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7d354f49 |
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25-Jan-2024 |
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> |
fortify: drop Clang version check for 12.0.1 or newer Now that the minimum supported version of LLVM for building the kernel has been bumped to 13.0.1, this condition is always true, as the build will fail during the configuration stage for older LLVM versions. Remove it. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240125-bump-min-llvm-ver-to-13-0-1-v1-9-f5ff9bda41c5@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Conor Dooley <conor@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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2947a456 |
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09-Jan-2024 |
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> |
treewide: update LLVM Bugzilla links LLVM moved their issue tracker from their own Bugzilla instance to GitHub issues. While all of the links are still valid, they may not necessarily show the most up to date information around the issues, as all updates will occur on GitHub, not Bugzilla. Another complication is that the Bugzilla issue number is not always the same as the GitHub issue number. Thankfully, LLVM maintains this mapping through two shortlinks: https://llvm.org/bz<num> -> https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=<num> https://llvm.org/pr<num> -> https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/<mapped_num> Switch all "https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=<num>" links to the "https://llvm.org/pr<num>" shortlink so that the links show the most up to date information. Each migrated issue links back to the Bugzilla entry, so there should be no loss of fidelity of information here. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240109-update-llvm-links-v1-3-eb09b59db071@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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d2e527f0 |
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23-May-2023 |
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> |
mm/slab: remove HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR With SLOB removed, both remaining allocators support hardened usercopy, so remove the config and associated #ifdef. Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
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ff61f079 |
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14-Mar-2023 |
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> |
docs: move x86 documentation into Documentation/arch/ Move the x86 documentation under Documentation/arch/ as a way of cleaning up the top-level directory and making the structure of our docs more closely match the structure of the source directories it describes. All in-kernel references to the old paths have been updated. Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230315211523.108836-1-corbet@lwn.net/ Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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f22f9aaf |
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16-Mar-2023 |
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it: The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until the system is rebooted. The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0" boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not allow for easy modification of the kernel command line. Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the "__ro_after_init" feature. It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening, which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level. From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state. If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot. It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written. Finally, in the several years where we have been working on deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel command line) resolved the issue without problem. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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b9b8701b |
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10-Mar-2023 |
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> |
security: Remove integrity from the LSM list in Kconfig Remove 'integrity' from the list of LSMs in Kconfig, as it is no longer necessary. Since the recent change (set order to LSM_ORDER_LAST), the 'integrity' LSM is always enabled (if selected in the kernel configuration). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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f43b9876 |
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27-Jun-2022 |
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> |
x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts. NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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1109a5d9 |
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10-Jan-2022 |
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> |
usercopy: Remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN There isn't enough information to make this a useful check any more; the useful parts of it were moved in earlier patches, so remove this set of checks now. Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-5-willy@infradead.org
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ef3e787c |
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24-Mar-2022 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
usercopy: Disable CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN has been mostly broken for a while, and it has become hard to ignore with some recent scsi changes[1]. While there is a more complete series to replace it with better checks[2], it should have more soak time in -next. Instead, disable the config now, with the expectation that it will be fully replaced in the next kernel release. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220324064846.GA12961@lst.de/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20220110231530.665970-1-willy@infradead.org/ Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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281d0c96 |
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08-Feb-2022 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
fortify: Add Clang support Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE support for Clang: Use the new __pass_object_size and __overloadable attributes so that Clang will have appropriate visibility into argument sizes such that __builtin_object_size(p, 1) will behave correctly. Additional details available here: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53516 https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1401 A bug with __builtin_constant_p() of globally defined variables was fixed in Clang 13 (and backported to 12.0.1), so FORTIFY support must depend on that version or later. Additional details here: https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459 commit a52f8a59aef4 ("fortify: Explicitly disable Clang support") A bug with Clang's -mregparm=3 and -m32 makes some builtins unusable, so removing -ffreestanding (to gain the needed libcall optimizations with Clang) cannot be done. Without the libcall optimizations, Clang cannot provide appropriate FORTIFY coverage, so it must be disabled for CONFIG_X86_32. Additional details here; https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645 Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: George Burgess IV <gbiv@google.com> Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220208225350.1331628-9-keescook@chromium.org
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53944f17 |
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05-Nov-2021 |
Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> |
mm: remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK This has served its purpose and is no longer used. All usercopy violations appear to have been handled by now, any remaining instances (or new bugs) will cause copies to be rejected. This isn't a direct revert of commit 2d891fbc3bb6 ("usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists"); since usercopy_fallback is effectively 0, the fallback handling is removed too. This also removes the usercopy_fallback module parameter on slab_common. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/153 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210921061149.1091163-1-steve@sk2.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> [defconfig change] Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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a52f8a59 |
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12-May-2021 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
