1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ 2// 3// Security related flags and so on. 4// 5// Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation. 6 7#include <linux/cpu.h> 8#include <linux/kernel.h> 9#include <linux/device.h> 10#include <linux/memblock.h> 11#include <linux/nospec.h> 12#include <linux/prctl.h> 13#include <linux/seq_buf.h> 14#include <linux/debugfs.h> 15 16#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h> 17#include <asm/code-patching.h> 18#include <asm/security_features.h> 19#include <asm/sections.h> 20#include <asm/setup.h> 21#include <asm/inst.h> 22 23#include "setup.h" 24 25u64 powerpc_security_features __read_mostly = SEC_FTR_DEFAULT; 26 27enum branch_cache_flush_type { 28 BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE = 0x1, 29 BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW = 0x2, 30 BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW = 0x4, 31}; 32static enum branch_cache_flush_type count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE; 33static enum branch_cache_flush_type link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE; 34 35bool barrier_nospec_enabled; 36static bool no_nospec; 37static bool btb_flush_enabled; 38#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_E500) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) 39static bool no_spectrev2; 40#endif 41 42static void enable_barrier_nospec(bool enable) 43{ 44 barrier_nospec_enabled = enable; 45 do_barrier_nospec_fixups(enable); 46} 47 48void __init setup_barrier_nospec(void) 49{ 50 bool enable; 51 52 /* 53 * It would make sense to check SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 below as well. 54 * But there's a good reason not to. The two flags we check below are 55 * both are enabled by default in the kernel, so if the hcall is not 56 * functional they will be enabled. 57 * On a system where the host firmware has been updated (so the ori 58 * functions as a barrier), but on which the hypervisor (KVM/Qemu) has 59 * not been updated, we would like to enable the barrier. Dropping the 60 * check for SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 achieves that. The only downside is 61 * we potentially enable the barrier on systems where the host firmware 62 * is not updated, but that's harmless as it's a no-op. 63 */ 64 enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && 65 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR); 66 67 if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off()) 68 enable_barrier_nospec(enable); 69} 70 71static int __init handle_nospectre_v1(char *p) 72{ 73 no_nospec = true; 74 75 return 0; 76} 77early_param("nospectre_v1", handle_nospectre_v1); 78 79#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS 80static int barrier_nospec_set(void *data, u64 val) 81{ 82 switch (val) { 83 case 0: 84 case 1: 85 break; 86 default: 87 return -EINVAL; 88 } 89 90 if (!!val == !!barrier_nospec_enabled) 91 return 0; 92 93 enable_barrier_nospec(!!val); 94 95 return 0; 96} 97 98static int barrier_nospec_get(void *data, u64 *val) 99{ 100 *val = barrier_nospec_enabled ? 1 : 0; 101 return 0; 102} 103 104DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_barrier_nospec, barrier_nospec_get, 105 barrier_nospec_set, "%llu\n"); 106 107static __init int barrier_nospec_debugfs_init(void) 108{ 109 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("barrier_nospec", 0600, 110 arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, 111 &fops_barrier_nospec); 112 return 0; 113} 114device_initcall(barrier_nospec_debugfs_init); 115 116static __init int security_feature_debugfs_init(void) 117{ 118 debugfs_create_x64("security_features", 0400, arch_debugfs_dir, 119 &powerpc_security_features); 120 return 0; 121} 122device_initcall(security_feature_debugfs_init); 123#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */ 124 125#if defined(CONFIG_PPC_E500) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) 126static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p) 127{ 128 no_spectrev2 = true; 129 130 return 0; 131} 132early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2); 133#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_E500 || CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ 134 135#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_E500 136void __init setup_spectre_v2(void) 137{ 138 if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) 139 do_btb_flush_fixups(); 140 else 141 btb_flush_enabled = true; 142} 143#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_E500 */ 144 145#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 146ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) 147{ 148 bool thread_priv; 149 150 thread_priv = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV); 151 152 if (rfi_flush) { 153 struct seq_buf s; 154 seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1); 155 156 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: RFI Flush"); 157 if (thread_priv) 158 seq_buf_printf(&s, ", L1D private per thread"); 159 160 seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n"); 161 162 return s.len; 163 } 164 165 if (thread_priv) 166 return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: L1D private per thread\n"); 167 168 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) && 169 !