#
f354ed98 |
|
29-Sep-2023 |
Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com> |
ecryptfs: move ecryptfs_xattr_handlers to .rodata This makes it harder for accidental or malicious changes to ecryptfs_xattr_handlers at runtime. Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230930050033.41174-8-wedsonaf@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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#
88569546 |
|
04-Aug-2022 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
ecryptfs: constify path Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
7f06ecd3 |
|
09-Apr-2021 |
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
ecryptfs: remove unused helpers Remove two helpers that are unused. Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> Cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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#
d0eb2d86 |
|
27-Nov-2020 |
Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> |
eCryptfs: add a semicolon Function like macros should have a semicolon. Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> [tyhicks: Remove the trailing semicolin from the macro's definition, as suggested by Joe Perches] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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#
9d786beb |
|
29-Jan-2021 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
ecryptfs: ecryptfs_dentry_info->crypt_stat is never used ... and never had anything non-NULL stored into it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
483bc7e8 |
|
29-Jan-2021 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
ecryptfs: get rid of unused accessors Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
f8e48a84 |
|
13-Feb-2020 |
Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com> |
eCryptfs: Replace deactivated email address Replace a recently deactived email address with one that I'll be able to personally control and keep alive. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
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#
028db3e2 |
|
10-Jul-2019 |
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs" This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus effectively commits 7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION") 2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL") that the merge brought in). It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of in-kernel X.509 certificates [2]. The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in order to not impact the rest of the merge window. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
2e12256b |
|
27-Jun-2019 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a greater range of subjects to represented. ============ WHY DO THIS? ============ The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of which should be grouped together. For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a key: (1) Changing a key's ownership. (2) Changing a key's security information. (3) Setting a keyring's restriction. And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime: (4) Setting an expiry time. (5) Revoking a key. and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache: (6) Invalidating a key. Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with controlling access to that key. Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however, be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is probably okay. As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers: (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search. (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined. (3) Invalidation. But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really need to be controlled separately. Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks. =============== WHAT IS CHANGED =============== The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions: (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring. (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked. The SEARCH permission is split to create: (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found. (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring. (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated. The WRITE permission is also split to create: (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be added, removed and replaced in a keyring. (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator. (3) REVOKE - see above. Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as: (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner (*) Group - permitted to the key group (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to everyone else. Further subjects may be made available by later patches. The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now: VIEW Can view the key metadata READ Can read the key content WRITE Can update/modify the key content SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting LINK Can make a link to the key SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry INVAL Can invalidate REVOKE Can revoke JOIN Can join this keyring CLEAR Can clear this keyring The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated. The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set, or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token. The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL. The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE. The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an existing keyring. The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually created keyrings only. ====================== BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY ====================== To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be returned. It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero. SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned on if a keyring is being altered. The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs. It will make the following mappings: (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set (4) CLEAR -> WRITE Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR. ======= TESTING ======= This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests: (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the key. (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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#
1a59d1b8 |
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27-May-2019 |
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 156 Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along with this program if not write to the free software foundation inc 59 temple place suite 330 boston ma 02111 1307 usa extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 1334 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070033.113240726@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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#
abbae6d5 |
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20-Sep-2016 |
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> |
ecryptfs: remove private bin2hex implementation Calling sprintf in a loop is not very efficient, and in any case, we already have an implementation of bin-to-hex conversion in lib/ which we might as well use. Note that ecryptfs_to_hex used to nul-terminate the destination (and the kernel doc was wrong about the required output size), while bin2hex doesn't. [All but one user of ecryptfs_to_hex explicitly nul-terminates the result anyway.] Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> [tyhicks: Include <linux/kernel.h> in ecryptfs_kernel.h] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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#
f66665c0 |
|
09-Oct-2017 |
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> |
ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload In eCryptfs, we failed to verify that the authentication token keys are not revoked before dereferencing their payloads, which is problematic because the payload of a revoked key is NULL. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked before we acquire the key semaphore. Fix it by updating ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to return -EKEYREVOKED if the key payload is NULL. For completeness we check this for "encrypted" keys as well as "user" keys, although encrypted keys cannot be revoked currently. Alternatively we could use key_validate(), but since we'll also need to fix ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to validate the payload length, it seems appropriate to just check the payload pointer. Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig") Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.19+] Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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#
e836818b |
|
11-Apr-2017 |
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> |
ecryptfs: Convert to separately allocated bdi Allocate struct backing_dev_info separately instead of embedding it inside the superblock. This unifies handling of bdi among users. CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> CC: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
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#
