secmodel_extensions: Split vfs part into separate .c file.

This way we can provide weak rumpkern stubs that don't require
rumpvfs for things that are relevant to vfs, but if you do link
rumpvfs then you get the same logic in secmodel extensions.

isroot should be bool...

secmodel: fix grammar in description of hardlink_check_gid

Implement restrictions for adding hard links to files

Use the module subsystem's ability to process SYSCTL_SETUP() entries to
automate installation of sysctl nodes.

Note that there are still a number of device and pseudo-device modules
that create entries tied to individual device units, rather than to the
module itself. These are not changed.

Explicitly cast pointers to uintptr_t before casting to enums. They are
not necessarily the same size. Don't cast pointers to bool, check for
NULL instead.

branches: 1.10.6;
Introduce KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_KPTR, and use it in the already-existing
modstat code. No real functional change.

Add KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_EPROC, and use it for the kern.proc node.
Same permission as before, so no functional change.

branches: 1.8.2;
Add new sysctl(3) entry: security.models.extensions.user_set_dbregs

Model this new sysctl(3) entry after "user_set_cpu_affinity" in the same
level of sysctl(3) switches.

Allow to read unconditionally Debug Registers (no change here). This is
convenient as even if a user of a debugger does not use hardware assisted
watchpoints/breakpoints, a debugger can still prompt these values to store
in an internal cache with context of registers. Reading them should have
no security concerns.

Add a paranoid MI switch that prohibits by default setting these registers
by a regular user (non-superuser). Make this switch disabled by default.
There are enough reserved bits out there to allow using them
unconditionally on hardened hosts.

Features shipped with Debug Registers are optional features in debuggers.
There is no reduction in elementary functionality.

Reviewed by <christos>

Sponsored by <The NetBSD Foundation>

branches: 1.7.10; 1.7.16;
secmodel_extensions_system_cb() is not mount-specific, even though
KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT happens to be the only option handled here.

Put everything into a swith(action). No functional change.

branches: 1.6.6;
Ensure that the top level sysctl nodes (kern, vfs, net, ...) exist before
the sysctl link sets are processed, and remove redundancy.

Shaves >13kB off of an amd64 GENERIC, not to mention >1k duplicate
lines of code.

branches: 1.5.6;
Make the callback deal with embryonic connections which do not have
credentials yet. Fixes PR kern/47598.

Re-instate backwards compatible security.models.bsd44.{curtain,securelevel}.

They were mistakenly removed when curtain and securelevel moved to
secmodel_extensions(9).

Reported by tls@ on tech-security@.

XXX will ask for pull-up for -6.

branches: 1.3.2; 1.3.4;
Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the following messages:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/18/msg012490.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/19/msg012502.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/02/17/msg012728.html

Thanks to christos, manu, njoly, and jmmv for input.

Huge thanks to pgoyette for spinning these changes through some build
cycles and ATF.

branches: 1.2.2; 1.2.4; 1.2.8;
When user_set_cpu_affinity is non-zero, only allow users to modify
the CPU affinity of the LWPs they own.

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.

isroot should be bool...

secmodel: fix grammar in description of hardlink_check_gid

Implement restrictions for adding hard links to files

Use the module subsystem's ability to process SYSCTL_SETUP() entries to
automate installation of sysctl nodes.

Note that there are still a number of device and pseudo-device modules
that create entries tied to individual device units, rather than to the
module itself. These are not changed.

Explicitly cast pointers to uintptr_t before casting to enums. They are
not necessarily the same size. Don't cast pointers to bool, check for
NULL instead.

branches: 1.10.6;
Introduce KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_KPTR, and use it in the already-existing
modstat code. No real functional change.

Add KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_EPROC, and use it for the kern.proc node.
Same permission as before, so no functional change.

branches: 1.8.2;
Add new sysctl(3) entry: security.models.extensions.user_set_dbregs

Model this new sysctl(3) entry after "user_set_cpu_affinity" in the same
level of sysctl(3) switches.

Allow to read unconditionally Debug Registers (no change here). This is
convenient as even if a user of a debugger does not use hardware assisted
watchpoints/breakpoints, a debugger can still prompt these values to store
in an internal cache with context of registers. Reading them should have
no security concerns.

Add a paranoid MI switch that prohibits by default setting these registers
by a regular user (non-superuser). Make this switch disabled by default.
There are enough reserved bits out there to allow using them
unconditionally on hardened hosts.

Features shipped with Debug Registers are optional features in debuggers.
There is no reduction in elementary functionality.

