arm: Use the generic devmem_is_allowed()

This is exactly the same as the arm64 version, which I recently copied
into lib/ for use by the RISC-V port.

Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>

arm: use generic mmap top-down layout and brk randomization

arm uses a top-down mmap layout by default that exactly fits the generic
functions, so get rid of arch specific code and use the generic version by
selecting ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT.

As ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT selects ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE,
use the generic version of arch_randomize_brk since it also fits. Note
that this commit also removes the possibility for arm to have elf
randomization and no MMU: without MMU, the security added by randomization
is worth nothing.

Note that it is safe to remove STACK_RND_MASK since it matches the default
value.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-9-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

arm: use STACK_TOP when computing mmap base address

mmap base address must be computed wrt stack top address, using TASK_SIZE
is wrong since STACK_TOP and TASK_SIZE are not equivalent.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-8-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

arm: properly account for stack randomization and stack guard gap

This commit takes care of stack randomization and stack guard gap when
computing mmap base address and checks if the task asked for
randomization. This fixes the problem uncovered and not fixed for arm
here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622200033.25714-1-riel@redhat.com

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190730055113.23635-7-alex@ghiti.fr
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

exec: pass stack rlimit into mm layout functions

Patch series "exec: Pin stack limit during exec".

Attempts to solve problems with the stack limit changing during exec
continue to be frustrated[1][2]. In addition to the specific issues
around the Stack Clash family of flaws, Andy Lutomirski pointed out[3]
other places during exec where the stack limit is used and is assumed to
be unchanging. Given the many places it gets used and the fact that it
can be manipulated/raced via setrlimit() and prlimit(), I think the only
way to handle this is to move away from the "current" view of the stack
limit and instead attach it to the bprm, and plumb this down into the
functions that need to know the stack limits. This series implements
the approach.

[1] 04e35f4495dd ("exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()")
[2] 779f4e1c6c7c ("Revert "exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()"")
[3] to security@kernel.org, "Subject: existing rlimit races?"

This patch (of 3):

Since it is possible that the stack rlimit can change externally during
exec (either via another thread calling setrlimit() or another process
calling prlimit()), provide a way to pass the rlimit down into the
per-architecture mm layout functions so that the rlimit can stay in the
bprm structure instead of sitting in the signal structure until exec is
finalized.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1518638796-20819-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license

Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.

For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139

and resulted in the first patch in this series.

If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930

and resulted in the second patch in this series.

- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:

SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1

and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).

- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.

Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving more code to <linux/sched/mm.h>

We are going to split more MM APIs out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from a couple of .c files.

The APIs that we are going to move are:

arch_pick_mmap_layout()
arch_get_unmapped_area()
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown()
mm_update_next_owner()

Include the header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/signal.h>

We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

mm: ASLR: use get_random_long()

Replace calls to get_random_int() followed by a cast to (unsigned long)
with calls to get_random_long(). Also address shifting bug which, in
case of x86 removed entropy mask for mmap_rnd_bits values > 31 bits.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS

arm: arch_mmap_rnd() uses a hard-code value of 8 to generate the random
offset for the mmap base address. This value represents a compromise
between increased ASLR effectiveness and avoiding address-space
fragmentation. Replace it with a Kconfig option, which is sensibly
bounded, so that platform developers may choose where to place this
compromise. Keep 8 as the minimum acceptable value.

[arnd@arndb.de: ARM: avoid ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS for NOMMU]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

mm: expose arch_mmap_rnd when available

When an architecture fully supports randomizing the ELF load location,
a per-arch mmap_rnd() function is used to find a randomized mmap base.
In preparation for randomizing the location of ET_DYN binaries
separately from mmap, this renames and exports these functions as
arch_mmap_rnd(). Additionally introduces CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
for describing this feature on architectures that support it
(which is a superset of ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE, since s390
already supports a separated ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR without the
ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE logic).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

arm: factor out mmap ASLR into mmap_rnd

To address the "offset2lib" ASLR weakness[1], this separates ET_DYN ASLR
from mmap ASLR, as already done on s390. The architectures that are
already randomizing mmap (arm, arm64, mips, powerpc, s390, and x86), have
their various forms of arch_mmap_rnd() made available via the new
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE. For these architectures,
arch_randomize_brk() is collapsed as well.

This is an alternative to the solutions in:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/2/23/442

I've been able to test x86 and arm, and the buildbot (so far) seems happy
with building the rest.

[1] http://cybersecurity.upv.es/attacks/offset2lib/offset2lib.html

This patch (of 10):

In preparation for splitting out ET_DYN ASLR, this moves the ASLR
calculations for mmap on ARM into a separate routine, similar to x86.
This also removes the redundant check of personality (PF_RANDOMIZE is
already set before calling arch_pick_mmap_layout).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Cc: Arun Chandran <achandran@mvista.com>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Min-Hua Chen <orca.chen@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex@alex-smith.me.uk>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: Vineeth Vijayan <vvijayan@mvista.com>
Cc: Jeff Bailey <jeffbailey@google.com>
Cc: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Behan Webster <behanw@converseincode.com>
Cc: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
Cc: Jan-Simon Mller <dl9pf@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

ARM: fix booting low-vectors machines

Commit f6f91b0d9fd9 (ARM: allow kuser helpers to be removed from the
vector page) required two pages for the vectors code. Although the
code setting up the initial page tables was updated, the code which
allocates page tables for new processes wasn't, neither was the code
which tears down the mappings. Fix this.