0837e49a |
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01-Mar-2017 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in two different, incompatible ways: (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used to protect the key. (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is used to protect the key and the may be being modified. Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce: (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked: dereference_key_locked() user_key_payload_locked() (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock: dereference_key_rcu() user_key_payload_rcu() This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------- ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190 nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4] nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4] nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc] call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc] __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc] rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4] _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4] nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4] nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4] nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4] nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4] nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 do_mount+0x254/0xf70 SyS_mount+0x94/0x100 system_call+0x38/0xe0 Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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#
4b899da5 |
|
29-Sep-2016 |
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> |
ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
3767e255 |
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27-May-2016 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
switch ->setxattr() to passing dentry and inode separately smack ->d_instantiate() uses ->setxattr(), so to be able to call it before we'd hashed the new dentry and attached it to inode, we need ->setxattr() instances getting the inode as an explicit argument rather than obtaining it from dentry. Similar change for ->getxattr() had been done in commit ce23e64. Unlike ->getxattr() (which is used by both selinux and smack instances of ->d_instantiate()) ->setxattr() is used only by smack one and unfortunately it got missed back then. Reported-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com> Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
e81f3340 |
|
16-Apr-2016 |
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> |
eCryptfs: Do not allocate hash tfm in NORECLAIM context You cannot allocate crypto tfm objects in NORECLAIM or NOFS contexts. The ecryptfs code currently does exactly that for the MD5 tfm. This patch fixes it by preallocating the MD5 tfm in a safe context. The MD5 tfm is also reentrant so this patch removes the superfluous cs_hash_tfm_mutex. Reported-by: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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#
ce23e640 |
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10-Apr-2016 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
->getxattr(): pass dentry and inode as separate arguments Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
97c31606 |
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22-Feb-2016 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
ecryptfs_encrypt_and_encode_filename(): drop unused argument the last time it was getting something other than NULL as crypt_stat had been back in 2009... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
3095e8e3 |
|
24-Jan-2016 |
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> |
eCryptfs: Use skcipher and shash This patch replaces uses of ablkcipher and blkcipher with skcipher, and the long obsolete hash interface with shash. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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#
146aa8b1 |
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21-Oct-2015 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
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#
2a559a8b |
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23-Feb-2015 |
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> |
eCryptfs: ensure copy to crypt_stat->cipher does not overrun The patch 237fead61998: "[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig" from Oct 4, 2006, leads to the following static checker warning: fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c:846 ecryptfs_new_file_context() error: off-by-one overflow 'crypt_stat->cipher' size 32. rl = '0-32' There is a mismatch between the size of ecryptfs_crypt_stat.cipher and ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat.global_default_cipher_name causing the copy of the cipher name to cause a off-by-one string copy error. This fix ensures the space reserved for this string is the same size including the trailing zero at the end throughout ecryptfs. This fix avoids increasing the size of ecryptfs_crypt_stat.cipher and also ecryptfs_parse_tag_70_packet_silly_stack.cipher_string and instead reduces the of ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE to 31 and includes the + 1 for the end of string terminator. NOTE: An overflow is not possible in practice since the value copied into global_default_cipher_name is validated by ecryptfs_code_for_cipher_string() at mount time. None of the allowed cipher strings are long enough to cause the potential buffer overflow fixed by this patch. Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> [tyhicks: Added the NOTE about the overflow not being triggerable] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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#
92dd1230 |
|
15-Sep-2013 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
ecryptfs: get rid of ecryptfs_set_dentry_lower{,_mnt} Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
2edbfbf1 |
|
15-Sep-2013 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
ecryptfs: don't leave RCU pathwalk immediately If the underlying dentry doesn't have ->d_revalidate(), there's no need to force dropping out of RCU mode. All we need for that is to make freeing ecryptfs_dentry_info RCU-delayed. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
0747fdb2 |
|
16-Jun-2013 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
ecryptfs: switch ecryptfs_decode_and_decrypt_filename() from dentry to sb Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
4dfea4f0 |
|
09-May-2013 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> |
eCryptfs: Use the ablkcipher crypto API Make the switch from the blkcipher kernel crypto interface to the ablkcipher interface. encrypt_scatterlist() and decrypt_scatterlist() now use the ablkcipher interface but, from the eCryptfs standpoint, still treat the crypto operation as a synchronous operation. They submit the async request and then wait until the operation is finished before they return. Most of the changes are contained inside those two functions. Despite waiting for the completion of the crypto operation, the ablkcipher interface provides performance increases in most cases when used on AES-NI capable hardware. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Acked-by: Colin King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Zeev Zilberman <zeev@annapurnaLabs.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com> Cc: Ying Huang <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Thieu Le <thieule@google.com> Cc: Li Wang <dragonylffly@163.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@iki.fi>
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#
290502be |
|
28-Feb-2013 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
eCryptfs: allow userspace messaging to be disabled When the userspace messaging (for the less common case of userspace key wrap/unwrap via ecryptfsd) is not needed, allow eCryptfs to build with it removed. This saves on kernel code size and reduces potential attack surface by removing the /dev/ecryptfs node. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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#
3dadecce |
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24-Jan-2013 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
switch vfs_getattr() to struct path Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
3b8b4871 |
|
25-Jun-2012 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
ecryptfs: don't reinvent the wheels, please - use struct completion ... and keep the sodding requests on stack - they are small enough. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
e3ccaa97 |
|
21-Jun-2012 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> |
