kasan,kmsan: remove __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM usage from kasan/kmsan

syzbot is reporting lockdep warning in __stack_depot_save(), for
the caller of __stack_depot_save() (i.e. __kasan_record_aux_stack() in
this report) is responsible for masking __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag in
order not to wake kswapd which in turn wakes kcompactd.

Since kasan/kmsan functions might be called with arbitrary locks held,
mask __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag from all GFP_NOWAIT/GFP_ATOMIC allocations
in kasan/kmsan.

Note that kmsan_save_stack_with_flags() is changed to mask both
__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM flag and __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag, for
wakeup_kswapd() from wake_all_kswapds() from __alloc_pages_slowpath()
calls wakeup_kcompactd() if __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag is set and
__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM flag is not set.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/656cb4f5-998b-c8d7-3c61-c2d37aa90f9a@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ece2915262061d6e0ac1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ece2915262061d6e0ac1
Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

kmsan: silence -Wmissing-prototypes warnings

When building the kernel with W=1, the compiler reports numerous warnings
about the missing prototypes for KMSAN instrumentation hooks.

Because these functions are not supposed to be called explicitly by the
kernel code (calls to them are emitted by the compiler), they do not have
to be declared in the headers. Instead, we add forward declarations right
before the definitions to silence the warnings produced by
-Wmissing-prototypes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230112103147.382416-1-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202301020356.dFruA4I5-lkp@intel.com/T/
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

kmsan: allow using __msan_instrument_asm_store() inside runtime

In certain cases (e.g. when handling a softirq)
__msan_instrument_asm_store(&var, sizeof(var)) may be called with from
within KMSAN runtime, but later the value of @var is used with
!kmsan_in_runtime(), leading to false positives.

Because kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory() doesn't take locks, it should be
fine to call it without kmsan_in_runtime() checks, which fixes the
mentioned false positives.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221128094541.2645890-2-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

x86: fortify: kmsan: fix KMSAN fortify builds

Ensure that KMSAN builds replace memset/memcpy/memmove calls with the
respective __msan_XXX functions, and that none of the macros are redefined
twice. This should allow building kernel with both CONFIG_KMSAN and
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024212144.2852069-5-glider@google.com
Link: https://github.com/google/kmsan/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reported-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core

For each memory location KernelMemorySanitizer maintains two types of
metadata:

1. The so-called shadow of that location - а byte:byte mapping describing
whether or not individual bits of memory are initialized (shadow is 0)
or not (shadow is 1).
2. The origins of that location - а 4-byte:4-byte mapping containing
4-byte IDs of the stack traces where uninitialized values were
created.

Each struct page now contains pointers to two struct pages holding KMSAN
metadata (shadow and origins) for the original struct page. Utility
routines in mm/kmsan/core.c and mm/kmsan/shadow.c handle the metadata
creation, addressing, copying and checking. mm/kmsan/report.c performs
error reporting in the cases an uninitialized value is used in a way that
leads to undefined behavior.

KMSAN compiler instrumentation is responsible for tracking the metadata
along with the kernel memory. mm/kmsan/instrumentation.c provides the
implementation for instrumentation hooks that are called from files
compiled with -fsanitize=kernel-memory.

To aid parameter passing (also done at instrumentation level), each
task_struct now contains a struct kmsan_task_state used to track the
metadata of function parameters and return values for that task.

Finally, this patch provides CONFIG_KMSAN that enables KMSAN, and declares
CFLAGS_KMSAN, which are applied to files compiled with KMSAN. The
KMSAN_SANITIZE:=n Makefile directive can be used to completely disable
KMSAN instrumentation for certain files.

Similarly, KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS:=n disables KMSAN checks and makes newly
created stack memory initialized.

Users can also use functions from include/linux/kmsan-checks.h to mark
certain memory regions as uninitialized or initialized (this is called
"poisoning" and "unpoisoning") or check that a particular region is
initialized.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-12-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>