1/* 2 * validator/val_utils.c - validator utility functions. 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved. 5 * 6 * This software is open source. 7 * 8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 10 * are met: 11 * 12 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, 13 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 14 * 15 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, 16 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation 17 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 18 * 19 * Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may 20 * be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without 21 * specific prior written permission. 22 * 23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS 24 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT 25 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR 26 * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT 27 * HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 28 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED 29 * TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR 30 * PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF 31 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING 32 * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS 33 * SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 34 */ 35 36/** 37 * \file 38 * 39 * This file contains helper functions for the validator module. 40 */ 41#include "config.h" 42#include "validator/val_utils.h" 43#include "validator/validator.h" 44#include "validator/val_kentry.h" 45#include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h" 46#include "validator/val_anchor.h" 47#include "validator/val_nsec.h" 48#include "validator/val_neg.h" 49#include "services/cache/rrset.h" 50#include "services/cache/dns.h" 51#include "util/data/msgreply.h" 52#include "util/data/packed_rrset.h" 53#include "util/data/dname.h" 54#include "util/net_help.h" 55#include "util/module.h" 56#include "util/regional.h" 57#include "util/config_file.h" 58#include "sldns/wire2str.h" 59#include "sldns/parseutil.h" 60 61enum val_classification 62val_classify_response(uint16_t query_flags, struct query_info* origqinf, 63 struct query_info* qinf, struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip) 64{ 65 int rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(rep->flags); 66 size_t i; 67 68 /* Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME 69 * chain ending in NXDOMAIN. */ 70 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN && rep->an_numrrsets == 0) 71 return VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR; 72 73 /* check for referral: nonRD query and it looks like a nodata */ 74 if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->an_numrrsets == 0 && 75 rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) { 76 /* SOA record in auth indicates it is NODATA instead. 77 * All validation requiring NODATA messages have SOA in 78 * authority section. */ 79 /* uses fact that answer section is empty */ 80 int saw_ns = 0; 81 for(i=0; i<rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 82 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_SOA) 83 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA; 84 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) 85 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL; 86 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) 87 saw_ns = 1; 88 } 89 return saw_ns?VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:VAL_CLASS_NODATA; 90 } 91 /* root referral where NS set is in the answer section */ 92 if(!(query_flags&BIT_RD) && rep->ns_numrrsets == 0 && 93 rep->an_numrrsets == 1 && rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && 94 ntohs(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS && 95 query_dname_compare(rep->rrsets[0]->rk.dname, 96 origqinf->qname) != 0) 97 return VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL; 98 99 /* dump bad messages */ 100 if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) 101 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN; 102 /* next check if the skip into the answer section shows no answer */ 103 if(skip>0 && rep->an_numrrsets <= skip) 104 return VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER; 105 106 /* Next is NODATA */ 107 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rep->an_numrrsets == 0) 108 return VAL_CLASS_NODATA; 109 110 /* We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative 111 * responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. */ 112 113 /* We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because 114 * ANY responses are validated differently. */ 115 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && qinf->qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) 116 return VAL_CLASS_ANY; 117 118 /* Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless 119 * qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. */ 120 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 121 if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && 122 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == qinf->qtype) 123 return VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE; 124 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) 125 return VAL_CLASS_CNAME; 126 } 127 log_dns_msg("validator: error. failed to classify response message: ", 128 qinf, rep); 129 return VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN; 130} 131 132/** Get signer name from RRSIG */ 133static void 134rrsig_get_signer(uint8_t* data, size_t len, uint8_t** sname, size_t* slen) 135{ 136 /* RRSIG rdata is not allowed to be compressed, it is stored 137 * uncompressed in memory as well, so return a ptr to the name */ 138 if(len < 21) { 139 /* too short RRSig: 140 * short, byte, byte, long, long, long, short, "." is 141 * 2 1 1 4 4 4 2 1 = 19 142 * and a skip of 18 bytes to the name. 143 * +2 for the rdatalen is 21 bytes len for root label */ 144 *sname = NULL; 145 *slen = 0; 146 return; 147 } 148 data += 20; /* skip the fixed size bits */ 149 len -= 20; 150 *slen = dname_valid(data, len); 151 if(!