1/*	$FreeBSD$	*/
2/*	$OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */
3/*-
4 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org),
5 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and
6 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de).
7 *
8 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis
9 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995.
10 *
11 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996,
12 * by Angelos D. Keromytis.
13 *
14 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis
15 * and Niels Provos.
16 *
17 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist.
18 *
19 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis,
20 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos.
21 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.
22 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis.
23 *
24 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee
25 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in
26 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or
27 * modification of this software.
28 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please
29 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license
30 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to
31 * all.
32 *
33 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
34 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY
35 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE
36 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR
37 * PURPOSE.
38 */
39#include "opt_inet.h"
40#include "opt_inet6.h"
41
42#include <sys/param.h>
43#include <sys/systm.h>
44#include <sys/mbuf.h>
45#include <sys/socket.h>
46#include <sys/syslog.h>
47#include <sys/kernel.h>
48#include <sys/sysctl.h>
49
50#include <net/if.h>
51#include <net/vnet.h>
52
53#include <netinet/in.h>
54#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
55#include <netinet/ip.h>
56#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h>
57#include <netinet/ip6.h>
58
59#include <net/route.h>
60#include <netipsec/ipsec.h>
61#include <netipsec/ah.h>
62#include <netipsec/ah_var.h>
63#include <netipsec/xform.h>
64
65#ifdef INET6
66#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
67#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h>
68#include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h>
69#endif
70
71#include <netipsec/key.h>
72#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
73
74#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
75
76/*
77 * Return header size in bytes.  The old protocol did not support
78 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter.
79 */
80#define HDRSIZE(sav) \
81	(((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \
82		sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t))
83/*
84 * Return authenticator size in bytes.  The old protocol is known
85 * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator.  The new algorithm use 12-byte
86 * authenticator.
87 */
88#define	AUTHSIZE(sav)	ah_authsize(sav)
89
90VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_enable) = 1;	/* control flow of packets with AH */
91VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_cleartos) = 1;	/* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */
92VNET_PCPUSTAT_DEFINE(struct ahstat, ahstat);
93VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSINIT(ahstat);
94
95#ifdef VIMAGE
96VNET_PCPUSTAT_SYSUNINIT(ahstat);
97#endif /* VIMAGE */
98
99#ifdef INET
100SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah);
101SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
102	ah_enable,	CTLFLAG_RW,	&VNET_NAME(ah_enable),	0, "");
103SYSCTL_VNET_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO,
104	ah_cleartos,	CTLFLAG_RW,	&VNET_NAME(ah_cleartos), 0, "");
105SYSCTL_VNET_PCPUSTAT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, stats, struct ahstat,
106    ahstat, "AH statistics (struct ahstat, netipsec/ah_var.h)");
107#endif
108
109static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256];	/* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */
110
111static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*);
112static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*);
113
114static int
115ah_authsize(struct secasvar *sav)
116{
117
118	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("%s: sav == NULL", __func__));
119
120	if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
121		return 16;
122
123	switch (sav->alg_auth) {
124	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256:
125		return 16;
126	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384:
127		return 24;
128	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512:
129		return 32;
130	default:
131		return AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
132	}
133	/* NOTREACHED */
134}
135/*
136 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support.
137 */
138struct auth_hash *
139ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg)
140{
141	if (alg > SADB_AALG_MAX)
142		return NULL;
143	switch (alg) {
144	case SADB_X_AALG_NULL:
145		return &auth_hash_null;
146	case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC:
147		return &auth_hash_hmac_md5;
148	case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC:
149		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
150	case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC:
151		return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160;
152	case SADB_X_AALG_MD5:
153		return &auth_hash_key_md5;
154	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA:
155		return &auth_hash_key_sha1;
156	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256:
157		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
158	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384:
159		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
160	case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512:
161		return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
162	}
163	return NULL;
164}
165
166size_t
167ah_hdrsiz(struct secasvar *sav)
168{
169	size_t size;
170
171	if (sav != NULL) {
172		int authsize;
173		IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, ("null xform"));
174		/*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/
175		authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
176		size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav);
177	} else {
178		/* default guess */
179		size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16;
180	}
181	return size;
182}
183
184/*
185 * NB: public for use by esp_init.
