MFC r335795,335796:
Make debug output produced by `setkey -x` command a more human readable.

Add text names of SADB message types and extension headers to the output.

Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16036

Revert r330897:

This was intended to be a non-functional change. It wasn't. The commit
message was thus wrong. In addition it broke arm, and merged crypto
related code.

Revert with prejudice.

This revert skips files touched in r316370 since that commit was since
MFCed. This revert also skips files that require $FreeBSD$ property
changes.

Thank you to those who helped me get out of this mess including but not
limited to gonzo, kevans, rgrimes.

Requested by: gjb (re)

Partial merge of the SPDX changes

These changes are incomplete but are making it difficult
to determine what other changes can/should be merged.

No objections from: pfg

MFC r319118:
Disable IPsec debugging code by default when IPSEC_DEBUG kernel option
is not specified.

Due to the long call chain IPsec code can produce the kernel stack
exhaustion on the i386 architecture. The debugging code usually is not
used, but it requires a lot of stack space to keep buffers for strings
formatting. This patch conditionally defines macros to disable building
of IPsec debugging code.

IPsec currently has two sysctl variables to configure debug output:
* net.key.debug variable is used to enable debug output for PF_KEY
protocol. Such debug messages are produced by KEYDBG() macro and
usually they can be interesting for developers.
* net.inet.ipsec.debug variable is used to enable debug output for
DPRINTF() macro and ipseclog() function. DPRINTF() macro usually
is used for development debugging. ipseclog() function is used for
debugging by administrator.

The patch disables KEYDBG() and DPRINTF() macros, and formatting buffers
declarations when IPSEC_DEBUG is not present in kernel config. This
reduces stack requirement for up to several hundreds of bytes.
The net.inet.ipsec.debug variable still can be used to enable ipseclog()
messages by administrator.

PR: 219476

MFC r319412:
Build kdebug_secreplay() function only when IPSEC_DEBUG is defined.
This should fix the build on sparc.

Approved by: re (kib)

MFC r316759:
Add large replay widow support to setkey(8) and libipsec.

When the replay window size is large than UINT8_MAX, add to the request
the SADB_X_EXT_SA_REPLAY extension header that was added in r309144.

Also add support of SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_TYPE, SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_SPORT,
SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_DPORT, SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OAI, SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OAR,
SADB_X_EXT_SA_REPLAY, SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC, SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST
extension headers to the key_debug that is used by `setkey -x`.

Modify kdebug_sockaddr() to use inet_ntop() for IP addresses formatting.
And modify kdebug_sadb_x_policy() to show policy scope and priority.

Reviewed by: gnn, Emeric Poupon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10375

MFC r304572 (by bz):
Remove the kernel optoion for IPSEC_FILTERTUNNEL, which was deprecated
more than 7 years ago in favour of a sysctl in r192648.

MFC r305122:
Remove redundant sanity checks from ipsec[46]_common_input_cb().

This check already has been done in the each protocol callback.

MFC r309144,309174,309201 (by fabient):
IPsec RFC6479 support for replay window sizes up to 2^32 - 32 packets.

Since the previous algorithm, based on bit shifting, does not scale
with large replay windows, the algorithm used here is based on
RFC 6479: IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm without Bit Shifting.
The replay window will be fast to be updated, but will cost as many bits
in RAM as its size.

The previous implementation did not provide a lock on the replay window,
which may lead to replay issues.

Obtained from: emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8468

MFC r309143,309146 (by fabient):
In a dual processor system (2*6 cores) during IPSec throughput tests,
we see a lot of contention on the arc4 lock, used to generate the IV
of the ESP output packets.

The idea of this patch is to split this mutex in order to reduce the
contention on this lock.

Update r309143 to prevent false sharing.

Reviewed by: delphij, markm, ache
Approved by: so
Obtained from: emeric.poupon@stormshield.eu
Sponsored by: Stormshield
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8130

MFC r313330:
Merge projects/ipsec into head/.