*slen) { 152 /* bad dname in this rrsig. */ 153 *sname = NULL; 154 return; 155 } 156 *sname = data; 157} 158 159void 160val_find_rrset_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** sname, 161 size_t* slen) 162{ 163 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 164 rrset->entry.data; 165 /* return signer for first signature, or NULL */ 166 if(d->rrsig_count == 0) { 167 *sname = NULL; 168 *slen = 0; 169 return; 170 } 171 /* get rrsig signer name out of the signature */ 172 rrsig_get_signer(d->rr_data[d->count], d->rr_len[d->count], 173 sname, slen); 174} 175 176/** 177 * Find best signer name in this set of rrsigs. 178 * @param rrset: which rrsigs to look through. 179 * @param qinf: the query name that needs validation. 180 * @param signer_name: the best signer_name. Updated if a better one is found. 181 * @param signer_len: length of signer name. 182 * @param matchcount: count of current best name (starts at 0 for no match). 183 * Updated if match is improved. 184 */ 185static void 186val_find_best_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, 187 struct query_info* qinf, uint8_t** signer_name, size_t* signer_len, 188 int* matchcount) 189{ 190 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 191 rrset->entry.data; 192 uint8_t* sign; 193 size_t i; 194 int m; 195 for(i=d->count; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) { 196 sign = d->rr_data[i]+2+18; 197 /* look at signatures that are valid (long enough), 198 * and have a signer name that is a superdomain of qname, 199 * and then check the number of labels in the shared topdomain 200 * improve the match if possible */ 201 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+19 && /* rdata, sig + root label*/ 202 dname_subdomain_c(qinf->qname, sign)) { 203 (void)dname_lab_cmp(qinf->qname, 204 dname_count_labels(qinf->qname), 205 sign, dname_count_labels(sign), &m); 206 if(m > *matchcount) { 207 *matchcount = m; 208 *signer_name = sign; 209 (void)dname_count_size_labels(*signer_name, 210 signer_len); 211 } 212 } 213 } 214} 215 216void 217val_find_signer(enum val_classification subtype, struct query_info* qinf, 218 struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip, uint8_t** signer_name, 219 size_t* signer_len) 220{ 221 size_t i; 222 223 if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) { 224 /* check for the answer rrset */ 225 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 226 if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 227 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) { 228 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 229 signer_name, signer_len); 230 return; 231 } 232 } 233 *signer_name = NULL; 234 *signer_len = 0; 235 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) { 236 /* check for the first signed cname/dname rrset */ 237 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 238 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 239 signer_name, signer_len); 240 if(*signer_name) 241 return; 242 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) 243 break; /* only check CNAME after a DNAME */ 244 } 245 *signer_name = NULL; 246 *signer_len = 0; 247 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR 248 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA) { 249 /*Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs*/ 250 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i< 251 rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 252 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC 253 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 254 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { 255 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 256 signer_name, signer_len); 257 return; 258 } 259 } 260 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) { 261 /* find closest superdomain signer name in authority section 262 * NSEC and NSEC3s */ 263 int matchcount = 0; 264 *signer_name = NULL; 265 *signer_len = 0; 266 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep-> 267 ns_numrrsets; i++) { 268 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC 269 || ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 270 LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) { 271 val_find_best_signer(rep->rrsets[i], qinf, 272 signer_name, signer_len, &matchcount); 273 } 274 } 275 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY) { 276 /* check for one of the answer rrset that has signatures, 277 * or potentially a DNAME is in use with a different qname */ 278 for(i=skip; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 279 if(query_dname_compare(qinf->qname, 280 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) { 281 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[i], 282 signer_name, signer_len); 283 if(*signer_name) 284 return; 285 } 286 } 287 /* no answer RRSIGs with qname, try a DNAME */ 288 if(skip < rep->an_numrrsets && 289 ntohs(rep->rrsets[skip]->rk.type) == 290 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { 291 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 292 signer_name, signer_len); 293 if(*signer_name) 294 return; 295 } 296 *signer_name = NULL; 297 *signer_len = 0; 298 } else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) { 299 /* find keys for the item at skip */ 300 if(skip < rep->rrset_count) { 301 val_find_rrset_signer(rep->rrsets[skip], 302 signer_name, signer_len); 303 return; 304 } 305 *signer_name = NULL; 306 *signer_len = 0; 307 } else { 308 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "find_signer: could not find signer name" 309 " for unknown type response"); 310 *signer_name = NULL; 311 *signer_len = 0; 312 } 313} 314 315/** return number of rrs in an rrset */ 316static size_t 317rrset_get_count(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset) 318{ 319 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 320 rrset->entry.data; 321 if(!d) return 0; 322 return d->count; 323} 324 325/** return TTL of rrset */ 326static uint32_t 327rrset_get_ttl(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset) 328{ 329 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*) 330 rrset->entry.data; 331 if(!d) return 0; 332 return d->ttl; 333} 334 335enum sec_status 336val_verify_rrset(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 337 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* keys, 338 uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, 339 struct module_qstate* qstate) 340{ 341 enum sec_status sec; 342 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset-> 343 entry.data; 344 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) { 345 /* re-verify all other statuses, because keyset may change*/ 346 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset cached", 347 rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 348 ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class)); 349 return d->security; 350 } 351 /* check in the cache if verification has already been done */ 352 rrset_check_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now); 353 if(d->security == sec_status_secure) { 354 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset from cache", 355 rrset->rk.dname, ntohs(rrset->rk.type), 356 ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class)); 357 return d->security; 358 } 359 log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "verify rrset", rrset->rk.dname, 360 ntohs(rrset->rk.type), ntohs(rrset->rk.rrset_class)); 361 sec = dnskeyset_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, keys, sigalg, reason, 362 section, qstate); 363 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "verify result: %s", sec_status_to_string(sec)); 364 regional_free_all(env->scratch); 365 366 /* update rrset security status 367 * only improves security status 368 * and bogus is set only once, even if we rechecked the status */ 369 if(sec > d->security) { 370 d->security = sec; 371 if(sec == sec_status_secure) 372 d->trust = rrset_trust_validated; 373 else if(sec == sec_status_bogus) { 374 size_t i; 375 /* update ttl for rrset to fixed value. */ 376 d->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl; 377 for(i=0; i<d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) 378 d->rr_ttl[i] = ve->bogus_ttl; 379 /* leave RR specific TTL: not used for determine 380 * if RRset timed out and clients see proper value. */ 381 lock_basic_lock(&ve->bogus_lock); 382 ve->num_rrset_bogus++; 383 lock_basic_unlock(&ve->bogus_lock); 384 } 385 /* if status updated - store in cache for reuse */ 386 rrset_update_sec_status(env->rrset_cache, rrset, *env->now); 387 } 388 389 return sec; 390} 391 392enum sec_status 393val_verify_rrset_entry(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 394 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, struct key_entry_key* kkey, 395 char** reason, sldns_pkt_section section, struct module_qstate* qstate) 396{ 397 /* temporary dnskey rrset-key */ 398 struct ub_packed_rrset_key dnskey; 399 struct key_entry_data* kd = (struct key_entry_data*)kkey->entry.data; 400 enum sec_status sec; 401 dnskey.rk.type = htons(kd->rrset_type); 402 dnskey.rk.rrset_class = htons(kkey->key_class); 403 dnskey.rk.flags = 0; 404 dnskey.rk.dname = kkey->name; 405 dnskey.rk.dname_len = kkey->namelen; 406 dnskey.entry.key = &dnskey; 407 dnskey.entry.data = kd->rrset_data; 408 sec = val_verify_rrset(env, ve, rrset, &dnskey, kd->algo, reason, 409 section, qstate); 410 return sec; 411} 412 413/** verify that a DS RR hashes to a key and that key signs the set */ 414static enum sec_status 415verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 416 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 417 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, size_t ds_idx, char** reason, 418 struct module_qstate* qstate) 419{ 420 enum sec_status sec = sec_status_bogus; 421 size_t i, num, numchecked = 0, numhashok = 0; 422 num = rrset_get_count(dnskey_rrset); 423 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 424 /* Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. */ 425 if(ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx) 426 != dnskey_get_algo(dnskey_rrset, i) 427 || dnskey_calc_keytag(dnskey_rrset, i) 428 != ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)) { 429 continue; 430 } 431 numchecked++; 432 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "attempt DS match algo %d keytag %d", 433 ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx), 434 ds_get_keytag(ds_rrset, ds_idx)); 435 436 /* Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the 437 * same DS hash algorithm. */ 438 if(!ds_digest_match_dnskey(env, dnskey_rrset, i, ds_rrset, 439 ds_idx)) { 440 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match attempt failed"); 441 continue; 442 } 443 numhashok++; 444 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS match digest ok, trying signature"); 445 446 /* Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY 447 * verifies *with this key* */ 448 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 449 dnskey_rrset, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); 450 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 451 return sec; 452 } 453 /* If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! */ 454 } 455 if(numchecked == 0) 456 algo_needs_reason(env, ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, ds_idx), 457 reason, "no keys have a DS"); 458 else if(numhashok == 0) 459 *reason = "DS hash mismatches key"; 460 else if(!*reason) 461 *reason = "keyset not secured by DNSKEY that matches DS"; 462 return sec_status_bogus; 463} 464 465int val_favorite_ds_algo(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset) 466{ 467 size_t i, num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); 468 int d, digest_algo = 0; /* DS digest algo 0 is not used. */ 469 /* find favorite algo, for now, highest number supported */ 470 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 471 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) || 472 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) { 473 continue; 474 } 475 d = ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i); 476 if(d > digest_algo) 477 digest_algo = d; 478 } 479 return digest_algo; 480} 481 482enum sec_status 483val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 484 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 485 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, 486 struct module_qstate* qstate) 487{ 488 /* as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be 489 * equivalent to no DS rrset. */ 490 int has_useful_ds = 0, digest_algo, alg; 491 struct algo_needs needs; 492 size_t i, num; 493 enum sec_status sec; 494 495 if(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ds_rrset->rk.dname_len || 496 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname) 497 != 0) { 498 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset " 499 "by name"); 500 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name"; 501 return sec_status_bogus; 502 } 503 504 if(sigalg) { 505 /* harden against algo downgrade is enabled */ 506 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ds_rrset); 507 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ds_rrset, digest_algo, sigalg); 508 } else { 509 /* accept any key algo, any digest algo */ 510 digest_algo = -1; 511 } 512 num = rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); 513 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 514 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 515 * And check it is the strongest digest */ 516 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) || 517 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) || 518 (sigalg && (ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i) != digest_algo))) { 519 continue; 520 } 521 522 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 523 * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 524 * "null" KeyEntry). */ 525 has_useful_ds = 1; 526 527 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 528 ds_rrset, i, reason, qstate); 529 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 530 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs, 531 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i))) { 532 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY."); 533 return sec_status_secure; 534 } 535 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) { 536 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs, 537 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i)); 538 } 539 } 540 541 /* None of the DS's worked out. */ 542 543 /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */ 544 if(!has_useful_ds) { 545 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable DS records were found -- " 546 "treating as insecure."); 547 return sec_status_insecure; 548 } 549 /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */ 550 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY."); 551 if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) { 552 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of " 553 "DNSKEY signature"); 554 } 555 return sec_status_bogus; 556} 557 558struct key_entry_key* 559val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, 560 struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 561 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset, int downprot, char** reason, 562 struct module_qstate* qstate) 563{ 564 uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1]; 565 enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_DS(env, ve, 566 dnskey_rrset, ds_rrset, downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate); 567 568 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 569 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 570 ds_rrset->rk.dname, ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, 571 ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset, 