1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include <openssl/buffer.h> 158#include <openssl/rand.h> 159#include <openssl/objects.h> 160#include <openssl/evp.h> 161#include <openssl/hmac.h> 162#include <openssl/x509.h> 163#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 164#include <openssl/dh.h> 165#endif 166#include <openssl/bn.h> 167#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 168#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 169#endif 170#include <openssl/md5.h> 171 172static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 173 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 175 { 176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 177 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 178 else 179 return(NULL); 180 } 181 182IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 183 ssl3_accept, 184 ssl_undefined_function, 185 ssl3_get_server_method) 186 187int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 188 { 189 BUF_MEM *buf; 190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 192 int ret= -1; 193 int new_state,state,skip=0; 194 195 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 196 ERR_clear_error(); 197 clear_sys_error(); 198 199 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 200 cb=s->info_callback; 201 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 202 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 203 204 /* init things to blank */ 205 s->in_handshake++; 206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 207 208 if (s->cert == NULL) 209 { 210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 211 return(-1); 212 } 213 214 for (;;) 215 { 216 state=s->state; 217 218 switch (s->state) 219 { 220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 221 s->new_session=1; 222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 223 224 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 225 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 227 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 228 229 s->server=1; 230 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 231 232 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 233 { 234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 235 return -1; 236 } 237 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 238 239 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 240 { 241 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 242 { 243 ret= -1; 244 goto end; 245 } 246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 247 { 248 ret= -1; 249 goto end; 250 } 251 s->init_buf=buf; 252 } 253 254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 255 { 256 ret= -1; 257 goto end; 258 } 259 260 s->init_num=0; 261 262 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 263 { 264 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 265 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 266 */ 267 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 268 269 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 270 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 271 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 272 } 273 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 274 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 275 { 276 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with 277 * client that doesn't support secure 278 * renegotiation. 279 */ 280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 281 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 282 ret = -1; 283 goto end; 284 } 285 else 286 { 287 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 288 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 289 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 291 } 292 break; 293 294 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 296 297 s->shutdown=0; 298 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 299 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 300 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 301 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 302 s->init_num=0; 303 304 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 305 break; 306 307 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 308 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 309 break; 310 311 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 314 315 s->shutdown=0; 316 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 317 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 318 319 s->new_session = 2; 320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 321 s->init_num=0; 322 break; 323 324 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 326 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 327 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 328#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 329 if (s->hit) 330 { 331 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 333 else 334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 335 } 336#else 337 if (s->hit) 338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 339#endif 340 else 341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 342 s->init_num=0; 343 break; 344 345 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 348 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */ 349 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 350 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) 351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) 352 { 353 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 354 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 355#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 356 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 357 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 358 else 359 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 360 } 361 else 362 { 363 skip = 1; 364 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 365 } 366#else 367 } 368 else 369 skip=1; 370 371 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 372#endif 373 s->init_num=0; 374 break; 375 376 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 378 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 379 380 /* clear this, it may get reset by 381 * send_server_key_exchange */ 382 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) 383#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 384 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 385#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 386 ) 387 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key 388 * even when forbidden by protocol specs 389 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to 390 * be able to handle this) */ 391 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 392 else 393 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 394 395 396 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 397 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 398 * 399 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints 400 * 401 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 402 * message only if the cipher suite is either 403 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 404 * server certificate contains the server's 405 * public key for key exchange. 406 */ 407 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp 408 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity 409 * hint if provided */ 410#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 411 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 412#endif 413 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH)) 414 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 415 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 416 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 417 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 418 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 419 ) 420 ) 421 ) 422 ) 423 { 424 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 425 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 426 } 427 else 428 skip=1; 429 430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 431 s->init_num=0; 432 break; 433 434 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 436 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 438 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 439 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 440 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 441 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 442 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 443 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 444 * and in RFC 2246): */ 445 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 446 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 447 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 448 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 449 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 450 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) 451 /* With normal PSK Certificates and 452 * Certificate Requests are omitted */ 453 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 454 { 455 /* no cert request */ 456 skip=1; 457 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 459 } 460 else 461 { 462 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 463 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 464 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 465#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 467#else 468 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 469 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 470#endif 471 s->init_num=0; 472 } 473 break; 474 475 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 477 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 478 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 479 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 480 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 481 s->init_num=0; 482 break; 483 484 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 485 486 /* This code originally checked to see if 487 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 488 * and then flushed. This caused problems 489 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 490 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 491 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 492 * still exist. So instead we just flush 493 * unconditionally. 494 */ 495 496 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 497 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) 498 { 499 ret= -1; 500 goto end; 501 } 502 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 503 504 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 505 break; 506 507 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 509 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 510 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 511 if (ret <= 0) 512 goto end; 513 if (ret == 2) 514 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 515 else { 516 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 517 { 518 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 519 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 520 } 521 s->init_num=0; 522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 523 } 524 break; 525 526 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 528 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 529 if (ret <= 0) 530 goto end; 531 if (ret == 2) 532 { 533 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 534 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 535 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 536 * message is not sent. 537 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when 538 * the client uses its key from the certificate 539 * for key exchange. 