186 */
187int
188ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp, struct cryptoini *cria)
189{
190	struct auth_hash *thash;
191	int keylen;
192
193	thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth);
194	if (thash == NULL) {
195		DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n",
196			__func__, sav->alg_auth));
197		return EINVAL;
198	}
199	/*
200	 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with
201	 * the protocol type.  We check here so we can make assumptions
202	 * later during protocol processing.
203	 */
204	/* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */
205	if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) {
206		DPRINTF(("%s: replay state block inconsistency, "
207			"%s algorithm %s replay state\n", __func__,
208			(sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new",
209			sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with"));
210		return EINVAL;
211	}
212	if (sav->key_auth == NULL) {
213		DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key for %s algorithm\n",
214			__func__, thash->name));
215		return EINVAL;
216	}
217	keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth);
218	if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) {
219		DPRINTF(("%s: invalid keylength %d, algorithm %s requires "
220			"keysize %d\n", __func__,
221			 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize));
222		return EINVAL;
223	}
224
225	sav->tdb_xform = xsp;
226	sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash;
227
228	/* Initialize crypto session. */
229	bzero(cria, sizeof (*cria));
230	cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type;
231	cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
232	cria->cri_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
233	cria->cri_mlen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
234
235	return 0;
236}
237
238/*
239 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up.
240 */
241static int
242ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, struct xformsw *xsp)
243{
244	struct cryptoini cria;
245	int error;
246
247	error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria);
248	return error ? error :
249		 crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, &cria, V_crypto_support);
250}
251
252/*
253 * Paranoia.
254 *
255 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX).
256 */
257int
258ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav)
259{
260	int err;
261
262	if (sav->key_auth)
263		bzero(sav->key_auth->key_data, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth));
264
265	err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid);
266	sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0;
267	sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL;
268	sav->tdb_xform = NULL;
269	return err;
270}
271
272/*
273 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing.
274 */
275static int
276ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out)
277{
278	struct mbuf *m = *m0;
279	unsigned char *ptr;
280	int off, count;
281
282#ifdef INET
283	struct ip *ip;
284#endif /* INET */
285
286#ifdef INET6
287	struct ip6_ext *ip6e;
288	struct ip6_hdr ip6;
289	int alloc, len, ad;
290#endif /* INET6 */
291
292	switch (proto) {
293#ifdef INET
294	case AF_INET:
295		/*
296		 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header
297		 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in
298		 * contiguous memory.
299		 */
300		*m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip);
301		if (m == NULL) {
302			DPRINTF(("%s: m_pullup failed\n", __func__));
303			return ENOBUFS;
304		}
305
306		/* Fix the IP header */
307		ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
308		if (V_ah_cleartos)
309			ip->ip_tos = 0;
310		ip->ip_ttl = 0;
311		ip->ip_sum = 0;
312
313		if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK)
314			ip->ip_off &= htons(IP_DF);
315		else
316			ip->ip_off = htons(0);
317
318		ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + sizeof(struct ip);
319
320		/* IPv4 option processing */
321		for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) {
322			if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP ||
323			    off + 1 < skip)
324				;
325			else {
326				DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option length for "
327					"option %d\n", __func__, ptr[off]));
328
329				m_freem(m);
330				return EINVAL;
331			}
332
333			switch (ptr[off]) {
334			case IPOPT_EOL:
335				off = skip;  /* End the loop. */
336				break;
337
338			case IPOPT_NOP:
339				off++;
340				break;
341
342			case IPOPT_SECURITY:	/* 0x82 */
343			case 0x85:	/* Extended security. */
344			case 0x86:	/* Commercial security. */
345			case 0x94:	/* Router alert */
346			case 0x95:	/* RFC1770 */
347				/* Sanity check for option length. */
348				if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
349					DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
350						"length for option %d\n",
351						__func__, ptr[off]));
352
353					m_freem(m);
354					return EINVAL;
355				}
356
357				off += ptr[off + 1];
358				break;
359
360			case IPOPT_LSRR:
361			case IPOPT_SSRR:
362				/* Sanity check for option length. */
363				if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
364					DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
365						"length for option %d\n",
366						__func__, ptr[off]));
367
368					m_freem(m);
369					return EINVAL;
370				}
371
372				/*
373				 * On output, if we have either of the
374				 * source routing options, we should
375				 * swap the destination address of the
376				 * IP header with the last address
377				 * specified in the option, as that is
378				 * what the destination's IP header
379				 * will look like.
