1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2/*
3 * Encryption policy functions for per-file encryption support.
4 *
5 * Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
6 * Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility.
7 *
8 * Originally written by Michael Halcrow, 2015.
9 * Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
10 * Modified by Eric Biggers, 2019 for v2 policy support.
11 */
12
13#include <linux/fs_context.h>
14#include <linux/random.h>
15#include <linux/seq_file.h>
16#include <linux/string.h>
17#include <linux/mount.h>
18#include "fscrypt_private.h"
19
20/**
21 * fscrypt_policies_equal() - check whether two encryption policies are the same
22 * @policy1: the first policy
23 * @policy2: the second policy
24 *
25 * Return: %true if equal, else %false
26 */
27bool fscrypt_policies_equal(const union fscrypt_policy *policy1,
28			    const union fscrypt_policy *policy2)
29{
30	if (policy1->version != policy2->version)
31		return false;
32
33	return !memcmp(policy1, policy2, fscrypt_policy_size(policy1));
34}
35
36int fscrypt_policy_to_key_spec(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
37			       struct fscrypt_key_specifier *key_spec)
38{
39	switch (policy->version) {
40	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
41		key_spec->type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR;
42		memcpy(key_spec->u.descriptor, policy->v1.master_key_descriptor,
43		       FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
44		return 0;
45	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
46		key_spec->type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER;
47		memcpy(key_spec->u.identifier, policy->v2.master_key_identifier,
48		       FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
49		return 0;
50	default:
51		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
52		return -EINVAL;
53	}
54}
55
56const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_get_dummy_policy(struct super_block *sb)
57{
58	if (!sb->s_cop->get_dummy_policy)
59		return NULL;
60	return sb->s_cop->get_dummy_policy(sb);
61}
62
63/*
64 * Return %true if the given combination of encryption modes is supported for v1
65 * (and later) encryption policies.
66 *
67 * Do *not* add anything new here, since v1 encryption policies are deprecated.
68 * New combinations of modes should go in fscrypt_valid_enc_modes_v2() only.
69 */
70static bool fscrypt_valid_enc_modes_v1(u32 contents_mode, u32 filenames_mode)
71{
72	if (contents_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS &&
73	    filenames_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS)
74		return true;
75
76	if (contents_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_128_CBC &&
77	    filenames_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_128_CTS)
78		return true;
79
80	if (contents_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM &&
81	    filenames_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM)
82		return true;
83
84	return false;
85}
86
87static bool fscrypt_valid_enc_modes_v2(u32 contents_mode, u32 filenames_mode)
88{
89	if (contents_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS &&
90	    filenames_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_HCTR2)
91		return true;
92
93	if (contents_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_SM4_XTS &&
94	    filenames_mode == FSCRYPT_MODE_SM4_CTS)
95		return true;
96
97	return fscrypt_valid_enc_modes_v1(contents_mode, filenames_mode);
98}
99
100static bool supported_direct_key_modes(const struct inode *inode,
101				       u32 contents_mode, u32 filenames_mode)
102{
103	const struct fscrypt_mode *mode;
104
105	if (contents_mode != filenames_mode) {
106		fscrypt_warn(inode,
107			     "Direct key flag not allowed with different contents and filenames modes");
108		return false;
109	}
110	mode = &fscrypt_modes[contents_mode];
111
112	if (mode->ivsize < offsetofend(union fscrypt_iv, nonce)) {
113		fscrypt_warn(inode, "Direct key flag not allowed with %s",
114			     mode->friendly_name);
115		return false;
116	}
117	return true;
118}
119
120static bool supported_iv_ino_lblk_policy(const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy,
121					 const struct inode *inode)
122{
123	const char *type = (policy->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64)
124				? "IV_INO_LBLK_64" : "IV_INO_LBLK_32";
125	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
126
127	/*
128	 * IV_INO_LBLK_* exist only because of hardware limitations, and
129	 * currently the only known use case for them involves AES-256-XTS.
130	 * That's also all we test currently.  For these reasons, for now only
131	 * allow AES-256-XTS here.  This can be relaxed later if a use case for
132	 * IV_INO_LBLK_* with other encryption modes arises.
