1/* $FreeBSD: releng/11.0/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c 288418 2015-09-30 08:16:33Z ae $ */ 2/* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 3/*- 4 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 5 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 6 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 7 * 8 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 9 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 10 * 11 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 12 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 13 * 14 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 15 * and Niels Provos. 16 * 17 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 18 * 19 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 20 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 21 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 22 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 23 * 24 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 25 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 26 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 27 * modification of this software. 28 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 29 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 30 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 31 * all. 32 * 33 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 34 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 35 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 36 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 37 * PURPOSE. 38 */ 39#include "opt_inet.h" 40#include "opt_inet6.h" 41 42#include <sys/param.h> 43#include <sys/systm.h> 44#include <sys/mbuf.h> 45#include <sys/socket.h> 46#include <sys/syslog.h> 47#include <sys/kernel.h> 48#include <sys/lock.h> 49#include <sys/rwlock.h> 50#include <sys/sysctl.h> 51 52#include <net/if.h> 53#include <net/vnet.h> 54 55#include <netinet/in.h> 56#include <netinet/in_systm.h> 57#include <netinet/ip.h> 58#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 59#include <netinet/ip6.h> 60 61#include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 62#include <netipsec/ah.h> 63#include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 64#include <netipsec/xform.h> 65 66#ifdef INET6 67#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 68#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 69#include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 70#endif 71 72#include <netipsec/key.h> 73#include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 74 75#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 76 77/* 78 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 79 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 80 */ 81#define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 82 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 83 sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t)) 84/* 85 * Return authenticator size in bytes, based on a field in the 86 * algorithm descriptor. 87 */ 88#define AUTHSIZE(sav) ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : \ 89 xform_ah_authsize((sav)->tdb_authalgxform)) 90 91VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_enable) = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 92VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_cleartos) = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 93VNET_PCPUSTAT_DEFINE(struct ahstat, ahstat); 94VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSINIT(ahstat); 95 96#ifdef VIMAGE 97VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSUNINIT(ahstat); 98#endif /* VIMAGE */ 99 100#ifdef INET 101SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 102SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, ah_enable, 103 CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_enable), 0, ""); 104SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, ah_cleartos, 105 CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW, &VNET_NAME(ah_cleartos), 0, ""); 106SYSCTL_VNET_PCPUSTAT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, stats, struct ahstat, 107 ahstat, "AH statistics (struct ahstat, netipsec/ah_var.h)"); 108#endif 109 110static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 111 112static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*); 113static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*); 114 115int 116xform_ah_authsize(struct auth_hash *esph) 117{ 118 int alen; 119 120 if (esph == NULL) 121 return 0; 122 123 switch (esph->type) { 124 case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC: 125 case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC: 126 case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC: 127 alen = esph->hashsize / 2; /* RFC4868 2.3 */ 128 break; 129 130 case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC: 131 case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC: 132 case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC: 133 alen = esph->hashsize; 134 break; 135 136 default: 137 alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN; 138 break; 139 } 140 141 return alen; 142} 143 144/* 145 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. 146 */ 147struct auth_hash * 148ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg) 149{ 150 if (alg > SADB_AALG_MAX) 151 return NULL; 152 switch (alg) { 153 case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: 154 return &auth_hash_null; 155 case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: 156 return &auth_hash_hmac_md5; 157 case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: 158 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1; 159 case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC: 160 return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160; 161 case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: 162 return &auth_hash_key_md5; 163 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: 164 return &auth_hash_key_sha1; 165 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: 166 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; 167 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: 168 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; 169 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: 170 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; 171 case SADB_X_AALG_AES128GMAC: 172 return &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_128; 173 case SADB_X_AALG_AES192GMAC: 174 return &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_192; 175 case SADB_X_AALG_AES256GMAC: 176 return &auth_hash_nist_gmac_aes_256; 177 } 178 return NULL; 179} 180 181size_t 182ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav) 183{ 184 size_t size; 185 186 if (sav != NULL) { 187 int authsize; 188 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, ("null xform")); 189 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 190 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 191 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 192 } else { 193 /* default guess */ 194 size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16; 195 } 196 return size; 197} 198 199/* 200 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 201 */ 202int 203ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria) 204{ 205 struct auth_hash *thash; 206 int keylen; 207 208 thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 209 if (thash == NULL) { 210 DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 211 __func__, sav->alg_auth)); 212 return EINVAL; 213 } 214 /* 215 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 216 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 217 * later during protocol processing. 