540 */ 541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 542 s->init_num = 0; 543 } 544 else 545 { 546 int offset=0; 547 int dgst_num; 548 549 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 550 s->init_num=0; 551 552 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 553 * a client cert, it can be verified 554 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify 555 * should be generalized. But it is next step 556 */ 557 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 558 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 559 return -1; 560 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++) 561 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 562 { 563 int dgst_size; 564 565 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset])); 566 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 567 if (dgst_size < 0) 568 { 569 ret = -1; 570 goto end; 571 } 572 offset+=dgst_size; 573 } 574 } 575 break; 576 577 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 579 580 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 581 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 582 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 583 584 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 585 s->init_num=0; 586 break; 587 588 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 589 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 590 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 591 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 592 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 593#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 594 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 596 else if (s->hit) 597 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 598#else 599 if (s->hit) 600 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 601#endif 602 else 603 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 604 s->init_num=0; 605 break; 606 607#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 608 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 609 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 610 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 611 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 612 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 613 s->init_num=0; 614 break; 615 616 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 617 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 618 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 619 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 621 s->init_num=0; 622 break; 623 624#endif 625 626 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 627 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 628 629 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 630 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 631 { ret= -1; goto end; } 632 633 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 634 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 635 636 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 638 s->init_num=0; 639 640 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 641 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 642 { 643 ret= -1; 644 goto end; 645 } 646 647 break; 648 649 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 650 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 651 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 652 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 653 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 654 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 655 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 656 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 657 if (s->hit) 658 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 659 else 660 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 661 s->init_num=0; 662 break; 663 664 case SSL_ST_OK: 665 /* clean a few things up */ 666 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 667 668 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 669 s->init_buf=NULL; 670 671 /* remove buffering on output */ 672 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 673 674 s->init_num=0; 675 676 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 677 { 678 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless 679 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ 680 681 s->new_session=0; 682 683 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 684 685 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 686 /* s->server=1; */ 687 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 688 689 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 690 } 691 692 ret = 1; 693 goto end; 694 /* break; */ 695 696 default: 697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 698 ret= -1; 699 goto end; 700 /* break; */ 701 } 702 703 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 704 { 705 if (s->debug) 706 { 707 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 708 goto end; 709 } 710 711 712 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 713 { 714 new_state=s->state; 715 s->state=state; 716 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 717 s->state=new_state; 718 } 719 } 720 skip=0; 721 } 722end: 723 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 724 725 s->in_handshake--; 726 if (cb != NULL) 727 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 728 return(ret); 729 } 730 731int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 732 { 733 unsigned char *p; 734 735 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 736 { 737 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 738 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 739 *(p++)=0; 740 *(p++)=0; 741 *(p++)=0; 742 743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 744 /* number of bytes to write */ 745 s->init_num=4; 746 s->init_off=0; 747 } 748 749 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 750 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 751 } 752 753int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 754 { 755 int ok; 756 long n; 757 758 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 759 * so permit appropriate message length */ 760 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 761 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 762 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 763 -1, 764 s->max_cert_list, 765 &ok); 766 if (!ok) return((int)n); 767 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 768 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 769 { 770 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 771 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) 772 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared 773 * when a handshake is not completed ... */ 774#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 775 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 776 { 777 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 778 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 779 } 780#endif 781 return 2; 782 } 783 return 1; 784} 785 786int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 787 { 788 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 789 unsigned int cookie_len; 790 long n; 791 unsigned long id; 792 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 793 SSL_CIPHER *c; 794#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 795 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 796#endif 797 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 798 799 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 800 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 801 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 802 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 803 * TLSv1. 804 */ 805 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 806 { 807 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 808 } 809 s->first_packet=1; 810 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 811 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 812 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 813 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 814 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 815 &ok); 816 817 if (!ok) return((int)n); 818 s->first_packet=0; 819 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 820 821 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 822 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 823 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 824 p+=2; 825 826 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 827 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 828 { 829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 830 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 831 { 832 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 833 s->version = s->client_version; 834 } 835 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 836 goto f_err; 837 } 838 839 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't 840 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 841 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 842 */ 843 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) 844 { 845 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 846 847 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 848 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 849 850 if (cookie_length == 0) 851 return 1; 852 } 853 854 /* load the client random */ 855 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 856 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 857 858 /* get the session-id */ 859 j= *(p++); 860 861 s->hit=0; 862 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation 863 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option 864 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. 865 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default, 866 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications 867 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with 868 * an earlier library version) 869 */ 870 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 871 { 872 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 873 goto err; 874 } 875 else 876 { 877 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 878 if (i == 1) 879 { /* previous session */ 880 s->hit=1; 881 } 882 else if (i == -1) 883 goto err; 884 else /* i == 0 */ 885 { 886 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 887 goto err; 888 } 889 } 890 891 p+=j; 892 893 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 894 { 895 /* cookie stuff */ 896 cookie_len = *(p++); 897 898 /* 899 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 900 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 901 * does not cause an overflow. 