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, 1381 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) 1382 1383{ 1384 /* TODO: requires secid support */ 1385 return -ENOPROTOOPT; 1386} 1387 1388/** 1389 * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket 1390 * @sk: child sock 1391 * @parent: parent socket 1392 * 1393 * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can 1394 * just set sk security information off of current creating process label 1395 * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based 1396 * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled 1397 * socket is shared by different tasks. 1398 */ 1399static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) 1400{ 1401 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1402 1403 if (!ctx->label) 1404 ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); 1405} 1406 1407#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK 1408static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, 1409 struct request_sock *req) 1410{ 1411 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk); 1412 1413 if (!skb->secmark) 1414 return 0; 1415 1416 return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, 1417 skb->secmark, sk); 1418} 1419#endif 1420 1421/* 1422 * The cred blob is a pointer to, not an instance of, an aa_label. 1423 */ 1424struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { 1425 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_label *), 1426 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), 1427 .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), 1428}; 1429 1430static const struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = { 1431 .name = "apparmor", 1432 .id = LSM_ID_APPARMOR, 1433}; 1434 1435static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { 1436 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), 1437 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), 1438 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), 1439 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), 1440 1441 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, apparmor_move_mount), 1442 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount), 1443 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount), 1444 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot), 1445 1446 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), 1447 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), 1448 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), 1449 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir), 1450 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir), 1451 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod), 1452 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename), 1453 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod), 1454 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown), 1455 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate), 1456 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr), 1457 1458 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open), 1459 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive), 1460 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission), 1461 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security), 1462 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security), 1463 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file), 1464 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect), 1465 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock), 1466 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate), 1467 1468 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, apparmor_getselfattr), 1469 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, apparmor_setselfattr), 1470 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), 1471 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), 1472 1473 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), 1474 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), 1475 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), 1476 1477 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), 1478 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), 1479 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), 1480 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), 1481 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), 1482 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), 1483 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), 1484 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), 1485 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), 1486 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), 1487 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), 1488 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), 1489 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), 1490#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK 1491 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), 1492#endif 1493 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, 1494 apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), 1495 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, 1496 apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), 1497 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), 1498#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK 1499 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request), 1500#endif 1501 1502 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), 1503 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), 1504 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), 1505 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer), 1506 1507 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec), 1508 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds), 1509 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), 1510 1511 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free), 1512 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc), 1513 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj), 1514 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj), 1515 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), 1516 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), 1517 