1/*- 2 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project. 6 * 7 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 8 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 9 * are met: 10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 12 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 14 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 15 * 16 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND 17 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 18 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 19 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 20 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 21 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 22 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 23 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 24 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 25 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 26 * SUCH DAMAGE. 27 */ 28/* 29 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project. 30 * 31 * ACL support routines specific to POSIX.1e access control lists. These are 32 * utility routines for code common across file systems implementing POSIX.1e 33 * ACLs. 34 */ 35 36#include <sys/cdefs.h> 37__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); 38 39#include <sys/param.h> 40#include <sys/kernel.h> 41#include <sys/module.h> 42#include <sys/systm.h> 43#include <sys/mount.h> 44#include <sys/priv.h> 45#include <sys/vnode.h> 46#include <sys/errno.h> 47#include <sys/stat.h> 48#include <sys/acl.h> 49 50/* 51 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics; 52 * the access ACL has already been prepared for evaluation by the file system 53 * and is passed via 'uid', 'gid', and 'acl'. Return 0 on success, else an 54 * errno value. 55 */ 56int 57vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid, 58 struct acl *acl, accmode_t accmode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused) 59{ 60 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask; 61 accmode_t dac_granted; 62 accmode_t priv_granted; 63 accmode_t acl_mask_granted; 64 int group_matched, i; 65 66 KASSERT((accmode & ~(VEXEC | VWRITE | VREAD | VADMIN | VAPPEND)) == 0, 67 ("invalid bit in accmode")); 68 KASSERT((accmode & VAPPEND) == 0 || (accmode & VWRITE), 69 ("VAPPEND without VWRITE")); 70 71 /* 72 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory 73 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt to 74 * use privileges granted via priv_granted. In some cases, which 75 * privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", in which 76 * case fall back on first match for the time being. 77 */ 78 if (privused != NULL) 79 *privused = 0; 80 81 /* 82 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found a DAC 83 * entry that matches but has failed to allow access. 84 * 85 * XXXRW: Ideally, we'd determine the privileges required before 86 * asking for them. 87 */ 88 priv_granted = 0; 89 90 if (type == VDIR) { 91 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred, 92 PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, 0)) 93 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 94 } else { 95 /* 96 * Ensure that at least one execute bit is on. Otherwise, 97 * a privileged user will always succeed, and we don't want 98 * this to happen unless the file really is executable. 99 */ 100 if ((accmode & VEXEC) && (acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(acl) & 101 (S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH)) != 0 && 102 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0)) 103 priv_granted |= VEXEC; 104 } 105 106 if ((accmode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0)) 107 priv_granted |= VREAD; 108 109 if (((accmode & VWRITE) || (accmode & VAPPEND)) && 110 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0)) 111 priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 112 113 if ((accmode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0)) 114 priv_granted |= VADMIN; 115 116 /* 117 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the 118 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're 119 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK and 120 * ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations. 121 */ 122 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL; 123 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 124 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 125 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 126 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid) 127 break; 128 dac_granted = 0; 129 dac_granted |= VADMIN; 130 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 131 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 132 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 133 dac_granted |= VREAD; 134 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 135 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 136 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 137 return (0); 138 139 /* 140 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 141 */ 142 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == 143 accmode) { 144 if (privused != NULL) 145 *privused = 1; 146 return (0); 147 } 148 goto error; 149 150 case ACL_MASK: 151 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 152 break; 153 154 case ACL_OTHER: 155 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 156 break; 157 158 default: 159 break; 160 } 161 } 162 163 /* 164 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access ACL. If 165 * it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now, this means 166 * a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future should probably 167 * be a panic. 168 */ 169 if (acl_other == NULL) { 170 /* 171 * XXX This should never happen 172 */ 173 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n"); 174 return (EPERM); 175 } 176 177 /* 178 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields are 179 * masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify the 180 * ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential user 181 * matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, assume that 182 * the mask allows all requests to succeed. 183 */ 184 if (acl_mask != NULL) { 185 acl_mask_granted = 0; 186 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 187 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC; 188 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 189 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD; 190 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 191 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 192 } else 193 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND; 194 195 /* 196 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. There will either be one or no 197 * matches; if there is one, we accept or rejected based on the 198 * match; otherwise, we continue on to groups. 