902 */ 903 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 904 { 905 /* too much data */ 906 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 908 goto f_err; 909 } 910 911 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 912 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 913 cookie_len > 0) 914 { 915 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 916 917 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 918 { 919 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 920 cookie_len) == 0) 921 { 922 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 924 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 925 goto f_err; 926 } 927 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 928 } 929 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 930 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 931 { 932 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 934 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 935 goto f_err; 936 } 937 938 ret = 2; 939 } 940 941 p += cookie_len; 942 } 943 944 n2s(p,i); 945 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 946 { 947 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 948 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 950 goto f_err; 951 } 952 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 953 { 954 /* not enough data */ 955 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 957 goto f_err; 958 } 959 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 960 == NULL)) 961 { 962 goto err; 963 } 964 p+=i; 965 966 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 967 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 968 { 969 j=0; 970 id=s->session->cipher->id; 971 972#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 973 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 974#endif 975 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 976 { 977 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 978#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 979 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 980 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 981#endif 982 if (c->id == id) 983 { 984 j=1; 985 break; 986 } 987 } 988/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade 989 * attack: CVE-2010-4180. 990 */ 991#if 0 992 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 993 { 994 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may 995 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to 996 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server 997 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not 998 * enabled, though. */ 999 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1000 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) 1001 { 1002 s->session->cipher = c; 1003 j = 1; 1004 } 1005 } 1006#endif 1007 if (j == 0) 1008 { 1009 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 1010 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 1011 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1013 goto f_err; 1014 } 1015 } 1016 1017 /* compression */ 1018 i= *(p++); 1019 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 1020 { 1021 /* not enough data */ 1022 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1024 goto f_err; 1025 } 1026 q=p; 1027 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 1028 { 1029 if (p[j] == 0) break; 1030 } 1031 1032 p+=i; 1033 if (j >= i) 1034 { 1035 /* no compress */ 1036 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1038 goto f_err; 1039 } 1040 1041#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1042 /* TLS extensions*/ 1043 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1044 { 1045 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 1046 { 1047 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1049 goto f_err; 1050 } 1051 } 1052 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1054 goto err; 1055 } 1056 1057 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this 1058 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate 1059 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow 1060 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */ 1061 { 1062 unsigned long Time; 1063 unsigned char *pos; 1064 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1065 pos=s->s3->server_random; 1066 l2n(Time,pos); 1067 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1068 { 1069 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1070 goto f_err; 1071 } 1072 } 1073 1074 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1075 { 1076 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; 1077 1078 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1079 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, 1080 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) 1081 { 1082 s->hit=1; 1083 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1084 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK; 1085 1086 ciphers=NULL; 1087 1088 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1089 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1090 if (pref_cipher == NULL) 1091 { 1092 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1094 goto f_err; 1095 } 1096 1097 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher; 1098 1099 if (s->cipher_list) 1100 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1101 1102 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1103 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1104 1105 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1106 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1107 } 1108 } 1109#endif 1110 1111 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1112 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1113 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 1114 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 1115#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1116 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1117 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1118 { 1119 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1120 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1121 /* Can't disable compression */ 1122 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) 1123 { 1124 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1126 goto f_err; 1127 } 1128 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1129 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) 1130 { 1131 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1132 if (comp_id == comp->id) 1133 { 1134 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1135 break; 1136 } 1137 } 1138 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1139 { 1140 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1142 goto f_err; 1143 } 1144 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1145 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) 1146 { 1147 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1148 break; 1149 } 1150 if (m >= i) 1151 { 1152 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1154 goto f_err; 1155 } 1156 } 1157 else if (s->hit) 1158 comp = NULL; 1159 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) 1160 { /* See if we have a match */ 1161 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 1162 1163 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1164 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 1165 { 1166 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1167 v=comp->id; 1168 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 1169 { 1170 if (v == q[o]) 1171 { 1172 done=1; 1173 break; 1174 } 1175 } 1176 if (done) break; 1177 } 1178 if (done) 1179 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1180 else 1181 comp=NULL; 1182 } 1183#else 1184 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1185 * using compression. 1186 */ 1187 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) 1188 { 1189 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1191 goto f_err; 1192 } 1193#endif 1194 1195 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1196 * pick a cipher */ 1197 1198 if (!s->hit) 1199 { 1200#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1201 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1202#else 1203 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1204#endif 1205 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1206 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1207 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1208 if (ciphers == NULL) 1209 { 1210 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1212 goto f_err; 1213 } 1214 ciphers=NULL; 1215 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1216 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1217 1218 if (c == NULL) 1219 { 1220 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1222 goto f_err; 1223 } 1224 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1225 } 1226 else 1227 { 1228 /* Session-id reuse */ 1229#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1230 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1231 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1232 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1233 1234 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1235 { 1236 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1237 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1238 { 1239 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1240 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1241 nc=c; 1242 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1243 ec=c; 1244 } 1245 if (nc != NULL) 1246 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1247 else if (ec != NULL) 1248 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1249 else 1250 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1251 } 1252 else 1253#endif 1254 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1255 } 1256 1257 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1258 goto f_err; 1259 1260 /* we now have the following setup. 1261 * client_random 1262 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1263 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1264 * compression - basically ignored right now 1265 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1266 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1267 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1268 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1269 */ 1270 1271 if (ret < 0) ret=1; 1272 if (0) 1273 { 1274f_err: 1275 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1276 } 1277err: 1278 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1279 return(ret); 1280 } 1281 1282int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1283 { 1284 unsigned char *buf; 1285 unsigned char *p,*d; 1286 int i,sl; 1287 unsigned long l; 1288#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1289 unsigned long Time; 1290#endif 1291 1292 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1293 { 1294 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1295#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1296 p=s->s3->server_random; 1297 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */ 1298 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1299 l2n(Time,p); 1300 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1301 return -1; 1302#endif 1303 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1304 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1305 1306 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1307 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1308 1309 /* Random stuff */ 1310 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1311 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1312 1313 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the 1314 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the 1315 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send 1316 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length 1317 * session-id if we want it to be single use. 1318 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id 1319 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. 