380				 */
381				if (out)
382					bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] -
383					    sizeof(struct in_addr),
384					    &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr));
385
386				/* Fall through */
387			default:
388				/* Sanity check for option length. */
389				if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) {
390					DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option "
391						"length for option %d\n",
392						__func__, ptr[off]));
393					m_freem(m);
394					return EINVAL;
395				}
396
397				/* Zeroize all other options. */
398				count = ptr[off + 1];
399				bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr, count);
400				off += count;
401				break;
402			}
403
404			/* Sanity check. */
405			if (off > skip)	{
406				DPRINTF(("%s: malformed IPv4 options header\n",
407					__func__));
408
409				m_freem(m);
410				return EINVAL;
411			}
412		}
413
414		break;
415#endif /* INET */
416
417#ifdef INET6
418	case AF_INET6:  /* Ugly... */
419		/* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */
420		m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), (caddr_t) &ip6);
421
422		/* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */
423		if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) {
424			DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n", __func__));
425			m_freem(m);
426			return EMSGSIZE;
427		}
428
429		ip6.ip6_flow = 0;
430		ip6.ip6_hlim = 0;
431		ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK;
432		ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION;
433
434		/* Scoped address handling. */
435		if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src))
436			ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
437		if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst))
438			ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0;
439
440		/* Done with IPv6 header. */
441		m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), (caddr_t) &ip6);
442
443		/* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */
444		if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) {
445			if (m->m_len <= skip) {
446				ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc(
447				    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
448				    M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT);
449				if (ptr == NULL) {
450					DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate memory"
451						"for IPv6 headers\n",__func__));
452					m_freem(m);
453					return ENOBUFS;
454				}
455
456				/*
457				 * Copy all the protocol headers after
458				 * the IPv6 header.
459				 */
460				m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
461				    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
462				alloc = 1;
463			} else {
464				/* No need to allocate memory. */
465				ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) +
466				    sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
467				alloc = 0;
468			}
469		} else
470			break;
471
472		off = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */
473
474		for (len = 0; len < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);)
475			switch (off) {
476			case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
477			case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
478				ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
479
480				/*
481				 * Process the mutable/immutable
482				 * options -- borrows heavily from the
483				 * KAME code.
484				 */
485				for (count = len + sizeof(struct ip6_ext);
486				     count < len + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) {
487					if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) {
488						count++;
489						continue; /* Skip padding. */
490					}
491
492					/* Sanity check. */
493					if (count > len +
494					    ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) {
495						m_freem(m);
496
497						/* Free, if we allocated. */
498						if (alloc)
499							free(ptr, M_XDATA);
500						return EINVAL;
501					}
502
503					ad = ptr[count + 1];
504
505					/* If mutable option, zeroize. */
506					if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE)
507						bcopy(ipseczeroes, ptr + count,
508						    ptr[count + 1]);
509
510					count += ad;
511
512					/* Sanity check. */
513					if (count >
514					    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
515						m_freem(m);
516
517						/* Free, if we allocated. */
518						if (alloc)
519							free(ptr, M_XDATA);
520						return EINVAL;
521					}
522				}
523
524				/* Advance. */
525				len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
526				off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
527				break;
528
529			case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
530				/*
531				 * Always include routing headers in
532				 * computation.