Reviewed by <christos>

Sponsored by <The NetBSD Foundation>

branches: 1.7.10; 1.7.16;
secmodel_extensions_system_cb() is not mount-specific, even though
KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT happens to be the only option handled here.

Put everything into a swith(action). No functional change.

branches: 1.6.6;
Ensure that the top level sysctl nodes (kern, vfs, net, ...) exist before
the sysctl link sets are processed, and remove redundancy.

Shaves >13kB off of an amd64 GENERIC, not to mention >1k duplicate
lines of code.

branches: 1.5.6;
Make the callback deal with embryonic connections which do not have
credentials yet. Fixes PR kern/47598.

Re-instate backwards compatible security.models.bsd44.{curtain,securelevel}.

They were mistakenly removed when curtain and securelevel moved to
secmodel_extensions(9).

Reported by tls@ on tech-security@.

XXX will ask for pull-up for -6.

branches: 1.3.2; 1.3.4;
Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the following messages:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/18/msg012490.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/19/msg012502.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/02/17/msg012728.html

Thanks to christos, manu, njoly, and jmmv for input.

Huge thanks to pgoyette for spinning these changes through some build
cycles and ATF.

branches: 1.2.2; 1.2.4; 1.2.8;
When user_set_cpu_affinity is non-zero, only allow users to modify
the CPU affinity of the LWPs they own.

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.

secmodel: fix grammar in description of hardlink_check_gid

Implement restrictions for adding hard links to files

Use the module subsystem's ability to process SYSCTL_SETUP() entries to
automate installation of sysctl nodes.

Note that there are still a number of device and pseudo-device modules
that create entries tied to individual device units, rather than to the
module itself. These are not changed.

Explicitly cast pointers to uintptr_t before casting to enums. They are
not necessarily the same size. Don't cast pointers to bool, check for
NULL instead.

branches: 1.10.6;
Introduce KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_KPTR, and use it in the already-existing
modstat code. No real functional change.

Add KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_EPROC, and use it for the kern.proc node.
Same permission as before, so no functional change.

branches: 1.8.2;
Add new sysctl(3) entry: security.models.extensions.user_set_dbregs

Model this new sysctl(3) entry after "user_set_cpu_affinity" in the same
level of sysctl(3) switches.

Allow to read unconditionally Debug Registers (no change here). This is
convenient as even if a user of a debugger does not use hardware assisted
watchpoints/breakpoints, a debugger can still prompt these values to store
in an internal cache with context of registers. Reading them should have
no security concerns.

Add a paranoid MI switch that prohibits by default setting these registers
by a regular user (non-superuser). Make this switch disabled by default.
There are enough reserved bits out there to allow using them
unconditionally on hardened hosts.

Features shipped with Debug Registers are optional features in debuggers.
There is no reduction in elementary functionality.

Reviewed by <christos>

Sponsored by <The NetBSD Foundation>

branches: 1.7.10; 1.7.16;
secmodel_extensions_system_cb() is not mount-specific, even though
KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT happens to be the only option handled here.

Put everything into a swith(action). No functional change.

branches: 1.6.6;
Ensure that the top level sysctl nodes (kern, vfs, net, ...) exist before
the sysctl link sets are processed, and remove redundancy.

Shaves >13kB off of an amd64 GENERIC, not to mention >1k duplicate
lines of code.

branches: 1.5.6;
Make the callback deal with embryonic connections which do not have
credentials yet. Fixes PR kern/47598.

Re-instate backwards compatible security.models.bsd44.{curtain,securelevel}.

They were mistakenly removed when curtain and securelevel moved to
secmodel_extensions(9).

Reported by tls@ on tech-security@.

XXX will ask for pull-up for -6.

branches: 1.3.2; 1.3.4;
Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the following messages:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/18/msg012490.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/19/msg012502.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/02/17/msg012728.html

Thanks to christos, manu, njoly, and jmmv for input.

Huge thanks to pgoyette for spinning these changes through some build
cycles and ATF.

branches: 1.2.2; 1.2.4; 1.2.8;
When user_set_cpu_affinity is non-zero, only allow users to modify
the CPU affinity of the LWPs they own.

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.

Implement restrictions for adding hard links to files

Use the module subsystem's ability to process SYSCTL_SETUP() entries to
automate installation of sysctl nodes.

Note that there are still a number of device and pseudo-device modules
that create entries tied to individual device units, rather than to the
module itself. These are not changed.