fortify: Explicitly disable Clang support Clang has never correctly compiled the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses due to a couple bugs: Eliding inlines with matching __builtin_* names https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50322 Incorrect __builtin_constant_p() of some globals https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459 In the process of making improvements to the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses, the first (silent) bug (coincidentally) becomes worked around, but exposes the latter which breaks the build. As such, Clang must not be used with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE until at least latter bug is fixed (in Clang 13), and the fortify routines have been rearranged. Update the Kconfig to reflect the reality of the current situation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKwvOd=A+ueGV2ihdy5GtgR2fQbcXjjAtVxv3=cPjffpebZB7A@mail.gmail.com
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385975dc |
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22-Apr-2021 |
Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> |
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials Process's credentials point to a Landlock domain, which is underneath implemented with a ruleset. In the following commits, this domain is used to check and enforce the ptrace and filesystem security policies. A domain is inherited from a parent to its child the same way a thread inherits a seccomp policy. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-4-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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90945448 |
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22-Apr-2021 |
Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> |
landlock: Add object management A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e. subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain). Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes. Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls. The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a rule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock, this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference objects. A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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c9fecf50 |
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05-Jul-2020 |
Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de> |
Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security Rationale: Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate. Deterministic algorithm: For each file: If not .svg: For each line: If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`: For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`: If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions return 200 OK and serve the same content: Replace HTTP with HTTPS. Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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520b7aa0 |
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28-Mar-2020 |
KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> |
bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks * The hooks are initialized using the definitions in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h. * The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM. Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
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000d388e |
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19-Aug-2019 |
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> |
security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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e8d776f2 |
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20-Apr-2019 |
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> |
docs: x86: move two x86-specific files to x86 arch dir Those two docs belong to the x86 architecture: Documentation/Intel-IOMMU.txt -> Documentation/x86/intel-iommu.rst Documentation/intel_txt.txt -> Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
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cb1aaebe |
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07-Jun-2019 |
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> |
docs: fix broken documentation links Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Reviewed-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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ec8f24b7 |
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19-May-2019 |
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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9f671e58 |
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10-Apr-2019 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
security: Create "kernel hardening" config area Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization options from the gcc-plugins. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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2623c4fb |
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29-Mar-2019 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
LSM: Revive CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* for "make oldconfig" Commit 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM") removed CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_{SELINUX,SMACK,TOMOYO,APPARMOR,DAC} from security/Kconfig and changed CONFIG_LSM to provide a fixed ordering as a default value. That commit expected that existing users (upgrading from Linux 5.0 and earlier) will edit CONFIG_LSM value in accordance with their CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* choice in their old kernel configs. But since users might forget to edit CONFIG_LSM value, this patch revives the choice (only for providing the default value for CONFIG_LSM) in order to make sure that CONFIG_LSM reflects CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* from their old kernel configs. Note that since TOMOYO can be fully stacked against the other legacy major LSMs, when it is selected, it explicitly disables the other LSMs to avoid them also initializing since TOMOYO does not expect this currently. Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Fixes: 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM") Co-developed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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b102c11e |
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28-Feb-2019 |
Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> |
LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig Remove modules not using it (SELinux and SMACK aren't the only ones not using it). Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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aeca4e2c |
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16-Jan-2019 |
Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> |
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set. Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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d6aed64b |
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14-Sep-2018 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM This converts Yama from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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70b62c25 |
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14-Sep-2018 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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79f7865d |
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19-Sep-2018 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new "lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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13e735c0 |
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09-Oct-2018 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will be expanded in future patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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8636a1f9 |
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11-Dec-2018 |
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> |
treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotes The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to support bare file paths in the source statement. I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of ambiguity. The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes, and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals. Make it treewide consistent now. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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61a6bd83 |
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13-Sep-2018 |
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> |
Revert "x86/mm/legacy: Populate the user page-table with user pgd's" This reverts commit 1f40a46cf47c12d93a5ad9dccd82bd36ff8f956a. It turned out that this patch is not sufficient to enable PTI on 32 bit systems with legacy 2-level page-tables. In this paging mode the huge-page PTEs are in the top-level page-table directory, where also the mirroring to the user-space page-table happens. So every huge PTE exits twice, in the kernel and in the user page-table. That means that accessed/dirty bits need to be fetched from two PTEs in this mode to be safe, but this is not trivial to implement because it needs changes to generic code just for the sake of enabling PTI with 32-bit legacy paging. As all systems that need PTI should support PAE anyway, remove support for PTI when 32-bit legacy paging is used. Fixes: 7757d607c6b3 ('x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32') Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536922754-31379-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