572 downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now); 573 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 574 return key_entry_create_null(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname, 575 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, 576 ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), 577 rrset_get_ttl(ds_rrset), *env->now); 578 } 579 return key_entry_create_bad(region, ds_rrset->rk.dname, 580 ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(ds_rrset->rk.rrset_class), 581 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now); 582} 583 584enum sec_status 585val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, 586 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 587 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds, 588 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey, uint8_t* sigalg, char** reason, 589 struct module_qstate* qstate) 590{ 591 /* as long as this is false, we can consider this anchor to be 592 * equivalent to no anchor. */ 593 int has_useful_ta = 0, digest_algo = 0, alg; 594 struct algo_needs needs; 595 size_t i, num; 596 enum sec_status sec; 597 598 if(ta_ds && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_ds->rk.dname_len || 599 query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_ds->rk.dname) 600 != 0)) { 601 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset " 602 "by name"); 603 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name"; 604 return sec_status_bogus; 605 } 606 if(ta_dnskey && (dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len != ta_dnskey->rk.dname_len 607 || query_dname_compare(dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, ta_dnskey->rk.dname) 608 != 0)) { 609 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset " 610 "by name"); 611 *reason = "DNSKEY RRset did not match anchor RRset by name"; 612 return sec_status_bogus; 613 } 614 615 if(ta_ds) 616 digest_algo = val_favorite_ds_algo(ta_ds); 617 if(sigalg) { 618 if(ta_ds) 619 algo_needs_init_ds(&needs, ta_ds, digest_algo, sigalg); 620 else memset(&needs, 0, sizeof(needs)); 621 if(ta_dnskey) 622 algo_needs_init_dnskey_add(&needs, ta_dnskey, sigalg); 623 } 624 if(ta_ds) { 625 num = rrset_get_count(ta_ds); 626 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 627 /* Check to see if we can understand this DS. 628 * And check it is the strongest digest */ 629 if(!ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) || 630 !ds_key_algo_is_supported(ta_ds, i) || 631 ds_get_digest_algo(ta_ds, i) != digest_algo) 632 continue; 633 634 /* Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and 635 * algorithm, we cannot return INSECURE (with a 636 * "null" KeyEntry). */ 637 has_useful_ta = 1; 638 639 sec = verify_dnskeys_with_ds_rr(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 640 ta_ds, i, reason, qstate); 641 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 642 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs, 643 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i))) { 644 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS matched DNSKEY."); 645 return sec_status_secure; 646 } 647 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) { 648 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs, 649 (uint8_t)ds_get_key_algo(ta_ds, i)); 650 } 651 } 652 } 653 654 /* None of the DS's worked out: check the DNSKEYs. */ 655 if(ta_dnskey) { 656 num = rrset_get_count(ta_dnskey); 657 for(i=0; i<num; i++) { 658 /* Check to see if we can understand this DNSKEY */ 659 if(!dnskey_algo_is_supported(ta_dnskey, i)) 660 continue; 661 662 /* we saw a useful TA */ 663 has_useful_ta = 1; 664 665 sec = dnskey_verify_rrset(env, ve, dnskey_rrset, 666 ta_dnskey, i, reason, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate); 667 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 668 if(!sigalg || algo_needs_set_secure(&needs, 669 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i))) { 670 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "anchor matched DNSKEY."); 671 return sec_status_secure; 672 } 673 } else if(sigalg && sec == sec_status_bogus) { 674 algo_needs_set_bogus(&needs, 675 (uint8_t)dnskey_get_algo(ta_dnskey, i)); 676 } 677 } 678 } 679 680 /* If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. */ 681 if(!has_useful_ta) { 682 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No usable trust anchors were found -- " 683 "treating as insecure."); 684 return sec_status_insecure; 685 } 686 /* If any were understandable, then it is bad. */ 687 verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Failed to match any usable anchor to a DNSKEY."); 688 if(sigalg && (alg=algo_needs_missing(&needs)) != 0) { 689 algo_needs_reason(env, alg, reason, "missing verification of " 690 "DNSKEY signature"); 691 } 692 return sec_status_bogus; 693} 694 695struct key_entry_key* 696val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(struct regional* region, struct module_env* env, 697 struct val_env* ve, struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset, 698 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_ds_rrset, 699 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ta_dnskey_rrset, int downprot, 700 char** reason, struct module_qstate* qstate) 701{ 702 uint8_t sigalg[ALGO_NEEDS_MAX+1]; 703 enum sec_status sec = val_verify_DNSKEY_with_TA(env, ve, 704 dnskey_rrset, ta_ds_rrset, ta_dnskey_rrset, 705 downprot?sigalg:NULL, reason, qstate); 706 707 if(sec == sec_status_secure) { 708 return