133	 */
134	if (policy->contents_encryption_mode != FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS) {
135		fscrypt_warn(inode,
136			     "Can't use %s policy with contents mode other than AES-256-XTS",
137			     type);
138		return false;
139	}
140
141	/*
142	 * It's unsafe to include inode numbers in the IVs if the filesystem can
143	 * potentially renumber inodes, e.g. via filesystem shrinking.
144	 */
145	if (!sb->s_cop->has_stable_inodes ||
146	    !sb->s_cop->has_stable_inodes(sb)) {
147		fscrypt_warn(inode,
148			     "Can't use %s policy on filesystem '%s' because it doesn't have stable inode numbers",
149			     type, sb->s_id);
150		return false;
151	}
152
153	/*
154	 * IV_INO_LBLK_64 and IV_INO_LBLK_32 both require that inode numbers fit
155	 * in 32 bits.  In principle, IV_INO_LBLK_32 could support longer inode
156	 * numbers because it hashes the inode number; however, currently the
157	 * inode number is gotten from inode::i_ino which is 'unsigned long'.
158	 * So for now the implementation limit is 32 bits.
159	 */
160	if (!sb->s_cop->has_32bit_inodes) {
161		fscrypt_warn(inode,
162			     "Can't use %s policy on filesystem '%s' because its inode numbers are too long",
163			     type, sb->s_id);
164		return false;
165	}
166
167	/*
168	 * IV_INO_LBLK_64 and IV_INO_LBLK_32 both require that file data unit
169	 * indices fit in 32 bits.
170	 */
171	if (fscrypt_max_file_dun_bits(sb,
172			fscrypt_policy_v2_du_bits(policy, inode)) > 32) {
173		fscrypt_warn(inode,
174			     "Can't use %s policy on filesystem '%s' because its maximum file size is too large",
175			     type, sb->s_id);
176		return false;
177	}
178	return true;
179}
180
181static bool fscrypt_supported_v1_policy(const struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *policy,
182					const struct inode *inode)
183{
184	if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes_v1(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
185				     policy->filenames_encryption_mode)) {
186		fscrypt_warn(inode,
187			     "Unsupported encryption modes (contents %d, filenames %d)",
188			     policy->contents_encryption_mode,
189			     policy->filenames_encryption_mode);
190		return false;
191	}
192
193	if (policy->flags & ~(FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK |
194			      FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY)) {
195		fscrypt_warn(inode, "Unsupported encryption flags (0x%02x)",
196			     policy->flags);
197		return false;
198	}
199
200	if ((policy->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) &&
201	    !supported_direct_key_modes(inode, policy->contents_encryption_mode,
202					policy->filenames_encryption_mode))
203		return false;
204
205	if (IS_CASEFOLDED(inode)) {
206		/* With v1, there's no way to derive dirhash keys. */
207		fscrypt_warn(inode,
208			     "v1 policies can't be used on casefolded directories");
209		return false;
210	}
211
212	return true;
213}
214
215static bool fscrypt_supported_v2_policy(const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy,
216					const struct inode *inode)
217{
218	int count = 0;
219
220	if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes_v2(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
221				     policy->filenames_encryption_mode)) {
222		fscrypt_warn(inode,
223			     "Unsupported encryption modes (contents %d, filenames %d)",
224			     policy->contents_encryption_mode,
225			     policy->filenames_encryption_mode);
226		return false;
227	}
228
229	if (policy->flags & ~(FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK |
230			      FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY |
231			      FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 |
232			      FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) {
233		fscrypt_warn(inode, "Unsupported encryption flags (0x%02x)",
234			     policy->flags);
235		return false;
236	}
237
238	count += !!(policy->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY);
239	count += !!(policy->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64);
240	count += !!(policy->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32);
241	if (count > 1) {
242		fscrypt_warn(inode, "Mutually exclusive encryption flags (0x%02x)",
243			     policy->flags);
244		return false;
245	}
246
247	if (policy->log2_data_unit_size) {
248		if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->supports_subblock_data_units) {
249			fscrypt_warn(inode,
250				     "Filesystem does not support configuring crypto data unit size");
251			return false;
252		}
253		if (policy->log2_data_unit_size > inode->i_blkbits ||
254		    policy->log2_data_unit_size < SECTOR_SHIFT /* 9 */) {
255			fscrypt_warn(inode,
256				     "Unsupported log2_data_unit_size in encryption policy: %d",
257				     policy->log2_data_unit_size);
258			return false;
259		}
260		if (policy->log2_data_unit_size != inode->i_blkbits &&
261		    (policy->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) {
262			/*
263			 * Not safe to enable yet, as we need to ensure that DUN
264			 * wraparound can only occur on a FS block boundary.