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#
7757d607 |
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18-Jul-2018 |
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> |
x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32 Allow PTI to be compiled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-38-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
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#
6aa56f44 |
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29-Jun-2018 |
Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> |
usercopy: Do not select BUG with HARDENED_USERCOPY There is no need to "select BUG" when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled. The kernel thread will always die, regardless of the CONFIG_BUG. Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> [kees: tweak commit log] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
2d891fbc |
|
30-Nov-2017 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive. If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists immediately. Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
a237f762 |
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12-Jan-2018 |
W. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us> |
security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI When the config option for PTI was added a reference to documentation was added as well. But the documentation did not exist at that point. The final documentation has a different file name. Fix it up to point to the proper file. Fixes: 385ce0ea ("x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig") Signed-off-by: W. Trevor King <wking@tremily.us> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/3009cc8ccbddcd897ec1e0cb6dda524929de0d14.1515799398.git.wking@tremily.us
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#
87faa0d9 |
|
03-Jan-2018 |
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
x86/pti: Enable PTI by default This really want's to be enabled by default. Users who know what they are doing can disable it either in the config or on the kernel command line. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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#
385ce0ea |
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04-Dec-2017 |
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> |
x86/mm/pti: Add Kconfig Finally allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to be enabled. PARAVIRT generally requires that the kernel not manage its own page tables. It also means that the hypervisor and kernel must agree wholeheartedly about what format the page tables are in and what they contain. PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, unfortunately, changes the rules and they can not be used together. I've seen conflicting feedback from maintainers lately about whether they want the Kconfig magic to go first or last in a patch series. It's going last here because the partially-applied series leads to kernels that can not boot in a bunch of cases. I did a run through the entire series with CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y to look for build errors, though. [ tglx: Removed SMP and !PARAVIRT dependencies as they not longer exist ] Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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#
22ec1a2a |
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01-Dec-2017 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
/dev/mem: Add bounce buffer for copy-out As done for /proc/kcore in commit df04abfd181a ("fs/proc/kcore.c: Add bounce buffer for ktext data") this adds a bounce buffer when reading memory via /dev/mem. This is needed to allow kernel text memory to be read out when built with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY (which refuses to read out kernel text) and without CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM (which would have refused to read any RAM contents at all). Since this build configuration isn't common (most systems with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY also have CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM), this also tries to inform Kconfig about the recommended settings. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's changes to /dev/mem code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Reported-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
6974f0c4 |
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12-Jul-2017 |
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> |
include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
d291f1a6 |
|
19-May-2017 |
Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> |
IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for permission to access a PKey. Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys. When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index, or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared make sure all handles to the QP also have access. Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the previous settings and the new ones. In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must have access enforced for the new cache settings. These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails, and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the modify fails. 1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate path insert that QP into the appropriate lists. 2. Check permission to access the new settings. 3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP. 4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations. 4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations. If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared. Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction. The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that flow before cleaning up the structure. If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy flow. To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security related functionality. Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> [PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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#
99c55fb1 |
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02-May-2017 |
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> |
security: Grammar s/allocates/allocated/ Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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#
2fefc97b |
|
05-Apr-2017 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY is unconditional now Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
dd0859dc |
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14-Feb-2017 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
security: introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible. Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS, and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case. Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
64e90a8a |
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16-Jan-2017 |
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper() Some usermode helper applications are defined at kernel build time, while others can be changed at runtime. To provide a sane way to filter these, add a new kernel option "STATIC_USERMODEHELPER". This option routes all call_usermodehelper() calls through this binary, no matter what the caller wishes to have called. The new binary (by default set to /sbin/usermode-helper, but can be changed through the STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH option) can properly filter the requested programs to be run by the kernel by looking at the first argument that is passed to it. All other options should then be passed onto the proper program if so desired. To disable all call_usermodehelper() calls by the kernel, set STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string. Thanks to Neil Brown for the idea of this feature. Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
8e1f74ea |
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07-Sep-2016 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
usercopy: remove page-spanning test for now A custom allocator without __GFP_COMP that copies to userspace has been found in vmw_execbuf_process[1], so this disables the page-span checker by placing it behind a CONFIG for future work where such things can be tracked down later. [1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1373326 Reported-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@freedesktop.org> Fixes: f5509cc18daa ("mm: Hardened usercopy") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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#
6040e576 |