Small summary
-------------

o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec.
o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel
option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading
and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules.
o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by
default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type
support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for
inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs.
setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA.
o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is
build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel).
It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs.
o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special
methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
should be included to declare all the needed things to work
with IPsec.
o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed.
Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods.
o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC.
o PF_KEY SADB was reworked:
- now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace,
and all SAs MUST have unique SPI.
- several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB.
- SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads
can do SA lookups in the same time.
- many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes
in SADB.
- SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers:
SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They
can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses.
o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to
avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support
only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported
for both INET and INET6.
o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches
used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet.
o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does
check for full history of applied IPsec transforms.
o References counting rules for security policies and security
associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform
code.
o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms.
tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in
SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting.

Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352

MFC r313331:
Add removed headers into the ObsoleteFiles.inc.

MFC r313561 (by glebius):
Move tcp_fields_to_net() static inline into tcp_var.h, just below its
friend tcp_fields_to_host(). There is third party code that also uses
this inline.

MFC r313697:
Remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.

The inpcb structure has inp_sp pointer that is initialized by
ipsec_init_pcbpolicy() function. This pointer keeps strorage for IPsec
security policies associated with a specific socket.
An application can use IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket
options to configure these security policies. Then ip[6]_output()
uses inpcb pointer to specify that an outgoing packet is associated
with some socket. And IPSEC_OUTPUT() method can use a security policy
stored in the inp_sp. For inbound packet the protocol-specific input
routine uses IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() method to check that a packet conforms
to inbound security policy configured in the inpcb.

SCTP protocol doesn't specify inpcb for ip[6]_output() when it sends
packets. Thus IPSEC_OUTPUT() method does not consider such packets as
associated with some socket and can not apply security policies
from inpcb, even if they are configured. Since IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY()
method is called from protocol-specific input routine, it can specify
inpcb pointer and associated with socket inbound policy will be
checked. But there are two problems:
1. Such check is asymmetric, becasue we can not apply security policy
from inpcb for outgoing packet.
2. IPSEC_CHECK_POLICY() expects that caller holds INPCB lock and
access to inp_sp is protected. But for SCTP this is not correct,
becasue SCTP uses own locks to protect inpcb.

To fix these problems remove IPsec related PCB code from SCTP.
This imply that IP_IPSEC_POLICY and IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket options
will be not applicable to SCTP sockets. To be able correctly check
inbound security policies for SCTP, mark its protocol header with
the PR_LASTHDR flag.

Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9538

MFC r313746:
Add missing check to fix the build with IPSEC_SUPPORT and without MAC.

MFC r313805:
Fix LINT build for powerpc.

Build kernel modules support only when both IPSEC and TCP_SIGNATURE
are not defined.

MFC r313922:
For translated packets do not adjust UDP checksum if it is zero.

In case when decrypted and decapsulated packet is an UDP datagram,
check that its checksum is not zero before doing incremental checksum
adjustment.

MFC r314339:
Document that the size of AH ICV for HMAC-SHA2-NNN should be half of
NNN bits as described in RFC4868.

PR: 215978

MFC r314812:
Introduce the concept of IPsec security policies scope.

Currently are defined three scopes: global, ifnet, and pcb.
Generic security policies that IKE daemon can add via PF_KEY interface
or an administrator creates with setkey(8) utility have GLOBAL scope.
Such policies can be applied by the kernel to outgoing packets and checked
agains inbound packets after IPsec processing.
Security policies created by if_ipsec(4) interfaces have IFNET scope.
Such policies are applied to packets that are passed through if_ipsec(4)
interface.
And security policies created by application using setsockopt()
IP_IPSEC_POLICY option have PCB scope. Such policies are applied to
packets related to specific socket. Currently there is no way to list
PCB policies via setkey(8) utility.

