1/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.103 2013/05/19 02:42:42 djm Exp $ */
2/* $FreeBSD$ */
3/*
4 * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
8 * are met:
9 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
10 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
11 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
12 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
13 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
14 *
15 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
16 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
17 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
18 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
19 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
20 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
21 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
22 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
23 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
24 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
25 */
26
27#include "includes.h"
28__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
29
30#include <sys/types.h>
31#include <sys/stat.h>
32#include <sys/param.h>
33
34#include <netinet/in.h>
35
36#include <errno.h>
37#include <fcntl.h>
38#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
39# include <paths.h>
40#endif
41#include <pwd.h>
42#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
43#include <login.h>
44#endif
45#ifdef USE_SHADOW
46#include <shadow.h>
47#endif
48#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
49#include <libgen.h>
50#endif
51#include <stdarg.h>
52#include <stdio.h>
53#include <string.h>
54#include <unistd.h>
55
56#include "xmalloc.h"
57#include "match.h"
58#include "groupaccess.h"
59#include "log.h"
60#include "buffer.h"
61#include "servconf.h"
62#include "key.h"
63#include "hostfile.h"
64#include "auth.h"
65#include "auth-options.h"
66#include "canohost.h"
67#include "uidswap.h"
68#include "misc.h"
69#include "packet.h"
70#include "loginrec.h"
71#ifdef GSSAPI
72#include "ssh-gss.h"
73#endif
74#include "authfile.h"
75#include "monitor_wrap.h"
76#include "krl.h"
77#include "compat.h"
78
79/* import */
80extern ServerOptions options;
81extern int use_privsep;
82extern Buffer loginmsg;
83extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
84
85/* Debugging messages */
86Buffer auth_debug;
87int auth_debug_init;
88
89/*
90 * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
91 * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
92 * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
93 * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
94 * listed there, false will be returned.
95 * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
96 * Otherwise true is returned.
97 */
98int
99allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
100{
101	struct stat st;
102	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
103	u_int i;
104#ifdef USE_SHADOW
105	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
106#endif
107
108	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
109	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
110		return 0;
111
112#ifdef USE_SHADOW
113	if (!options.use_pam)
114		spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
115#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
116	if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
117		return 0;
118#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
119#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
120
121	/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
122	passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
123#ifdef USE_SHADOW
124	if (spw != NULL)
125#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
126		passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
127#else
128		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
129#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
130#endif
131
132	/* check for locked account */
133	if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
134		int locked = 0;
135
136#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
137		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
138			 locked = 1;
139#endif
140#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
141		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
142		    strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
143			 locked = 1;
144#endif
145#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
146		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
147			locked = 1;
148#endif
149#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
150		free((void *) passwd);
151#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
152		if (locked) {
153			logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
154			    pw->pw_name);
155			return 0;
156		}
157	}
158
159	/*
160	 * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
161	 * are chrooting.