Explicitly cast pointers to uintptr_t before casting to enums. They are
not necessarily the same size. Don't cast pointers to bool, check for
NULL instead.

branches: 1.10.6;
Introduce KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_KPTR, and use it in the already-existing
modstat code. No real functional change.

Add KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_EPROC, and use it for the kern.proc node.
Same permission as before, so no functional change.

branches: 1.8.2;
Add new sysctl(3) entry: security.models.extensions.user_set_dbregs

Model this new sysctl(3) entry after "user_set_cpu_affinity" in the same
level of sysctl(3) switches.

Allow to read unconditionally Debug Registers (no change here). This is
convenient as even if a user of a debugger does not use hardware assisted
watchpoints/breakpoints, a debugger can still prompt these values to store
in an internal cache with context of registers. Reading them should have
no security concerns.

Add a paranoid MI switch that prohibits by default setting these registers
by a regular user (non-superuser). Make this switch disabled by default.
There are enough reserved bits out there to allow using them
unconditionally on hardened hosts.

Features shipped with Debug Registers are optional features in debuggers.
There is no reduction in elementary functionality.

Reviewed by <christos>

Sponsored by <The NetBSD Foundation>

branches: 1.7.10; 1.7.16;
secmodel_extensions_system_cb() is not mount-specific, even though
KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT happens to be the only option handled here.

Put everything into a swith(action). No functional change.

branches: 1.6.6;
Ensure that the top level sysctl nodes (kern, vfs, net, ...) exist before
the sysctl link sets are processed, and remove redundancy.

Shaves >13kB off of an amd64 GENERIC, not to mention >1k duplicate
lines of code.

branches: 1.5.6;
Make the callback deal with embryonic connections which do not have
credentials yet. Fixes PR kern/47598.

Re-instate backwards compatible security.models.bsd44.{curtain,securelevel}.

They were mistakenly removed when curtain and securelevel moved to
secmodel_extensions(9).

Reported by tls@ on tech-security@.

XXX will ask for pull-up for -6.

branches: 1.3.2; 1.3.4;
Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the following messages:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/18/msg012490.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/19/msg012502.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/02/17/msg012728.html

Thanks to christos, manu, njoly, and jmmv for input.

Huge thanks to pgoyette for spinning these changes through some build
cycles and ATF.

branches: 1.2.2; 1.2.4; 1.2.8;
When user_set_cpu_affinity is non-zero, only allow users to modify
the CPU affinity of the LWPs they own.

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.

Use the module subsystem's ability to process SYSCTL_SETUP() entries to
automate installation of sysctl nodes.

Note that there are still a number of device and pseudo-device modules
that create entries tied to individual device units, rather than to the
module itself. These are not changed.

Explicitly cast pointers to uintptr_t before casting to enums. They are
not necessarily the same size. Don't cast pointers to bool, check for
NULL instead.

branches: 1.10.6;
Introduce KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_KPTR, and use it in the already-existing
modstat code. No real functional change.

Add KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_EPROC, and use it for the kern.proc node.
Same permission as before, so no functional change.

branches: 1.8.2;
Add new sysctl(3) entry: security.models.extensions.user_set_dbregs

Model this new sysctl(3) entry after "user_set_cpu_affinity" in the same
level of sysctl(3) switches.

Allow to read unconditionally Debug Registers (no change here). This is
convenient as even if a user of a debugger does not use hardware assisted
watchpoints/breakpoints, a debugger can still prompt these values to store
in an internal cache with context of registers. Reading them should have
no security concerns.

Add a paranoid MI switch that prohibits by default setting these registers
by a regular user (non-superuser). Make this switch disabled by default.
There are enough reserved bits out there to allow using them
unconditionally on hardened hosts.

Features shipped with Debug Registers are optional features in debuggers.
There is no reduction in elementary functionality.

Reviewed by <christos>

Sponsored by <The NetBSD Foundation>

branches: 1.7.10; 1.7.16;
secmodel_extensions_system_cb() is not mount-specific, even though
KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT happens to be the only option handled here.

Put everything into a swith(action). No functional change.

branches: 1.6.6;
Ensure that the top level sysctl nodes (kern, vfs, net, ...) exist before
the sysctl link sets are processed, and remove redundancy.

Shaves >13kB off of an amd64 GENERIC, not to mention >1k duplicate
lines of code.

branches: 1.5.6;
Make the callback deal with embryonic connections which do not have
credentials yet. Fixes PR kern/47598.

Re-instate backwards compatible security.models.bsd44.{curtain,securelevel}.

They were mistakenly removed when curtain and securelevel moved to
secmodel_extensions(9).

