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1.1.1.1 |
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31-May-2023 |
christos |
Import OpenSSL-3.0.9
### Changes between 3.0.8 and 3.0.9 [30 May 2023]
* Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.
OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that sub-identifier. ([CVE-2023-2650])
To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise.
The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub- identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586 bytes.
Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
*Richard Levitte*
* Fixed buffer overread in AES-XTS decryption on ARM 64 bit platforms which happens if the buffer size is 4 mod 5 in 16 byte AES blocks. This can trigger a crash of an application using AES-XTS decryption if the memory just after the buffer being decrypted is not mapped. Thanks to Anton Romanov (Amazon) for discovering the issue. ([CVE-2023-1255])
*Nevine Ebeid*
* Reworked the Fix for the Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption ([CVE-2022-4304]). The previous fix for this timing side channel turned out to cause a severe 2-3x performance regression in the typical use case compared to 3.0.7. The new fix uses existing constant time code paths, and restores the previous performance level while fully eliminating all existing timing side channels. The fix was developed by Bernd Edlinger with testing support by Hubert Kario.
*Bernd Edlinger*
* Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to David Benjamin for discovering this issue. ([CVE-2023-0466])
*Tom���� Mr��z*
* Fixed an issue where invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are silently ignored by OpenSSL and other certificate policy checks are skipped for that certificate. A malicious CA could use this to deliberately assert invalid certificate policies in order to circumvent policy checking on the certificate altogether. ([CVE-2023-0465])
*Matt Caswell*
* Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree to mitigate against CVE-2023-0464. The default limit is set to 1000 nodes, which should be sufficient for most installations. If required, the limit can be adjusted by setting the OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX build time define to a desired maximum number of nodes or zero to allow unlimited growth. ([CVE-2023-0464])
*Paul Dale*
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