265			 */
266			fscrypt_warn(inode,
267				     "Sub-block data units not yet supported with IV_INO_LBLK_32");
268			return false;
269		}
270	}
271
272	if ((policy->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) &&
273	    !supported_direct_key_modes(inode, policy->contents_encryption_mode,
274					policy->filenames_encryption_mode))
275		return false;
276
277	if ((policy->flags & (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 |
278			      FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)) &&
279	    !supported_iv_ino_lblk_policy(policy, inode))
280		return false;
281
282	if (memchr_inv(policy->__reserved, 0, sizeof(policy->__reserved))) {
283		fscrypt_warn(inode, "Reserved bits set in encryption policy");
284		return false;
285	}
286
287	return true;
288}
289
290/**
291 * fscrypt_supported_policy() - check whether an encryption policy is supported
292 * @policy_u: the encryption policy
293 * @inode: the inode on which the policy will be used
294 *
295 * Given an encryption policy, check whether all its encryption modes and other
296 * settings are supported by this kernel on the given inode.  (But we don't
297 * currently don't check for crypto API support here, so attempting to use an
298 * algorithm not configured into the crypto API will still fail later.)
299 *
300 * Return: %true if supported, else %false
301 */
302bool fscrypt_supported_policy(const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u,
303			      const struct inode *inode)
304{
305	switch (policy_u->version) {
306	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
307		return fscrypt_supported_v1_policy(&policy_u->v1, inode);
308	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
309		return fscrypt_supported_v2_policy(&policy_u->v2, inode);
310	}
311	return false;
312}
313
314/**
315 * fscrypt_new_context() - create a new fscrypt_context
316 * @ctx_u: output context
317 * @policy_u: input policy
318 * @nonce: nonce to use
319 *
320 * Create an fscrypt_context for an inode that is being assigned the given
321 * encryption policy.  @nonce must be a new random nonce.
322 *
323 * Return: the size of the new context in bytes.
324 */
325static int fscrypt_new_context(union fscrypt_context *ctx_u,
326			       const union fscrypt_policy *policy_u,
327			       const u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE])
328{
329	memset(ctx_u, 0, sizeof(*ctx_u));
330
331	switch (policy_u->version) {
332	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1: {
333		const struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *policy = &policy_u->v1;
334		struct fscrypt_context_v1 *ctx = &ctx_u->v1;
335
336		ctx->version = FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1;
337		ctx->contents_encryption_mode =
338			policy->contents_encryption_mode;
339		ctx->filenames_encryption_mode =
340			policy->filenames_encryption_mode;
341		ctx->flags = policy->flags;
342		memcpy(ctx->master_key_descriptor,
343		       policy->master_key_descriptor,
344		       sizeof(ctx->master_key_descriptor));
345		memcpy(ctx->nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE);
346		return sizeof(*ctx);
347	}
348	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2: {
349		const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy = &policy_u->v2;
350		struct fscrypt_context_v2 *ctx = &ctx_u->v2;
351
352		ctx->version = FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2;
353		ctx->contents_encryption_mode =
354			policy->contents_encryption_mode;
355		ctx->filenames_encryption_mode =
356			policy->filenames_encryption_mode;
357		ctx->flags = policy->flags;
358		ctx->log2_data_unit_size = policy->log2_data_unit_size;
359		memcpy(ctx->master_key_identifier,
360		       policy->master_key_identifier,
361		       sizeof(ctx->master_key_identifier));
362		memcpy(ctx->nonce, nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE);
363		return sizeof(*ctx);
364	}
365	}
366	BUG();
367}
368
369/**
370 * fscrypt_policy_from_context() - convert an fscrypt_context to
371 *				   an fscrypt_policy
372 * @policy_u: output policy
373 * @ctx_u: input context
374 * @ctx_size: size of input context in bytes
375 *
376 * Given an fscrypt_context, build the corresponding fscrypt_policy.