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19-Aug-2016 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Make the hardened user-copy code depend on having a hardened allocator The kernel test robot reported a usercopy failure in the new hardened sanity checks, due to a page-crossing copy of the FPU state into the task structure. This happened because the kernel test robot was testing with SLOB, which doesn't actually do the required book-keeping for slab allocations, and as a result the hardening code didn't realize that the task struct allocation was one single allocation - and the sanity checks fail. Since SLOB doesn't even claim to support hardening (and you really shouldn't use it), the straightforward solution is to just make the usercopy hardening code depend on the allocator supporting it. Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
f5509cc1 |
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07-Jun-2016 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
mm: Hardened usercopy This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel. This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object being copied to/from: - address range doesn't wrap around - address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size) - if on the slab allocator: - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches) - otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved and CMA ranges) - if on the stack - object must not extend before/after the current process stack - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is arch/build support for identifying stack frames) - object must not overlap with kernel text Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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#
9b091556 |
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20-Apr-2016 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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#
730daa16 |
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23-Jul-2015 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
Yama: remove needless CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED Now that minor LSMs can cleanly stack with major LSMs, remove the unneeded config for Yama to be made to explicitly stack. Just selecting the main Yama CONFIG will allow it to work, regardless of the major LSM. Since distros using Yama are already forcing it to stack, this is effectively a no-op change. Additionally add MAINTAINERS entry. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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#
2813893f |
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15-Apr-2015 |
Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> |
kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
530b099d |
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03-Feb-2014 |
Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> |
security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on arm on arm64 Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is selected. Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 && COMPAT to prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that are mapped at 0x8000. Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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#
f0894940 |
|
11-May-2012 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot of key-related options. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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#
2d514487 |
|
21-Dec-2011 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
security: Yama LSM This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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#
982e617a |
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27-Aug-2011 |
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or, for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key. This patch removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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#
f381c272 |
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09-Mar-2011 |
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
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#
58068960 |
|
14-Mar-2011 |
Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> |
security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on ARM. The default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says: For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. The text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets that fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map. So select the right value if we know we are building ARM. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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#
7e70cb49 |
|
23-Nov-2010 |
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
keys: add new key-type encrypted Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted' symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel. Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs. Changelog: - bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore (reported by David Howells) - Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output - Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with one based on string constants. - Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt - Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells) - Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells) Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int' (size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long) - Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells) - allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key (fixed by Roberto Sassu) - wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered - cleanup security/Kconfig - Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu) - Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure, remove unnecessary tests. - Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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#
d00a1c72 |
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23-Nov-2010 |
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
keys: add new trusted key-type Define a new kernel key-type called 'trusted'. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys, if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace can only ever see encrypted blobs. Based on suggestions by Jason Gunthorpe, several new options have been added to support additional usages. The new options are: migratable= designates that the key may/may not ever be updated (resealed under a new key, new pcrinfo or new auth.) pcrlock=n extends the designated PCR 'n' with a random value, so that a key sealed to that PCR may not be unsealed again until after a reboot. keyhandle= specifies the sealing/unsealing key handle. keyauth= specifies the sealing/unsealing key auth. blobauth= specifies the sealed data auth. Implementation of a kernel reserved locality for trusted keys will be investigated for a possible future extension. Changelog: - Updated and added examples to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt - Moved generic TPM constants to include/linux/tpm_command.h (David Howell's suggestion.) - trusted_defined.c: replaced kzalloc with kmalloc, added pcrlock failure error handling, added const qualifiers where appropriate. - moved to late_initcall - updated from hash to shash (suggestion by David Howells) - reduced worst stack usage (tpm_seal) from 530 to 312 bytes - moved documentation to Documentation directory (suggestion by David Howells) - all the other code cleanups suggested by David Howells - Add pcrlock CAP_SYS_ADMIN dependency (based on comment by Jason Gunthorpe) - New options: migratable, pcrlock, keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth (based on discussions with Jason Gunthorpe) - Free payload on failure to create key(reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu) - Updated Kconfig and other descriptions (based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion) - Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc() (reported by Serge Hallyn) Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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eaf06b24 |
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11-Nov-2010 |
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> |
Restrict unprivileged access to kernel syslog The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap addresses. Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog. This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the dmesg_restrict sysctl. When set to "0", the default, no restrictions are enforced. When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read the kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: explain the config option in kernel.txt] Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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f9ad1af5 |
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29-Jul-2010 |
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> |
AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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b3a222e5 |
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23-Nov-2009 |
Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> |
remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option As far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y. Since having the option on leaves a 'no_file_caps' option to boot without file capabilities, the main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves you (on my s390x partition) 5k. In particular, vmlinux sizes came to: without patch fscaps=n: 53598392 without patch fscaps=y: 53603406 with this patch applied: 53603342 with the security-next tree. Against this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for userspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported, while things like per-process securebits, capability bounding sets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n, leaving a bit of a problem for applications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why something failed. It also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must maintain at the risk of severe security regressions. So this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option. It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y kernel, by removing the cap_limit_ptraced_target() function. Changelog: Nov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it's logic was ifndef'ed. Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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6e65f92f |
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05-Nov-2009 |
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> |
Config option to set a default LSM The LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select a specific LSM. This adds a config option that allows specifying a default LSM that is used unless overridden with the security= kernel parameter. If the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM to register is used. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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3e1c2515 |
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19-Oct-2009 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
security: remove root_plug Remove the root_plug example LSM code. It's unmaintained and increasingly broken in various ways. Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo! Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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69575d38 |
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01-Sep-2009 |
Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com> |
x86, intel_txt: clean up the impact on generic code, unbreak non-x86 Move tboot.h from asm to linux to fix the build errors of intel_txt patch on non-X86 platforms. Remove the tboot code from generic code init/main.c and kernel/cpu.c. Signed-off-by: Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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024e6cb4 |
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18-Aug-2009 |
Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> |
security: Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR Fix prompt for LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. (Verbs are cool!) Signed-off-by: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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a58578e4 |
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18-Aug-2009 |
Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> |
security: Make LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR default match its help text. Commit 788084aba2ab7348257597496befcbccabdc98a3 added the LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR option, whose help text states "For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems." Which implies that it's default setting was typoed. Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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788084ab |
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30-Jul-2009 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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3c556e41 |
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11-Aug-2009 |
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> |
x86, intel_txt: Fix typos in Kconfig help Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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#
a2551df7 |
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30-Jul-2009 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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31625340 |
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30-Jun-2009 |
Joseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@intel.com> |
x86, intel_txt: Intel TXT boot support This patch adds kernel configuration and boot support for Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT). Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel Trusted Execution Technology (Intel TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms. Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT). Intel TXT in Brief: o Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM) o Data protection in case of improper shutdown o Measurement and verification of launched environment Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some non-vPro systems. It is currently available on desktop systems based on the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45 Express chipsets. For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/. This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which has been updated for the new released platforms. A much more complete description of how these patches support TXT, how to configure a system for it, etc. is in the Documentation/intel_txt.txt file in this patch. This patch provides the TXT support routines for complete functionality, documentation for TXT support and for the changes to the boot_params structure, and boot detection of a TXT launch. Attempts to shutdown (reboot, Sx) the system will result in platform resets; subsequent patches will support these shutdown modes properly. Documentation/intel_txt.txt | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt | 1 arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam.h | 3 arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 3 arch/x86/include/asm/tboot.h | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 4 arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 379 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 30 +++ 9 files changed, 827 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) Signed-off-by: Joseph Cihula <joseph.cihula@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shane Wang <shane.wang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Gang Wei <gang.wei@intel.com> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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e0a94c2a |
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03-Jun-2009 |
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> |
security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY. It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096. mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes with CAP_SYS_RAWIO. Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Looks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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#
00d7d6f8 |
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05-Feb-2009 |
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> |
Kconfig and Makefile TOMOYO uses LSM hooks for pathname based access control and securityfs support. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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3323eec9 |
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04-Feb-2009 |
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider IMA provides hardware (TPM) based measurement and attestation for file measurements. As the Trusted Computing (TPM) model requires, IMA measures all files before they are accessed in any way (on the integrity_bprm_check, integrity_path_check and integrity_file_mmap hooks), and commits the measurements to the TPM. Once added to the TPM, measurements can not be removed. In addition, IMA maintains a list of these file measurements, which can be used to validate the aggregate value stored in the TPM. The TPM can sign these measurements, and thus the system can prove, to itself and to a third party, the system's integrity in a way that cannot be circumvented by malicious or compromised software. - alloc ima_template_entry before calling ima_store_template() - log ima_add_boot_aggregate() failure - removed unused IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN - replaced hard coded string length with #define name Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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#
be6d3e56 |
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16-Dec-2008 |
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> |
introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available. Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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da31894e |