Fixes: f6f91b0d9fd9 ("ARM: allow kuser helpers to be removed from the vector page")
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>

ARM: 7840/1: LPAE: don't reject mapping /dev/mem above 4GB

With LPAE enabled, physical address space is larger than 4GB. Allow mapping any
part of it via /dev/mem by using PHYS_MASK to determine valid range.

PHYS_MASK covers 40 bits with LPAE enabled and 32 bits otherwise.

Reported-by: Vassili Karpov <av1474@comtv.ru>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

mm: remove free_area_cache

Since all architectures have been converted to use vm_unmapped_area(),
there is no remaining use for the free_area_cache.

Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

mm: use vm_unmapped_area() on arm architecture

Update the arm arch_get_unmapped_area[_topdown] functions to make use of
vm_unmapped_area() instead of implementing a brute force search.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove now-unused COLOUR_ALIGN_DOWN()]
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

/dev/mem: use phys_addr_t for physical addresses

This patch fixes the /dev/mem driver to use phys_addr_t for physical
addresses. This is required on PAE systems, especially those that run
entirely out of >4G physical memory space.

Signed-off-by: Cyril Chemparathy <cyril@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

ARM: 7169/1: topdown mmap support

Similar to other architectures, this adds topdown mmap support in user
process address space allocation policy. This allows mmap sizes greater
than 2GB. This support is largely copied from MIPS and the generic
implementations.

The address space randomization is moved into arch_pick_mmap_layout.

Tested on V-Express with ubuntu and a mmap test from here:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/861296

Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

ARM: 7168/1: use cache type functions for arch_get_unmapped_area

There are already cache type decoding functions, so use those instead
of custom decode code which only works for ARMv6.

Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

ARM: 6877/1: the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE personality flag should be honored with mmap()

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

ARM: v6k: introduce CPU_V6K option

Introduce a CPU_V6K configuration option for platforms to select if they
have a V6K CPU core. This allows us to identify whether we need to
support ARMv6 CPUs without the V6K SMP extensions at build time.

Currently CPU_V6K is just an alias for CPU_V6, and all places which
reference CPU_V6 are replaced by (CPU_V6 || CPU_V6K).

Select CPU_V6K from platforms which are known to be V6K-only.

Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Tested-by: Sourav Poddar <sourav.poddar@ti.com>
Tested-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

ARM: implement CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM by disabling access to RAM via /dev/mem

There are very few legitimate use cases, if any, for directly accessing
system RAM through /dev/mem. So let's mimic what they do on x86 and
forbid it when CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM is turned on.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>

[ARM] add address randomization to mmap()

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>

fix broken aliasing checks for MAP_FIXED on sparc32, mips, arm and sh

We want addr - (pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) consistently coloured...

Acked-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

ARM: 5740/1: fix valid_phys_addr_range() range check

Commit 1522ac3ec95ff0230e7aa516f86b674fdf72866c
("Fix virtual to physical translation macro corner cases")
breaks the end of memory check in valid_phys_addr_range().
The modified expression results in the apparent /dev/mem size
being 2 bytes smaller than what it actually is.

This patch reworks the expression to correctly check the address,
while maintaining use of a valid address to __pa().

Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

[ARM] Fix virtual to physical translation macro corner cases

The current use of these macros works well when the conversion is
entirely linear. In this case, we can be assured that the following
holds true:

__va(p + s) - s = __va(p)

However, this is not always the case, especially when there is a
non-linear conversion (eg, when there is a 3.5GB hole in memory.)
In this case, if 's' is the size of the region (eg, PAGE_SIZE) and
'p' is the final page, the above is most definitely not true.

So, we must ensure that __va() and __pa() are only used with valid
kernel direct mapped RAM addresses. This patch tweaks the code
to achieve this.

Tested-by: Charles Moschel <fred99@carolina.rr.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

[ARM] sparse: fix several warnings

arch/arm/kernel/process.c:270:6: warning: symbol 'show_fpregs' was not declared. Should it be static?

This function isn't used, so can be removed.

arch/arm/kernel/setup.c:532:9: warning: symbol 'len' shadows an earlier one
arch/arm/kernel/setup.c:524:6: originally declared here

A function containing two 'len's.

arch/arm/mm/fault-armv.c:188:13: warning: symbol 'check_writebuffer_bugs' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/arm/mm/mmap.c:122:5: warning: symbol 'valid_phys_addr_range' was not declared. Should it be static?
arch/arm/mm/mmap.c:137:5: warning: symbol 'valid_mmap_phys_addr_range' was not declared. Should it be static?