1320 * 1321 * We also have an additional case where stateless session 1322 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old 1323 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can 1324 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful 1325 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality 1326 * is unaffected. 1327 */ 1328 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1329 && !s->hit) 1330 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1331 1332 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1333 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1334 { 1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1336 return -1; 1337 } 1338 *(p++)=sl; 1339 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1340 p+=sl; 1341 1342 /* put the cipher */ 1343 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1344 p+=i; 1345 1346 /* put the compression method */ 1347#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1348 *(p++)=0; 1349#else 1350 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1351 *(p++)=0; 1352 else 1353 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1354#endif 1355#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1356 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 1357 { 1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1359 return -1; 1360 } 1361 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1362 { 1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1364 return -1; 1365 } 1366#endif 1367 /* do the header */ 1368 l=(p-d); 1369 d=buf; 1370 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1371 l2n3(l,d); 1372 1373 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1374 /* number of bytes to write */ 1375 s->init_num=p-buf; 1376 s->init_off=0; 1377 } 1378 1379 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1380 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1381 } 1382 1383int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1384 { 1385 unsigned char *p; 1386 1387 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1388 { 1389 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1390 1391 /* do the header */ 1392 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1393 *(p++)=0; 1394 *(p++)=0; 1395 *(p++)=0; 1396 1397 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1398 /* number of bytes to write */ 1399 s->init_num=4; 1400 s->init_off=0; 1401 } 1402 1403 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1404 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1405 } 1406 1407int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1408 { 1409#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1410 unsigned char *q; 1411 int j,num; 1412 RSA *rsa; 1413 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1414 unsigned int u; 1415#endif 1416#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1417 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1418#endif 1419#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1420 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1421 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1422 int encodedlen = 0; 1423 int curve_id = 0; 1424 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1425#endif 1426 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1427 unsigned char *p,*d; 1428 int al,i; 1429 unsigned long type; 1430 int n; 1431 CERT *cert; 1432 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1433 int nr[4],kn; 1434 BUF_MEM *buf; 1435 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1436 1437 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1438 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1439 { 1440 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1441 cert=s->cert; 1442 1443 buf=s->init_buf; 1444 1445 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1446 n=0; 1447#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1448 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1449 { 1450 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1451 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1452 { 1453 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1454 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1455 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1456 if(rsa == NULL) 1457 { 1458 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1460 goto f_err; 1461 } 1462 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1463 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1464 } 1465 if (rsa == NULL) 1466 { 1467 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1469 goto f_err; 1470 } 1471 r[0]=rsa->n; 1472 r[1]=rsa->e; 1473 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1474 } 1475 else 1476#endif 1477#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1478 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1479 { 1480 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1481 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1482 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1483 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1484 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1485 if (dhp == NULL) 1486 { 1487 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1489 goto f_err; 1490 } 1491 1492 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1493 { 1494 DH_free(dh); 1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1496 goto err; 1497 } 1498 1499 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1500 { 1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1502 goto err; 1503 } 1504 1505 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1506 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1507 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1508 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1509 { 1510 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1511 { 1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1513 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1514 goto err; 1515 } 1516 } 1517 else 1518 { 1519 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1520 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1521 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1522 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1523 { 1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1525 goto err; 1526 } 1527 } 1528 r[0]=dh->p; 1529 r[1]=dh->g; 1530 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1531 } 1532 else 1533#endif 1534#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1535 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1536 { 1537 const EC_GROUP *group; 1538 1539 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1540 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1541 { 1542 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1543 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1544 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1545 } 1546 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1547 { 1548 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1550 goto f_err; 1551 } 1552 1553 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1554 { 1555 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1557 goto err; 1558 } 1559 1560 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1561 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1562 { 1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1564 goto err; 1565 } 1566 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp)) 1567 { 1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1569 goto err; 1570 } 1571 ecdh = ecdhp; 1572 1573 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1574 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1575 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1576 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1577 { 1578 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1579 { 1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1581 goto err; 1582 } 1583 } 1584 1585 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1586 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1587 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1588 { 1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1590 goto err; 1591 } 1592 1593 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1594 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1595 { 1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1597 goto err; 1598 } 1599 1600 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1601 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1602 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1603 */ 1604 if ((curve_id = 1605 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1606 == 0) 1607 { 1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1609 goto err; 1610 } 1611 1612 /* Encode the public key. 1613 * First check the size of encoding and 1614 * allocate memory accordingly. 1615 */ 1616 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1617 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1618 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1619 NULL, 0, NULL); 1620 1621 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1622 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1623 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1624 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1625 { 1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1627 goto err; 1628 } 1629 1630 1631 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1632 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1633 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1634 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1635 1636 if (encodedlen == 0) 1637 { 1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1639 goto err; 1640 } 1641 1642 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1643 1644 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1645 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1646 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1647 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1648 * structure. 