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22-Aug-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
securityfs: do not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY Add a new Kconfig option SECURITYFS which will build securityfs support but does not require CONFIG_SECURITY. The only current user of securityfs does not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY and there is no reason the full LSM needs to be built to build this fs. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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84aaa7ab |
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23-Jul-2008 |
Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> |
security: filesystem capabilities no longer experimental Filesystem capabilities have come of age. Remove the experimental tag for configuring filesystem capabilities. Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
93cbace7 |
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10-Jul-2008 |
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> |
security: remove dummy module fix Fix small oversight in "security: remove dummy module": CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES doesn't depend on CONFIG_SECURITY Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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#
5915eb53 |
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03-Jul-2008 |
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> |
security: remove dummy module Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default. Compile and boot tested. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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5f46ce14 |
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16-Apr-2008 |
maximilian attems <max@stro.at> |
security: enhance DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR description Got burned by setting the proposed default of 65536 across all Debian archs. Thus proposing to be more specific on which archs you may set this. Also propose a value for arm and friends that doesn't break sshd. Reword to mention working archs ia64 and ppc64 too. Signed-off-by: maximilian attems <max@stro.at> Cc: Martin Michlmayr <tbm@cyrius.com> Cc: Gordon Farquharson <gordonfarquharson@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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a5ecbcb8 |
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31-Jan-2008 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
security: allow Kconfig to set default mmap_min_addr protection Since it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn't be turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to set a default at compile time. This value is still tunable after boot in /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr Discussion: http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.html Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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e114e473 |
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04-Feb-2008 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC, and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires an absolute minimum of application support and a very small amount of configuration data. Smack uses extended attributes and provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of system Smack attributes. The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script, and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on http://www.schaufler-ca.com Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine environment and on an old Sony laptop. Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not include "/". A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it. Smack defines and uses these labels: "*" - pronounced "star" "_" - pronounced "floor" "^" - pronounced "hat" "?" - pronounced "huh" The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order: 1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied. 2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^" is permitted. 3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_" is permitted. 4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted. 5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same label is permitted. 6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded rule set is permitted. 7. Any other access is denied. Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access triples to /smack/load. Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time of day. Some practical use cases: Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack to support this, these rules could be defined: C Unclass rx S C rx S Unclass rx TS S rx TS C rx TS Unclass rx A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it. An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it has to be explicitly stated. Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a subject cannot access an object with a different label no access rules are required to implement compartmentalization. A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated with this Smack access rule: A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does: ESPN ABC r ABC ESPN r On my portable video device I have two applications, one that shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which is just as well all things considered. Another case that I especially like: SatData Guard w Guard Publish w A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label. The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label. This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish file system object because file system semanitic require read as well as write. The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least for a while. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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f71ea9dd |
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29-Jan-2008 |
sergeh@us.ibm.com <sergeh@us.ibm.com> |
security: compile capabilities by default Capabilities have long been the default when CONFIG_SECURITY=n, and its help text suggests turning it on when CONFIG_SECURITY=y. But it is set to default n. Default it to y instead. Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Matt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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b5376771 |
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17-Oct-2007 |
Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> |
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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20510f2f |
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17-Oct-2007 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
security: Convert LSM into a static interface Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API abuse. Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified at boot. The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix] [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc] Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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3bc1fa8a |
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29-Sep-2006 |
Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> |
[PATCH] LSM: remove BSD secure level security module This code has suffered from broken core design and lack of developer attention. Broken security modules are too dangerous to leave around. It is time to remove this one. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Davi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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06ec7be5 |
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26-Jun-2006 |
Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> |
[PATCH] keys: restrict contents of /proc/keys to Viewable keys Restrict /proc/keys such that only those keys to which the current task is granted View permission are presented. The documentation is also updated to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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df71837d |
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14-Dec-2005 |
Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> |
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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2c40579b |
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22-Aug-2005 |
Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> |
[PATCH] SECURITY must depend on SYSFS CONFIG_SECURITY=y and CONFIG_SYSFS=n results in the following compile error: <-- snip --> ... LD vmlinux security/built-in.o: In function `securityfs_init': inode.c:(.init.text+0x1c2): undefined reference to `kernel_subsys' make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1 <-- snip --> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
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1da177e4 |
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16-Apr-2005 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org> |
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
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