eCryptfs: Initialize empty lower files when opening them Historically, eCryptfs has only initialized lower files in the ecryptfs_create() path. Lower file initialization is the act of writing the cryptographic metadata from the inode's crypt_stat to the header of the file. The ecryptfs_open() path already expects that metadata to be in the header of the file. A number of users have reported empty lower files in beneath their eCryptfs mounts. Most of the causes for those empty files being left around have been addressed, but the presence of empty files causes problems due to the lack of proper cryptographic metadata. To transparently solve this problem, this patch initializes empty lower files in the ecryptfs_open() error path. If the metadata is unreadable due to the lower inode size being 0, plaintext passthrough support is not in use, and the metadata is stored in the header of the file (as opposed to the user.ecryptfs extended attribute), the lower file will be initialized. The number of nested conditionals in ecryptfs_open() was getting out of hand, so a helper function was created. To avoid the same nested conditional problem, the conditional logic was reversed inside of the helper function. https://launchpad.net/bugs/911507 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
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#
2ecaf55d |
|
11-Jun-2012 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> |
eCryptfs: Make all miscdev functions use daemon ptr in file private_data Now that a pointer to a valid struct ecryptfs_daemon is stored in the private_data of an opened /dev/ecryptfs file, the remaining miscdev functions can utilize the pointer rather than looking up the ecryptfs_daemon at the beginning of each operation. The security model of /dev/ecryptfs is simplified a little bit with this patch. Upon opening /dev/ecryptfs, a per-user ecryptfs_daemon is registered. Another daemon cannot be registered for that user until the last file reference is released. During the lifetime of the ecryptfs_daemon, access checks are not performed on the /dev/ecryptfs operations because it is assumed that the application securely handles the opened file descriptor and does not unintentionally leak it to processes that are not trusted. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
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#
56696886 |
|
11-Jun-2012 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> |
eCryptfs: Remove unused messaging declarations and function These are no longer needed. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
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#
4a26620d |
|
05-Nov-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> |
eCryptfs: Improve statfs reporting statfs() calls on eCryptfs files returned the wrong filesystem type and, when using filename encryption, the wrong maximum filename length. If mount-wide filename encryption is enabled, the cipher block size and the lower filesystem's max filename length will determine the max eCryptfs filename length. Pre-tested, known good lengths are used when the lower filesystem's namelen is 255 and a cipher with 8 or 16 byte block sizes is used. In other, less common cases, we fall back to a safe rounded-down estimate when determining the eCryptfs namelen. https://launchpad.net/bugs/885744 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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#
48399c0b |
|
14-Jan-2012 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> |
eCryptfs: Replace miscdev read/write magic numbers ecryptfs_miscdev_read() and ecryptfs_miscdev_write() contained many magic numbers for specifying packet header field sizes and offsets. This patch defines those values and replaces the magic values. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
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#
b59db43a |
|
21-Nov-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> |
eCryptfs: Prevent file create race condition The file creation path prematurely called d_instantiate() and unlock_new_inode() before the eCryptfs inode info was fully allocated and initialized and before the eCryptfs metadata was written to the lower file. This could result in race conditions in subsequent file and inode operations leading to unexpected error conditions or a null pointer dereference while attempting to use the unallocated memory. https://launchpad.net/bugs/813146 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org
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#
b9075fa9 |
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31-Oct-2011 |
Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> |
treewide: use __printf not __attribute__((format(printf,...))) Standardize the style for compiler based printf format verification. Standardized the location of __printf too. Done via script and a little typing. $ grep -rPl --include=*.[ch] -w "__attribute__" * | \ grep -vP "^(tools|scripts|include/linux/compiler-gcc.h)" | \ xargs perl -n -i -e 'local $/; while (<>) { s/\b__attribute__\s*\(\s*\(\s*format\s*\(\s*printf\s*,\s*(.+)\s*,\s*(.+)\s*\)\s*\)\s*\)/__printf($1, $2)/g ; print; }' [akpm@linux-foundation.org: revert arch bits] Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
1252cc3b |
|
27-Jun-2011 |
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> |
eCryptfs: added support for the encrypted key type The function ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig() has been modified in order to search keys of both 'user' and 'encrypted' types. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
f8f85271 |
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27-Jun-2011 |
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> |
eCryptfs: export global eCryptfs definitions to include/linux/ecryptfs.h Some eCryptfs specific definitions, such as the current version and the authentication token structure, are moved to the new include file 'include/linux/ecryptfs.h', in order to be available for all kernel subsystems. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
30632870 |
|
24-May-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Remove ecryptfs_header_cache_2 Now that ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() is no longer using ecryptfs_header_cache_2 to read in metadata, the kmem_cache can be removed and the ecryptfs_header_cache_1 kmem_cache can be renamed to ecryptfs_header_cache. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
778aeb42 |
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24-May-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Cleanup and optimize ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() ecryptfs_lookup_interpose() has turned into spaghetti code over the years. This is an effort to clean it up. - Shorten overly descriptive variable names such as ecryptfs_dentry - Simplify gotos and error paths - Create helper function for reading plaintext i_size from metadata It also includes an optimization when reading i_size from the metadata. A complete page-sized kmem_cache_alloc() was being done to read in 16 bytes of metadata. The buffer for that is now statically declared. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
3b06b3eb |
|
24-May-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Fix new inode race condition Only unlock and d_add() new inodes after the plaintext inode size has been read from the lower filesystem. This fixes a race condition that was sometimes seen during a multi-job kernel build in an eCryptfs mount. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=36002 Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: David <david@unsolicited.net> Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
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#
5ccf9203 |
|
24-May-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Cleanup inode initialization code The eCryptfs inode get, initialization, and dentry interposition code has two separate paths. One is for when dentry interposition is needed after doing things like a mkdir in the lower filesystem and the other is needed after a lookup. Unlocking new inodes and doing a d_add() needs to happen at different times, depending on which type of dentry interposing is being done. This patch cleans up the inode get and initialization code paths and splits them up so that the locking and d_add() differences mentioned above can be handled appropriately in a later patch. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
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#
c4f79073 |
|
23-May-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Consolidate inode functions into inode.c These functions should live in inode.c since their focus is on inodes and they're primarily used by functions in inode.c. Also does a simple cleanup of ecryptfs_inode_test() and rolls ecryptfs_init_inode() into ecryptfs_inode_set(). Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David <david@unsolicited.net>
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#
3aeb86ea |
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15-Mar-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Handle failed metadata read in lookup When failing to read the lower file's crypto metadata during a lookup, eCryptfs must continue on without throwing an error. For example, there may be a plaintext file in the lower mount point that the user wants to delete through the eCryptfs mount. If an error is encountered while reading the metadata in lookup(), the eCryptfs inode's size could be incorrect. We must be sure to reread the plaintext inode size from the metadata when performing an open() or setattr(). The metadata is already being read in those paths, so this adds minimal performance overhead. This patch introduces a flag which will track whether or not the plaintext inode size has been read so that an incorrect i_size can be fixed in the open() or setattr() paths. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/509180 Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
