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/freebsd-9.3-release/sys/sys/ | ||
H A D | random.h | diff 63306 Mon Jul 17 10:23:04 MDT 2000 markm Add randomness write functionality. This does absolutely nothing for entropy estimation, but causes an immediate reseed after the input (read in sizeof(u_int64_t) chunks) is "harvested". This will be used in the reboot "reseeder", coming in another commit. This can be used very effectively at any time you think your randomness is compromised; something like # (ps -gauxwww; netstat -an; dmesg; vmstat -c10 1) > /dev/random will give the attacker something to think about. |
/freebsd-9.3-release/sys/dev/random/ | ||
H A D | randomdev.c | diff 63306 Mon Jul 17 10:23:04 MDT 2000 markm Add randomness write functionality. This does absolutely nothing for entropy estimation, but causes an immediate reseed after the input (read in sizeof(u_int64_t) chunks) is "harvested". This will be used in the reboot "reseeder", coming in another commit. This can be used very effectively at any time you think your randomness is compromised; something like # (ps -gauxwww; netstat -an; dmesg; vmstat -c10 1) > /dev/random will give the attacker something to think about. |
H A D | yarrow.c | diff 63306 Mon Jul 17 10:23:04 MDT 2000 markm Add randomness write functionality. This does absolutely nothing for entropy estimation, but causes an immediate reseed after the input (read in sizeof(u_int64_t) chunks) is "harvested". This will be used in the reboot "reseeder", coming in another commit. This can be used very effectively at any time you think your randomness is compromised; something like # (ps -gauxwww; netstat -an; dmesg; vmstat -c10 1) > /dev/random will give the attacker something to think about. |
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