1649 */ 1650 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1651 1652 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1653 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1654 */ 1655 r[0]=NULL; 1656 r[1]=NULL; 1657 r[2]=NULL; 1658 r[3]=NULL; 1659 } 1660 else 1661#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1662#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1663 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1664 { 1665 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/ 1666 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1667 } 1668 else 1669#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1670 { 1671 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1673 goto f_err; 1674 } 1675 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1676 { 1677 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1678 n+=2+nr[i]; 1679 } 1680 1681 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) 1682 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) 1683 { 1684 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) 1685 == NULL) 1686 { 1687 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1688 goto f_err; 1689 } 1690 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1691 } 1692 else 1693 { 1694 pkey=NULL; 1695 kn=0; 1696 } 1697 1698 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1699 { 1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1701 goto err; 1702 } 1703 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1704 p= &(d[4]); 1705 1706 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1707 { 1708 s2n(nr[i],p); 1709 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1710 p+=nr[i]; 1711 } 1712 1713#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1714 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) 1715 { 1716 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1717 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1718 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1719 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1720 * the actual encoded point itself 1721 */ 1722 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1723 p += 1; 1724 *p = 0; 1725 p += 1; 1726 *p = curve_id; 1727 p += 1; 1728 *p = encodedlen; 1729 p += 1; 1730 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1731 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1732 encodedlen); 1733 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1734 p += encodedlen; 1735 } 1736#endif 1737 1738#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1739 if (type & SSL_kPSK) 1740 { 1741 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1742 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1743 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1744 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1745 } 1746#endif 1747 1748 /* not anonymous */ 1749 if (pkey != NULL) 1750 { 1751 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1752 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1753#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1754 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 1755 { 1756 q=md_buf; 1757 j=0; 1758 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1759 { 1760 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1761 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1762 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1763 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1764 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1765 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1766 (unsigned int *)&i); 1767 q+=i; 1768 j+=i; 1769 } 1770 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1771 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1772 { 1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1774 goto err; 1775 } 1776 s2n(u,p); 1777 n+=u+2; 1778 } 1779 else 1780#endif 1781#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) 1782 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 1783 { 1784 /* lets do DSS */ 1785 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); 1786 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1787 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1788 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1789 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1790 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1791 { 1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); 1793 goto err; 1794 } 1795 s2n(i,p); 1796 n+=i+2; 1797 } 1798 else 1799#endif 1800#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) 1801 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 1802 { 1803 /* let's do ECDSA */ 1804 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); 1805 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1806 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1807 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1808 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1809 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1810 { 1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); 1812 goto err; 1813 } 1814 s2n(i,p); 1815 n+=i+2; 1816 } 1817 else 1818#endif 1819 { 1820 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1821 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1823 goto f_err; 1824 } 1825 } 1826 1827 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1828 l2n3(n,d); 1829 1830 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1831 * it off */ 1832 s->init_num=n+4; 1833 s->init_off=0; 1834 } 1835 1836 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1837 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1838 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1839f_err: 1840 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1841err: 1842#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1843 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1844 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1845#endif 1846 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1847 return(-1); 1848 } 1849 1850int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1851 { 1852 unsigned char *p,*d; 1853 int i,j,nl,off,n; 1854 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 1855 X509_NAME *name; 1856 BUF_MEM *buf; 1857 1858 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 1859 { 1860 buf=s->init_buf; 1861 1862 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 1863 1864 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 1865 p++; 1866 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 1867 d[0]=n; 1868 p+=n; 1869 n++; 1870 1871 off=n; 1872 p+=2; 1873 n+=2; 1874 1875 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1876 nl=0; 1877 if (sk != NULL) 1878 { 1879 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 1880 { 1881 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 1882 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 1883 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 1884 { 1885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1886 goto err; 1887 } 1888 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 1889 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 1890 { 1891 s2n(j,p); 1892 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1893 n+=2+j; 1894 nl+=2+j; 1895 } 1896 else 1897 { 1898 d=p; 1899 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1900 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 1901 n+=j; 1902 nl+=j; 1903 } 1904 } 1905 } 1906 /* else no CA names */ 1907 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 1908 s2n(nl,p); 1909 1910 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 1911 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1912 l2n3(n,d); 1913 1914 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1915 * it off */ 1916 1917 s->init_num=n+4; 1918 s->init_off=0; 1919#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 1920 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 1921 1922 /* do the header */ 1923 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1924 *(p++)=0; 1925 *(p++)=0; 1926 *(p++)=0; 1927 s->init_num += 4; 1928#endif 1929 1930 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1931 } 1932 1933 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1934 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1935err: 1936 return(-1); 1937 } 1938 1939int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1940 { 1941 int i,al,ok; 1942 long n; 1943 unsigned long alg_k; 1944 unsigned char *p; 1945#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1946 RSA *rsa=NULL; 1947 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1948#endif 1949#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1950 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 1951 DH *dh_srvr; 1952#endif 1953#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1954 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 1955#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 1956 1957#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1958 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 1959 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 1960 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 1961 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1962#endif 1963 1964 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 1965 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 1966 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 1967 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1968 2048, /* ??? */ 1969 &ok); 1970 1971 if (!ok) return((int)n); 1972 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 1973 1974 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1975 1976#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1977 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 1978 { 1979 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 1980 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 1981 { 1982 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 1983 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 1984 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 1985 * be sent already */ 1986 if (rsa == NULL) 1987 { 1988 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 1990 goto f_err; 1991 1992 } 1993 } 1994 else 1995 { 1996 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1997 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 1998 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1999 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 2000 { 2001 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2003 goto f_err; 2004 } 2005 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 2006 } 2007 2008 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2009 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2010 { 2011 n2s(p,i); 2012 if (n != i+2) 2013 { 2014 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 2015 { 2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2017 goto err; 2018 } 2019 else 2020 p-=2; 2021 } 2022 else 2023 n=i; 2024 } 2025 2026 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2027 2028 al = -1; 2029 2030 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2031 { 2032 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2033 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 2034 } 2035 2036 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2037 { 2038 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2039 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2040 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2041 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2042 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2043 * protocol version. 