199 */ 200 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 201 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 202 case ACL_USER: 203 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid) 204 break; 205 dac_granted = 0; 206 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 207 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 208 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 209 dac_granted |= VREAD; 210 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 211 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 212 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 213 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 214 return (0); 215 /* 216 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 217 */ 218 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) != 219 accmode) 220 goto error; 221 222 if (privused != NULL) 223 *privused = 1; 224 return (0); 225 } 226 } 227 228 /* 229 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a "best" 230 * match. Iterate across, testing each potential group match. Make 231 * sure we keep track of whether we found a match or not, so that we 232 * know if we should try again with any available privilege, or if we 233 * should move on to ACL_OTHER. 234 */ 235 group_matched = 0; 236 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 237 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 238 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 239 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 240 break; 241 dac_granted = 0; 242 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 243 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 244 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 245 dac_granted |= VREAD; 246 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 247 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 248 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 249 250 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 251 return (0); 252 253 group_matched = 1; 254 break; 255 256 case ACL_GROUP: 257 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred)) 258 break; 259 dac_granted = 0; 260 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 261 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 262 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 263 dac_granted |= VREAD; 264 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 265 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 266 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 267 268 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 269 return (0); 270 271 group_matched = 1; 272 break; 273 274 default: 275 break; 276 } 277 } 278 279 if (group_matched == 1) { 280 /* 281 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via pure 282 * DAC. Try again, this time with privilege. 283 */ 284 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 285 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 286 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 287 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred)) 288 break; 289 dac_granted = 0; 290 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 291 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 292 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 293 dac_granted |= VREAD; 294 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 295 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 296 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 297 298 /* 299 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 300 */ 301 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 302 != accmode) 303 break; 304 305 if (privused != NULL) 306 *privused = 1; 307 return (0); 308 309 case ACL_GROUP: 310 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, 311 cred)) 312 break; 313 dac_granted = 0; 314 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 315 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 316 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ) 317 dac_granted |= VREAD; 318 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 319 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 320 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted; 321 322 /* 323 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 324 */ 325 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) 326 != accmode) 327 break; 328 329 if (privused != NULL) 330 *privused = 1; 331 return (0); 332 333 default: 334 break; 335 } 336 } 337 /* 338 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient. 339 * Return failure. 340 */ 341 goto error; 342 } 343 344 /* 345 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER. 346 */ 347 dac_granted = 0; 348 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 349 dac_granted |= VEXEC; 350 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 351 dac_granted |= VREAD; 352 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 353 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND); 354 355 if ((accmode & dac_granted) == accmode) 356 return (0); 357 /* 358 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here. 359 */ 360 if ((accmode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == accmode) { 361 if (privused != NULL) 362 *privused = 1; 363 return (0); 364 } 365 366error: 367 return ((accmode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES); 368} 369 370/* 371 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an inode 372 * with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry to an 373 * acl_perm_t. 374 */ 375acl_perm_t 376acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode) 377{ 378 acl_perm_t perm = 0; 379 380 switch(tag) { 381 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 382 if (mode & S_IXUSR) 383 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 384 if (mode & S_IRUSR) 385 perm |= ACL_READ; 386 if (mode & S_IWUSR) 387 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 388 return (perm); 389 390 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 391 if (mode & S_IXGRP) 392 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 393 if (mode & S_IRGRP) 394 perm |= ACL_READ; 395 if (mode & S_IWGRP) 396 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 397 return (perm); 398 399 case ACL_OTHER: 400 if (mode & S_IXOTH) 401 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE; 402 if (mode & S_IROTH) 403 perm |= ACL_READ; 404 if (mode & S_IWOTH) 405 perm |= ACL_WRITE; 406 return (perm); 407 408 default: 409 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 410 return (0); 411 } 412} 413 414/* 415 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the 416 * appropriate type. 417 */ 418struct acl_entry 419acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode) 420{ 421 struct acl_entry acl_entry; 422 423 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag; 424 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode); 425 acl_entry.ae_entry_type = 0; 426 acl_entry.ae_flags = 0; 427 switch(tag) { 428 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 429 acl_entry.ae_id = uid; 430 break; 431 432 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 433 acl_entry.ae_id = gid; 434 break; 435 436 case ACL_OTHER: 437 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 438 break; 439 440 default: 441 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; 442 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag); 443 } 444 445 return (acl_entry); 446} 447 448/* 449 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries. 450 */ 451mode_t 452acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry, 453 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry) 454{ 455 mode_t mode; 456 457 mode = 0; 458 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 459 mode |= S_IXUSR; 460 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 461 mode |= S_IRUSR; 462 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 463 mode |= S_IWUSR; 464 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 465 mode |= S_IXGRP; 466 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 467 mode |= S_IRGRP; 468 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 469 mode |= S_IWGRP; 470 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE) 471 mode |= S_IXOTH; 472 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ) 473 mode |= S_IROTH; 474 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE) 475 mode |= S_IWOTH; 476 477 return (mode); 478} 479 480/* 481 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e access 482 * ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may result in a 483 * panic. 484 */ 485mode_t 486acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl) 487{ 488 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other; 489 int i; 490 491 /* 492 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode. 493 */ 494 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL; 495 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 496 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 497 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 498 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 499 break; 500 501 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 502 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 503 break; 504 505 case ACL_OTHER: 506 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 507 break; 508 509 case ACL_MASK: 510 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i]; 511 break; 512 513 case ACL_USER: 514 case ACL_GROUP: 515 break; 516 517 default: 518 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag"); 519 } 520 } 521 522 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL) 523 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags"); 524 525 /* 526 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace 527 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we 528 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions. 529 */ 530 if (acl_mask != NULL) 531 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask, 532 acl_other)); 533 else 534 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj, 535 acl_other)); 536} 537 538/* 539 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an implementing 540 * filesystem to determine if it should accept this and rely on the POSIX.1e 541 * ACL properties. 542 */ 543int 544acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl) 545{ 546 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group; 547 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i; 548 549 /* 550 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum 551 * defined for acl_t. 552 * 553 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are 554 * present: 555 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ 556 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ 557 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER 558 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one 559 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear. 560 * 561 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS. 562 * 563 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation. 564 * 565 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field. 566 */ 567 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group = 568 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0; 569 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES) 570 return (EINVAL); 571 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) { 572 /* 573 * Check for a valid tag. 574 */ 575 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) { 576 case ACL_USER_OBJ: 577 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 578 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 579 return (EINVAL); 580 num_acl_user_obj++; 581 break; 582 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ: 583 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 584 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 585 return (EINVAL); 586 num_acl_group_obj++; 587 break; 588 case ACL_USER: 589 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 590 return (EINVAL); 591 num_acl_user++; 592 break; 593 case ACL_GROUP: 594 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 595 return (EINVAL); 596 num_acl_group++; 597 break; 598 case ACL_OTHER: 599 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 600 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 601 return (EINVAL); 602 num_acl_other++; 603 break; 604 case ACL_MASK: 605 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */ 606 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID) 607 return (EINVAL); 608 num_acl_mask++; 609 break; 610 default: 611 return (EINVAL); 612 } 613 /* 614 * Check for valid perm entries. 615 */ 616 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) != 617 ACL_PERM_BITS) 618 return (EINVAL); 619 } 620 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) || 621 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1)) 622 return (EINVAL); 623 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) && 624 (num_acl_mask != 1)) 625 return (EINVAL); 626 return (0); 627} 628 629/* 630 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine the 631 * two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that aren't 632 * intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually, this might also 633 * take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down into 634 * per-filesystem-code. 635 */ 636mode_t 637acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl) 638{ 639 mode_t mode; 640 641 mode = cmode; 642 /* 643 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must be 644 * set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for it to 645 * appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any possibly 646 * effected bits, then reconstruct. 647 */ 648 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK; 649 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl)); 650 651 return (mode); 652} 653 654 655static int 656acl_posix1e_modload(module_t mod, int what, void *arg) 657{ 658 int ret; 659 660 ret = 0; 661 662 switch (what) { 663 case MOD_LOAD: 664 case MOD_SHUTDOWN: 665 break; 666 667 case MOD_QUIESCE: 668 /* XXX TODO */ 669 ret = 0; 670 break; 671 672 case MOD_UNLOAD: 673 /* XXX TODO */ 674 ret = 0; 675 break; 676 default: 677 ret = EINVAL; 678 break; 679 } 680 681 return (ret); 682} 683 684static moduledata_t acl_posix1e_mod = { 685 "acl_posix1e", 686 acl_posix1e_modload, 687 NULL 688}; 689 690DECLARE_MODULE(acl_posix1e, acl_posix1e_mod, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_FIRST); 691MODULE_VERSION(acl_posix1e, 1); 692