332ab16f |
|
14-Apr-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Add reference counting to lower files For any given lower inode, eCryptfs keeps only one lower file open and multiplexes all eCryptfs file operations through that lower file. The lower file was considered "persistent" and stayed open from the first lookup through the lifetime of the inode. This patch keeps the notion of a single, per-inode lower file, but adds reference counting around the lower file so that it is closed when not currently in use. If the reference count is at 0 when an operation (such as open, create, etc.) needs to use the lower file, a new lower file is opened. Since the file is no longer persistent, all references to the term persistent file are changed to lower file. Locking is added around the sections of code that opens the lower file and assign the pointer in the inode info, as well as the code the fputs the lower file when all eCryptfs users are done with it. This patch is needed to fix issues, when mounted on top of the NFSv3 client, where the lower file is left silly renamed until the eCryptfs inode is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
0e1fc5ef |
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21-Mar-2011 |
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> |
eCryptfs: verify authentication tokens before their use Authentication tokens content may change if another requestor calls the update() method of the corresponding key. The new function ecryptfs_verify_auth_tok_from_key() retrieves the authentication token from the provided key and verifies if it is still valid before being used to encrypt or decrypt an eCryptfs file. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> [tyhicks: Minor formatting changes] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
7762e230 |
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21-Mar-2011 |
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> |
eCryptfs: modified size of keysig in the ecryptfs_key_sig structure The size of the 'keysig' array is incremented of one byte in order to make room for the NULL character. The 'keysig' variable is used, in the function ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(), to find an authentication token with the given signature and is printed a debug message if it cannot be retrieved. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
cf35ca69 |
|
21-Mar-2011 |
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> |
eCryptfs: removed num_global_auth_toks from ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat This patch removes the 'num_global_auth_toks' field of the ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat structure, used to count the number of items in the 'global_auth_tok_list' list. This variable is not needed because there are no checks based upon it. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
57db4e8d |
|
08-Mar-2011 |
Thieu Le <thieule@chromium.org> |
ecryptfs: modify write path to encrypt page in writepage Change the write path to encrypt the data only when the page is written to disk in ecryptfs_writepage. Previously, ecryptfs encrypts the page in ecryptfs_write_end which means that if there are multiple write requests to the same page, ecryptfs ends up re-encrypting that page over and over again. This patch minimizes the number of encryptions needed. Signed-off-by: Thieu Le <thieule@chromium.org> [tyhicks: Changed NULL .drop_inode sop pointer to generic_drop_inode] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
fed8859b |
|
22-Feb-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Remove ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE crypt stat flag Now that grow_file() is not called in the ecryptfs_create() path, the ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE flag is no longer needed. It helped ecryptfs_readpage() know not to decrypt zeroes that were read from the lower file in the grow_file() path. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
70b89021 |
|
17-Feb-2011 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Handle NULL nameidata pointers Allow for NULL nameidata pointers in eCryptfs create, lookup, and d_revalidate functions. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
888d57bb |
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10-Nov-2010 |
Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> |
fs/ecryptfs: Add printf format/argument verification and fix fallout Add __attribute__((format... to __ecryptfs_printk Make formats and arguments match. Add casts to (unsigned long long) for %llu. Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> [tyhicks: 80 columns cleanup and fixed typo] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
2a8652f4 |
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03-Nov-2010 |
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> |
ecryptfs: moved ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC definition to linux/magic.h The definition of ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC has been moved to the include file 'linux/magic.h' to become available to other kernel subsystems. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
f16feb51 |
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06-Oct-2010 |
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> |
ecryptfs: added ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only mount parameter This patch adds a new mount parameter 'ecryptfs_mount_auth_tok_only' to force ecryptfs to use only authentication tokens which signature has been specified at mount time with parameters 'ecryptfs_sig' and 'ecryptfs_fnek_sig'. In this way, after disabling the passthrough and the encrypted view modes, it's possible to make available to users only files encrypted with the specified authentication token. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> [Tyler: Clean up coding style errors found by checkpatch] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
0c6d7d5d |
|
04-Sep-2010 |
Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> |
fs/ecryptfs: Remove unnecessary casts of private_data Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
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#
48c1e44a |
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21-May-2010 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
switch ecryptfs_write() to struct inode *, kill on-stack fake files Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
02bd9799 |
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21-May-2010 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
switch ecryptfs_get_locked_page() to struct inode * Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
9df9c8b9 |
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21-Apr-2010 |
Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com> |
ecryptfs: add bdi backing to mount session This ensures that dirty data gets flushed properly. Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
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#
f4e60e6b |
|
10-Feb-2010 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Strip metadata in xattr flag in encrypted view The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option provides a unified way of viewing encrypted eCryptfs files. If the metadata is stored in a xattr, the metadata is moved to the file header when the file is read inside the eCryptfs mount. Because of this, we should strip the ECRYPTFS_METADATA_IN_XATTR flag from the header's flag section. This allows eCryptfs to treat the file as an eCryptfs file with a header at the front. Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
fa3ef1cb |
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11-Feb-2010 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Rename ecryptfs_crypt_stat.num_header_bytes_at_front This patch renames the num_header_bytes_at_front variable to metadata_size since it now contains the max size of the metadata. Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
157f1071 |
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11-Feb-2010 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Fix metadata in xattr feature regression Fixes regression in 8faece5f906725c10e7a1f6caf84452abadbdc7b When using the ecryptfs_xattr_metadata mount option, eCryptfs stores the metadata (normally stored at the front of the file) in the user.ecryptfs xattr. This causes ecryptfs_crypt_stat.num_header_bytes_at_front to be 0, since there is no header data at the front of the file. This results in too much memory being requested and ENOMEM being returned from ecryptfs_write_metadata(). This patch fixes the problem by using the num_header_bytes_at_front variable for specifying the max size of the metadata, despite whether it is stored in the header or xattr. Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
7f09410b |
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21-Sep-2009 |
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> |
const: mark remaining address_space_operations const Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