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR)) 170 return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); 171 172 return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); 173} 174 175ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) 176{ 177 return cpu_show_meltdown(dev, attr, buf); 178} 179#endif 180 181ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) 182{ 183 struct seq_buf s; 184 185 seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1); 186 187 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR)) { 188 if (barrier_nospec_enabled) 189 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization"); 190 else 191 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable"); 192 193 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31)) 194 seq_buf_printf(&s, ", ori31 speculation barrier enabled"); 195 196 seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n"); 197 } else 198 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Not affected\n"); 199 200 return s.len; 201} 202 203ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) 204{ 205 struct seq_buf s; 206 bool bcs, ccd; 207 208 seq_buf_init(&s, buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1); 209 210 bcs = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED); 211 ccd = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED); 212 213 if (bcs || ccd) { 214 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: "); 215 216 if (bcs) 217 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)"); 218 219 if (bcs && ccd) 220 seq_buf_printf(&s, ", "); 221 222 if (ccd) 223 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Indirect branch cache disabled"); 224 225 } else if (count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) { 226 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Software count cache flush"); 227 228 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) 229 seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)"); 230 231 } else if (btb_flush_enabled) { 232 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Mitigation: Branch predictor state flush"); 233 } else { 234 seq_buf_printf(&s, "Vulnerable"); 235 } 236 237 if (bcs || ccd || count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) { 238 if (link_stack_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) 239 seq_buf_printf(&s, ", Software link stack flush"); 240 if (link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) 241 seq_buf_printf(&s, " (hardware accelerated)"); 242 } 243 244 seq_buf_printf(&s, "\n"); 245 246 return s.len; 247} 248 249#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 250/* 251 * Store-forwarding barrier support. 252 */ 253 254static enum stf_barrier_type stf_enabled_flush_types; 255static bool no_stf_barrier; 256static bool stf_barrier; 257 258static int __init handle_no_stf_barrier(char *p) 259{ 260 pr_info("stf-barrier: disabled on command line."); 261 no_stf_barrier = true; 262 return 0; 263} 264 265early_param("no_stf_barrier", handle_no_stf_barrier); 266 267enum stf_barrier_type stf_barrier_type_get(void) 268{ 269 return stf_enabled_flush_types; 270} 271 272/* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */ 273static int __init handle_ssbd(char *p) 274{ 275 if (!p || strncmp(p, "auto", 5) == 0 || strncmp(p, "on", 2) == 0 ) { 276 /* Until firmware tells us, we have the barrier with auto */ 277 return 0; 278 } else if (strncmp(p, "off", 3) == 0) { 279 handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL); 280 return 0; 281 } else 282 return 1; 283 284 return 0; 285} 286early_param("spec_store_bypass_disable", handle_ssbd); 287 288/* This is the generic flag used by other architectures */ 289static int __init handle_no_ssbd(char *p) 290{ 291 handle_no_stf_barrier(NULL); 292 return 0; 293} 294early_param("nospec_store_bypass_disable", handle_no_ssbd); 295 296static void stf_barrier_enable(bool enable) 297{ 298 if (enable) 299 do_stf_barrier_fixups(stf_enabled_flush_types); 300 else 301 do_stf_barrier_fixups(STF_BARRIER_NONE); 302 303 stf_barrier = enable; 304} 305 306void setup_stf_barrier(void) 307{ 308 enum stf_barrier_type type; 309 bool enable; 310 311 /* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */ 312 if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300)) 313 type = STF_BARRIER_EIEIO; 314 else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)) 315 type = STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI; 316 else if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_206)) 317 type = STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK; 318 else 319 type = STF_BARRIER_NONE; 320 321 enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && 322 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_STF_BARRIER); 323 324 if (type == STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK) { 325 pr_info("stf-barrier: fallback barrier available\n"); 326 } else if (type == STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI) { 327 pr_info("stf-barrier: hwsync barrier available\n"); 328 } else if (type == STF_BARRIER_EIEIO) { 329 pr_info("stf-barrier: eieio barrier available\n"); 330 } 331 332 stf_enabled_flush_types = type; 333 334 if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off()) 335 stf_barrier_enable(enable); 336} 337 338ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) 339{ 340 if (stf_barrier && stf_enabled_flush_types != STF_BARRIER_NONE) { 341 const char *type; 342 switch (stf_enabled_flush_types) { 343 case STF_BARRIER_EIEIO: 344 type = "eieio"; 345 break; 346 case STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI: 347 type = "hwsync"; 348 break; 349 case STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK: 350 type = "fallback"; 351 break; 352 default: 353 type = "unknown"; 354 } 355 return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Kernel entry/exit barrier (%s)\n", type); 356 } 357 358 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV) && 359 !