162	 */
163	if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
164	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
165		char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
166		    _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
167
168		if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
169			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
170			    "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
171			free(shell);
172			return 0;
173		}
174		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
175		    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
176			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
177			    "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
178			free(shell);
179			return 0;
180		}
181		free(shell);
182	}
183
184	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
185	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
186		hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
187		ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
188	}
189
190	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
191	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
192		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
193			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
194			    options.deny_users[i])) {
195				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
196				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
197				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
198				return 0;
199			}
200	}
201	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
202	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
203		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
204			if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
205			    options.allow_users[i]))
206				break;
207		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
208		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
209			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
210			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
211			return 0;
212		}
213	}
214	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
215		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
216		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
217			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
218			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
219			return 0;
220		}
221
222		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
223		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
224			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
225			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
226				ga_free();
227				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
228				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
229				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
230				return 0;
231			}
232		/*
233		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
234		 * isn't listed there
235		 */
236		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
237			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
238			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
239				ga_free();
240				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
241				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
242				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
243				return 0;
244			}
245		ga_free();
246	}
247
248#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
249	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
250		return 0;
251#endif
252
253	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
254	return 1;
255}
256
257void
258auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
259{
260	va_list ap;
261        int i;
262
263	free(authctxt->info);
264	authctxt->info = NULL;
265
266	va_start(ap, fmt);
267	i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap);
268	va_end(ap);
269
270	if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL)
271		fatal("vasprintf failed");
272}
273
274void
275auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
276    const char *method, const char *submethod)
277{
278	void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
279	char *authmsg;
280
281	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
282		return;
283
284	/* Raise logging level */
285	if (authenticated == 1 ||
286	    !authctxt->valid ||
287	    authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
288	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
289		authlog = logit;
290
291	if (authctxt->postponed)
292		authmsg = "Postponed";
293	else if (partial)
294		authmsg = "Partial";
295	else
296		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
297
298	authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s",
299	    authmsg,
300	    method,
301	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
302	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
303	    authctxt->user,
304	    get_remote_ipaddr(),
305	    get_remote_port(),
306	    compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
307	    authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
308	    authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
309	free(authctxt->info);
310	authctxt->info = NULL;
311
312#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
313	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
314	    (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
315	    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
316	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
317		record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
318		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
319# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
320	if (authenticated)
321		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
322		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
323# endif
324#endif
325#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
326	if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
327		audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
328#endif
329}
330
331/*
332 * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
333 */
334int
335auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
336{
337	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
338	case PERMIT_YES:
339		return 1;
340	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
341		if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
342			return 1;
343		break;
344	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
345		if (forced_command) {
346			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
347			return 1;
348		}
349		break;
350	}
351	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
352	return 0;
353}
354
355
356/*
357 * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
358 * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
359 * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
360 *
361 * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
362 */
363char *
364expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
365{
366	char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
367	int i;
368
369	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
370	    "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
371
372	/*
373	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
374	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
375	 */
376	if (*file == '/')
377		return (file);
378
379	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
380	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
381		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
382	free(file);
383	return (xstrdup(ret));
384}
385
386char *
387authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
388{
389	if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL ||
390	    strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0)
391		return NULL;
392	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
393}
394
395/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
396HostStatus
397check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
398    const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
399{
400	char *user_hostfile;
401	struct stat st;
402	HostStatus host_status;
403	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
404	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
405
406	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
407	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
408	if (userfile != NULL) {
409		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
410		if (options.strict_modes &&
411		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
412		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
413		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
414			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
415			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
416			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
417			auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
418			    user_hostfile);
419		} else {
420			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
421			load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
422			restore_uid();
423		}
424		free(user_hostfile);
425	}
426	host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
427	if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
428		error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
429		    found->host);
430	else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
431		debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
432		    found->host, found->file, found->line);
433	else
434		debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
435
436	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
437
438	return host_status;
439}
440
441/*
442 * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
443 * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
444 * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
445 *
446 * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
447 *
448 * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
449 * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
450 * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
451 *
452 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
453 */
454int
455auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
456    uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
457{
458	char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
459	char *cp;
460	int comparehome = 0;
461	struct stat st;
462
463	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
464		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
465		    strerror(errno));
466		return -1;
467	}
468	if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
469		comparehome = 1;
470
471	if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
472		snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
473		return -1;
474	}
475	if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
476	    (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
477		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
478		    buf);
479		return -1;
480	}
481
482	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
483	for (;;) {
484		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
485			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
486			return -1;
487		}
488		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
489
490		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
491		    (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
492		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
493			snprintf(err, errlen,
494			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
495			return -1;
496		}
497
498		/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
499		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
500			break;
501
502		/*
503		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
504		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
505		 */
506		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
507			break;
508	}
509	return 0;
510}
511
512/*
513 * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
514 * avoid races.