377 *
378 * Return: 0 on success, or -EINVAL if the fscrypt_context has an unrecognized
379 * version number or size.
380 *
381 * This does *not* validate the settings within the policy itself, e.g. the
382 * modes, flags, and reserved bits.  Use fscrypt_supported_policy() for that.
383 */
384int fscrypt_policy_from_context(union fscrypt_policy *policy_u,
385				const union fscrypt_context *ctx_u,
386				int ctx_size)
387{
388	memset(policy_u, 0, sizeof(*policy_u));
389
390	if (!fscrypt_context_is_valid(ctx_u, ctx_size))
391		return -EINVAL;
392
393	switch (ctx_u->version) {
394	case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1: {
395		const struct fscrypt_context_v1 *ctx = &ctx_u->v1;
396		struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *policy = &policy_u->v1;
397
398		policy->version = FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1;
399		policy->contents_encryption_mode =
400			ctx->contents_encryption_mode;
401		policy->filenames_encryption_mode =
402			ctx->filenames_encryption_mode;
403		policy->flags = ctx->flags;
404		memcpy(policy->master_key_descriptor,
405		       ctx->master_key_descriptor,
406		       sizeof(policy->master_key_descriptor));
407		return 0;
408	}
409	case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2: {
410		const struct fscrypt_context_v2 *ctx = &ctx_u->v2;
411		struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *policy = &policy_u->v2;
412
413		policy->version = FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2;
414		policy->contents_encryption_mode =
415			ctx->contents_encryption_mode;
416		policy->filenames_encryption_mode =
417			ctx->filenames_encryption_mode;
418		policy->flags = ctx->flags;
419		policy->log2_data_unit_size = ctx->log2_data_unit_size;
420		memcpy(policy->__reserved, ctx->__reserved,
421		       sizeof(policy->__reserved));
422		memcpy(policy->master_key_identifier,
423		       ctx->master_key_identifier,
424		       sizeof(policy->master_key_identifier));
425		return 0;
426	}
427	}
428	/* unreachable */
429	return -EINVAL;
430}
431
432/* Retrieve an inode's encryption policy */
433static int fscrypt_get_policy(struct inode *inode, union fscrypt_policy *policy)
434{
435	const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci;
436	union fscrypt_context ctx;
437	int ret;
438
439	ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info(inode);
440	if (ci) {
441		/* key available, use the cached policy */
442		*policy = ci->ci_policy;
443		return 0;
444	}
445
446	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
447		return -ENODATA;
448
449	ret = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
450	if (ret < 0)
451		return (ret == -ERANGE) ? -EINVAL : ret;
452
453	return fscrypt_policy_from_context(policy, &ctx, ret);
454}
455
456static int set_encryption_policy(struct inode *inode,
457				 const union fscrypt_policy *policy)
458{
459	u8 nonce[FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE];
460	union fscrypt_context ctx;
461	int ctxsize;
462	int err;
463
464	if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(policy, inode))
465		return -EINVAL;
466
467	switch (policy->version) {
468	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1:
469		/*
470		 * The original encryption policy version provided no way of
471		 * verifying that the correct master key was supplied, which was
472		 * insecure in scenarios where multiple users have access to the
473		 * same encrypted files (even just read-only access).  The new
474		 * encryption policy version fixes this and also implies use of
475		 * an improved key derivation function and allows non-root users
476		 * to securely remove keys.  So as long as compatibility with
477		 * old kernels isn't required, it is recommended to use the new
478		 * policy version for all new encrypted directories.
