Merge local changes from v2.7 -> v2.9 for wpa_supplicant and hostapd

merge conflicts.

branches: 1.6.12; 1.6.14;
Merge conflicts.

branches: 1.5.2;
http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.

This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.

This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
unexpected configuration file data might be written.

This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the credential value before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.

This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch
Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
characters in the psk parameter.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch
WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
includes an invalid passphrase.

This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.

This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
wpa_supplicant process privileges.

branches: 1.1.1;
Initial revision

merge conflicts.

branches: 1.6.12;
Merge conflicts.

branches: 1.5.2;
http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.

This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.

This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
unexpected configuration file data might be written.

This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the credential value before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.

This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch
Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
characters in the psk parameter.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch
WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
includes an invalid passphrase.

This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.

This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
wpa_supplicant process privileges.

branches: 1.1.1;
Initial revision

Merge conflicts.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.

This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.

This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0004-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch
Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
unexpected configuration file data might be written.

This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the credential value before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.

This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0003-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch
Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
characters in the psk parameter.

http://w1.fi/security/2016-1/0002-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch
WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
includes an invalid passphrase.

This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.

This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
wpa_supplicant process privileges.

branches: 1.1.1;
Initial revision