2044 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 2045 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 2046 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) 2047 { 2048 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2049 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 2050 2051 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2052 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 2053 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 2054 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 2055 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except 2056 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, 2057 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ 2058 } 2059 } 2060 2061 if (al != -1) 2062 { 2063 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure 2064 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding 2065 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ 2066 ERR_clear_error(); 2067 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 2068 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 2069 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 2070 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ 2071 goto err; 2072 } 2073 2074 s->session->master_key_length= 2075 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2076 s->session->master_key, 2077 p,i); 2078 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2079 } 2080 else 2081#endif 2082#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2083 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 2084 { 2085 n2s(p,i); 2086 if (n != i+2) 2087 { 2088 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 2089 { 2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2091 goto err; 2092 } 2093 else 2094 { 2095 p-=2; 2096 i=(int)n; 2097 } 2098 } 2099 2100 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 2101 { 2102 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 2104 goto f_err; 2105 } 2106 else 2107 { 2108 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 2109 { 2110 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2112 goto f_err; 2113 } 2114 else 2115 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 2116 } 2117 2118 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 2119 if (pub == NULL) 2120 { 2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2122 goto err; 2123 } 2124 2125 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 2126 2127 if (i <= 0) 2128 { 2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2130 goto err; 2131 } 2132 2133 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2134 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 2135 2136 BN_clear_free(pub); 2137 pub=NULL; 2138 s->session->master_key_length= 2139 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2140 s->session->master_key,p,i); 2141 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 2142 } 2143 else 2144#endif 2145#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2146 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) 2147 { 2148 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2149 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2150 krb5_data authenticator; 2151 krb5_data enc_pms; 2152 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2153 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2154 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2155 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2156 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 2157 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2158 int padl, outl; 2159 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2160 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2161 2162 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2163 2164 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2165 2166 n2s(p,i); 2167 enc_ticket.length = i; 2168 2169 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) 2170 { 2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2172 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2173 goto err; 2174 } 2175 2176 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2177 p+=enc_ticket.length; 2178 2179 n2s(p,i); 2180 authenticator.length = i; 2181 2182 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) 2183 { 2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2185 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2186 goto err; 2187 } 2188 2189 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2190 p+=authenticator.length; 2191 2192 n2s(p,i); 2193 enc_pms.length = i; 2194 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2195 p+=enc_pms.length; 2196 2197 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 2198 ** after decryption 2199 */ 2200 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 2201 { 2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2203 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2204 goto err; 2205 } 2206 2207 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2208 enc_pms.length + 6)) 2209 { 2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2211 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2212 goto err; 2213 } 2214 2215 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2216 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2217 { 2218#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2219 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2220 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2221 if (kssl_err.text) 2222 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2223#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2225 kssl_err.reason); 2226 goto err; 2227 } 2228 2229 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2230 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2231 */ 2232 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2233 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2234 { 2235#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2236 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2237 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2238 if (kssl_err.text) 2239 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2240#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2242 kssl_err.reason); 2243 goto err; 2244 } 2245 2246 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2247 { 2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2249 goto err; 2250 } 2251 2252#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2253 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2254#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2255 2256 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2257 if (enc == NULL) 2258 goto err; 2259 2260 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2261 2262 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2263 { 2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2265 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2266 goto err; 2267 } 2268 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2269 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2270 { 2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2272 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2273 goto err; 2274 } 2275 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2276 { 2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2278 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2279 goto err; 2280 } 2281 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2282 { 2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2284 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2285 goto err; 2286 } 2287 outl += padl; 2288 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2289 { 2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2291 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2292 goto err; 2293 } 2294 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2295 { 2296 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2297 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2298 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2299 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2300 * the protocol version. 2301 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2302 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2303 */ 2304 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2305 { 2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2307 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2308 goto err; 2309 } 2310 } 2311 2312 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2313 2314 s->session->master_key_length= 2315 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2316 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2317 2318 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2319 { 2320 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2321 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2322 { 2323 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2324 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2325 } 2326 } 2327 2328 2329 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2330 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2331 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2332 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2333 */ 2334 } 2335 else 2336#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2337 2338#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2339 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2340 { 2341 int ret = 1; 2342 int field_size = 0; 2343 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2344 const EC_GROUP *group; 2345 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2346 2347 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2348 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2349 { 2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2351 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2352 goto err; 2353 } 2354 2355 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2356 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) 2357 { 2358 /* use the certificate */ 2359 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2360 } 2361 else 2362 { 2363 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2364 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2365 */ 2366 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2367 } 2368 2369 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2370 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2371 2372 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2373 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2374 { 2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2376 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2377 goto err; 2378 } 2379 2380 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2381 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2382 { 2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2384 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2385 goto err; 2386 } 2387 2388 if (n == 0L) 2389 { 2390 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2391 2392 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 2393 { 2394 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2396 goto f_err; 2397 } 2398 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2399 == NULL) || 2400 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2401 { 2402 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2403 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2404 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2405 * never executed. When that support is 2406 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2407 * received in the certificate is 2408 * authorized for key agreement. 2409 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2410 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2411 * group. 