History log of /netbsd-current/sys/arch/arm/sunxi/sun8i_crypto.h
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# 1.2 13-Jun-2020 riastradh

Rework sun8i crypto.

- Preallocate tasks and DMA maps together for now, for 4k transfers.
- Confine setup of the task descriptor to a single function, without
bus_dmamap_t as an input; just use the preallocated DMA maps.
- Take the DMA map part out of sun8i_crypto_buf.
=> Not much left here, just a dmamem segment and kva mapping.

This should make it easier to use with opencrypto.


Revision tags: bouyer-xenpvh-base2 phil-wifi-20200421 bouyer-xenpvh-base1 phil-wifi-20200411 bouyer-xenpvh-base is-mlppp-base phil-wifi-20200406 ad-namecache-base3 ad-namecache-base2 ad-namecache-base1 ad-namecache-base
# 1.1 09-Dec-2019 riastradh

branches: 1.1.6; 1.1.10;
Draft driver for Allwinner Crypto Engine.

Found on, e.g., the Pinebook.

Only used for TRNG at the moment, but hooking it up to opencrypto(9)
shouldn't be too hard if anyone still cares about that these days.

The distribution of the alleged TRNG is very nonuniform distributed
seems to alternate between toward runs with exceptionally high
fractions of 0 bits and runs with exceptionally high fractions of 1
bits -- initially all my samples were mostly 0's, and then all my
samples were mostly 1's, and now I'm seeing more oscillation between
these runs.

So I've wired it up as RND_TYPE_UNKNOWN, not RND_TYPE_RNG (it will
immediately flunk our rngtest and be disabled), and I estimated it to
provide at most one bit of entropy per byte of data -- which may
still be optimistic. I also added a sysctl node hw.sun8icryptoN.rng
to read out 1024-byte samples for analysis, and I left the driver
commented out in GENERIC64 for now.

(If anyone has contacts at Allwinner who can tell us about how the
alleged TRNG is supposed to work, please let me know!)


# 1.1 09-Dec-2019 riastradh

Draft driver for Allwinner Crypto Engine.

Found on, e.g., the Pinebook.

Only used for TRNG at the moment, but hooking it up to opencrypto(9)
shouldn't be too hard if anyone still cares about that these days.

The distribution of the alleged TRNG is very nonuniform distributed
seems to alternate between toward runs with exceptionally high
fractions of 0 bits and runs with exceptionally high fractions of 1
bits -- initially all my samples were mostly 0's, and then all my
samples were mostly 1's, and now I'm seeing more oscillation between
these runs.

So I've wired it up as RND_TYPE_UNKNOWN, not RND_TYPE_RNG (it will
immediately flunk our rngtest and be disabled), and I estimated it to
provide at most one bit of entropy per byte of data -- which may
still be optimistic. I also added a sysctl node hw.sun8icryptoN.rng
to read out 1024-byte samples for analysis, and I left the driver
commented out in GENERIC64 for now.

(If anyone has contacts at Allwinner who can tell us about how the
alleged TRNG is supposed to work, please let me know!)