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR)) 360 return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); 361 362 return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); 363} 364 365static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) 366{ 367 /* 368 * The STF_BARRIER feature is on by default, so if it's off that means 369 * firmware has explicitly said the CPU is not vulnerable via either 370 * the hypercall or device tree. 371 */ 372 if (!security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_STF_BARRIER)) 373 return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; 374 375 /* 376 * If the system's CPU has no known barrier (see setup_stf_barrier()) 377 * then assume that the CPU is not vulnerable. 378 */ 379 if (stf_enabled_flush_types == STF_BARRIER_NONE) 380 return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; 381 382 /* 383 * Otherwise the CPU is vulnerable. The barrier is not a global or 384 * per-process mitigation, so the only value that can be reported here 385 * is PR_SPEC_ENABLE, which appears as "vulnerable" in /proc. 386 */ 387 return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; 388} 389 390int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) 391{ 392 switch (which) { 393 case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: 394 return ssb_prctl_get(task); 395 default: 396 return -ENODEV; 397 } 398} 399 400#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS 401static int stf_barrier_set(void *data, u64 val) 402{ 403 bool enable; 404 405 if (val == 1) 406 enable = true; 407 else if (val == 0) 408 enable = false; 409 else 410 return -EINVAL; 411 412 /* Only do anything if we're changing state */ 413 if (enable != stf_barrier) 414 stf_barrier_enable(enable); 415 416 return 0; 417} 418 419static int stf_barrier_get(void *data, u64 *val) 420{ 421 *val = stf_barrier ? 1 : 0; 422 return 0; 423} 424 425DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_stf_barrier, stf_barrier_get, stf_barrier_set, 426 "%llu\n"); 427 428static __init int stf_barrier_debugfs_init(void) 429{ 430 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("stf_barrier", 0600, arch_debugfs_dir, 431 NULL, &fops_stf_barrier); 432 return 0; 433} 434device_initcall(stf_barrier_debugfs_init); 435#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */ 436 437static void update_branch_cache_flush(void) 438{ 439 u32 *site, __maybe_unused *site2; 440 441#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE 442 site = &patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack; 443 site2 = &patch__call_kvm_flush_link_stack_p9; 444 // This controls the branch from guest_exit_cont to kvm_flush_link_stack 445 if (link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) { 446 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_RAW_NOP())); 447 patch_instruction_site(site2, ppc_inst(PPC_RAW_NOP())); 448 } else { 449 // Could use HW flush, but that could also flush count cache 450 patch_branch_site(site, (u64)&kvm_flush_link_stack, BRANCH_SET_LINK); 451 patch_branch_site(site2, (u64)&kvm_flush_link_stack, BRANCH_SET_LINK); 452 } 453#endif 454 455 // Patch out the bcctr first, then nop the rest 456 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches3; 457 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_RAW_NOP())); 458 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches2; 459 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_RAW_NOP())); 460 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches1; 461 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_RAW_NOP())); 462 463 // This controls the branch from _switch to flush_branch_caches 464 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE && 465 link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) { 466 // Nothing to be done 467 468 } else if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW && 469 link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) { 470 // Patch in the bcctr last 471 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches1; 472 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(0x39207fff)); // li r9,0x7fff 473 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches2; 474 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(0x7d2903a6)); // mtctr r9 475 site = &patch__call_flush_branch_caches3; 476 patch_instruction_site(site, ppc_inst(PPC_INST_BCCTR_FLUSH)); 477 478 } else { 479 patch_branch_site(site, (u64)&flush_branch_caches, BRANCH_SET_LINK); 480 481 // If we just need to flush the link stack, early return 482 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) { 483 patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_link_stack_return, 484 ppc_inst(PPC_RAW_BLR())); 485 486 // If we have flush instruction, early return 487 } else if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW) { 488 patch_instruction_site(&patch__flush_count_cache_return, 489 ppc_inst(PPC_RAW_BLR())); 490 } 491 } 492} 493 494static void toggle_branch_cache_flush(bool enable) 495{ 496 if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) { 497 if (count_cache_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) 498 count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE; 499 500 pr_info("count-cache-flush: flush disabled.