key_entry_create_rrset(region, 709 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, 710 ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), dnskey_rrset, 711 downprot?sigalg:NULL, *env->now); 712 } else if(sec == sec_status_insecure) { 713 return key_entry_create_null(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, 714 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, 715 ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), 716 rrset_get_ttl(dnskey_rrset), *env->now); 717 } 718 return key_entry_create_bad(region, dnskey_rrset->rk.dname, 719 dnskey_rrset->rk.dname_len, ntohs(dnskey_rrset->rk.rrset_class), 720 BOGUS_KEY_TTL, *env->now); 721} 722 723int 724val_dsset_isusable(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds_rrset) 725{ 726 size_t i; 727 for(i=0; i<rrset_get_count(ds_rrset); i++) { 728 if(ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i) && 729 ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, i)) 730 return 1; 731 } 732 if(verbosity < VERB_ALGO) 733 return 0; 734 if(rrset_get_count(ds_rrset) == 0) 735 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS is not usable"); 736 else { 737 /* report usability for the first DS RR */ 738 sldns_lookup_table *lt; 739 char herr[64], aerr[64]; 740 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_hashes, 741 (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i)); 742 if(lt) snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%s", lt->name); 743 else snprintf(herr, sizeof(herr), "%d", 744 (int)ds_get_digest_algo(ds_rrset, i)); 745 lt = sldns_lookup_by_id(sldns_algorithms, 746 (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i)); 747 if(lt) snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%s", lt->name); 748 else snprintf(aerr, sizeof(aerr), "%d", 749 (int)ds_get_key_algo(ds_rrset, i)); 750 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "DS unsupported, hash %s %s, " 751 "key algorithm %s %s", herr, 752 (ds_digest_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)? 753 "(supported)":"(unsupported)"), aerr, 754 (ds_key_algo_is_supported(ds_rrset, 0)? 755 "(supported)":"(unsupported)")); 756 } 757 return 0; 758} 759 760/** get label count for a signature */ 761static uint8_t 762rrsig_get_labcount(struct packed_rrset_data* d, size_t sig) 763{ 764 if(d->rr_len[sig] < 2+4) 765 return 0; /* bad sig length */ 766 return d->rr_data[sig][2+3]; 767} 768 769int 770val_rrset_wildcard(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t** wc, 771 size_t* wc_len) 772{ 773 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset-> 774 entry.data; 775 uint8_t labcount; 776 int labdiff; 777 uint8_t* wn; 778 size_t i, wl; 779 if(d->rrsig_count == 0) { 780 return 1; 781 } 782 labcount = rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + 0); 783 /* check rest of signatures identical */ 784 for(i=1; i<d->rrsig_count; i++) { 785 if(labcount != rrsig_get_labcount(d, d->count + i)) { 786 return 0; 787 } 788 } 789 /* OK the rrsigs check out */ 790 /* if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual 791 * labels, then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard. 792 * Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. */ 793 wn = rrset->rk.dname; 794 wl = rrset->rk.dname_len; 795 /* skip a leading wildcard label in the dname (RFC4035 2.2) */ 796 if(dname_is_wild(wn)) { 797 wn += 2; 798 wl -= 2; 799 } 800 labdiff = (dname_count_labels(wn) - 1) - (int)labcount; 801 if(labdiff > 0) { 802 *wc = wn; 803 dname_remove_labels(wc, &wl, labdiff); 804 *wc_len = wl; 805 return 1; 806 } 807 return 1; 808} 809 810int 811val_chase_cname(struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* rep, 812 size_t* cname_skip) { 813 size_t i; 814 /* skip any DNAMEs, go to the CNAME for next part */ 815 for(i = *cname_skip; i < rep->an_numrrsets; i++) { 816 if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME && 817 query_dname_compare(qchase->qname, rep->rrsets[i]-> 818 rk.dname) == 0) { 819 qchase->qname = NULL; 820 get_cname_target(rep->rrsets[i], &qchase->qname, 821 &qchase->qname_len); 822 if(!qchase->qname) 823 return 0; /* bad CNAME rdata */ 824 (*cname_skip) = i+1; 825 return 1; 826 } 827 } 828 return 0; /* CNAME classified but no matching CNAME ?! */ 829} 830 831/** see if rrset has signer name as one of the rrsig signers */ 832static int 833rrset_has_signer(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset, uint8_t* name, size_t len) 834{ 835 struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset-> 836 entry.data; 837 size_t i; 838 for(i = d->count; i< d->count+d->rrsig_count; i++) { 839 if(d->rr_len[i] > 2+18+len) { 840 /* at least rdatalen + signature + signame (+1 sig)*/ 841 if(!dname_valid(d->rr_data[i]+2+18, d->rr_len[i]-2-18)) 842 continue; 843 if(query_dname_compare(name, d->rr_data[i]+2+18) == 0) 844 { 845 return 1; 846 } 847 } 848 } 849 return 0; 850} 851 852void 853val_fill_reply(struct reply_info* chase, struct reply_info* orig, 854 size_t skip, uint8_t* name, size_t len, uint8_t* signer) 855{ 856 size_t i; 857 int seen_dname = 0; 858 chase->rrset_count = 0; 859 chase->an_numrrsets = 0; 860 chase->ns_numrrsets = 0; 861 chase->ar_numrrsets = 0; 862 /* ANSWER section */ 863 for(i=skip; i<orig->an_numrrsets; i++) { 864 if(!signer) { 865 if(query_dname_compare(name, 866 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) 867 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = 868 orig->rrsets[i]; 869 } else if(seen_dname && ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 870 LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) { 871 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 872 seen_dname = 0; 873 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) { 874 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 875 if(ntohs(orig->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == 876 LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) { 877 seen_dname = 1; 878 } 879 } 880 } 881 /* AUTHORITY section */ 882 for(i = (skip > orig->an_numrrsets)?skip:orig->an_numrrsets; 883 i<orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 884 i++) { 885 if(!signer) { 886 if(query_dname_compare(name, 887 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) 888 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+ 889 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 890 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) { 891 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+ 892 chase->ns_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 893 } 894 } 895 /* ADDITIONAL section */ 896 for(i= (skip>orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets)? 897 skip:orig->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets; 898 i<orig->rrset_count; i++) { 899 if(!signer) { 900 if(query_dname_compare(name, 901 orig->rrsets[i]->rk.dname) == 0) 902 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets 903 +orig->ns_numrrsets+chase->ar_numrrsets++] 904 = orig->rrsets[i]; 905 } else if(rrset_has_signer(orig->rrsets[i], name, len)) { 906 chase->rrsets[chase->an_numrrsets+orig->ns_numrrsets+ 907 chase->ar_numrrsets++] = orig->rrsets[i]; 908 } 909 } 910 chase->rrset_count = chase->an_numrrsets + chase->ns_numrrsets + 911 chase->ar_numrrsets; 912} 913 914void val_reply_remove_auth(struct reply_info* rep, size_t index) 915{ 916 log_assert(index < rep->rrset_count); 917 log_assert(index >= rep->an_numrrsets); 918 log_assert(index < rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets); 919 memmove(rep->rrsets+index, rep->rrsets+index+1, 920 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)* 921 (rep->rrset_count - index - 1)); 922 rep->ns_numrrsets--; 923 rep->rrset_count--; 924} 925 926void 927val_check_nonsecure(struct module_env* env, struct reply_info* rep) 928{ 929 size_t i; 930 /* authority */ 931 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 932 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data) 933 ->security != sec_status_secure) { 934 /* because we want to return the authentic original 935 * message when presented with CD-flagged queries, 936 * we need to preserve AUTHORITY section data. 937 * However, this rrset is not signed or signed 938 * with the wrong keys. Validation has tried to 939 * verify this rrset with the keysets of import. 940 * But this rrset did not verify. 941 * Therefore the message is bogus. 942 */ 943 944 /* check if authority has an NS record 945 * which is bad, and there is an answer section with 946 * data. In that case, delete NS and additional to 947 * be lenient and make a minimal response */ 948 if(rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && 949 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type) 950 == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS) { 951 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncate to minimal"); 952 rep->ar_numrrsets = 0; 953 rep->rrset_count = rep->an_numrrsets + 954 rep->ns_numrrsets; 955 /* remove this unneeded authority rrset */ 956 memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1, 957 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)* 958 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1)); 959 rep->ns_numrrsets--; 960 rep->rrset_count--; 961 i--; 962 return; 963 } 964 965 log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "message is bogus, " 966 "non secure rrset", 967 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 968 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type), 969 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class)); 970 rep->security = sec_status_bogus; 971 return; 972 } 973 } 974 /* additional */ 975 if(!env->cfg->val_clean_additional) 976 return; 977 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) { 978 if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data) 979 ->security != sec_status_secure) { 980 /* This does not cause message invalidation. It was 981 * simply unsigned data in the additional. The 982 * RRSIG must have been truncated off the message. 983 * 984 * However, we do not want to return possible bogus 985 * data to clients that rely on this service for 986 * their authentication. 987 */ 988 /* remove this unneeded additional rrset */ 989 memmove(rep->rrsets+i, rep->rrsets+i+1, 990 sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)* 991 (rep->rrset_count - i - 1)); 992 rep->ar_numrrsets--; 993 rep->rrset_count--; 994 i--; 995 } 996 } 997} 998 999/** check no anchor and unlock */ 1000static int 1001check_no_anchor(struct val_anchors* anchors, uint8_t* nm, size_t l, uint16_t c) 1002{ 1003 struct trust_anchor* ta; 1004 if((ta=anchors_lookup(anchors, nm, l, c))) { 1005 lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock); 1006 } 1007 return !ta; 1008} 1009 1010void 1011val_mark_indeterminate(struct reply_info* rep, struct val_anchors* anchors, 1012 struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env) 1013{ 1014 size_t i; 1015 struct packed_rrset_data* d; 1016 for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) { 1017 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data; 