e77cc8d2 |
|
22-Apr-2009 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Remove ecryptfs_unlink_sigs warnings A feature was added to the eCryptfs umount helper to automatically unlink the keys used for an eCryptfs mount from the kernel keyring upon umount. This patch keeps the unrecognized mount option warnings for ecryptfs_unlink_sigs out of the logs. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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#
5a3fd05a |
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19-Feb-2009 |
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
constify dentry_operations: ecryptfs Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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#
2aac0cf8 |
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20-Mar-2009 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: NULL crypt_stat dereference during lookup If ecryptfs_encrypted_view or ecryptfs_xattr_metadata were being specified as mount options, a NULL pointer dereference of crypt_stat was possible during lookup. This patch moves the crypt_stat assignment into ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower(), ensuring that crypt_stat will not be NULL before we attempt to dereference it. Thanks to Dan Carpenter and his static analysis tool, smatch, for finding this bug. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
84814d64 |
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13-Mar-2009 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: don't encrypt file key with filename key eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the FNEK. This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK from being encrypted with a FNEK. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
addd65ad |
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06-Jan-2009 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: filldir, lookup, and readlink Make the requisite modifications to ecryptfs_filldir(), ecryptfs_lookup(), and ecryptfs_readlink() to call out to filename encryption functions. Propagate filename encryption policy flags from mount-wide crypt_stat to inode crypt_stat. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
a34f60f7 |
|
06-Jan-2009 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Header updates Extensions to the header file to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
#
9c79f34f |
|
06-Jan-2009 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Tag 70 packets This patchset implements filename encryption via a passphrase-derived mount-wide Filename Encryption Key (FNEK) specified as a mount parameter. Each encrypted filename has a fixed prefix indicating that eCryptfs should try to decrypt the filename. When eCryptfs encounters this prefix, it decodes the filename into a tag 70 packet and then decrypts the packet contents using the FNEK, setting the filename to the decrypted filename. Both unencrypted and encrypted filenames can reside in the same lower filesystem. Because filename encryption expands the length of the filename during the encoding stage, eCryptfs will not properly handle filenames that are already near the maximum filename length. In the present implementation, eCryptfs must be able to produce a match against the lower encrypted and encoded filename representation when given a plaintext filename. Therefore, two files having the same plaintext name will encrypt and encode into the same lower filename if they are both encrypted using the same FNEK. This can be changed by finding a way to replace the prepended bytes in the blocked-aligned filename with random characters; they are hashes of the FNEK right now, so that it is possible to deterministically map from a plaintext filename to an encrypted and encoded filename in the lower filesystem. An implementation using random characters will have to decode and decrypt every single directory entry in any given directory any time an event occurs wherein the VFS needs to determine whether a particular file exists in the lower directory and the decrypted and decoded filenames have not yet been extracted for that directory. Thanks to Tyler Hicks and David Kleikamp for assistance in the development of this patchset. This patch: A tag 70 packet contains a filename encrypted with a Filename Encryption Key (FNEK). This patch implements functions for writing and parsing tag 70 packets. This patch also adds definitions and extends structures to support filename encryption. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tchicks@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Kleikamp <shaggy@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
#
745ca247 |
|
13-Nov-2008 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
CRED: Pass credentials through dentry_open() Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself when it opens its null chardev. The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the dentry_open hook in struct security_operations. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
#
624ae528 |
|
15-Oct-2008 |
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: remove netlink transport The netlink transport code has not worked for a while and the miscdev transport is a simpler solution. This patch removes the netlink code and makes the miscdev transport the only eCryptfs kernel to userspace transport. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
#
391b52f9 |
|
23-Jul-2008 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Make all persistent file opens delayed There is no good reason to immediately open the lower file, and that can cause problems with files that the user does not intend to immediately open, such as device nodes. This patch removes the persistent file open from the interpose step and pushes that to the locations where eCryptfs really does need the lower persistent file, such as just before reading or writing the metadata stored in the lower file header. Two functions are jumping to out_dput when they should just be jumping to out on error paths. This patch also fixes these. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
#
72b55fff |
|
23-Jul-2008 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: do not try to open device files on mknod When creating device nodes, eCryptfs needs to delay actually opening the lower persistent file until an application tries to open. Device handles may not be backed by anything when they first come into existence. [Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu: build fix] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu} Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
#
746f1e55 |
|
23-Jul-2008 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: Privileged kthread for lower file opens eCryptfs would really like to have read-write access to all files in the lower filesystem. Right now, the persistent lower file may be opened read-only if the attempt to open it read-write fails. One way to keep from having to do that is to have a privileged kthread that can open the lower persistent file on behalf of the user opening the eCryptfs file; this patch implements this functionality. This patch will properly allow a less-privileged user to open the eCryptfs file, followed by a more-privileged user opening the eCryptfs file, with the first user only being able to read and the second user being able to both read and write. eCryptfs currently does this wrong; it will wind up calling vfs_write() on a file that was opened read-only. This is fixed in this patch. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
d3e49afb |
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05-Jun-2008 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: remove unnecessary page decrypt call The page decrypt calls in ecryptfs_write() are both pointless and buggy. Pointless because ecryptfs_get_locked_page() has already brought the page up to date, and buggy because prior mmap writes will just be blown away by the decrypt call. This patch also removes the declaration of a now-nonexistent function ecryptfs_write_zeros(). Thanks to Eric Sandeen and David Kleikamp for helping to track this down. Eric said: fsx w/ mmap dies quickly ( < 100 ops) without this, and survives nicely (to millions of ops+) with it in place. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@austin.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
6a3fd92e |
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29-Apr-2008 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: make key module subsystem respect namespaces Make eCryptfs key module subsystem respect namespaces. Since I will be removing the netlink interface in a future patch, I just made changes to the netlink.c code so that it will not break the build. With my recent patches, the kernel module currently defaults to the device handle interface rather than the netlink interface. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export free_user_ns()] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
f66e883e |