533				 */
534				ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + len);
535				len += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);
536				off = ip6e->ip6e_nxt;
537				break;
538
539			default:
540				DPRINTF(("%s: unexpected IPv6 header type %d",
541					__func__, off));
542				if (alloc)
543					free(ptr, M_XDATA);
544				m_freem(m);
545				return EINVAL;
546			}
547
548		/* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */
549		if (alloc) {
550			m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
551			    skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr);
552			free(ptr, M_XDATA);
553		}
554
555		break;
556#endif /* INET6 */
557	}
558
559	return 0;
560}
561
562/*
563 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet
564 * passes authentication.
565 */
566static int
567ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
568{
569	struct auth_hash *ahx;
570	struct tdb_ident *tdbi;
571	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
572	struct m_tag *mtag;
573	struct newah *ah;
574	int hl, rplen, authsize;
575
576	struct cryptodesc *crda;
577	struct cryptop *crp;
578
579	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
580	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, ("null authentication key"));
581	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL,
582		("null authentication xform"));
583
584	/* Figure out header size. */
585	rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
586
587	/* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */
588	IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen);
589	if (ah == NULL) {
590		DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n"));
591		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);		/*XXX*/
592		m_freem(m);
593		return ENOBUFS;
594	}
595
596	/* Check replay window, if applicable. */
597	if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) {
598		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay);
599		DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay failure: %s\n", __func__,
600			  ipsec_logsastr(sav)));
601		m_freem(m);
602		return ENOBUFS;
603	}
604
605	/* Verify AH header length. */
606	hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t);
607	ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
608	authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
609	if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) {
610		DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)"
611			" for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
612			hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)),
613			ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
614			(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
615		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauthl);
616		m_freem(m);
617		return EACCES;
618	}
619	AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_ibytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl);
620
621	/* Get crypto descriptors. */
622	crp = crypto_getreq(1);
623	if (crp == NULL) {
624		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n",__func__));
625		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
626		m_freem(m);
627		return ENOBUFS;
628	}
629
630	crda = crp->crp_desc;
631	IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("null crypto descriptor"));
632
633	crda->crd_skip = 0;
634	crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
635	crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
636
637	/* Authentication operation. */
638	crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
639	crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
640	crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
641
642	/* Find out if we've already done crypto. */
643	for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL);
644	     mtag != NULL;
645	     mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) {
646		tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1);
647		if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto &&
648		    tdbi->spi == sav->spi &&
649		    !bcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst,
650			  sizeof (union sockaddr_union)))
651			break;
652	}
653
654	/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
655	if (mtag == NULL) {
656		tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) +
657			skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
658	} else {
659		/* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */
660		tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto),
661						    M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
662	}
663	if (tc == NULL) {
664		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
665		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
666		crypto_freereq(crp);
667		m_freem(m);
668		return ENOBUFS;
669	}
670
671	/* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */
672	if (mtag == NULL) {
673		int error;
674
675		/*
676		 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet,
677		 * and the AH header.
678		 */
679		m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (caddr_t)(tc+1));
680
681		/* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */
682		m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
683
684		/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
685		error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
686		    skip, ahx->type, 0);
687		if (error != 0) {
688			/* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */
689			AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);
690			free(tc, M_XDATA);
691			crypto_freereq(crp);
692			return error;
693		}
694	}
695
696	/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
697	crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
698	crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
699	crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
700	crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb;
701	crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
702	crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
703
704	/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
705	tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
706	tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
707	tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
708	tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt;
709	tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
710	tc->tc_skip = skip;
711	tc->tc_ptr = (caddr_t) mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */
712	KEY_ADDREFSA(sav);
713	tc->tc_sav = sav;
714
715	if (mtag == NULL)
716		return crypto_dispatch(crp);
717	else
718		return ah_input_cb(crp);
719}
720
721/*
722 * AH input callback from the crypto driver.