479		 */
480		pr_warn_once("%s (pid %d) is setting deprecated v1 encryption policy; recommend upgrading to v2.\n",
481			     current->comm, current->pid);
482		break;
483	case FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2:
484		err = fscrypt_verify_key_added(inode->i_sb,
485					       policy->v2.master_key_identifier);
486		if (err)
487			return err;
488		if (policy->v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32)
489			pr_warn_once("%s (pid %d) is setting an IV_INO_LBLK_32 encryption policy.  This should only be used if there are certain hardware limitations.\n",
490				     current->comm, current->pid);
491		break;
492	default:
493		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
494		return -EINVAL;
495	}
496
497	get_random_bytes(nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE);
498	ctxsize = fscrypt_new_context(&ctx, policy, nonce);
499
500	return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, ctxsize, NULL);
501}
502
503int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
504{
505	union fscrypt_policy policy;
506	union fscrypt_policy existing_policy;
507	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
508	u8 version;
509	int size;
510	int ret;
511
512	if (get_user(policy.version, (const u8 __user *)arg))
513		return -EFAULT;
514
515	size = fscrypt_policy_size(&policy);
516	if (size <= 0)
517		return -EINVAL;
518
519	/*
520	 * We should just copy the remaining 'size - 1' bytes here, but a
521	 * bizarre bug in gcc 7 and earlier (fixed by gcc r255731) causes gcc to
522	 * think that size can be 0 here (despite the check above!) *and* that
523	 * it's a compile-time constant.  Thus it would think copy_from_user()
524	 * is passed compile-time constant ULONG_MAX, causing the compile-time
525	 * buffer overflow check to fail, breaking the build. This only occurred
526	 * when building an i386 kernel with -Os and branch profiling enabled.
527	 *
528	 * Work around it by just copying the first byte again...
529	 */
530	version = policy.version;
531	if (copy_from_user(&policy, arg, size))
532		return -EFAULT;
533	policy.version = version;
534
535	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode))
536		return -EACCES;
537
538	ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
539	if (ret)
540		return ret;
541
542	inode_lock(inode);
543
544	ret = fscrypt_get_policy(inode, &existing_policy);
545	if (ret == -ENODATA) {
546		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
547			ret = -ENOTDIR;
548		else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode))
549			ret = -ENOENT;
550		else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
551			ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
552		else
553			ret = set_encryption_policy(inode, &policy);
554	} else if (ret == -EINVAL ||
555		   (ret == 0 && !fscrypt_policies_equal(&policy,
556							&existing_policy))) {
557		/* The file already uses a different encryption policy. */
558		ret = -EEXIST;
559	}
560
561	inode_unlock(inode);
562
563	mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
564	return ret;
565}
566EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy);
567
568/* Original ioctl version; can only get the original policy version */
569int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
570{
571	union fscrypt_policy policy;
572	int err;
573
574	err = fscrypt_get_policy(file_inode(filp), &policy);
575	if (err)
576		return err;
577
578	if (policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1)
579		return -EINVAL;
580
581	if (copy_to_user(arg, &policy, sizeof(policy.v1)))
582		return -EFAULT;
583	return 0;
584}
585EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy);
586
587/* Extended ioctl version; can get policies of any version */
588int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
589{
590	struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg arg;
591	union fscrypt_policy *policy = (union fscrypt_policy *)&arg.policy;
592	size_t policy_size;
593	int err;
594
595	/* arg is policy_size, then policy */
596	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(typeof(arg), policy_size) != 0);
597	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(typeof(arg), policy_size) !=
598		     offsetof(typeof(arg), policy));
599	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(arg.policy) != sizeof(*policy));
600
601	err = fscrypt_get_policy(file_inode(filp), policy);
602	if (err)
603		return err;
604	policy_size = fscrypt_policy_size(policy);
605
606	if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg.policy_size)))
607		return -EFAULT;
608
609	if (policy_size > arg.policy_size)
610		return -EOVERFLOW;
611	arg.policy_size = policy_size;
612
613	if (copy_to_user(uarg, &arg, sizeof(arg.policy_size) + policy_size))
614		return -EFAULT;
615	return 0;
616}
617EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex);
618
619/* FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE: retrieve file's encryption nonce for testing */
620int fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
621{
622	struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
623	union fscrypt_context ctx;
624	int ret;
625
626	ret = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
627	if (ret < 0)
628		return ret;
629	if (!fscrypt_context_is_valid(&ctx, ret))
630		return -EINVAL;
631	if (copy_to_user(arg, fscrypt_context_nonce(&ctx),
632			 FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE))
633		return -EFAULT;
634	return 0;
635}
636EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce);
637
638/**
639 * fscrypt_has_permitted_context() - is a file's encryption policy permitted
640 *				     within its directory?