Reported by tls@ on tech-security@.

XXX will ask for pull-up for -6.

branches: 1.3.2; 1.3.4;
Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the following messages:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/18/msg012490.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/19/msg012502.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/02/17/msg012728.html

Thanks to christos, manu, njoly, and jmmv for input.

Huge thanks to pgoyette for spinning these changes through some build
cycles and ATF.

branches: 1.2.2; 1.2.4; 1.2.8;
When user_set_cpu_affinity is non-zero, only allow users to modify
the CPU affinity of the LWPs they own.

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.

Explicitly cast pointers to uintptr_t before casting to enums. They are
not necessarily the same size. Don't cast pointers to bool, check for
NULL instead.

Introduce KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_KPTR, and use it in the already-existing
modstat code. No real functional change.

Add KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_EPROC, and use it for the kern.proc node.
Same permission as before, so no functional change.

branches: 1.8.2;
Add new sysctl(3) entry: security.models.extensions.user_set_dbregs

Model this new sysctl(3) entry after "user_set_cpu_affinity" in the same
level of sysctl(3) switches.

Allow to read unconditionally Debug Registers (no change here). This is
convenient as even if a user of a debugger does not use hardware assisted
watchpoints/breakpoints, a debugger can still prompt these values to store
in an internal cache with context of registers. Reading them should have
no security concerns.

Add a paranoid MI switch that prohibits by default setting these registers
by a regular user (non-superuser). Make this switch disabled by default.
There are enough reserved bits out there to allow using them
unconditionally on hardened hosts.

Features shipped with Debug Registers are optional features in debuggers.
There is no reduction in elementary functionality.

Reviewed by <christos>

Sponsored by <The NetBSD Foundation>

branches: 1.7.10; 1.7.16;
secmodel_extensions_system_cb() is not mount-specific, even though
KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT happens to be the only option handled here.

Put everything into a swith(action). No functional change.

branches: 1.6.6;
Ensure that the top level sysctl nodes (kern, vfs, net, ...) exist before
the sysctl link sets are processed, and remove redundancy.

Shaves >13kB off of an amd64 GENERIC, not to mention >1k duplicate
lines of code.

branches: 1.5.6;
Make the callback deal with embryonic connections which do not have
credentials yet. Fixes PR kern/47598.

Re-instate backwards compatible security.models.bsd44.{curtain,securelevel}.

They were mistakenly removed when curtain and securelevel moved to
secmodel_extensions(9).

Reported by tls@ on tech-security@.

XXX will ask for pull-up for -6.

branches: 1.3.2; 1.3.4;
Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the following messages:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/18/msg012490.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/19/msg012502.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/02/17/msg012728.html

Thanks to christos, manu, njoly, and jmmv for input.

Huge thanks to pgoyette for spinning these changes through some build
cycles and ATF.

branches: 1.2.2; 1.2.4; 1.2.8;
When user_set_cpu_affinity is non-zero, only allow users to modify
the CPU affinity of the LWPs they own.

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.

Introduce KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_KPTR, and use it in the already-existing
modstat code. No real functional change.

Add KAUTH_REQ_PROCESS_CANSEE_EPROC, and use it for the kern.proc node.
Same permission as before, so no functional change.

Add new sysctl(3) entry: security.models.extensions.user_set_dbregs

Model this new sysctl(3) entry after "user_set_cpu_affinity" in the same
level of sysctl(3) switches.

Allow to read unconditionally Debug Registers (no change here). This is
convenient as even if a user of a debugger does not use hardware assisted
watchpoints/breakpoints, a debugger can still prompt these values to store
in an internal cache with context of registers. Reading them should have
no security concerns.

Add a paranoid MI switch that prohibits by default setting these registers
by a regular user (non-superuser). Make this switch disabled by default.
There are enough reserved bits out there to allow using them
unconditionally on hardened hosts.

Features shipped with Debug Registers are optional features in debuggers.
There is no reduction in elementary functionality.

Reviewed by <christos>

Sponsored by <The NetBSD Foundation>

branches: 1.7.10; 1.7.16;
secmodel_extensions_system_cb() is not mount-specific, even though
KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT happens to be the only option handled here.

Put everything into a swith(action). No functional change.

branches: 1.6.6;
Ensure that the top level sysctl nodes (kern, vfs, net, ...) exist before
the sysctl link sets are processed, and remove redundancy.

Shaves >13kB off of an amd64 GENERIC, not to mention >1k duplicate
lines of code.

branches: 1.5.6;
Make the callback deal with embryonic connections which do not have
credentials yet. Fixes PR kern/47598.