723 */
724static int
725ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
726{
727	int rplen, error, skip, protoff;
728	unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX];
729	struct mbuf *m;
730	struct cryptodesc *crd;
731	struct auth_hash *ahx;
732	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
733	struct m_tag *mtag;
734	struct secasvar *sav;
735	struct secasindex *saidx;
736	u_int8_t nxt;
737	caddr_t ptr;
738	int authsize;
739
740	crd = crp->crp_desc;
741
742	tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
743	IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque crypto data area!"));
744	skip = tc->tc_skip;
745	nxt = tc->tc_nxt;
746	protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
747	mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr;
748	m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
749
750	sav = tc->tc_sav;
751	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA!"));
752
753	saidx = &sav->sah->saidx;
754	IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET ||
755		saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6,
756		("unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family));
757
758	ahx = (struct auth_hash *) sav->tdb_authalgxform;
759
760	/* Check for crypto errors. */
761	if (crp->crp_etype) {
762		if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
763			sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
764
765		if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN)
766			return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
767
768		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform);
769		DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
770		error = crp->crp_etype;
771		goto bad;
772	} else {
773		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
774		crypto_freereq(crp);		/* No longer needed. */
775		crp = NULL;
776	}
777
778	/* Shouldn't happen... */
779	if (m == NULL) {
780		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
781		DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
782		error = EINVAL;
783		goto bad;
784	}
785
786	/* Figure out header size. */
787	rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
788	authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
789
790	/* Copy authenticator off the packet. */
791	m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc);
792
793	/*
794	 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator --
795	 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC.
796	 */
797	if (mtag == NULL) {
798		ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
799
800		/* Verify authenticator. */
801		if (bcmp(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) {
802			DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch for packet "
803			    "in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
804			    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst),
805			    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
806			AHSTAT_INC(ahs_badauth);
807			error = EACCES;
808			goto bad;
809		}
810
811		/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
812		((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt;
813
814		/* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */
815		m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
816	} else {
817		/* Fix the Next Protocol field. */
818		m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt);
819	}
820
821	free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL;			/* No longer needed */
822
823	/*
824	 * Header is now authenticated.
825	 */
826	m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM;
827
828	/*
829	 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate.
830	 */
831	if (sav->replay) {
832		u_int32_t seq;
833
834		m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq),
835			   sizeof (seq), (caddr_t) &seq);
836		if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) {
837			AHSTAT_INC(ahs_replay);
838			error = ENOBUFS;			/*XXX as above*/
839			goto bad;
840		}
841	}
842
843	/*
844	 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf.
845	 */
846	error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize);
847	if (error) {
848		DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
849		    ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
850
851		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);
852		goto bad;
853	}
854
855	switch (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family) {
856#ifdef INET6
857	case AF_INET6:
858		error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag);
859		break;
860#endif
861#ifdef INET
862	case AF_INET:
863		error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag);
864		break;
865#endif
866	default:
867		panic("%s: Unexpected address family: %d saidx=%p", __func__,
868		    saidx->dst.sa.sa_family, saidx);
869	}
870
871	KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
872	return error;
873bad:
874	if (sav)
875		KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
876	if (m != NULL)
877		m_freem(m);
878	if (tc != NULL)
879		free(tc, M_XDATA);
880	if (crp != NULL)
881		crypto_freereq(crp);
882	return error;
883}
884
885/*
886 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet().
