/openbsd-current/lib/libcrypto/hkdf/ |
H A D | hkdf.h | 37 const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt, 47 const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
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H A D | hkdf.c | 32 const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt, 38 if (!HKDF_extract(prk, &prk_len, digest, secret, secret_len, salt, 52 const EVP_MD *digest, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, 61 if (HMAC(digest, salt, salt_len, secret, secret_len, out_key, &len) == 31 HKDF(uint8_t *out_key, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *digest, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len) argument 51 HKDF_extract(uint8_t *out_key, size_t *out_len, const EVP_MD *digest, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len) argument
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/openbsd-current/regress/lib/libcrypto/dh/ |
H A D | dhtest.c | 95 int flags, buf_len, secret_len; local 148 secret_len = DH_compute_key(buf, DH_get0_pub_key(dh), dh); 151 for (i = 0; i < secret_len; i++) { 156 if (secret_len < 4) {
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/openbsd-current/lib/libcrypto/ecdh/ |
H A D | ecdh.c | 230 size_t secret_len = 0; local 243 if (!eckey->meth->compute_key(&secret, &secret_len, pub_key, eckey)) 248 if (KDF(secret, secret_len, out, &out_len) == NULL) { 253 if (out_len < secret_len) { 258 out_len = secret_len; 270 freezero(secret, secret_len);
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/openbsd-current/usr.sbin/unbound/util/ |
H A D | edns.h | 156 * @param secret_len: the length of the secret. 165 size_t cookie_len, const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4,
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H A D | edns.c | 158 const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4, 168 if(secret_len != 16 || /* RFC9018 cookies have 16 byte secrets */ 157 edns_cookie_server_validate(const uint8_t* cookie, size_t cookie_len, const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4, const uint8_t* hash_input, uint32_t now) argument
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H A D | configparser.y | 3880 size_t secret_len = sizeof(secret); 3883 if(sldns_str2wire_hex_buf($2, secret, &secret_len) 3884 || (secret_len != 16)) 3887 cfg_parser->cfg->cookie_secret_len = secret_len;
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/openbsd-current/sbin/unwind/libunbound/util/ |
H A D | edns.h | 156 * @param secret_len: the length of the secret. 165 size_t cookie_len, const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4,
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H A D | edns.c | 158 const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4, 168 if(secret_len != 16 || /* RFC9018 cookies have 16 byte secrets */ 157 edns_cookie_server_validate(const uint8_t* cookie, size_t cookie_len, const uint8_t* secret, size_t secret_len, int v4, const uint8_t* hash_input, uint32_t now) argument
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H A D | configparser.y | 3880 size_t secret_len = sizeof(secret); 3883 if(sldns_str2wire_hex_buf($2, secret, &secret_len) 3884 || (secret_len != 16)) 3887 cfg_parser->cfg->cookie_secret_len = secret_len;
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/openbsd-current/lib/libssl/ |
H A D | t1_enc.c | 160 tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, argument 179 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, secret, secret_len); 247 tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, argument 265 half_len = secret_len - (secret_len / 2); 271 secret += secret_len - half_len; 280 if (!tls1_P_hash(md, secret, secret_len, seed1, seed1_len,
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H A D | ssl.h | 372 typedef int (*tls_session_secret_cb_fn)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, 1636 size_t secret_len); 1682 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len); 1694 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len);
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H A D | ssl_sess.c | 1073 void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, 1072 SSL_set_session_secret_cb(SSL *s, int (*tls_session_secret_cb)(SSL *s, void *secret, int *secret_len, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers, SSL_CIPHER **cipher, void *arg), void *arg) argument
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H A D | ssl_local.h | 1409 int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
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/openbsd-current/usr.sbin/pppd/ |
H A D | chap.c | 397 int secret_len; local 442 secret, &secret_len, 0)) { 443 secret_len = 0; /* assume null secret if can't find one */ 461 MD5Update(&mdContext, secret, secret_len); 489 int secret_len, old_state; local 552 secret, &secret_len, 1)) { 565 MD5Update(&mdContext, secret, secret_len);
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H A D | auth.c | 941 get_secret(unit, client, server, secret, secret_len, save_addrs) 946 int *secret_len; 982 *secret_len = len;
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/openbsd-current/regress/lib/libssl/quic/ |
H A D | quictest.c | 51 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len) 62 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len) 50 quic_set_read_secret(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len) argument 61 quic_set_write_secret(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len) argument
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/openbsd-current/usr.sbin/nsd/ |
H A D | nsd.c | 909 size_t secret_len = 0; local 912 secret_len = strlen(secret); 913 if( secret_len == 0 ) { break; } 914 assert( secret_len <= sizeof(secret) ); 915 secret_len = secret[secret_len - 1] == '\n' ? secret_len - 1 : secret_len; 916 if( secret_len != NSD_COOKIE_SECRET_SIZE * 2 ) { corrupt++; break; } 918 secret[secret_len] [all...] |
/openbsd-current/lib/libfido2/src/ |
H A D | assert.c | 547 const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len) 549 if (idx >= assert->stmt_len || (secret_len != 32 && secret_len != 64) || 551 secret_len) < 0) 546 fido_assert_set_hmac_secret(fido_assert_t *assert, size_t idx, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len) argument
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/openbsd-current/lib/libcrypto/sm2/ |
H A D | sm2_crypt.c | 182 sm2_kdf(uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len, argument 211 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, secret, secret_len)) {
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/openbsd-current/regress/lib/libssl/unit/ |
H A D | tls_prf.c | 22 int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len,
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