Re-instate backwards compatible security.models.bsd44.{curtain,securelevel}.

They were mistakenly removed when curtain and securelevel moved to
secmodel_extensions(9).

Reported by tls@ on tech-security@.

XXX will ask for pull-up for -6.

branches: 1.3.2; 1.3.4;
Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the following messages:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/18/msg012490.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/19/msg012502.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/02/17/msg012728.html

Thanks to christos, manu, njoly, and jmmv for input.

Huge thanks to pgoyette for spinning these changes through some build
cycles and ATF.

branches: 1.2.2; 1.2.4; 1.2.8;
When user_set_cpu_affinity is non-zero, only allow users to modify
the CPU affinity of the LWPs they own.

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.

secmodel_extensions_system_cb() is not mount-specific, even though
KAUTH_SYSTEM_MOUNT happens to be the only option handled here.

Put everything into a swith(action). No functional change.

branches: 1.6.6;
Ensure that the top level sysctl nodes (kern, vfs, net, ...) exist before
the sysctl link sets are processed, and remove redundancy.

Shaves >13kB off of an amd64 GENERIC, not to mention >1k duplicate
lines of code.

branches: 1.5.6;
Make the callback deal with embryonic connections which do not have
credentials yet. Fixes PR kern/47598.

Re-instate backwards compatible security.models.bsd44.{curtain,securelevel}.

They were mistakenly removed when curtain and securelevel moved to
secmodel_extensions(9).

Reported by tls@ on tech-security@.

XXX will ask for pull-up for -6.

branches: 1.3.2; 1.3.4;
Replace the remaining KAUTH_GENERIC_ISSUSER authorization calls with
something meaningful. All relevant documentation has been updated or
written.

Most of these changes were brought up in the following messages:

http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/18/msg012490.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/01/19/msg012502.html
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-kern/2012/02/17/msg012728.html

Thanks to christos, manu, njoly, and jmmv for input.

Huge thanks to pgoyette for spinning these changes through some build
cycles and ATF.

branches: 1.2.2; 1.2.4; 1.2.8;
When user_set_cpu_affinity is non-zero, only allow users to modify
the CPU affinity of the LWPs they own.

Implement the register/deregister/evaluation API for secmodel(9). It
allows registration of callbacks that can be used later for
cross-secmodel "safe" communication.

When a secmodel wishes to know a property maintained by another
secmodel, it has to submit a request to it so the other secmodel can
proceed to evaluating the request. This is done through the
secmodel_eval(9) call; example:

bool isroot;
error = secmodel_eval("org.netbsd.secmodel.suser", "is-root",
cred, &isroot);
if (error == 0 && !isroot)
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;

This one asks the suser module if the credentials are assumed to be root
when evaluated by suser module. If the module is present, it will
respond. If absent, the call will return an error.

Args and command are arbitrarily defined; it's up to the secmodel(9) to
document what it expects.

Typical example is securelevel testing: when someone wants to know
whether securelevel is raised above a certain level or not, the caller
has to request this property to the secmodel_securelevel(9) module.
Given that securelevel module may be absent from system's context (thus
making access to the global "securelevel" variable impossible or
unsafe), this API can cope with this absence and return an error.

We are using secmodel_eval(9) to implement a secmodel_extensions(9)
module, which plugs with the bsd44, suser and securelevel secmodels
to provide the logic behind curtain, usermount and user_set_cpu_affinity
modes, without adding hooks to traditional secmodels. This solves a
real issue with the current secmodel(9) code, as usermount or
user_set_cpu_affinity are not really tied to secmodel_suser(9).

The secmodel_eval(9) is also used to restrict security.models settings
when securelevel is above 0, through the "is-securelevel-above"
evaluation:
- curtain can be enabled any time, but cannot be disabled if
securelevel is above 0.
- usermount/user_set_cpu_affinity can be disabled any time, but cannot
be enabled if securelevel is above 0.

Regarding sysctl(7) entries:
curtain and usermount are now found under security.models.extensions
tree. The security.curtain and vfs.generic.usermount are still
accessible for backwards compat.

Documentation is incoming, I am proof-reading my writings.

Written by elad@, reviewed and tested (anita test + interact for rights
tests) by me. ok elad@.

See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2011/11/29/msg000422.html

XXX might consider va0 mapping too.

XXX Having a secmodel(9) specific printf (like aprint_*) for reporting
secmodel(9) errors might be a good idea, but I am not sure on how
to design such a function right now.