2412 */ 2413 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2415 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2416 goto f_err; 2417 } 2418 2419 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2420 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2421 { 2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2423 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2424 goto err; 2425 } 2426 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2427 } 2428 else 2429 { 2430 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2431 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2432 */ 2433 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2434 { 2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2436 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2437 goto err; 2438 } 2439 2440 /* Get encoded point length */ 2441 i = *p; 2442 p += 1; 2443 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2444 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2445 { 2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2447 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2448 goto err; 2449 } 2450 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2451 * currently, so set it to the start 2452 */ 2453 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2454 } 2455 2456 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2457 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2458 if (field_size <= 0) 2459 { 2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2461 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2462 goto err; 2463 } 2464 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2465 if (i <= 0) 2466 { 2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2468 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2469 goto err; 2470 } 2471 2472 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2473 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2474 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2475 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2476 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2477 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2478 2479 /* Compute the master secret */ 2480 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2481 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2482 2483 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2484 return (ret); 2485 } 2486 else 2487#endif 2488#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2489 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) 2490 { 2491 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2492 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; 2493 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2494 int psk_err = 1; 2495 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1]; 2496 2497 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2498 2499 n2s(p,i); 2500 if (n != i+2) 2501 { 2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2503 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2504 goto psk_err; 2505 } 2506 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) 2507 { 2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2509 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2510 goto psk_err; 2511 } 2512 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) 2513 { 2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2515 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2516 goto psk_err; 2517 } 2518 2519 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity 2520 * string for the callback */ 2521 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2522 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i); 2523 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2524 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2525 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1); 2526 2527 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) 2528 { 2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2530 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2531 goto psk_err; 2532 } 2533 else if (psk_len == 0) 2534 { 2535 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */ 2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2537 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2538 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2539 goto psk_err; 2540 } 2541 2542 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2543 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len; 2544 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2545 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2546 s2n(psk_len, t); 2547 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2548 t+=psk_len; 2549 s2n(psk_len, t); 2550 2551 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2552 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2553 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p); 2554 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) 2555 { 2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2557 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2558 goto psk_err; 2559 } 2560 2561 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2562 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2563 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2564 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2565 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) 2566 { 2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2568 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2569 goto psk_err; 2570 } 2571 2572 s->session->master_key_length= 2573 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2574 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 2575 psk_err = 0; 2576 psk_err: 2577 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2578 if (psk_err != 0) 2579 goto f_err; 2580 } 2581 else 2582#endif 2583 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 2584 { 2585 int ret = 0; 2586 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2587 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2588 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2589 size_t outlen=32, inlen; 2590 unsigned long alg_a; 2591 2592 /* Get our certificate private key*/ 2593 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2594 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2595 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2596 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2597 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2598 2599 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL); 2600 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx); 2601 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2602 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2603 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use 2604 * a client certificate for authorization only. */ 2605 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2606 if (client_pub_pkey) 2607 { 2608 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2609 ERR_clear_error(); 2610 } 2611 /* Decrypt session key */ 2612 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) 2613 { 2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2615 goto gerr; 2616 } 2617 if (p[1] == 0x81) 2618 { 2619 start = p+3; 2620 inlen = p[2]; 2621 } 2622 else if (p[1] < 0x80) 2623 { 2624 start = p+2; 2625 inlen = p[1]; 2626 } 2627 else 2628 { 2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2630 goto gerr; 2631 } 2632 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 2633 2634 { 2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2636 goto gerr; 2637 } 2638 /* Generate master secret */ 2639 s->session->master_key_length= 2640 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2641 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32); 2642 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2643 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2644 ret = 2; 2645 else 2646 ret = 1; 2647 gerr: 2648 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2649 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2650 if (ret) 2651 return ret; 2652 else 2653 goto err; 2654 } 2655 else 2656 { 2657 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2659 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2660 goto f_err; 2661 } 2662 2663 return(1); 2664f_err: 2665 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2666#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) 2667err: 2668#endif 2669#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2670 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2671 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2672 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2673 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2674 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2675#endif 2676 return(-1); 2677 } 2678 2679int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2680 { 2681 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2682 unsigned char *p; 2683 int al,ok,ret=0; 2684 long n; 2685 int type=0,i,j; 2686 X509 *peer; 2687 2688 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2689 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2690 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2691 -1, 2692 514, /* 514? */ 2693 &ok); 2694 2695 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2696 2697 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 2698 { 2699 peer=s->session->peer; 2700 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2701 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 2702 } 2703 else 2704 { 2705 peer=NULL; 2706 pkey=NULL; 2707 } 2708 2709 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 2710 { 2711 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2712 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2713 { 2714 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2716 goto f_err; 2717 } 2718 ret=1; 2719 goto end; 2720 } 2721 2722 if (peer == NULL) 2723 { 2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2725 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2726 goto f_err; 2727 } 2728 2729 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2730 { 2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2732 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2733 goto f_err; 2734 } 2735 2736 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 2737 { 2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2739 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2740 goto f_err; 2741 } 2742 2743 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2744 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2745 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 2746 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare 2747 * signature without length field */ 2748 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 2749 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) 2750 { 2751 i=64; 2752 } 2753 else 2754 { 2755 n2s(p,i); 2756 n-=2; 2757 if (i > n) 2758 { 2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2760 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2761 goto f_err; 2762 } 2763 } 2764 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2765 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 2766 { 2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2768 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2769 goto f_err; 2770 } 2771 2772#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2773 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 2774 { 2775 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2776 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 2777 pkey->pkey.rsa); 2778 if (i < 0) 2779 { 2780 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2782 goto f_err; 2783 } 2784 if (i == 0) 2785 { 2786 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2788 goto f_err; 2789 } 2790 } 2791 else 2792#endif 2793#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2794 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 2795 { 2796 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2797 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2798 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 2799 if (j <= 0) 2800 { 2801 /* bad signature */ 2802 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 2804 goto f_err; 2805 } 2806 } 2807 else 2808#endif 2809#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2810 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 2811 { 2812 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2813 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2814 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 2815 if (j <= 0) 2816 { 2817 /* bad signature */ 2818 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2820 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2821 goto f_err; 2822 } 2823 } 2824 else 2825#endif 2826 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 2827 { unsigned char signature[64]; 2828 int idx; 2829 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL); 2830 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx); 2831 if (i!