1<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"><title>HTTP Client Security</title><link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="../manual.css"><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.76.1"><link rel="home" href="index.html" title="neon HTTP/WebDAV client library"><link rel="up" href="intro.html" title="Chapter 1. Introduction"><link rel="prev" href="compliance.html" title="Standards compliance"><link rel="next" href="api.html" title="Chapter 2. The neon C language interface"></head><body bgcolor="white" text="black" link="#0000FF" vlink="#840084" alink="#0000FF"><div class="navheader"><table width="100%" summary="Navigation header"><tr><th colspan="3" align="center">HTTP Client Security</th></tr><tr><td width="20%" align="left"><a accesskey="p" href="compliance.html">Prev</a> </td><th width="60%" align="center">Chapter 1. Introduction</th><td width="20%" align="right"> <a accesskey="n" href="api.html">Next</a></td></tr></table><hr></div><div class="sect1" title="HTTP Client Security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a name="security"></a>HTTP Client Security</h2></div></div></div><p>neon is intended to be secure against a specific threat
2  model: use of a malicious HTTP server.  Under this threat model, a
3  range of attacks are possible against a client when the user (or
4  application) can be tricked into accessing an HTTP server which is
5  controlled by an attacker.  This section documents various types of
6  possible attack and describes what mitigation is used in
7  neon.</p><div class="sect2" title="CPU or memory consumption attacks"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="id444512"></a>CPU or memory consumption attacks</h3></div></div></div><p>neon uses fixed resource limits to prevent the following
8    attacks:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" type="disc"><li class="listitem"><p>memory/CPU consumption attack using an unbounded number
9        of response header fields</p></li><li class="listitem"><p>memory consumption attack using an unbounded length of
10        individual response header lines (or continuation
11        headers)</p></li><li class="listitem"><p>memory consumption attack against the PROPFIND code
12        using an unbounded number of properties (propstat elements)
13        per resource</p></li><li class="listitem"><p>memory consumption attack against the PROPFIND code
14        using an unbounded CDATA element in a "flat property"
15        value</p></li></ul></div><p>Memory consumption attacks against applications based on
16    neon by use of unbounded response length are also possible, but
17    must be mitigated at application level.  Memory consumption in
18    neon itself is fixed and is not proportional to the response
19    size.</p><p>Test cases for all the above attacks are present in the
20    neon test suite.</p></div><div class="sect2" title="SSL/TLS connection security"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="id444586"></a>SSL/TLS connection security</h3></div></div></div><p>When using a connection secured by SSL/TLS, it is necessary
21    for clients to verify that the X.509 certificate presented by the
22    server matches the server's expected identity.  The algorithm
23    required for this purpose is described in RFC 2818 and RFC 3280,
24    and is implemented by neon in the following manner:</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul class="itemizedlist" type="disc"><li class="listitem"><p>the hostname argument passed to <a class="xref" href="refsess.html#ne_session_create">ne_session_create</a> is the expected identity of the
25        server</p></li><li class="listitem"><p>the subjectAltName extension of the certificate is used
26        for comparision against the expected identity, in preference
27        to the Subject name's commonName attribute.</p></li><li class="listitem"><p>the dNSName, iPAddress, and uniformResourceIdentifier
28        classes of GeneralName are supported in subjectAltName
29        comparison.</p></li><li class="listitem"><p>if no subjectAltName is present in the certificate, the
30        most specific commonName attribute in the Subject name is used
31        for comparison instead.</p></li></ul></div><p>In the case where a server certificate is presented that
32    does not match the expected identity (or is otherwise not
33    trusted), neon will fail the request by default.  This behaviour
34    can be overridden by the use of a callback installed using <a class="xref" href="refsslvfy.html#ne_ssl_set_verify">ne_ssl_set_verify</a>, which allows the application to
35    present the certificate details to a user for manual/off-line
36    verification, if possible.</p><p>Test cases for the correctness of the implementation of the
37    identity verification algorithm are present in the neon test
38    suite.</p></div><div class="sect2" title="Control character insertion in error messages"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="id445137"></a>Control character insertion in error messages</h3></div></div></div><p>Where error messages (as returned by
39    (<a class="xref" href="referr.html#ne_get_error">ne_get_error</a>) contain data supplied by the
40    server, the untrusted data is sanitised to remove both control
41    characters and non-ASCII characters.  This prevents any attacks
42    where such error messages are exposed to the user and can
43    potentially distort the presentation of the interface (for
44    example, through the use of a carriage return character in a text
45    user interface).</p></div><div class="sect2" title="Attacks against authentication credentials"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a name="id445154"></a>Attacks against authentication credentials</h3></div></div></div><p>Authentication credentials can be compromised by a
46    "downgrade attack" by an active attacker; for example, where a
47    MITM presents a Basic authentication challenge in place of the
48    server's Digest challenge.  neon mitigates these attacks by
49    allowing the application (and hence, user) to specify that only a
50    specific set of authentication protocols is permitted.</p><p>neon supports the Digest and Negotiate authentication
51    schemes, which both allow authentication of users without passing
52    credentials in cleartext over the wire.  The "domain" parameter is
53    supported in Digest, allowing the server to restrict an
54    authentication session to a particular set of URIs.</p></div></div><div class="navfooter"><hr><table width="100%" summary="Navigation footer"><tr><td width="40%" align="left"><a accesskey="p" href="compliance.html">Prev</a> </td><td width="20%" align="center"><a accesskey="u" href="intro.html">Up</a></td><td width="40%" align="right"> <a accesskey="n" href="api.html">Next</a></td></tr><tr><td width="40%" align="left" valign="top">Standards compliance </td><td width="20%" align="center"><a accesskey="h" href="index.html">Home</a></td><td width="40%" align="right" valign="top"> Chapter 2. The neon C language interface</td></tr></table></div></body></html>
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