\n"); 501 } else { 502 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_FLUSH_ASSIST)) { 503 count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW; 504 pr_info("count-cache-flush: hardware flush enabled.\n"); 505 } else { 506 count_cache_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW; 507 pr_info("count-cache-flush: software flush enabled.\n"); 508 } 509 } 510 511 if (!enable || !security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK)) { 512 if (link_stack_flush_type != BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) 513 link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE; 514 515 pr_info("link-stack-flush: flush disabled.\n"); 516 } else { 517 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTR_LINK_FLUSH_ASSIST)) { 518 link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_HW; 519 pr_info("link-stack-flush: hardware flush enabled.\n"); 520 } else { 521 link_stack_flush_type = BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_SW; 522 pr_info("link-stack-flush: software flush enabled.\n"); 523 } 524 } 525 526 update_branch_cache_flush(); 527} 528 529void setup_count_cache_flush(void) 530{ 531 bool enable = true; 532 533 if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off()) { 534 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED) || 535 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED)) 536 pr_warn("Spectre v2 mitigations not fully under software control, can't disable\n"); 537 538 enable = false; 539 } 540 541 /* 542 * There's no firmware feature flag/hypervisor bit to tell us we need to 543 * flush the link stack on context switch. So we set it here if we see 544 * either of the Spectre v2 mitigations that aim to protect userspace. 545 */ 546 if (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED) || 547 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_COUNT_CACHE)) 548 security_ftr_set(SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK); 549 550 toggle_branch_cache_flush(enable); 551} 552 553static enum l1d_flush_type enabled_flush_types; 554static void *l1d_flush_fallback_area; 555static bool no_rfi_flush; 556static bool no_entry_flush; 557static bool no_uaccess_flush; 558bool rfi_flush; 559static bool entry_flush; 560static bool uaccess_flush; 561DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(uaccess_flush_key); 562EXPORT_SYMBOL(uaccess_flush_key); 563 564static int __init handle_no_rfi_flush(char *p) 565{ 566 pr_info("rfi-flush: disabled on command line."); 567 no_rfi_flush = true; 568 return 0; 569} 570early_param("no_rfi_flush", handle_no_rfi_flush); 571 572static int __init handle_no_entry_flush(char *p) 573{ 574 pr_info("entry-flush: disabled on command line."); 575 no_entry_flush = true; 576 return 0; 577} 578early_param("no_entry_flush", handle_no_entry_flush); 579 580static int __init handle_no_uaccess_flush(char *p) 581{ 582 pr_info("uaccess-flush: disabled on command line."); 583 no_uaccess_flush = true; 584 return 0; 585} 586early_param("no_uaccess_flush", handle_no_uaccess_flush); 587 588/* 589 * The RFI flush is not KPTI, but because users will see doco that says to use 590 * nopti we hijack that option here to also disable the RFI flush. 591 */ 592static int __init handle_no_pti(char *p) 593{ 594 pr_info("rfi-flush: disabling due to 'nopti' on command line.\n"); 595 handle_no_rfi_flush(NULL); 596 return 0; 597} 598early_param("nopti", handle_no_pti); 599 600static void do_nothing(void *unused) 601{ 602 /* 603 * We don't need to do the flush explicitly, just enter+exit kernel is 604 * sufficient, the RFI exit handlers will do the right thing. 605 */ 606} 607 608void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable) 609{ 610 if (enable) { 611 do_rfi_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types); 612 on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1); 613 } else 614 do_rfi_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE); 615 616 rfi_flush = enable; 617} 618 619static void entry_flush_enable(bool enable) 620{ 621 if (enable) { 622 do_entry_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types); 623 on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1); 624 } else { 625 do_entry_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE); 626 } 627 628 entry_flush = enable; 629} 630 631static void uaccess_flush_enable(bool enable) 632{ 633 if (enable) { 634 do_uaccess_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types); 635 static_branch_enable(&uaccess_flush_key); 636 on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1); 637 } else { 638 static_branch_disable(&uaccess_flush_key); 639 do_uaccess_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE); 640 } 641 642 uaccess_flush = enable; 643} 644 645static void __ref init_fallback_flush(void) 646{ 647 u64 l1d_size, limit; 648 int cpu; 649 650 /* Only allocate the fallback flush area once (at boot time). */ 651 if (l1d_flush_fallback_area) 652 return; 653 654 l1d_size = ppc64_caches.l1d.size; 655 656 /* 657 * If there is no d-cache-size property in the device tree, l1d_size 658 * could be zero. That leads to the loop in the asm wrapping around to 659 * 2^64-1, and then walking off the end of the fallback area and 660 * eventually causing a page fault which is fatal. Just default to 661 * something vaguely sane. 662 */ 663 if (!l1d_size) 664 l1d_size = (64 * 1024); 665 666 limit = min(ppc64_bolted_size(), ppc64_rma_size); 667 668 /* 669 * Align to L1d size, and size it at 2x L1d size, to catch possible 670 * hardware prefetch runoff. We don't have a recipe for load patterns to 671 * reliably avoid the prefetcher. 