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create), 1518 1519#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT 1520 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, aa_audit_rule_init), 1521 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, aa_audit_rule_known), 1522 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, aa_audit_rule_match), 1523 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, aa_audit_rule_free), 1524#endif 1525 1526 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx), 1527 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid), 1528 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx), 1529 1530#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING 1531 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, apparmor_uring_override_creds), 1532 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, apparmor_uring_sqpoll), 1533#endif 1534}; 1535 1536/* 1537 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters 1538 */ 1539 1540static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1541static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1542#define param_check_aabool param_check_bool 1543static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = { 1544 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, 1545 .set = param_set_aabool, 1546 .get = param_get_aabool 1547}; 1548 1549static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1550static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1551#define param_check_aauint param_check_uint 1552static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = { 1553 .set = param_set_aauint, 1554 .get = param_get_aauint 1555}; 1556 1557static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, 1558 const struct kernel_param *kp); 1559static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, 1560 const struct kernel_param *kp); 1561#define param_check_aacompressionlevel param_check_int 1562static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aacompressionlevel = { 1563 .set = param_set_aacompressionlevel, 1564 .get = param_get_aacompressionlevel 1565}; 1566 1567static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1568static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1569#define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool 1570static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { 1571 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG, 1572 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy, 1573 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy 1574}; 1575 1576static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1577static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1578 1579static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1580static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1581 1582/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters 1583 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. 1584 */ 1585 1586/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ 1587enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; 1588module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, 1589 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1590 1591/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */ 1592bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); 1593#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH 1594module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1595#endif 1596 1597/* whether policy exactly as loaded is retained for debug and checkpointing */ 1598bool aa_g_export_binary = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY); 1599#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY 1600module_param_named(export_binary, aa_g_export_binary, aabool, 0600); 1601#endif 1602 1603/* policy loaddata compression level */ 1604int aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = AA_DEFAULT_CLEVEL; 1605module_param_named(rawdata_compression_level, aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, 1606 aacompressionlevel, 0400); 1607 1608/* Debug mode */ 1609bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES); 1610module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1611 1612/* Audit mode */ 1613enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; 1614module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, 1615 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1616 1617/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This 1618 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running 1619 */ 1620bool aa_g_audit_header = true; 1621module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, 1622 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1623 1624/* lock out loading/removal of policy 1625 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to 1626 * load policy, if lock_policy is set 1627 */ 1628bool aa_g_lock_policy; 1629module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, 1630 S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1631 1632/* Syscall logging mode */ 1633bool aa_g_logsyscall; 1634module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); 1635 1636/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ 1637unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; 1638module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); 1639 1640/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification 1641 * on the loaded policy is done. 1642 * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now 1643 * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. 