History log of /linux-master/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c
Revision Date Author Comments
# 3f67987c 07-Apr-2023 Gregory Price <gourry.memverge@gmail.com>

ptrace: Provide set/get interface for syscall user dispatch

The syscall user dispatch configuration can only be set by the task itself,
but lacks a ptrace set/get interface which makes it impossible to implement
checkpoint/restore for it.

Add the required ptrace requests and the get/set functions in the syscall
user dispatch code to make that possible.

Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gregory.price@memverge.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230407171834.3558-4-gregory.price@memverge.com


# 463b7715 07-Apr-2023 Gregory Price <gourry.memverge@gmail.com>

syscall_user_dispatch: Untag selector address before access_ok()

To support checkpoint/restart, ptrace must be able to set the selector
of the tracee. The selector is a user pointer that may be subject to
memory tagging extensions on some architectures (namely ARM MTE).

access_ok() clears memory tags for tagged addresses if the current task has
memory tagging enabled.

This obviously fails when ptrace modifies the selector of a tracee when
tracer and tracee do not have the same memory tagging enabled state.

Solve this by untagging the selector address before handing it to
access_ok(), like other ptrace functions which modify tracee pointers do.

Obviously a tracer can set an invalid selector address for the tracee, but
that's independent of tagging and a general capability of the tracer.

Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gregory.price@memverge.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZCWXE04nLZ4pXEtM@arm.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230407171834.3558-3-gregory.price@memverge.com


# 43360686 07-Apr-2023 Gregory Price <gourry.memverge@gmail.com>

syscall_user_dispatch: Split up set_syscall_user_dispatch()

syscall user dispatch configuration is not covered by checkpoint/restore.

To prepare for ptrace access to the syscall user dispatch configuration,
move the inner working of set_syscall_user_dispatch() into a helper
function. Make the helper function task pointer based and let
set_syscall_user_dispatch() invoke it with task=current.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gregory.price@memverge.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230407171834.3558-2-gregory.price@memverge.com


# fcb116bc 18-Nov-2021 Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

signal: Replace force_fatal_sig with force_exit_sig when in doubt

Recently to prevent issues with SECCOMP_RET_KILL and similar signals
being changed before they are delivered SA_IMMUTABLE was added.

Unfortunately this broke debuggers[1][2] which reasonably expect
to be able to trap synchronous SIGTRAP and SIGSEGV even when
the target process is not configured to handle those signals.

Add force_exit_sig and use it instead of force_fatal_sig where
historically the code has directly called do_exit. This has the
implementation benefits of going through the signal exit path
(including generating core dumps) without the danger of allowing
userspace to ignore or change these signals.

This avoids userspace regressions as older kernels exited with do_exit
which debuggers also can not intercept.

In the future is should be possible to improve the quality of
implementation of the kernel by changing some of these force_exit_sig
calls to force_fatal_sig. That can be done where it matters on
a case-by-case basis with careful analysis.

Reported-by: Kyle Huey <me@kylehuey.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAP045AoMY4xf8aC_4QU_-j7obuEPYgTcnQQP3Yxk=2X90jtpjw@mail.gmail.com
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211117150258.GB5403@xsang-OptiPlex-9020
Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed")
Fixes: a3616a3c0272 ("signal/m68k: Use force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV) in fpsp040_die")
Fixes: 83a1f27ad773 ("signal/powerpc: On swapcontext failure force SIGSEGV")
Fixes: 9bc508cf0791 ("signal/s390: Use force_sigsegv in default_trap_handler")
Fixes: 086ec444f866 ("signal/sparc32: In setup_rt_frame and setup_fram use force_fatal_sig")
Fixes: c317d306d550 ("signal/sparc32: Exit with a fatal signal when try_to_clear_window_buffer fails")
Fixes: 695dd0d634df ("signal/x86: In emulate_vsyscall force a signal instead of calling do_exit")
Fixes: 1fbd60df8a85 ("signal/vm86_32: Properly send SIGSEGV when the vm86 state cannot be saved.")
Fixes: 941edc5bf174 ("exit/syscall_user_dispatch: Send ordinary signals on failure")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/871r3dqfv8.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>


# 941edc5b 19-Oct-2021 Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

exit/syscall_user_dispatch: Send ordinary signals on failure

Use force_fatal_sig instead of calling do_exit directly. This ensures
the ordinary signal handling path gets invoked, core dumps as
appropriate get created, and for multi-threaded processes all of the
threads are terminated not just a single thread.