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29-Apr-2008 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: integrate eCryptfs device handle into the module. Update the versioning information. Make the message types generic. Add an outgoing message queue to the daemon struct. Make the functions to parse and write the packet lengths available to the rest of the module. Add functions to create and destroy the daemon structs. Clean up some of the comments and make the code a little more consistent with itself. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: printk fixes] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
18d1dbf1 |
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29-Apr-2008 |
Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> |
ecryptfs: replace remaining __FUNCTION__ occurrences __FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__ Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
af440f52 |
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06-Feb-2008 |
Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> |
ecryptfs: check for existing key_tfm at mount time Jeff Moyer pointed out that a mount; umount loop of ecryptfs, with the same cipher & other mount options, created a new ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache item each time, and the cache could grow quite large this way. Looking at this with mhalcrow, we saw that ecryptfs_parse_options() unconditionally called ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(), which is what was adding these items. Refactor ecryptfs_get_tfm_and_mutex_for_cipher_name() to create a new helper function, ecryptfs_tfm_exists(), which checks for the cipher on the cached key_tfm_list, and sets a pointer to it if it exists. This can then be called from ecryptfs_parse_options(), and new key_tfm's can be added only when a cached one is not found. With list locking changes suggested by akpm. Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
19e66a67 |
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06-Feb-2008 |
Trevor Highland <thighlan@gmail.com> |
eCryptfs: change the type of cipher_code from u16 to u8 Only the lower byte of cipher_code is ever used, so it makes sense for its type to be u8. Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <trevor.highland@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
8e3a6f16 |
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06-Feb-2008 |
Trevor Highland <trevor.highland@gmail.com> |
eCryptfs: set inode key only once per crypto operation There is no need to keep re-setting the same key for any given eCryptfs inode. This patch optimizes the use of the crypto API and helps performance a bit. Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <trevor.highland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
cc11beff |
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06-Feb-2008 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: track header bytes rather than extents Remove internal references to header extents; just keep track of header bytes instead. Headers can easily span multiple pages with the recent persistent file changes. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
7896b631 |
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06-Feb-2008 |
Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> |
fs/ecryptfs/: possible cleanups - make the following needlessly global code static: - crypto.c:ecryptfs_lower_offset_for_extent() - crypto.c:key_tfm_list - crypto.c:key_tfm_list_mutex - inode.c:ecryptfs_getxattr() - main.c:ecryptfs_init_persistent_file() - remove the no longer used mmap.c:ecryptfs_lower_page_cache - #if 0 the unused read_write.c:ecryptfs_read() Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
16a72c45 |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
ecryptfs: clean up page flag handling The functions that eventually call down to ecryptfs_read_lower(), ecryptfs_decrypt_page(), and ecryptfs_copy_up_encrypted_with_header() should have the responsibility of managing the page Uptodate status. This patch gets rid of some of the ugliness that resulted from trying to push some of the page flag setting too far down the stack. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
b6c1d8fc |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: remove unused functions and kmem_cache The switch to read_write.c routines and the persistent file make a number of functions unnecessary. This patch removes them. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
d7cdc5fe |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: update metadata read/write functions Update the metadata read/write functions and grow_file() to use the read_write.c routines. Do not open another lower file; use the persistent lower file instead. Provide a separate function for crypto.c::ecryptfs_read_xattr_region() to get to the lower xattr without having to go through the eCryptfs getxattr. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
0216f7f7 |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: replace encrypt, decrypt, and inode size write Replace page encryption and decryption routines and inode size write routine with versions that utilize the read_write.c functions. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
da0102a1 |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: read_write.c routines Add a set of functions through which all I/O to lower files is consolidated. This patch adds a new inode_info reference to a persistent lower file for each eCryptfs inode; another patch later in this series will set that up. This persistent lower file is what the read_write.c functions use to call vfs_read() and vfs_write() on the lower filesystem, so even when reads and writes come in through aops->readpage and aops->writepage, we can satisfy them without resorting to direct access to the lower inode's address space. Several function declarations are going to be changing with this patchset. For now, in order to keep from breaking the build, I am putting dummy parameters in for those functions. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
45eaab79 |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: remove header_extent_size There is no point to keeping a separate header_extent_size and an extent_size. The total size of the header can always be represented as some multiple of the regular data extent size. [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: ecryptfs: fix printk format warning] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
cd9d67df |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: make needlessly global symbols static Andrew Morton wrote: > Please check that all the newly-added global symbols do indeed need > to be global. Change symbols in keystore.c and crypto.o to static if they do not need to be global. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
6c6f57f3 |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: comments for some structs Andrew Morton wrote: > > +struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok { > > +#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID 0x00000001 > > + u32 flags; > > + struct list_head mount_crypt_stat_list; > > + struct key *global_auth_tok_key; > > + struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *global_auth_tok; > > + unsigned char sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX + 1]; > > +}; > > + > > +struct ecryptfs_key_tfm { > > + struct crypto_blkcipher *key_tfm; > > + size_t key_size; > > + struct mutex key_tfm_mutex; > > + struct list_head key_tfm_list; > > + unsigned char cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE + 1]; > > +}; > > Please consider commenting your struct fields carefully: it's a > great way to help other to understand your code. Add some comments to the ecryptfs_global_auth_tok and ecryptfs_key_tfm structs to make their functions more easily ascertained. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
fcd12835 |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: grammatical fix (destruct to destroy) Andrew Morton wrote: > > +int ecryptfs_destruct_crypto(void) > > ecryptfs_destroy_crypto would be more grammatically correct ;) Grammatical fix for some function names. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
f4aad16a |
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16-Oct-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: add key list structure; search keyring Add support structures for handling multiple keys. The list in crypt_stat contains the key identifiers for all of the keys that should be used for encrypting each file's File Encryption Key (FEK). For now, each inode inherits this list from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, via the ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs() function. This patch also removes the global key tfm from the mount-wide crypt_stat struct, instead keeping a list of tfm's meant for dealing with the various inode FEK's. eCryptfs will now search the user's keyring for FEK's parsed from the existing file metadata, so the user can make keys available at any time before or after mounting. Now that multiple FEK packets can be written to the file metadata, we need to be more meticulous about size limits. The updates to the code for writing out packets to the file metadata makes sizes and limits more explicit, uniformly expressed, and (hopefully) easier to follow. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
240e2df5 |