887 */
888static int
889ah_output(
890	struct mbuf *m,
891	struct ipsecrequest *isr,
892	struct mbuf **mp,
893	int skip,
894	int protoff)
895{
896	struct secasvar *sav;
897	struct auth_hash *ahx;
898	struct cryptodesc *crda;
899	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
900	struct mbuf *mi;
901	struct cryptop *crp;
902	u_int16_t iplen;
903	int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff;
904	u_int8_t prot;
905	struct newah *ah;
906
907	sav = isr->sav;
908	IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
909	ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
910	IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("null authentication xform"));
911
912	AHSTAT_INC(ahs_output);
913
914	/* Figure out header size. */
915	rplen = HDRSIZE(sav);
916
917	/* Check for maximum packet size violations. */
918	switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
919#ifdef INET
920	case AF_INET:
921		maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET;
922		break;
923#endif /* INET */
924#ifdef INET6
925	case AF_INET6:
926		maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
927		break;
928#endif /* INET6 */
929	default:
930		DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol family %u, "
931		    "SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
932		    sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
933		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
934		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
935		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_nopf);
936		error = EPFNOSUPPORT;
937		goto bad;
938	}
939	authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav);
940	if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) {
941		DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big "
942		    "(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__,
943		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
944		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi),
945		    rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize));
946		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_toobig);
947		error = EMSGSIZE;
948		goto bad;
949	}
950
951	/* Update the counters. */
952	AHSTAT_ADD(ahs_obytes, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip);
953
954	m = m_unshare(m, M_NOWAIT);
955	if (m == NULL) {
956		DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__,
957		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
958		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
959		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);
960		error = ENOBUFS;
961		goto bad;
962	}
963
964	/* Inject AH header. */
965	mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff);
966	if (mi == NULL) {
967		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA "
968		    "%s/%08lx\n", __func__,
969		    rplen + authsize,
970		    ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
971		    (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
972		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hdrops);		/*XXX differs from openbsd */
973		error = ENOBUFS;
974		goto bad;
975	}
976
977	/*
978	 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in
979	 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf.
980	 */
981	ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, caddr_t) + roff);
982
983	/* Initialize the AH header. */
984	m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &ah->ah_nxt);
985	ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t);
986	ah->ah_reserve = 0;
987	ah->ah_spi = sav->spi;
988
989	/* Zeroize authenticator. */
990	m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes);
991
992	/* Insert packet replay counter, as requested.  */
993	if (sav->replay) {
994		if (sav->replay->count == ~0 &&
995		    (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) {
996			DPRINTF(("%s: replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08lx\n",
997				__func__,
998				ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst),
999				(u_long) ntohl(sav->spi)));
1000			AHSTAT_INC(ahs_wrap);
1001			error = EINVAL;
1002			goto bad;
1003		}
1004#ifdef REGRESSION
1005		/* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */
1006		if (!V_ipsec_replay)
1007#endif
1008			sav->replay->count++;
1009		ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count);
1010	}
1011
1012	/* Get crypto descriptors. */
1013	crp = crypto_getreq(1);
1014	if (crp == NULL) {
1015		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n",
1016			__func__));
1017		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
1018		error = ENOBUFS;
1019		goto bad;
1020	}
1021
1022	crda = crp->crp_desc;
1023
1024	crda->crd_skip = 0;
1025	crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen;
1026	crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
1027
1028	/* Authentication operation. */
1029	crda->crd_alg = ahx->type;
1030	crda->crd_key = sav->key_auth->key_data;
1031	crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth);
1032
1033	/* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */
1034	tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(
1035		sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO);
1036	if (tc == NULL) {
1037		crypto_freereq(crp);
1038		DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__));
1039		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
1040		error = ENOBUFS;
1041		goto bad;
1042	}
1043
1044	/* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */
1045	m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (caddr_t) (tc + 1));
1046
1047	/*
1048	 * Fix IP header length on the header used for
1049	 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original
1050	 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller.