1644 */ 1645bool aa_g_paranoid_load = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_PARANOID_LOAD); 1646module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); 1647 1648static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1649static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); 1650#define param_check_aaintbool param_check_int 1651static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aaintbool = { 1652 .set = param_set_aaintbool, 1653 .get = param_get_aaintbool 1654}; 1655/* Boot time disable flag */ 1656static int apparmor_enabled __ro_after_init = 1; 1657module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aaintbool, 0444); 1658 1659static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) 1660{ 1661 unsigned long enabled; 1662 int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled); 1663 if (!error) 1664 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; 1665 return 1; 1666} 1667 1668__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); 1669 1670/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ 1671static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1672{ 1673 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1674 return -EINVAL; 1675 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 1676 return -EPERM; 1677 return param_set_bool(val, kp); 1678} 1679 1680static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1681{ 1682 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1683 return -EINVAL; 1684 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 1685 return -EPERM; 1686 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); 1687} 1688 1689static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1690{ 1691 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1692 return -EINVAL; 1693 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 1694 return -EPERM; 1695 return param_set_bool(val, kp); 1696} 1697 1698static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1699{ 1700 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1701 return -EINVAL; 1702 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 1703 return -EPERM; 1704 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); 1705} 1706 1707static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1708{ 1709 int error; 1710 1711 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1712 return -EINVAL; 1713 /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */ 1714 if (apparmor_initialized) 1715 return -EPERM; 1716 1717 error = param_set_uint(val, kp); 1718 aa_g_path_max = max_t(uint32_t, aa_g_path_max, sizeof(union aa_buffer)); 1719 pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max); 1720 1721 return error; 1722} 1723 1724static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1725{ 1726 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1727 return -EINVAL; 1728 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 1729 return -EPERM; 1730 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); 1731} 1732 1733/* Can only be set before AppArmor is initialized (i.e. on boot cmdline). */ 1734static int param_set_aaintbool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1735{ 1736 struct kernel_param kp_local; 1737 bool value; 1738 int error; 1739 1740 if (apparmor_initialized) 1741 return -EPERM; 1742 1743 /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ 1744 value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); 1745 memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); 1746 kp_local.arg = &value; 1747 1748 error = param_set_bool(val, &kp_local); 1749 if (!error) 1750 *((int *)kp->arg) = *((bool *)kp_local.arg); 1751 return error; 1752} 1753 1754/* 1755 * To avoid changing /sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled from Y/N to 1756 * 1/0, this converts the "int that is actually bool" back to bool for 1757 * display in the /sys filesystem, while keeping it "int" for the LSM 1758 * infrastructure. 1759 */ 1760static int param_get_aaintbool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1761{ 1762 struct kernel_param kp_local; 1763 bool value; 1764 1765 /* Create local copy, with arg pointing to bool type. */ 1766 value = !!*((int *)kp->arg); 1767 memcpy(&kp_local, kp, sizeof(kp_local)); 1768 kp_local.arg = &value; 1769 1770 return param_get_bool(buffer, &kp_local); 1771} 1772 1773static int param_set_aacompressionlevel(const char *val, 1774 const struct kernel_param *kp) 1775{ 1776 int error; 1777 1778 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1779 return -EINVAL; 1780 if (apparmor_initialized) 1781 return -EPERM; 1782 1783 error = param_set_int(val, kp); 1784 1785 aa_g_rawdata_compression_level = clamp(aa_g_rawdata_compression_level, 1786 AA_MIN_CLEVEL, AA_MAX_CLEVEL); 1787 pr_info("AppArmor: policy rawdata compression level set to %d\n", 1788 aa_g_rawdata_compression_level); 1789 1790 return error; 1791} 1792 1793static int param_get_aacompressionlevel(char *buffer, 1794 const struct kernel_param *kp) 1795{ 1796 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1797 return -EINVAL; 1798 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 1799 return -EPERM; 1800 return param_get_int(buffer, kp); 1801} 1802 1803static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1804{ 1805 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1806 return -EINVAL; 1807 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 1808 return -EPERM; 1809 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); 1810} 1811 1812static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1813{ 1814 int i; 1815 1816 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1817 return -EINVAL; 1818 if (!val) 1819 return -EINVAL; 1820 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 1821 return -EPERM; 1822 1823 i = match_string(audit_mode_names, AUDIT_MAX_INDEX, val); 1824 if (i < 0) 1825 return -EINVAL; 1826 1827 aa_g_audit = i; 1828 return 0; 1829} 1830 1831static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1832{ 1833 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1834 return -EINVAL; 1835 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_view_capable(NULL)) 1836 return -EPERM; 1837 1838 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); 1839} 1840 1841static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 1842{ 1843 int i; 1844 1845 if (!apparmor_enabled) 1846 return -EINVAL; 1847 if (!val) 1848 return -EINVAL; 1849 if (apparmor_initialized && !aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 1850 return -EPERM; 1851 1852 i = match_string(aa_profile_mode_names, APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX, 1853 val); 1854 if (i < 0) 1855 return -EINVAL; 1856 1857 aa_g_profile_mode = i; 1858 return 0; 1859} 1860 1861char *aa_get_buffer(bool in_atomic) 1862{ 1863 union aa_buffer *aa_buf; 1864 struct aa_local_cache *cache; 1865 bool try_again = true; 1866 gfp_t flags = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); 1867 1868 /* use per cpu cached buffers first */ 1869 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1870 