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27-Jun-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
eCryptfs: fix write zeros behavior This patch fixes the processes involved in wiping regions of the data during truncate and write events, fixing a kernel hang in 2.6.22-rc4 while assuring that zero values are written out to the appropriate locations during events in which the i_size will change. The range passed to ecryptfs_truncate() from ecryptfs_prepare_write() includes the page that is the object of ecryptfs_prepare_write(). This leads to a kernel hang as read_cache_page() is executed on the same page in the ecryptfs_truncate() execution path. This patch remedies this by limiting the range passed to ecryptfs_truncate() so as to exclude the page that is the object of ecryptfs_prepare_write(); it also adds code to ecryptfs_prepare_write() to zero out the region of its own page when writing past the i_size position. This patch also modifies ecryptfs_truncate() so that when a file is truncated to a smaller size, eCryptfs will zero out the contents of the new last page from the new size through to the end of the last page. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
eb95e7ff |
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16-Feb-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Reduce stack usage in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() eCryptfs is gobbling a lot of stack in ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() because it allocates a temporary memory-hungry ecryptfs_key_record struct. This patch introduces a new kmem_cache for that struct and converts ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set() to use it. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
ee9b6d61 |
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12-Feb-2007 |
Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu> |
[PATCH] Mark struct super_operations const This patch is inspired by Arjan's "Patch series to mark struct file_operations and struct inode_operations const". Compile tested with gcc & sparse. Signed-off-by: Josef 'Jeff' Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
754661f1 |
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12-Feb-2007 |
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> |
[PATCH] mark struct inode_operations const 1 Many struct inode_operations in the kernel can be "const". Marking them const moves these to the .rodata section, which avoids false sharing with potential dirty data. In addition it'll catch accidental writes at compile time to these shared resources. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
e2bd99ec |
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12-Feb-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: open-code flag checking and manipulation Open-code flag checking and manipulation. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <tshighla@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
9d8b8ce5 |
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12-Feb-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: convert kmap() to kmap_atomic() Replace kmap() with kmap_atomic(). Reduce the amount of time that mappings are held. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trevor Highland <tshighla@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
e77a56dd |
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12-Feb-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough Provide an option to provide a view of the encrypted files such that the metadata is always in the header of the files, regardless of whether the metadata is actually in the header or in the extended attribute. This mode of operation is useful for applications like incremental backup utilities that do not preserve the extended attributes when directly accessing the lower files. With this option enabled, the files under the eCryptfs mount point will be read-only. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
dd2a3b7a |
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12-Feb-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Generalize metadata read/write Generalize the metadata reading and writing mechanisms, with two targets for now: metadata in file header and metadata in the user.ecryptfs xattr of the lower file. [akpm@osdl.org: printk warning fix] [bunk@stusta.de: make some needlessly global code static] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
17398957 |
|
12-Feb-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: xattr flags and mount options This patch set introduces the ability to store cryptographic metadata into an lower file extended attribute rather than the lower file header region. This patch set implements two new mount options: ecryptfs_xattr_metadata - When set, newly created files will have their cryptographic metadata stored in the extended attribute region of the file rather than the header. When storing the data in the file header, there is a minimum of 8KB reserved for the header information for each file, making each file at least 12KB in size. This can take up a lot of extra disk space if the user creates a lot of small files. By storing the data in the extended attribute, each file will only occupy at least of 4KB of space. As the eCryptfs metadata set becomes larger with new features such as multi-key associations, most popular filesystems will not be able to store all of the information in the xattr region in some cases due to space constraints. However, the majority of users will only ever associate one key per file, so most users will be okay with storing their data in the xattr region. This option should be used with caution. I want to emphasize that the xattr must be maintained under all circumstances, or the file will be rendered permanently unrecoverable. The last thing I want is for a user to forget to set an xattr flag in a backup utility, only to later discover that their backups are worthless. ecryptfs_encrypted_view - When set, this option causes eCryptfs to present applications a view of encrypted files as if the cryptographic metadata were stored in the file header, whether the metadata is actually stored in the header or in the extended attributes. No matter what eCryptfs winds up doing in the lower filesystem, I want to preserve a baseline format compatibility for the encrypted files. As of right now, the metadata may be in the file header or in an xattr. There is no reason why the metadata could not be put in a separate file in future versions. Without the compatibility mode, backup utilities would have to know to back up the metadata file along with the files. The semantics of eCryptfs have always been that the lower files are self-contained units of encrypted data, and the only additional information required to decrypt any given eCryptfs file is the key. That is what has always been emphasized about eCryptfs lower files, and that is what users expect. Providing the encrypted view option will provide a way to userspace applications wherein they can always get to the same old familiar eCryptfs encrypted files, regardless of what eCryptfs winds up doing with the metadata behind the scenes. This patch: Add extended attribute support to version bit vector, flags to indicate when xattr or encrypted view modes are enabled, and support for the new mount options. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
dddfa461 |
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12-Feb-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management Public key support code. This reads and writes packets in the header that contain public key encrypted file keys. It calls the messaging code in the previous patch to send and receive encryption and decryption request packets from the userspace daemon. [akpm@osdl.org: cleab fix] Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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#
88b4a07e |
