crypto: sparc/crc32c - stop using the shash alignmask

As far as I can tell, "crc32c-sparc64" is the only "shash" algorithm in
the kernel that sets a nonzero alignmask and actually relies on it to
get the crypto API to align the inputs and outputs. This capability is
not really useful, though. To unblock removing the support for
alignmask from shash_alg, this patch updates crc32c-sparc64 to no longer
use the alignmask. This means doing 8-byte alignment of the data when
doing an update, using get_unaligned_le32() when setting a non-default
initial CRC, and using put_unaligned_le32() to output the final CRC.

Partially tested with:

export ARCH=sparc64 CROSS_COMPILE=sparc64-linux-gnu-
make sparc64_defconfig
echo CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32C_SPARC64=y >> .config
echo '# CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS is not set' >> .config
echo CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y >> .config
echo CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y >> .config
make olddefconfig
make -j$(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN)
qemu-system-sparc64 -kernel arch/sparc/boot/image -nographic

However, qemu doesn't actually support the sparc CRC32C instructions, so
for the test I temporarily replaced crc32c_sparc64() with __crc32c_le()
and made sparc64_has_crc32c_opcode() always return true. So essentially
I tested the glue code, not the actual SPARC part which is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

crypto: sparc - Fix sparse endianness warnings

This patch fixes a coulpe of sparse endianness warnings.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN

The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.

However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.

Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.

Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.

So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.

So just remove this flag.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier for more missed files

Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:

- Have no license information of any form

- Have MODULE_LICENCE("GPL*") inside which was used in the initial
scan/conversion to ignore the file

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

crypto: hash - annotate algorithms taking optional key

We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without
setting the key. To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether
a given hash algorithm is keyed or not. AF_ALG currently does this by
checking for the presence of a ->setkey() method. However, this is
actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement
->setkey() but can also be used without a key. (The CRC-32 "key" is not
actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state.
If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.)

Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which
indicates that the algorithm has a ->setkey() method, but it is not
required to be called. Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms.

The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre.

Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag
from their underlying algorithm.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"

This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:

https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

sparc64: Fix build with mix of modular vs. non-modular crypto drivers.

We tried linking in a single built object to hold the device table,
but only works if all of the sparc64 crypto modules get built the same
way (modular vs. non-modular).

Just include the device ID stub into each driver source file so that
the table gets compiled into the correct result in all cases.

Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

sparc64: Adjust crypto priorities.

Make the crypto opcode implementations have a higher priority than
those provides by the ring buffer based Niagara crypto device.

Also, several crypto opcode hashes were not setting the priority value
at all.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

sparc64: Add CRC32C driver making use of the new crc32c opcode.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>