if (!list_empty(&cache->head)) { 1871 aa_buf = list_first_entry(&cache->head, union aa_buffer, list); 1872 list_del(&aa_buf->list); 1873 cache->hold--; 1874 cache->count--; 1875 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1876 return &aa_buf->buffer[0]; 1877 } 1878 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1879 1880 if (!spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) { 1881 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1882 cache->hold += 1; 1883 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1884 spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); 1885 } else { 1886 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1887 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1888 } 1889retry: 1890 if (buffer_count > reserve_count || 1891 (in_atomic && !list_empty(&aa_global_buffers))) { 1892 aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, 1893 list); 1894 list_del(&aa_buf->list); 1895 buffer_count--; 1896 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 1897 return aa_buf->buffer; 1898 } 1899 if (in_atomic) { 1900 /* 1901 * out of reserve buffers and in atomic context so increase 1902 * how many buffers to keep in reserve 1903 */ 1904 reserve_count++; 1905 flags = GFP_ATOMIC; 1906 } 1907 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 1908 1909 if (!in_atomic) 1910 might_sleep(); 1911 aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, flags); 1912 if (!aa_buf) { 1913 if (try_again) { 1914 try_again = false; 1915 spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); 1916 goto retry; 1917 } 1918 pr_warn_once("AppArmor: Failed to allocate a memory buffer.\n"); 1919 return NULL; 1920 } 1921 return aa_buf->buffer; 1922} 1923 1924void aa_put_buffer(char *buf) 1925{ 1926 union aa_buffer *aa_buf; 1927 struct aa_local_cache *cache; 1928 1929 if (!buf) 1930 return; 1931 aa_buf = container_of(buf, union aa_buffer, buffer[0]); 1932 1933 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1934 if (!cache->hold) { 1935 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1936 1937 if (spin_trylock(&aa_buffers_lock)) { 1938 /* put back on global list */ 1939 list_add(&aa_buf->list, &aa_global_buffers); 1940 buffer_count++; 1941 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 1942 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1943 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1944 return; 1945 } 1946 /* contention on global list, fallback to percpu */ 1947 cache = get_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1948 cache->hold += 1; 1949 } 1950 1951 /* cache in percpu list */ 1952 list_add(&aa_buf->list, &cache->head); 1953 cache->count++; 1954 put_cpu_ptr(&aa_local_buffers); 1955} 1956 1957/* 1958 * AppArmor init functions 1959 */ 1960 1961/** 1962 * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task. 1963 * 1964 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined 1965 */ 1966static int __init set_init_ctx(void) 1967{ 1968 struct cred *cred = (__force struct cred *)current->real_cred; 1969 1970 set_cred_label(cred, aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns))); 1971 1972 return 0; 1973} 1974 1975static void destroy_buffers(void) 1976{ 1977 union aa_buffer *aa_buf; 1978 1979 spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); 1980 while (!list_empty(&aa_global_buffers)) { 1981 aa_buf = list_first_entry(&aa_global_buffers, union aa_buffer, 1982 list); 1983 list_del(&aa_buf->list); 1984 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 1985 kfree(aa_buf); 1986 spin_lock(&aa_buffers_lock); 1987 } 1988 spin_unlock(&aa_buffers_lock); 1989} 1990 1991static int __init alloc_buffers(void) 1992{ 1993 union aa_buffer *aa_buf; 1994 int i, num; 1995 1996 /* 1997 * per cpu set of cached allocated buffers used to help reduce 1998 * lock contention 1999 */ 2000 for_each_possible_cpu(i) { 2001 per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).hold = 0; 2002 per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).count = 0; 2003 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(aa_local_buffers, i).head); 2004 } 2005 /* 2006 * A function may require two buffers at once. Usually the buffers are 2007 * used for a short period of time and are shared. On UP kernel buffers 2008 * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more 2009 * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow. 2010 * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be 2011 * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high. 2012 */ 2013 if (num_online_cpus() > 1) 2014 num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT; 2015 else 2016 num = 2 + RESERVE_COUNT; 2017 2018 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { 2019 2020 aa_buf = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL | 2021 __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL | __GFP_NOWARN); 2022 if (!aa_buf) { 2023 destroy_buffers(); 2024 return -ENOMEM; 2025 } 2026 aa_put_buffer(aa_buf->buffer); 2027 } 2028 return 0; 2029} 2030 2031#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL 2032static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, 2033 void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) 2034{ 2035 if (!aa_current_policy_admin_capable(NULL)) 2036 return -EPERM; 2037 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2038 return -EINVAL; 2039 2040 return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); 2041} 2042 2043static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = { 2044#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS 2045 { 2046 .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy", 2047 .