218 */ 219 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 220 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 221 DPRINTF(("%s: replay state block inconsistency, " 222 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", __func__, 223 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 224 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 225 return EINVAL; 226 } 227 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 228 DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key for %s algorithm\n", 229 __func__, thash->name)); 230 return EINVAL; 231 } 232 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 233 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 234 DPRINTF(("%s: invalid keylength %d, algorithm %s requires " 235 "keysize %d\n", __func__, 236 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 237 return EINVAL; 238 } 239 240 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 241 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 242 243 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 244 bzero(cria, sizeof (*cria)); 245 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 246 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 247 cria->cri_key = sav->key_auth->key_data; 248 cria->cri_mlen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 249 250 return 0; 251} 252 253/* 254 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 255 */ 256static int 257ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp) 258{ 259 struct cryptoini cria; 260 int error; 261 262 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 263 return error ? error : 264 crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, V_crypto_support); 265} 266 267/* 268 * Paranoia. 269 * 270 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 271 */ 272int 273ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 274{ 275 int err; 276 277 if (sav->key_auth) 278 bzero(sav->key_auth->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 279 280 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 281 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 282 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 283 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 284 return err; 285} 286 287/* 288 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 289 */ 290static int 291ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 292{ 293 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 294 unsigned char *ptr; 295 int off, count; 296 297#ifdef INET 298 struct ip *ip; 299#endif /* INET */ 300 301#ifdef INET6 302 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 303 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 304 int alloc, len, ad; 305#endif /* INET6 */ 306 307 switch (proto) { 308#ifdef INET 309 case AF_INET: 310 /* 311 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 312 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 313 * contiguous memory. 314 */ 315 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 316 if (m == NULL) { 317 DPRINTF(("%s: m_pullup failed\n", __func__)); 318 return ENOBUFS; 319 } 320 321 /* Fix the IP header */ 322 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 323 if (V_ah_cleartos) 324 ip->ip_tos = 0; 325 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 326 ip->ip_sum = 0; 327 328 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 329 ip->ip_off &= htons(IP_DF); 330 else 331 ip->ip_off = htons(0); 332 333 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip); 334 335 /* IPv4 option processing */ 336 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 337 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 338 off + 1 < skip) 339 ; 340 else { 341 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option length for " 342 "option %d\n", __func__, ptr[off])); 343 344 m_freem(m); 345 return EINVAL; 346 } 347 348 switch (ptr[off]) { 349 case IPOPT_EOL: 350 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 351 break; 352 353 case IPOPT_NOP: 354 off++; 355 break; 356 357 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 358 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 359 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 360 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 361 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 362 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 363 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 364 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option " 365 "length for option %d\n", 366 __func__, ptr[off])); 367 368 m_freem(m); 369 return EINVAL; 370 } 371 372 off += ptr[off + 1]; 373 break; 374 375 case IPOPT_LSRR: 376 case IPOPT_SSRR: 377 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 378 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 379 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option " 380 "length for option %d\n", 381 __func__, ptr[off])); 382 383 m_freem(m); 384 return EINVAL; 385 } 386 387 /* 388 * On output, if we have either of the 389 * source routing options, we should 390 * swap the destination address of the 391 * IP header with the last address 392 * specified in the option, as that is 393 * what the destination's IP header 394 * will look like. 395 */ 396 if (out) 397 bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 398 sizeof(struct in_addr), 399 &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr)); 400 401 /* Fall through */ 402 default: 403 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 404 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 405 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option " 406 "length for option %d\n", 407 __func__, ptr[off])); 408 m_freem(m); 409 return EINVAL; 410 } 411 412 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 413 count = ptr[off + 1]; 414 bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr, count); 415 off += count; 416 break; 417 } 418 419 /* Sanity check. */ 420 if (off > skip) { 421 DPRINTF(("%s: malformed IPv4 options header\n", 422 __func__)); 423 424 m_freem(m); 425 return EINVAL; 426 } 427 } 428 429 break; 430#endif /* INET */ 431 432#ifdef INET6 433 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 434 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 435 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t) &ip6); 436 437 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 438 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 439 DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n", __func__)); 440 m_freem(m); 441 return EMSGSIZE; 442 } 443 444 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 445 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 446 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 447 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 448 449 /* Scoped address handling. */ 450 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 451 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 452 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 453 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 454 455 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 456 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), (caddr_t) &ip6); 457 458 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 459 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 460 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 461 ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc( 462 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 463 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 464 if (ptr == NULL) { 465 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate memory" 466 "for IPv6 headers\n",__func__)); 467 m_freem(m); 468 return ENOBUFS; 469 } 470 471 /* 472 * Copy all the protocol headers after 473 * the IPv6 header. 