672 */ 673 l1d_flush_fallback_area = memblock_alloc_try_nid(l1d_size * 2, 674 l1d_size, MEMBLOCK_LOW_LIMIT, 675 limit, NUMA_NO_NODE); 676 if (!l1d_flush_fallback_area) 677 panic("%s: Failed to allocate %llu bytes align=0x%llx max_addr=%pa\n", 678 __func__, l1d_size * 2, l1d_size, &limit); 679 680 681 for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { 682 struct paca_struct *paca = paca_ptrs[cpu]; 683 paca->rfi_flush_fallback_area = l1d_flush_fallback_area; 684 paca->l1d_flush_size = l1d_size; 685 } 686} 687 688void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) 689{ 690 if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) { 691 pr_info("rfi-flush: fallback displacement flush available\n"); 692 init_fallback_flush(); 693 } 694 695 if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) 696 pr_info("rfi-flush: ori type flush available\n"); 697 698 if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG) 699 pr_info("rfi-flush: mttrig type flush available\n"); 700 701 enabled_flush_types = types; 702 703 if (!cpu_mitigations_off() && !no_rfi_flush) 704 rfi_flush_enable(enable); 705} 706 707void setup_entry_flush(bool enable) 708{ 709 if (cpu_mitigations_off()) 710 return; 711 712 if (!no_entry_flush) 713 entry_flush_enable(enable); 714} 715 716void setup_uaccess_flush(bool enable) 717{ 718 if (cpu_mitigations_off()) 719 return; 720 721 if (!no_uaccess_flush) 722 uaccess_flush_enable(enable); 723} 724 725#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS 726static int count_cache_flush_set(void *data, u64 val) 727{ 728 bool enable; 729 730 if (val == 1) 731 enable = true; 732 else if (val == 0) 733 enable = false; 734 else 735 return -EINVAL; 736 737 toggle_branch_cache_flush(enable); 738 739 return 0; 740} 741 742static int count_cache_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val) 743{ 744 if (count_cache_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) 745 *val = 0; 746 else 747 *val = 1; 748 749 return 0; 750} 751 752static int link_stack_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val) 753{ 754 if (link_stack_flush_type == BRANCH_CACHE_FLUSH_NONE) 755 *val = 0; 756 else 757 *val = 1; 758 759 return 0; 760} 761 762DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_count_cache_flush, count_cache_flush_get, 763 count_cache_flush_set, "%llu\n"); 764DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fops_link_stack_flush, link_stack_flush_get, 765 count_cache_flush_set, "%llu\n"); 766 767static __init int count_cache_flush_debugfs_init(void) 768{ 769 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("count_cache_flush", 0600, 770 arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, 771 &fops_count_cache_flush); 772 debugfs_create_file_unsafe("link_stack_flush", 0600, 773 arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, 774 &fops_link_stack_flush); 775 return 0; 776} 777device_initcall(count_cache_flush_debugfs_init); 778 779static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val) 780{ 781 bool enable; 782 783 if (val == 1) 784 enable = true; 785 else if (val == 0) 786 enable = false; 787 else 788 return -EINVAL; 789 790 /* Only do anything if we're changing state */ 791 if (enable != rfi_flush) 792 rfi_flush_enable(enable); 793 794 return 0; 795} 796 797static int rfi_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val) 798{ 799 *val = rfi_flush ? 1 : 0; 800 return 0; 801} 802 803DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_rfi_flush, rfi_flush_get, rfi_flush_set, "%llu\n"); 804 805static int entry_flush_set(void *data, u64 val) 806{ 807 bool enable; 808 809 if (val == 1) 810 enable = true; 811 else if (val == 0) 812 enable = false; 813 else 814 return -EINVAL; 815 816 /* Only do anything if we're changing state */ 817 if (enable != entry_flush) 818 entry_flush_enable(enable); 819 820 return 0; 821} 822 823static int entry_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val) 824{ 825 *val = entry_flush ? 1 : 0; 826 return 0; 827} 828 829DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_entry_flush, entry_flush_get, entry_flush_set, "%llu\n"); 830 831static int uaccess_flush_set(void *data, u64 val) 832{ 833 bool enable; 834 835 if (val == 1) 836 enable = true; 837 else if (val == 0) 838 enable = false; 839 else 840 return -EINVAL; 841 842 /* Only do anything if we're changing state */ 843 if (enable != uaccess_flush) 844 uaccess_flush_enable(enable); 845 846 return 0; 847} 848 849static int uaccess_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val) 850{ 851 *val = uaccess_flush ? 1 : 0; 852 return 0; 853} 854 855DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_uaccess_flush, uaccess_flush_get, uaccess_flush_set, "%llu\n"); 856 857static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void) 858{ 859 debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush); 860 debugfs_create_file("entry_flush", 0600, arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_entry_flush); 861 debugfs_create_file("uaccess_flush", 0600, arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_uaccess_flush); 862 return 0; 863} 864device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init); 865#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */ 866#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ 867