When asked Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com> said [1]:
> ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) asked:
>
> > Why does do_syscal_user_dispatch call do_exit(SIGSEGV) and
> > do_exit(SIGSYS) instead of force_sig(SIGSEGV) and force_sig(SIGSYS)?
> >
> > Looking at the code these cases are not expected to happen, so I would
> > be surprised if userspace depends on any particular behaviour on the
> > failure path so I think we can change this.
>
> Hi Eric,
>
> There is not really a good reason, and the use case that originated the
> feature doesn't rely on it.
>
> Unless I'm missing yet another problem and others correct me, I think
> it makes sense to change it as you described.
>
> > Is using do_exit in this way something you copied from seccomp?
>
> I'm not sure, its been a while, but I think it might be just that. The
> first prototype of SUD was implemented as a seccomp mode.

If at some point it becomes interesting we could relax
"force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV)" to instead say
"force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_MAPERR, sd->selector)".

I avoid doing that in this patch to avoid making it possible
to catch currently uncatchable signals.

Cc: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87mtr6gdvi.fsf@collabora.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020174406.17889-14-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>


# 36a6c843 05-Feb-2021 Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>

entry: Use different define for selector variable in SUD

Michael Kerrisk suggested that, from an API perspective, it is a bad
idea to share the PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ defines between the prctl operation
and the selector variable.

Therefore, define two new constants to be used by SUD's selector variable
and update the corresponding documentation and test cases.

While this changes the API syscall user dispatch has never been part of a
Linux release, it will show up for the first time in 5.11.

Suggested-by: Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210205184321.2062251-1-krisman@collabora.com


# 1446e1df 27-Nov-2020 Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>

kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection

Introduce a mechanism to quickly disable/enable syscall handling for a
specific process and redirect to userspace via SIGSYS. This is useful
for processes with parts that require syscall redirection and parts that
don't, but who need to perform this boundary crossing really fast,
without paying the cost of a system call to reconfigure syscall handling
on each boundary transition. This is particularly important for Windows
games running over Wine.

The proposed interface looks like this:

prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, <op>, <off>, <length>, [selector])

The range [<offset>,<offset>+<length>) is a part of the process memory
map that is allowed to by-pass the redirection code and dispatch
syscalls directly, such that in fast paths a process doesn't need to
disable the trap nor the kernel has to check the selector. This is
essential to return from SIGSYS to a blocked area without triggering
another SIGSYS from rt_sigreturn.

selector is an optional pointer to a char-sized userspace memory region
that has a key switch for the mechanism. This key switch is set to
either PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF to enable and disable the
redirection without calling the kernel.

The feature is meant to be set per-thread and it is disabled on
fork/clone/execv.

Internally, this doesn't add overhead to the syscall hot path, and it
requires very little per-architecture support. I avoided using seccomp,
even though it duplicates some functionality, due to previous feedback
that maybe it shouldn't mix with seccomp since it is not a security
mechanism. And obviously, this should never be considered a security
mechanism, since any part of the program can by-pass it by using the
syscall dispatcher.

For the sysinfo benchmark, which measures the overhead added to
executing a native syscall that doesn't require interception, the
overhead using only the direct dispatcher region to issue syscalls is
pretty much irrelevant. The overhead of using the selector goes around
40ns for a native (unredirected) syscall in my system, and it is (as
expected) dominated by the supervisor-mode user-address access. In
fact, with SMAP off, the overhead is consistently less than 5ns on my
test box.

Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127193238.821364-4-krisman@collabora.com