515 *
516 * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
517 */
518static int
519secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
520    char *err, size_t errlen)
521{
522	struct stat st;
523
524	/* check the open file to avoid races */
525	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
526		snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
527		    file, strerror(errno));
528		return -1;
529	}
530	return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
531}
532
533static FILE *
534auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
535    int log_missing, char *file_type)
536{
537	char line[1024];
538	struct stat st;
539	int fd;
540	FILE *f;
541
542	if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
543		if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
544			debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
545			   strerror(errno));
546		return NULL;
547	}
548
549	if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
550		close(fd);
551		return NULL;
552	}
553	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
554		logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
555		    pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
556		close(fd);
557		return NULL;
558	}
559	unset_nonblock(fd);
560	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
561		close(fd);
562		return NULL;
563	}
564	if (strict_modes &&
565	    secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
566		fclose(f);
567		logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
568		auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
569		return NULL;
570	}
571
572	return f;
573}
574
575
576FILE *
577auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
578{
579	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
580}
581
582FILE *
583auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
584{
585	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
586	    "authorized principals");
587}
588
589struct passwd *
590getpwnamallow(const char *user)
591{
592#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
593	extern login_cap_t *lc;
594#ifdef BSD_AUTH
595	auth_session_t *as;
596#endif
597#endif
598	struct passwd *pw;
599	struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns);
600
601	ci->user = user;
602	parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
603
604#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
605	aix_setauthdb(user);
606#endif
607
608	pw = getpwnam(user);
609
610#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
611	aix_restoreauthdb();
612#endif
613#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
614	/*
615	 * Windows usernames are case-insensitive.  To avoid later problems
616	 * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to
617	 * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the
618	 * user database.
619	 */
620	if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) {
621		logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s",
622		    user, pw->pw_name);
623		pw = NULL;
624	}
625#endif
626	if (pw == NULL) {
627		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
628		    user, get_remote_ipaddr());
629#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
630		record_failed_login(user,
631		    get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
632#endif
633#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
634		audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
635#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
636		return (NULL);
637	}
638	if (!allowed_user(pw))
639		return (NULL);
640#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
641	if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) {
642		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
643		return (NULL);
644	}
645#ifdef BSD_AUTH
646	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
647	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
648		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
649		pw = NULL;
650	}
651	if (as != NULL)
652		auth_close(as);
653#endif
654#endif
655	if (pw != NULL)
656		return (pwcopy(pw));
657	return (NULL);
658}
659
660/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
661int
662auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
663{
664	char *key_fp;
665
666	if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
667		return 0;
668	switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) {
669	case 0:
670		return 0;	/* Not revoked */
671	case -2:
672		break;		/* Not a KRL */
673	default:
674		goto revoked;
675	}
676	debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__,
677	    options.revoked_keys_file);
678	switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) {
679	case 0:
680		/* key not revoked */
681		return 0;
682	case -1:
683		/* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */
684		error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key "
685		    "authentication");
686		return 1;
687	case 1:
688 revoked:
689		/* Key revoked */
690		key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
691		error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
692		    "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
693		free(key_fp);
694		return 1;
695	}
696	fatal("key_in_file returned junk");
697}
698
699void
700auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
701{
702	char buf[1024];
703	va_list args;
704
705	if (!auth_debug_init)
706		return;
707
708	va_start(args, fmt);
709	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
710	va_end(args);
711	buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
712}
713
714void
715auth_debug_send(void)
716{
717	char *msg;
718
719	if (!auth_debug_init)
720		return;
721	while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
722		msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
723		packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
724		free(msg);
725	}
726}
727
728void
729auth_debug_reset(void)
730{
731	if (auth_debug_init)
732		buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
733	else {
734		buffer_init(&auth_debug);
735		auth_debug_init = 1;
736	}
737}
738
739struct passwd *
740fakepw(void)
741{
742	static struct passwd fake;
743
744	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
745	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
746	fake.pw_passwd =
747	    "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
748#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
749	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
750#endif
751	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
752	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
753#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
754	fake.pw_class = "";
755#endif
756	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
757	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
758
759	return (&fake);
760}
761