641 *
642 * @parent: inode for parent directory
643 * @child: inode for file being looked up, opened, or linked into @parent
644 *
645 * Filesystems must call this before permitting access to an inode in a
646 * situation where the parent directory is encrypted (either before allowing
647 * ->lookup() to succeed, or for a regular file before allowing it to be opened)
648 * and before any operation that involves linking an inode into an encrypted
649 * directory, including link, rename, and cross rename.  It enforces the
650 * constraint that within a given encrypted directory tree, all files use the
651 * same encryption policy.  The pre-access check is needed to detect potentially
652 * malicious offline violations of this constraint, while the link and rename
653 * checks are needed to prevent online violations of this constraint.
654 *
655 * Return: 1 if permitted, 0 if forbidden.
656 */
657int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
658{
659	union fscrypt_policy parent_policy, child_policy;
660	int err, err1, err2;
661
662	/* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */
663	if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) &&
664	    !S_ISLNK(child->i_mode))
665		return 1;
666
667	/* No restrictions if the parent directory is unencrypted */
668	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent))
669		return 1;
670
671	/* Encrypted directories must not contain unencrypted files */
672	if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(child))
673		return 0;
674
675	/*
676	 * Both parent and child are encrypted, so verify they use the same
677	 * encryption policy.  Compare the cached policies if the keys are
678	 * available, otherwise retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts.
679	 *
680	 * Note that the fscrypt_context retrieval will be required frequently
681	 * when accessing an encrypted directory tree without the key.
682	 * Performance-wise this is not a big deal because we already don't
683	 * really optimize for file access without the key (to the extent that
684	 * such access is even possible), given that any attempted access
685	 * already causes a fscrypt_context retrieval and keyring search.
686	 *
687	 * In any case, if an unexpected error occurs, fall back to "forbidden".
688	 */
689
690	err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent, true);
691	if (err)
692		return 0;
693	err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child, true);
694	if (err)
695		return 0;
696
697	err1 = fscrypt_get_policy(parent, &parent_policy);
698	err2 = fscrypt_get_policy(child, &child_policy);
699
700	/*
701	 * Allow the case where the parent and child both have an unrecognized
702	 * encryption policy, so that files with an unrecognized encryption
703	 * policy can be deleted.
704	 */
705	if (err1 == -EINVAL && err2 == -EINVAL)
706		return 1;
707
708	if (err1 || err2)
709		return 0;
710
711	return fscrypt_policies_equal(&parent_policy, &child_policy);
712}
713EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context);
714
715/*
716 * Return the encryption policy that new files in the directory will inherit, or
717 * NULL if none, or an ERR_PTR() on error.  If the directory is encrypted, also
718 * ensure that its key is set up, so that the new filename can be encrypted.
719 */
720const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(struct inode *dir)
721{
722	int err;
723
724	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(dir)) {
725		err = fscrypt_require_key(dir);
726		if (err)
727			return ERR_PTR(err);
728		return &dir->i_crypt_info->ci_policy;
729	}
730
731	return fscrypt_get_dummy_policy(dir->i_sb);
732}
733
734/**
735 * fscrypt_context_for_new_inode() - create an encryption context for a new inode
736 * @ctx: where context should be written
737 * @inode: inode from which to fetch policy and nonce
738 *
739 * Given an in-core "prepared" (via fscrypt_prepare_new_inode) inode,
740 * generate a new context and write it to ctx. ctx _must_ be at least
741 * FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE bytes.
742 *
743 * Return: size of the resulting context or a negative error code.
744 */
745int fscrypt_context_for_new_inode(void *ctx, struct inode *inode)
746{
747	struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
748
749	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(union fscrypt_context) !=
750			FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE);
751
752	/* fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() should have set up the key already. */
753	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ci))
754		return -ENOKEY;
755
756	return fscrypt_new_context(ctx, &ci->ci_policy, ci->ci_nonce);
757}
758EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_context_for_new_inode);
759
760/**
761 * fscrypt_set_context() - Set the fscrypt context of a new inode
762 * @inode: a new inode
763 * @fs_data: private data given by FS and passed to ->set_context()
764 *
765 * This should be called after fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(), generally during a
766 * filesystem transaction.  Everything here must be %GFP_NOFS-safe.