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy, 2048 .maxlen = sizeof(int), 2049 .mode = 0600, 2050 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, 2051 }, 2052#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */ 2053 { 2054 .procname = "apparmor_display_secid_mode", 2055 .data = &apparmor_display_secid_mode, 2056 .maxlen = sizeof(int), 2057 .mode = 0600, 2058 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, 2059 }, 2060 { 2061 .procname = "apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_unconfined", 2062 .data = &aa_unprivileged_unconfined_restricted, 2063 .maxlen = sizeof(int), 2064 .mode = 0600, 2065 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec, 2066 }, 2067 { } 2068}; 2069 2070static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void) 2071{ 2072 return register_sysctl("kernel", apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; 2073} 2074#else 2075static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void) 2076{ 2077 return 0; 2078} 2079#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ 2080 2081#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK) 2082static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv, 2083 struct sk_buff *skb, 2084 const struct nf_hook_state *state) 2085{ 2086 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; 2087 struct sock *sk; 2088 2089 if (!skb->secmark) 2090 return NF_ACCEPT; 2091 2092 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); 2093 if (sk == NULL) 2094 return NF_ACCEPT; 2095 2096 ctx = aa_sock(sk); 2097 if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, 2098 skb->secmark, sk)) 2099 return NF_ACCEPT; 2100 2101 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); 2102 2103} 2104 2105static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = { 2106 { 2107 .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute, 2108 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, 2109 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, 2110 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, 2111 }, 2112#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) 2113 { 2114 .hook = apparmor_ip_postroute, 2115 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, 2116 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, 2117 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, 2118 }, 2119#endif 2120}; 2121 2122static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net) 2123{ 2124 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, 2125 ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); 2126} 2127 2128static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net) 2129{ 2130 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops, 2131 ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops)); 2132} 2133 2134static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = { 2135 .init = apparmor_nf_register, 2136 .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister, 2137}; 2138 2139static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void) 2140{ 2141 int err; 2142 2143 if (!apparmor_enabled) 2144 return 0; 2145 2146 err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops); 2147 if (err) 2148 panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err); 2149 2150 return 0; 2151} 2152__initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init); 2153#endif 2154 2155static char nulldfa_src[] = { 2156 #include "nulldfa.in" 2157}; 2158static struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; 2159 2160static char stacksplitdfa_src[] = { 2161 #include "stacksplitdfa.in" 2162}; 2163struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; 2164struct aa_policydb *nullpdb; 2165 2166static int __init aa_setup_dfa_engine(void) 2167{ 2168 int error = -ENOMEM; 2169 2170 nullpdb = aa_alloc_pdb(GFP_KERNEL); 2171 if (!nullpdb) 2172 return -ENOMEM; 2173 2174 nulldfa = aa_dfa_unpack(nulldfa_src, sizeof(nulldfa_src), 2175 TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | 2176 TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); 2177 if (IS_ERR(nulldfa)) { 2178 error = PTR_ERR(nulldfa); 2179 goto fail; 2180 } 2181 nullpdb->dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); 2182 nullpdb->perms = kcalloc(2, sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL); 2183 if (!nullpdb->perms) 2184 goto fail; 2185 nullpdb->size = 2; 2186 2187 stacksplitdfa = aa_dfa_unpack(stacksplitdfa_src, 2188 sizeof(stacksplitdfa_src), 2189 TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | 2190 TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32)); 2191 if (IS_ERR(stacksplitdfa)) { 2192 error = PTR_ERR(stacksplitdfa); 2193 goto fail; 2194 } 2195 2196 return 0; 2197 2198fail: 2199 aa_put_pdb(nullpdb); 2200 aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); 2201 nullpdb = NULL; 2202 nulldfa = NULL; 2203 stacksplitdfa = NULL; 2204 2205 return error; 2206} 2207 2208static void __init aa_teardown_dfa_engine(void) 2209{ 2210 aa_put_dfa(stacksplitdfa); 2211 aa_put_dfa(nulldfa); 2212 aa_put_pdb(nullpdb); 2213 nullpdb = NULL; 2214 stacksplitdfa = NULL; 2215 nulldfa = NULL; 2216} 2217 2218static int __init apparmor_init(void) 2219{ 2220 int error; 2221 2222 error = aa_setup_dfa_engine(); 2223 if (error) { 2224 AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n"); 2225 goto alloc_out; 2226 } 2227 2228 error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); 2229 if (error) { 2230 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); 2231 goto alloc_out; 2232 } 2233 2234 error = apparmor_init_sysctl(); 2235 if (error) { 2236 AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n"); 2237 goto alloc_out; 2238 2239 } 2240 2241 error = alloc_buffers(); 2242 if (error) { 2243 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n"); 2244 goto alloc_out; 2245 } 2246 2247 error = set_init_ctx(); 2248 if (error) { 2249 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); 2250 aa_free_root_ns(); 2251 goto buffers_out; 2252 } 2253 security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks), 2254 &apparmor_lsmid); 2255 2256 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ 2257 apparmor_initialized = 1; 2258 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) 2259 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); 2260 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) 2261 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); 2262 else 2263 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); 2264 2265 return error; 2266 2267buffers_out: 2268 destroy_buffers(); 2269alloc_out: 2270 aa_destroy_aafs(); 2271 aa_teardown_dfa_engine(); 2272 2273 apparmor_enabled = false; 2274 return error; 2275} 2276 2277DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) = { 2278 .name = "apparmor", 2279 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE, 2280 .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, 2281 .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, 2282 .init = apparmor_init, 2283}; 2284