474 */ 475 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 476 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 477 alloc = 1; 478 } else { 479 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 480 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 481 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 482 alloc = 0; 483 } 484 } else 485 break; 486 487 off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 488 489 for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) 490 switch (off) { 491 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 492 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 493 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 494 495 /* 496 * Process the mutable/immutable 497 * options -- borrows heavily from the 498 * KAME code. 499 */ 500 for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 501 count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) { 502 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 503 count++; 504 continue; /* Skip padding. */ 505 } 506 507 /* Sanity check. */ 508 if (count > len + 509 ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) { 510 m_freem(m); 511 512 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 513 if (alloc) 514 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 515 return EINVAL; 516 } 517 518 ad = ptr[count + 1]; 519 520 /* If mutable option, zeroize. */ 521 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) 522 bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr + count, 523 ptr[count + 1]); 524 525 count += ad; 526 527 /* Sanity check. */ 528 if (count > 529 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { 530 m_freem(m); 531 532 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 533 if (alloc) 534 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 535 return EINVAL; 536 } 537 } 538 539 /* Advance. */ 540 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 541 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 542 break; 543 544 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 545 /* 546 * Always include routing headers in 547 * computation. 548 */ 549 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len); 550 len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 551 off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 552 break; 553 554 default: 555 DPRINTF(("%s: unexpected IPv6 header type %d", 556 __func__, off)); 557 if (alloc) 558 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 559 m_freem(m); 560 return EINVAL; 561 } 562 563 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 564 if (alloc) { 565 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 566 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 567 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 568 } 569 570 break; 571#endif /* INET6 */ 572 } 573 574 return 0; 575} 576 577/* 578 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 579 * passes authentication. 580 */ 581static int 582ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 583{ 584 char buf[128]; 585 struct auth_hash *ahx; 586 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 587 struct newah *ah; 588 int hl, rplen, authsize, error; 589 590 struct cryptodesc *crda; 591 struct cryptop *crp; 592 593 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA")); 594 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, ("null authentication key")); 595 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 596 ("null authentication xform")); 597 598 /* Figure out header size. */ 599 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 600 601 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 602 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 603 if (ah == NULL) { 604 DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n")); 605 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); /*XXX*/ 606 m_freem(m); 607 return ENOBUFS; 608 } 609 610 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 611 if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) { 612 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay); 613 DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay failure: %s\n", __func__, 614 ipsec_logsastr(sav, buf, sizeof(buf)))); 615 m_freem(m); 616 return ENOBUFS; 617 } 618 619 /* Verify AH header length. */ 620 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t); 621 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 622 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 623 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) { 624 DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 625 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, hl, 626 (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)), 627 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 628 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 629 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauthl); 630 m_freem(m); 631 return EACCES; 632 } 633 AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 634 635 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 636 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 637 if (crp == NULL) { 638 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n",__func__)); 639 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 640 m_freem(m); 641 return ENOBUFS; 642 } 643 644 crda = crp->crp_desc; 645 IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor")); 646 647 crda->crd_skip = 0; 648 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 649 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 650 651 /* Authentication operation. */ 652 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 653 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 654 crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data; 655 656 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 657 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) + 658 skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO); 659 if (tc == NULL) { 660 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__)); 661 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 662 crypto_freereq(crp); 663 m_freem(m); 664 return ENOBUFS; 665 } 666 667 /* 668 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 669 * and the AH header. 670 */ 671 m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (caddr_t)(tc+1)); 672 673 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 674 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 675 676 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 677 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 678 skip, ahx->type, 0); 679 if (error != 0) { 680 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 681 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); 682 free(tc, M_XDATA); 683 crypto_freereq(crp); 684 return (error); 685 } 686 687 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 688 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 689 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC; 690 crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m; 691 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 692 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 693 crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc; 694 695 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 696 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 697 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 698 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 699 tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 700 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 701 tc->tc_skip = skip; 702 KEY_ADDREFSA(sav); 703 tc->tc_sav = sav; 704 return (crypto_dispatch(crp)); 705} 706 707/* 708 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 709 */ 710static int 711ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 712{ 713 char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; 714 int rplen, error, skip, protoff; 715 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 716 struct mbuf *m; 717 struct cryptodesc *crd; 718 struct auth_hash *ahx; 719 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 720 struct secasvar *sav; 721 struct secasindex *saidx; 722 u_int8_t nxt; 723 caddr_t ptr; 724 int authsize; 725 726 crd = crp->crp_desc; 727 728 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 729 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque crypto data area!")); 730 skip = tc->tc_skip; 731 nxt = tc->tc_nxt; 732 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 733 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 734 735 sav = tc->tc_sav; 736 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA!")); 737 738 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 739 IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 