1051	 */
1052	switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) {
1053#ifdef INET
1054	case AF_INET:
1055		bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
1056		    offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
1057		    (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
1058		iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
1059		m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len),
1060		    sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
1061		break;
1062#endif /* INET */
1063
1064#ifdef INET6
1065	case AF_INET6:
1066		bcopy(((caddr_t)(tc + 1)) +
1067		    offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
1068		    (caddr_t) &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t));
1069		iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize);
1070		m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen),
1071		    sizeof(u_int16_t), (caddr_t) &iplen);
1072		break;
1073#endif /* INET6 */
1074	}
1075
1076	/* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */
1077	((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH;
1078
1079	/* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */
1080	prot = IPPROTO_AH;
1081	m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), (caddr_t) &prot);
1082
1083	/* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */
1084	error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family,
1085			skip, ahx->type, 1);
1086	if (error != 0) {
1087		m = NULL;	/* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */
1088		free(tc, M_XDATA);
1089		crypto_freereq(crp);
1090		goto bad;
1091	}
1092
1093	/* Crypto operation descriptor. */
1094	crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */
1095	crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF | CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC;
1096	crp->crp_buf = (caddr_t) m;
1097	crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb;
1098	crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid;
1099	crp->crp_opaque = (caddr_t) tc;
1100
1101	/* These are passed as-is to the callback. */
1102	tc->tc_isr = isr;
1103	KEY_ADDREFSA(sav);
1104	tc->tc_sav = sav;
1105	tc->tc_spi = sav->spi;
1106	tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst;
1107	tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto;
1108	tc->tc_skip = skip;
1109	tc->tc_protoff = protoff;
1110
1111	return crypto_dispatch(crp);
1112bad:
1113	if (m)
1114		m_freem(m);
1115	return (error);
1116}
1117
1118/*
1119 * AH output callback from the crypto driver.
1120 */
1121static int
1122ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
1123{
1124	int skip, protoff, error;
1125	struct tdb_crypto *tc;
1126	struct ipsecrequest *isr;
1127	struct secasvar *sav;
1128	struct mbuf *m;
1129	caddr_t ptr;
1130
1131	tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque;
1132	IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("null opaque data area!"));
1133	skip = tc->tc_skip;
1134	protoff = tc->tc_protoff;
1135	ptr = (caddr_t) (tc + 1);
1136	m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf;
1137
1138	isr = tc->tc_isr;
1139	IPSECREQUEST_LOCK(isr);
1140	sav = tc->tc_sav;
1141	/* With the isr lock released SA pointer can be updated. */
1142	if (sav != isr->sav) {
1143		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_notdb);
1144		DPRINTF(("%s: SA expired while in crypto\n", __func__));
1145		error = ENOBUFS;		/*XXX*/
1146		goto bad;
1147	}
1148
1149	/* Check for crypto errors. */
1150	if (crp->crp_etype) {
1151		if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0)
1152			sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid;
1153
1154		if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
1155			IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
1156			return (crypto_dispatch(crp));
1157		}
1158
1159		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_noxform);
1160		DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype));
1161		error = crp->crp_etype;
1162		goto bad;
1163	}
1164
1165	/* Shouldn't happen... */
1166	if (m == NULL) {
1167		AHSTAT_INC(ahs_crypto);
1168		DPRINTF(("%s: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n", __func__));
1169		error = EINVAL;
1170		goto bad;
1171	}
1172	AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
1173
1174	/*
1175	 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back
1176	 * in place.
1177	 */
1178	m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr);
1179
1180	/* No longer needed. */
1181	free(tc, M_XDATA);
1182	crypto_freereq(crp);
1183
1184#ifdef REGRESSION
1185	/* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */
1186	if (V_ipsec_integrity) {
1187		int alen;
1188
1189		/*
1190		 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of
1191		 * the other side.
1192		 */
1193		alen = AUTHSIZE(sav);
1194		m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes);
1195	}
1196#endif
1197
1198	/* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */
1199	error = ipsec_process_done(m, isr);
1200	KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
1201	IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
1202	return error;
1203bad:
1204	if (sav)
1205		KEY_FREESAV(&sav);
1206	IPSECREQUEST_UNLOCK(isr);
1207	if (m)
1208		m_freem(m);
1209	free(tc, M_XDATA);
1210	crypto_freereq(crp);
1211	return error;
1212}
1213
1214static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = {
1215	XF_AH,		XFT_AUTH,	"IPsec AH",
1216	ah_init,	ah_zeroize,	ah_input,	ah_output,
1217};
1218
1219static void
1220ah_attach(void)
1221{
1222
1223	xform_register(&ah_xformsw);
1224}
1225
1226SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL);
1227