1018 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked && 1019 check_no_anchor(anchors, rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, 1020 rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname_len, 1021 ntohs(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.rrset_class))) 1022 { 1023 /* mark as indeterminate */ 1024 d->security = sec_status_indeterminate; 1025 rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now); 1026 } 1027 } 1028} 1029 1030void 1031val_mark_insecure(struct reply_info* rep, uint8_t* kname, 1032 struct rrset_cache* r, struct module_env* env) 1033{ 1034 size_t i; 1035 struct packed_rrset_data* d; 1036 for(i=0; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) { 1037 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data; 1038 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked && 1039 dname_subdomain_c(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.dname, kname)) { 1040 /* mark as insecure */ 1041 d->security = sec_status_insecure; 1042 rrset_update_sec_status(r, rep->rrsets[i], *env->now); 1043 } 1044 } 1045} 1046 1047size_t 1048val_next_unchecked(struct reply_info* rep, size_t skip) 1049{ 1050 size_t i; 1051 struct packed_rrset_data* d; 1052 for(i=skip+1; i<rep->rrset_count; i++) { 1053 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data; 1054 if(d->security == sec_status_unchecked) { 1055 return i; 1056 } 1057 } 1058 return rep->rrset_count; 1059} 1060 1061const char* 1062val_classification_to_string(enum val_classification subtype) 1063{ 1064 switch(subtype) { 1065 case VAL_CLASS_UNTYPED: return "untyped"; 1066 case VAL_CLASS_UNKNOWN: return "unknown"; 1067 case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE: return "positive"; 1068 case VAL_CLASS_CNAME: return "cname"; 1069 case VAL_CLASS_NODATA: return "nodata"; 1070 case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR: return "nameerror"; 1071 case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER: return "cnamenoanswer"; 1072 case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL: return "referral"; 1073 case VAL_CLASS_ANY: return "qtype_any"; 1074 default: 1075 return "bad_val_classification"; 1076 } 1077} 1078 1079/** log a sock_list entry */ 1080static void 1081sock_list_logentry(enum verbosity_value v, const char* s, struct sock_list* p) 1082{ 1083 if(p->len) 1084 log_addr(v, s, &p->addr, p->len); 1085 else verbose(v, "%s cache", s); 1086} 1087 1088void val_blacklist(struct sock_list** blacklist, struct regional* region, 1089 struct sock_list* origin, int cross) 1090{ 1091 /* debug printout */ 1092 if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) { 1093 struct sock_list* p; 1094 for(p=*blacklist; p; p=p->next) 1095 sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist", p); 1096 if(!origin) 1097 verbose(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add: cache"); 1098 for(p=origin; p; p=p->next) 1099 sock_list_logentry(VERB_ALGO, "blacklist add", p); 1100 } 1101 /* blacklist the IPs or the cache */ 1102 if(!origin) { 1103 /* only add if nothing there. anything else also stops cache*/ 1104 if(!*blacklist) 1105 sock_list_insert(blacklist, NULL, 0, region); 1106 } else if(!cross) 1107 sock_list_prepend(blacklist, origin); 1108 else sock_list_merge(blacklist, region, origin); 1109} 1110 1111int val_has_signed_nsecs(struct reply_info* rep, char** reason) 1112{ 1113 size_t i, num_nsec = 0, num_nsec3 = 0; 1114 struct packed_rrset_data* d; 1115 for(i=rep->an_numrrsets; i<rep->an_numrrsets+rep->ns_numrrsets; i++) { 1116 if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC)) 1117 num_nsec++; 1118 else if(rep->rrsets[i]->rk.type == htons(LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3)) 1119 num_nsec3++; 1120 else continue; 1121 d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[i]->entry.data; 1122 if(d && d->rrsig_count != 0) { 1123 return 1; 1124 } 1125 } 1126 if(num_nsec == 0 && num_nsec3 == 0) 1127 *reason = "no DNSSEC records"; 1128 else if(num_nsec != 0) 1129 *reason = "no signatures over NSECs"; 1130 else *reason = "no signatures over NSEC3s"; 1131 return 0; 1132} 1133 1134struct dns_msg* 1135val_find_DS(struct module_env* env, uint8_t* nm, size_t nmlen, uint16_t c, 1136 struct regional* region, uint8_t* topname) 1137{ 1138 struct dns_msg* msg; 1139 struct query_info qinfo; 1140 struct ub_packed_rrset_key *rrset = rrset_cache_lookup( 1141 env->rrset_cache, nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, 0, 1142 *env->now, 0); 1143 if(rrset) { 1144 /* DS rrset exists. Return it to the validator immediately*/ 1145 struct ub_packed_rrset_key* copy = packed_rrset_copy_region( 1146 rrset, region, *env->now); 1147 lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock); 1148 if(!copy) 1149 return NULL; 1150 msg = dns_msg_create(nm, nmlen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, c, region, 1); 1151 if(!msg) 1152 return NULL; 1153 msg->rep->rrsets[0] = copy; 1154 msg->rep->rrset_count++; 1155 msg->rep->an_numrrsets++; 1156 return msg; 1157 } 1158 /* lookup in rrset and negative cache for NSEC/NSEC3 */ 1159 qinfo.qname = nm; 1160 qinfo.qname_len = nmlen; 1161 qinfo.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS; 1162 qinfo.qclass = c; 1163 qinfo.local_alias = NULL; 1164 /* do not add SOA to reply message, it is going to be used internal */ 1165 msg = val_neg_getmsg(env->neg_cache, &qinfo, region, env->rrset_cache, 1166 env->scratch_buffer, *env->now, 0, topname, env->cfg); 1167 return msg; 1168} 1169