=64) { 2832 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i); 2833 } 2834 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) { 2835 signature[63-idx]=p[idx]; 2836 } 2837 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32); 2838 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 2839 if (j<=0) 2840 { 2841 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2843 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2844 goto f_err; 2845 } 2846 } 2847 else 2848 { 2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2850 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2851 goto f_err; 2852 } 2853 2854 2855 ret=1; 2856 if (0) 2857 { 2858f_err: 2859 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2860 } 2861end: 2862 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2863 return(ret); 2864 } 2865 2866int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2867 { 2868 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 2869 X509 *x=NULL; 2870 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 2871 const unsigned char *p,*q; 2872 unsigned char *d; 2873 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 2874 2875 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2876 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 2877 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2878 -1, 2879 s->max_cert_list, 2880 &ok); 2881 2882 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2883 2884 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 2885 { 2886 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2887 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2888 { 2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2890 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2891 goto f_err; 2892 } 2893 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 2894 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 2895 { 2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 2897 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2898 goto f_err; 2899 } 2900 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2901 return(1); 2902 } 2903 2904 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 2905 { 2906 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2908 goto f_err; 2909 } 2910 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2911 2912 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 2913 { 2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2915 goto err; 2916 } 2917 2918 n2l3(p,llen); 2919 if (llen+3 != n) 2920 { 2921 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2923 goto f_err; 2924 } 2925 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 2926 { 2927 n2l3(p,l); 2928 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 2929 { 2930 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2932 goto f_err; 2933 } 2934 2935 q=p; 2936 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 2937 if (x == NULL) 2938 { 2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2940 goto err; 2941 } 2942 if (p != (q+l)) 2943 { 2944 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2946 goto f_err; 2947 } 2948 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 2949 { 2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2951 goto err; 2952 } 2953 x=NULL; 2954 nc+=l+3; 2955 } 2956 2957 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 2958 { 2959 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 2960 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 2961 { 2962 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 2964 goto f_err; 2965 } 2966 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 2967 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2968 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2969 { 2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2971 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2972 goto f_err; 2973 } 2974 } 2975 else 2976 { 2977 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 2978 if (i <= 0) 2979 { 2980 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2982 goto f_err; 2983 } 2984 } 2985 2986 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 2987 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2988 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 2989 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2990 2991 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2992 * when we arrive here. */ 2993 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2994 { 2995 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2996 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2997 { 2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2999 goto err; 3000 } 3001 } 3002 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3003 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3004 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 3005 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 3006 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 3007 3008 sk=NULL; 3009 3010 ret=1; 3011 if (0) 3012 { 3013f_err: 3014 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 3015 } 3016err: 3017 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 3018 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 3019 return(ret); 3020 } 3021 3022int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3023 { 3024 unsigned long l; 3025 X509 *x; 3026 3027 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 3028 { 3029 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 3030 if (x == NULL) 3031 { 3032 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3033 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3034 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) 3035 { 3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3037 return(0); 3038 } 3039 } 3040 3041 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 3042 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3043 s->init_num=(int)l; 3044 s->init_off=0; 3045 } 3046 3047 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3048 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3049 } 3050#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3051int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3052 { 3053 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 3054 { 3055 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 3056 int len, slen; 3057 unsigned int hlen; 3058 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3059 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3060 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3061 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3062 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3063 3064 /* get session encoding length */ 3065 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3066 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 3067 * too long 3068 */ 3069 if (slen > 0xFF00) 3070 return -1; 3071 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3072 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 3073 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3074 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3075 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3076 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3077 */ 3078 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3079 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 3080 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3081 return -1; 3082 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); 3083 if (!senc) 3084 return -1; 3085 p = senc; 3086 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 3087 3088 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3089 /* do the header */ 3090 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 3091 /* Skip message length for now */ 3092 p += 3; 3093 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3094 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3095 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 3096 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 3097 * from parent ctx. 3098 */ 3099 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 3100 { 3101 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3102 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3103 { 3104 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3105 return -1; 3106 } 3107 } 3108 else 3109 { 3110 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 3111 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3112 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 3113 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3114 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 3115 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3116 } 3117 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); 3118 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3119 p += 2; 3120 /* Output key name */ 3121 macstart = p; 3122 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3123 p += 16; 3124 /* output IV */ 3125 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3126 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3127 /* Encrypt session data */ 3128 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 3129 p += len; 3130 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 3131 p += len; 3132 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3133 3134 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 3135 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 3136 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3137 3138 p += hlen; 3139 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3140 /* Total length */ 3141 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3142 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 3143 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 3144 p += 4; 3145 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 3146 3147 /* number of bytes to write */ 3148 s->init_num= len; 3149 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3150 s->init_off=0; 3151 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3152 } 3153 3154 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3155 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3156 } 3157 3158int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3159 { 3160 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 3161 { 3162 unsigned char *p; 3163 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3164 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3165 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3166 * + (ocsp response) 3167 */ 3168 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 3169 return -1; 3170 3171 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3172 3173 /* do the header */ 3174 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3175 /* message length */ 3176 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3177 /* status type */ 3178 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 3179 /* length of OCSP response */ 3180 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3181 /* actual response */ 3182 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3183 /* number of bytes to write */ 3184 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3185 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3186 s->init_off = 0; 3187 } 3188 3189 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3190 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3191 } 3192#endif 3193