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fdafd315 |
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24-Nov-2023 |
Warner Losh <imp@FreeBSD.org> |
sys: Automated cleanup of cdefs and other formatting Apply the following automated changes to try to eliminate no-longer-needed sys/cdefs.h includes as well as now-empty blank lines in a row. Remove /^#if.*\n#endif.*\n#include\s+<sys/cdefs.h>.*\n/ Remove /\n+#include\s+<sys/cdefs.h>.*\n+#if.*\n#endif.*\n+/ Remove /\n+#if.*\n#endif.*\n+/ Remove /^#if.*\n#endif.*\n/ Remove /\n+#include\s+<sys/cdefs.h>\n#include\s+<sys/types.h>/ Remove /\n+#include\s+<sys/cdefs.h>\n#include\s+<sys/param.h>/ Remove /\n+#include\s+<sys/cdefs.h>\n#include\s+<sys/capsicum.h>/ Sponsored by: Netflix
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685dc743 |
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16-Aug-2023 |
Warner Losh <imp@FreeBSD.org> |
sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: one-line .c pattern Remove /^[\s*]*__FBSDID\("\$FreeBSD\$"\);?\s*\n/
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a4e4ea73 |
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24-Jul-2023 |
Mitchell Horne <mhorne@FreeBSD.org> |
sys_getrandom: fix a function reference in a comment MFC after: 3 days Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation
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4d846d26 |
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10-May-2023 |
Warner Losh <imp@FreeBSD.org> |
spdx: The BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier is obsolete, drop -FreeBSD The SPDX folks have obsoleted the BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD identifier. Catch up to that fact and revert to their recommended match of BSD-2-Clause. Discussed with: pfg MFC After: 3 days Sponsored by: Netflix
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365cd522 |
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12-Jan-2020 |
Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org> |
Fix a typo in r356667 comment No functional change. Reported by: bdragon Approved by: csprng(markm), earlier version X-MFC-With: r356667
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86def3dc |
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12-Jan-2020 |
Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org> |
getrandom(2): Add Linux GRND_INSECURE API flag Treat it as a synonym for GRND_NONBLOCK. The reasoning is this: We have two choices for handling Linux's GRND_INSECURE API flag. 1. We could ignore it completely (like GRND_RANDOM). However, this might produce the surprising result of GRND_INSECURE requests blocking, when the Linux API does not block. 2. Alternatively, we could treat GRND_INSECURE requests as requests for GRND_NONBLOCk. Here, the surprising result for Linux programs is that invocations with unseeded random(4) will produce EAGAIN, rather than garbage. Honoring the flag in the way Linux does seems fraught. If we actually use the output of a random(4) implementation prior to seeding, we leak some entropy (in an information theory and also practical sense) from what will be the initial seed to attackers (or allow attackers to arbitrary DoS initial seeding, if we don't leak). This seems unacceptable -- it defeats the purpose of blocking on initial seeding. Secondary to that concern, before seeding we may have arbitrarily little entropy collected; producing output from zero or a handful of entropy bits does not seem particularly useful to userspace. If userspace can accept garbage, insecure, non-random bytes, they can create their own insecure garbage with srandom(time(NULL)) or similar. Any program which would be satisfied with a 3-bit key CTR stream has no need for CSPRNG bytes. So asking the kernel to produce such an output from the secure getrandom(2) API seems inane. For now, we've elected to emulate GRND_INSECURE as an alternative spelling of GRND_NONBLOCK (2). Consider this API not-quite stable for now. We guarantee it will never block. But we will attempt to monitor actual port uptake of this bizarre API and may revise our plans for the unseeded behavior (prior stable/13 branching). Approved by: csprng(markm), manpages(bcr) See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/cover.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org/ See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/20200107204400.GH3619@mit.edu/ Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23130
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6469bdcd |
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06-Apr-2018 |
Brooks Davis <brooks@FreeBSD.org> |
Move most of the contents of opt_compat.h to opt_global.h. opt_compat.h is mentioned in nearly 180 files. In-progress network driver compabibility improvements may add over 100 more so this is closer to "just about everywhere" than "only some files" per the guidance in sys/conf/options. Keep COMPAT_LINUX32 in opt_compat.h as it is confined to a subset of sys/compat/linux/*.c. A fake _COMPAT_LINUX option ensure opt_compat.h is created on all architectures. Move COMPAT_LINUXKPI to opt_dontuse.h as it is only used to control the set of compiled files. Reviewed by: kib, cem, jhb, jtl Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14941
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c37125d9 |
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20-Mar-2018 |
Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org> |
Add missed sys/limits.h include Apparently header pollution on x86 hid its absense. Sorry, other arch users. Fix the missed header introduced in r331279. Reported by: tinderbox
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e9ac2743 |
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20-Mar-2018 |
Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org> |
Implement getrandom(2) and getentropy(3) The general idea here is to provide userspace programs with well-defined sources of entropy, in a fashion that doesn't require opening a new file descriptor (ulimits) or accessing paths (/dev/urandom may be restricted by chroot or capsicum). getrandom(2) is the more general API, and comes from the Linux world. Since our urandom and random devices are identical, the GRND_RANDOM flag is ignored. getentropy(3) is added as a compatibility shim for the OpenBSD API. truss(1) support is included. Tests for both system calls are provided. Coverage is believed to be at least as comprehensive as LTP getrandom(2) test coverage. Additionally, instructions for running the LTP tests directly against FreeBSD are provided in the "Test Plan" section of the Differential revision linked below. (They pass, of course.) PR: 194204 Reported by: David CARLIER <david.carlier AT hardenedbsd.org> Discussed with: cperciva, delphij, jhb, markj Relnotes: maybe Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14500
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