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12-Feb-2007 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism This is the transport code for public key functionality in eCryptfs. It manages encryption/decryption request queues with a transport mechanism. Currently, netlink is the only implemented transport. Each inode has a unique File Encryption Key (FEK). Under passphrase, a File Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) is generated from a salt/passphrase combo on mount. This FEKEK encrypts each FEK and writes it into the header of each file using the packet format specified in RFC 2440. This is all symmetric key encryption, so it can all be done via the kernel crypto API. These new patches introduce public key encryption of the FEK. There is no asymmetric key encryption support in the kernel crypto API, so eCryptfs pushes the FEK encryption and decryption out to a userspace daemon. After considering our requirements and determining the complexity of using various transport mechanisms, we settled on netlink for this communication. eCryptfs stores authentication tokens into the kernel keyring. These tokens correlate with individual keys. For passphrase mode of operation, the authentication token contains the symmetric FEKEK. For public key, the authentication token contains a PKI type and an opaque data blob managed by individual PKI modules in userspace. Each user who opens a file under an eCryptfs partition mounted in public key mode must be running a daemon. That daemon has the user's credentials and has access to all of the keys to which the user should have access. The daemon, when started, initializes the pluggable PKI modules available on the system and registers itself with the eCryptfs kernel module. Userspace utilities register public key authentication tokens into the user session keyring. These authentication tokens correlate key signatures with PKI modules and PKI blobs. The PKI blobs contain PKI-specific information necessary for the PKI module to carry out asymmetric key encryption and decryption. When the eCryptfs module parses the header of an existing file and finds a Tag 1 (Public Key) packet (see RFC 2440), it reads in the public key identifier (signature). The asymmetrically encrypted FEK is in the Tag 1 packet; eCryptfs puts together a decrypt request packet containing the signature and the encrypted FEK, then it passes it to the daemon registered for the current->euid via a netlink unicast to the PID of the daemon, which was registered at the time the daemon was started by the user. The daemon actually just makes calls to libecryptfs, which implements request packet parsing and manages PKI modules. libecryptfs grabs the public key authentication token for the given signature from the user session keyring. This auth tok tells libecryptfs which PKI module should receive the request. libecryptfs then makes a decrypt() call to the PKI module, and it passes along the PKI block from the auth tok. The PKI uses the blob to figure out how it should decrypt the data passed to it; it performs the decryption and passes the decrypted data back to libecryptfs. libecryptfs then puts together a reply packet with the decrypted FEK and passes that back to the eCryptfs module. The eCryptfs module manages these request callouts to userspace code via message context structs. The module maintains an array of message context structs and places the elements of the array on two lists: a free and an allocated list. When eCryptfs wants to make a request, it moves a msg ctx from the free list to the allocated list, sets its state to pending, and fires off the message to the user's registered daemon. When eCryptfs receives a netlink message (via the callback), it correlates the msg ctx struct in the alloc list with the data in the message itself. The msg->index contains the offset of the array of msg ctx structs. It verifies that the registered daemon PID is the same as the PID of the process that sent the message. It also validates a sequence number between the received packet and the msg ctx. Then, it copies the contents of the message (the reply packet) into the msg ctx struct, sets the state in the msg ctx to done, and wakes up the process that was sleeping while waiting for the reply. The sleeping process was whatever was performing the sys_open(). This process originally called ecryptfs_send_message(); it is now in ecryptfs_wait_for_response(). When it wakes up and sees that the msg ctx state was set to done, it returns a pointer to the message contents (the reply packet) and returns. If all went well, this packet contains the decrypted FEK, which is then copied into the crypt_stat struct, and life continues as normal. The case for creation of a new file is very similar, only instead of a decrypt request, eCryptfs sends out an encrypt request. > - We have a great clod of key mangement code in-kernel. Why is that > not suitable (or growable) for public key management? eCryptfs uses Howells' keyring to store persistent key data and PKI state information. It defers public key cryptographic transformations to userspace code. The userspace data manipulation request really is orthogonal to key management in and of itself. What eCryptfs basically needs is a secure way to communicate with a particular daemon for a particular task doing a syscall, based on the UID. Nothing running under another UID should be able to access that channel of communication. > - Is it appropriate that new infrastructure for public key > management be private to a particular fs? The messaging.c file contains a lot of code that, perhaps, could be extracted into a separate kernel service. In essence, this would be a sort of request/reply mechanism that would involve a userspace daemon. I am not aware of anything that does quite what eCryptfs does, so I was not aware of any existing tools to do just what we wanted. > What happens if one of these daemons exits without sending a quit > message? There is a stale uid<->pid association in the hash table for that user. When the user registers a new daemon, eCryptfs cleans up the old association and generates a new one. See ecryptfs_process_helo(). > - _why_ does it use netlink? Netlink provides the transport mechanism that would minimize the complexity of the implementation, given that we can have multiple daemons (one per user). I explored the possibility of using relayfs, but that would involve having to introduce control channels and a protocol for creating and tearing down channels for the daemons. We do not have to worry about any of that with netlink. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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f1ddcaf3 |
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26-Jan-2007 |
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> |
[CRYPTO] api: Remove deprecated interface This patch removes the old cipher interface and related code. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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b65d34fd |
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08-Dec-2006 |
Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu> |
[PATCH] struct path: make eCryptfs a user of struct path Convert eCryptfs dentry-vfsmount pairs in dentry private data to struct path. Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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0cc72dc7 |
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08-Dec-2006 |
Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Use fsstack's generic copy inode attr functions Replace eCryptfs specific code & calls with the more generic fsstack equivalents and remove the eCryptfs specific functions. Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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7ff1d74f |
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30-Oct-2006 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Consolidate lower dentry_open's Opens on lower dentry objects happen in several places in eCryptfs, and they all involve the same steps (dget, mntget, dentry_open). This patch consolidates the lower open events into a single function call. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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8bba066f |
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30-Oct-2006 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Cipher code to new crypto API Update cipher block encryption code to the new crypto API. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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565d9724 |
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30-Oct-2006 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Hash code to new crypto API Update eCryptfs hash code to the new kernel crypto API. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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e5d9cbde |
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30-Oct-2006 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] eCryptfs: Clean up crypto initialization Clean up the crypto initialization code; let the crypto API take care of the key size checks. Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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237fead6 |
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04-Oct-2006 |
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> |
[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig eCryptfs is a stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux. It is derived from Erez Zadok's Cryptfs, implemented through the FiST framework for generating stacked filesystems. eCryptfs extends Cryptfs to provide advanced key management and policy features. eCryptfs stores cryptographic metadata in the header of each file written, so that encrypted files can be copied between hosts; the file will be decryptable with the proper key, and there is no need to keep track of any additional information aside from what is already in the encrypted file itself. [akpm@osdl.org: updates for ongoing API changes] [bunk@stusta.de: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: alpha build fix] [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [tytso@mit.edu: inode-diet updates] [pbadari@us.ibm.com: generic_file_*_read/write() interface updates] [rdunlap@xenotime.net: printk format fixes] [akpm@osdl.org: make slab creation and teardown table-driven] Signed-off-by: Phillip Hellewell <phillip@hellewell.homeip.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Badari Pulavarty <pbadari@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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