740 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 741 ("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); 742 743 ahx = (struct auth_hash *) sav->tdb_authalgxform; 744 745 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 746 if (crp->crp_etype) { 747 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 748 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 749 750 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) 751 return (crypto_dispatch(crp)); 752 753 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform); 754 DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype)); 755 error = crp->crp_etype; 756 goto bad; 757 } else { 758 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]); 759 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 760 crp = NULL; 761 } 762 763 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 764 if (m == NULL) { 765 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 766 DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__)); 767 error = EINVAL; 768 goto bad; 769 } 770 771 /* Figure out header size. */ 772 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 773 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 774 775 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 776 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 777 778 /* Verify authenticator. */ 779 ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1); 780 if (timingsafe_bcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) { 781 DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for packet " 782 "in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 783 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 784 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 785 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauth); 786 error = EACCES; 787 goto bad; 788 } 789 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 790 ((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt; 791 792 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 793 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 794 free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */ 795 796 /* 797 * Header is now authenticated. 798 */ 799 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 800 801 /* 802 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 803 */ 804 if (sav->replay) { 805 u_int32_t seq; 806 807 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 808 sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq); 809 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 810 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay); 811 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/ 812 goto bad; 813 } 814 } 815 816 /* 817 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 818 */ 819 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 820 if (error) { 821 DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 822 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 823 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 824 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); 825 goto bad; 826 } 827 828 switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) { 829#ifdef INET6 830 case AF_INET6: 831 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff); 832 break; 833#endif 834#ifdef INET 835 case AF_INET: 836 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff); 837 break; 838#endif 839 default: 840 panic("%s: Unexpected address family: %d saidx=%p", __func__, 841 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, saidx); 842 } 843 844 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 845 return error; 846bad: 847 if (sav) 848 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 849 if (m != NULL) 850 m_freem(m); 851 if (tc != NULL) 852 free(tc, M_XDATA); 853 if (crp != NULL) 854 crypto_freereq(crp); 855 return error; 856} 857 858/* 859 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). 860 */ 861static int 862ah_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp, 863 int skip, int protoff) 864{ 865 char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; 866 struct secasvar *sav; 867 struct auth_hash *ahx; 868 struct cryptodesc *crda; 869 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 870 struct mbuf *mi; 871 struct cryptop *crp; 872 u_int16_t iplen; 873 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 874 u_int8_t prot; 875 struct newah *ah; 876 877 sav = isr->sav; 878 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA")); 879 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 880 IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("null authentication xform")); 881 882 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_output); 883 884 /* Figure out header size. */ 885 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 886 887 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 888 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 889#ifdef INET 890 case AF_INET: 891 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 892 break; 893#endif /* INET */ 894#ifdef INET6 895 case AF_INET6: 896 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 897 break; 898#endif /* INET6 */ 899 default: 900 DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol family %u, " 901 "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 902 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 903 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 904 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 905 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_nopf); 906 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 907 goto bad; 908 } 909 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 910 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 911 DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 912 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__, 913 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 914 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 915 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 916 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_toobig); 917 error = EMSGSIZE; 918 goto bad; 919 } 920 921 /* Update the counters. */ 922 AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_obytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 923 924 m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT); 925 if (m == NULL) { 926 DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 927 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 928 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 929 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); 930 error = ENOBUFS; 931 goto bad; 932 } 933 934 /* Inject AH header. */ 935 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 936 if (mi == NULL) { 937 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 938 "%s/%08lx\n", __func__, 939 rplen + authsize, 940 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 941 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 942 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops); /*XXX differs from openbsd */ 943 error = ENOBUFS; 944 goto bad; 945 } 946 947 /* 948 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 949 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 950 */ 951 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + roff); 952 953 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 954 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &ah->ah_nxt); 955 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t); 956 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 957 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 958 959 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 960 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 961 962 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 963 if (sav->replay) { 964 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 965 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 966 DPRINTF(("%s: replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08lx\n", 967 __func__, ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, 968 sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 969 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_wrap); 970 error = EINVAL; 971 goto bad; 972 } 973#ifdef REGRESSION 974 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 975 if (!V_ipsec_replay) 976#endif 977 sav->replay->count++; 978 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 979 } 980 981 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 982 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 983 if (crp == NULL) { 984 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n", 985 __func__)); 986 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 987 error = ENOBUFS; 988 goto bad; 989 } 990 991 crda = crp->crp_desc; 992 993 crda->crd_skip = 0; 994 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 995 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 996 997 /* Authentication operation. */ 998 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 999 crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data; 1000 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 1001 1002 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 1003 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc( 1004 sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 1005 if (tc == NULL) { 1006 crypto_freereq(crp); 1007 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__)); 1008 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 1009 error = ENOBUFS; 1010 goto bad; 1011 } 1012 1013 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 1014 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (caddr_t) (tc + 1)); 1015 1016 /* 1017 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 1018 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 1019 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 1020 */ 1021 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1022#ifdef INET 1023 case AF_INET: 1024 bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) + 1025 offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1026 (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1027 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1028 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1029 sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen); 1030 break; 1031#endif /* INET */ 1032 1033#ifdef INET6 1034 case AF_INET6: 1035 bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) + 1036 offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1037 (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1038 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1039 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1040 sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen); 1041 break; 1042#endif /* INET6 */ 1043 } 1044 1045 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1046 ((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1047 1048 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1049 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1050 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &prot); 1051 1052 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1053 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1054 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1055 if (error != 0) { 1056 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1057 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1058 crypto_freereq(crp); 1059 goto bad; 1060 } 1061 1062 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1063 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1064 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC; 1065 crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m; 1066 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1067 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 1068 crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc; 1069 1070 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1071 key_addref(isr->sp); 1072 tc->tc_isr = isr; 1073 KEY_ADDREFSA(sav); 1074 tc->tc_sav = sav; 1075 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 1076 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 1077 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 1078 tc->tc_skip = skip; 1079 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 1080 1081 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1082bad: 1083 if (m) 1084 m_freem(m); 1085 return (error); 1086} 1087 1088/* 1089 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1090 */ 1091static int 1092ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1093{ 1094 int skip, protoff, error; 1095 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1096 struct ipsecrequest *isr; 1097 struct secasvar *sav; 1098 struct mbuf *m; 1099 caddr_t ptr; 1100 1101 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 1102 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque data area!")); 1103 skip = tc->tc_skip; 1104 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 1105 ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1); 1106 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 1107 1108 isr = tc->tc_isr; 1109 IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sp != NULL, ("NULL isr->sp")); 1110 IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr); 1111 sav = tc->tc_sav; 1112 /* With the isr lock released SA pointer can be updated. */ 1113 if (sav != isr->sav) { 1114 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_notdb); 1115 DPRINTF(("%s: SA expired while in crypto\n", __func__)); 1116 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 1117 goto bad; 1118 } 1119 1120 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1121 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1122 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 1123 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1124 1125 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1126 IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr); 1127 return (crypto_dispatch(crp)); 1128 } 1129 1130 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform); 1131 DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype)); 1132 error = crp->crp_etype; 1133 goto bad; 1134 } 1135 1136 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 1137 if (m == NULL) { 1138 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto); 1139 DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__)); 1140 error = EINVAL; 1141 goto bad; 1142 } 1143 AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]); 1144 1145 /* 1146 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1147 * in place. 1148 */ 1149 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1150 1151 /* No longer needed. */ 1152 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1153 crypto_freereq(crp); 1154 1155#ifdef REGRESSION 1156 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1157 if (V_ipsec_integrity) { 1158 int alen; 1159 1160 /* 1161 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1162 * the other side. 1163 */ 1164 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1165 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1166 } 1167#endif 1168 1169 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1170 error = ipsec_process_done(m, isr); 1171 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1172 IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr); 1173 KEY_FREESP(&isr->sp); 1174 return (error); 1175bad: 1176 if (sav) 1177 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1178 IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr); 1179 KEY_FREESP(&isr->sp); 1180 if (m) 1181 m_freem(m); 1182 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1183 crypto_freereq(crp); 1184 return (error); 1185} 1186 1187static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1188 XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH", 1189 ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output, 1190}; 1191 1192static void 1193ah_attach(void) 1194{ 1195 1196 xform_register(&ah_xformsw); 1197} 1198 1199SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL); 1200