767 *
768 * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
769 */
770int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data)
771{
772	struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
773	union fscrypt_context ctx;
774	int ctxsize;
775
776	ctxsize = fscrypt_context_for_new_inode(&ctx, inode);
777	if (ctxsize < 0)
778		return ctxsize;
779
780	/*
781	 * This may be the first time the inode number is available, so do any
782	 * delayed key setup that requires the inode number.
783	 */
784	if (ci->ci_policy.version == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2 &&
785	    (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32))
786		fscrypt_hash_inode_number(ci, ci->ci_master_key);
787
788	return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, ctxsize, fs_data);
789}
790EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_set_context);
791
792/**
793 * fscrypt_parse_test_dummy_encryption() - parse the test_dummy_encryption mount option
794 * @param: the mount option
795 * @dummy_policy: (input/output) the place to write the dummy policy that will
796 *	result from parsing the option.  Zero-initialize this.  If a policy is
797 *	already set here (due to test_dummy_encryption being given multiple
798 *	times), then this function will verify that the policies are the same.
799 *
800 * Return: 0 on success; -EINVAL if the argument is invalid; -EEXIST if the
801 *	   argument conflicts with one already specified; or -ENOMEM.
802 */
803int fscrypt_parse_test_dummy_encryption(const struct fs_parameter *param,
804				struct fscrypt_dummy_policy *dummy_policy)
805{
806	const char *arg = "v2";
807	union fscrypt_policy *policy;
808	int err;
809
810	if (param->type == fs_value_is_string && *param->string)
811		arg = param->string;
812
813	policy = kzalloc(sizeof(*policy), GFP_KERNEL);
814	if (!policy)
815		return -ENOMEM;
816
817	if (!strcmp(arg, "v1")) {
818		policy->version = FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1;
819		policy->v1.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
820		policy->v1.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
821		memset(policy->v1.master_key_descriptor, 0x42,
822		       FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
823	} else if (!strcmp(arg, "v2")) {
824		policy->version = FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2;
825		policy->v2.contents_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
826		policy->v2.filenames_encryption_mode = FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
827		err = fscrypt_get_test_dummy_key_identifier(
828				policy->v2.master_key_identifier);
829		if (err)
830			goto out;
831	} else {
832		err = -EINVAL;
833		goto out;
834	}
835
836	if (dummy_policy->policy) {
837		if (fscrypt_policies_equal(policy, dummy_policy->policy))
838			err = 0;
839		else
840			err = -EEXIST;
841		goto out;
842	}
843	dummy_policy->policy = policy;
844	policy = NULL;
845	err = 0;
846out:
847	kfree(policy);
848	return err;
849}
850EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_parse_test_dummy_encryption);
851
852/**
853 * fscrypt_dummy_policies_equal() - check whether two dummy policies are equal
854 * @p1: the first test dummy policy (may be unset)
855 * @p2: the second test dummy policy (may be unset)
856 *
857 * Return: %true if the dummy policies are both set and equal, or both unset.
858 */
859bool fscrypt_dummy_policies_equal(const struct fscrypt_dummy_policy *p1,
860				  const struct fscrypt_dummy_policy *p2)
861{
862	if (!p1->policy && !p2->policy)
863		return true;
864	if (!p1->policy || !p2->policy)
865		return false;
866	return fscrypt_policies_equal(p1->policy, p2->policy);
867}
868EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_dummy_policies_equal);
869
870/**
871 * fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption() - show '-o test_dummy_encryption'
872 * @seq: the seq_file to print the option to
873 * @sep: the separator character to use
874 * @sb: the filesystem whose options are being shown
875 *
876 * Show the test_dummy_encryption mount option, if it was specified.
877 * This is mainly used for /proc/mounts.
878 */
879void fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption(struct seq_file *seq, char sep,
880					struct super_block *sb)
881{
882	const union fscrypt_policy *policy = fscrypt_get_dummy_policy(sb);
883	int vers;
884
885	if (!policy)
886		return;
887
888	vers = policy->version;
889	if (vers == FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1) /* Handle numbering quirk */
890		vers = 1;
891
892	seq_printf(seq, "%ctest_dummy_encryption=v%d", sep, vers);
893}
894EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_show_test_dummy_encryption);
895