Missing includes.

arch/arm/kernel/traps.c:71:77: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer
arch/arm/mm/ioremap.c:355:46: error: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces)

Sillies.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

[ARM] cputype: separate definitions, use them

Add asm/cputype.h, moving functions and definitions from asm/system.h
there. Convert all users of 'processor_id' to the more efficient
read_cpuid_id() function.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

[ARM] 4839/1: fixes kernel Oops in /dev/mem device driver for memory map with PHYS_OFF

"cat /dev/mem" may cause kernel Oops for boards with PHYS_OFFSET != 0
because character device is mapped to addresses starting from zero
and there is no protection against such situation.
Patch just add this.

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Rusev <arusev@ru.mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

Detach sched.h from mm.h

First thing mm.h does is including sched.h solely for can_do_mlock() inline
function which has "current" dereference inside. By dealing with can_do_mlock()
mm.h can be detached from sched.h which is good. See below, why.

This patch
a) removes unconditional inclusion of sched.h from mm.h
b) makes can_do_mlock() normal function in mm/mlock.c
c) exports can_do_mlock() to not break compilation
d) adds sched.h inclusions back to files that were getting it indirectly.
e) adds less bloated headers to some files (asm/signal.h, jiffies.h) that were
getting them indirectly

Net result is:
a) mm.h users would get less code to open, read, preprocess, parse, ... if
they don't need sched.h
b) sched.h stops being dependency for significant number of files:
on x86_64 allmodconfig touching sched.h results in recompile of 4083 files,
after patch it's only 3744 (-8.3%).

Cross-compile tested on

all arm defconfigs, all mips defconfigs, all powerpc defconfigs,
alpha alpha-up
arm
i386 i386-up i386-defconfig i386-allnoconfig
ia64 ia64-up
m68k
mips
parisc parisc-up
powerpc powerpc-up
s390 s390-up
sparc sparc-up
sparc64 sparc64-up
um-x86_64
x86_64 x86_64-up x86_64-defconfig x86_64-allnoconfig

as well as my two usual configs.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

get_unmapped_area handles MAP_FIXED on arm

ARM already had a case for MAP_FIXED in arch_get_unmapped_area() though it was
not called before. Fix the comment to reflect that it will now be called.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

[ARM] 3813/1: prevent >= 4G /dev/mem mmap()

Prevent userland from mapping in physical address regions >= 4G by
checking for that in valid_mmap_phys_addr_range().

Unfortunately, we cannot override valid_mmap_phys_addr_range() without
also overriding valid_phys_addr_range(), so copy drivers/char/mem.c's
version of valid_phys_addr_range() over to arch/arm/mm/mmap.c as well.

Signed-off-by: Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh@wantstofly.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>

Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

[PATCH] Avoiding mmap fragmentation

Ingo recently introduced a great speedup for allocating new mmaps using the
free_area_cache pointer which boosts the specweb SSL benchmark by 4-5% and
causes huge performance increases in thread creation.

The downside of this patch is that it does lead to fragmentation in the
mmap-ed areas (visible via /proc/self/maps), such that some applications
that work fine under 2.4 kernels quickly run out of memory on any 2.6
kernel.

The problem is twofold:

1) the free_area_cache is used to continue a search for memory where
the last search ended. Before the change new areas were always
searched from the base address on.

So now new small areas are cluttering holes of all sizes
throughout the whole mmap-able region whereas before small holes
tended to close holes near the base leaving holes far from the base
large and available for larger requests.

2) the free_area_cache also is set to the location of the last
munmap-ed area so in scenarios where we allocate e.g. five regions of
1K each, then free regions 4 2 3 in this order the next request for 1K
will be placed in the position of the old region 3, whereas before we
appended it to the still active region 1, placing it at the location
of the old region 2. Before we had 1 free region of 2K, now we only
get two free regions of 1K -> fragmentation.

The patch addresses thes issues by introducing yet another cache descriptor
cached_hole_size that contains the largest known hole size below the
current free_area_cache. If a new request comes in the size is compared
against the cached_hole_size and if the request can be filled with a hole
below free_area_cache the search is started from the base instead.

The results look promising: Whereas 2.6.12-rc4 fragments quickly and my
(earlier posted) leakme.c test program terminates after 50000+ iterations
with 96 distinct and fragmented maps in /proc/self/maps it performs nicely
(as expected) with thread creation, Ingo's test_str02 with 20000 threads
requires 0.7s system time.

Taking out Ingo's patch (un-patch available per request) by basically
deleting all mentions of free_area_cache from the kernel and starting the
search for new memory always at the respective bases we observe: leakme
terminates successfully with 11 distinctive hardly fragmented areas in
/proc/self/maps but thread creating is gringdingly slow: 30+s(!) system
time for Ingo's test_str02 with 20000 threads.

Now - drumroll ;-) the appended patch works fine with leakme: it ends with
only 7 distinct areas in /proc/self/maps and also thread creation seems
sufficiently fast with 0.71s for 20000 threads.

Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Wander <wwc@rentec.com>
Credit-to: "Richard Purdie" <rpurdie@rpsys.net>
Signed-off-by: Ken Chen <kenneth.w.chen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> (partly)
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Linux-2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!