Modify setkey(8) and libipsec(3) to be able distinguish the scope of
security policies in the `setkey -DP` listing. Add two optional flags:
'-t' to list only policies related to virtual *tunneling* interfaces,
i.e. policies with IFNET scope, and '-g' to list only policies with GLOBAL
scope. By default policies from all scopes are listed.

To implement this PF_KEY's sadb_x_policy structure was modified.
sadb_x_policy_reserved field is used to pass the policy scope from the
kernel to userland. SADB_SPDDUMP message extended to support filtering
by scope: sadb_msg_satype field is used to specify bit mask of requested
scopes.

For IFNET policies the sadb_x_policy_priority field of struct sadb_x_policy
is used to pass if_ipsec's interface if_index to the userland. For GLOBAL
policies sadb_x_policy_priority is used only to manage order of security
policies in the SPDB. For IFNET policies it is not used, so it can be used
to keep if_index.

After this change the output of `setkey -DP` now looks like:
# setkey -DPt
0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any
in ipsec
esp/tunnel/87.250.242.144-87.250.242.145/unique:145
spid=7 seq=3 pid=58025 scope=ifnet ifname=ipsec0
refcnt=1
# setkey -DPg
::/0 ::/0 icmp6 135,0
out none
spid=5 seq=1 pid=872 scope=global
refcnt=1

Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9805

PR: 212018
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC

Copy head@r302406 to stable/11 as part of the 11.0-RELEASE cycle.
Prune svn:mergeinfo from the new branch, as nothing has been merged
here.

Additional commits post-branch will follow.

Approved by: re (implicit)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation

Use ipsec_address() function to print IP addresses.

Constify mbuf pointer for IPSEC functions where mbuf isn't modified.

These files were getting sys/malloc.h and vm/uma.h with header pollution
via sys/mbuf.h

Make IPsec work with AES-GCM and AES-ICM (aka CTR) in OCF... IPsec
defines the keys differently than NIST does, so we have to muck with
key lengths and nonce/IVs to be standard compliant...

Remove the iv from secasvar as it was unused...

Add a counter protected by a mutex to ensure that the counter for GCM
and ICM will never be repeated.. This is a requirement for security..
I would use atomics, but we don't have a 64bit one on all platforms..

Fix a bug where IPsec was depending upon the OCF to ensure that the
blocksize was always at least 4 bytes to maintain alignment... Move
this logic into IPsec so changes to OCF won't break IPsec...

In one place, espx was always non-NULL, so don't test that it's
non-NULL before doing work..

minor style cleanups...

drop setting key and klen as they were not used...

Enforce that OCF won't pass invalid key lengths to AES that would
panic the machine...

This was has been tested by others too... I tested this against
NetBSD 6.1.5 using mini-test suite in
https://github.com/jmgurney/ipseccfgs and the only things that don't
pass are keyed md5 and sha1, and 3des-deriv (setkey syntax error),
all other modes listed in setkey's man page... The nice thing is
that NetBSD uses setkey, so same config files were used on both...

Reviewed by: gnn

Rename ip4_def_policy variable to def_policy. It is used by both IPv4 and
IPv6. Initialize it only once in def_policy_init(). Remove its
initialization from key_init() and make it static.

Remove several fields from struct secpolicy:
* lock - it isn't so useful having mutex in the structure, but the only
thing we do with it is initialization and destroying.
* state - it has only two values - DEAD and ALIVE. Instead of take a lock
and change the state to DEAD, then take lock again in GC function and
delete policy from the chain - keep in the chain only ALIVE policies.
* scangen - it was used in GC function to protect from sending several
SADB_SPDEXPIRE messages for one SPD entry. Now we don't keep DEAD entries
in the chain and there is no need to have scangen variable.

Use TAILQ to implement SPD entries chain. Use rmlock to protect access
to SPD entries chain. Protect all SP lookup with RLOCK, and use WLOCK
when we are inserting (or removing) SP entry in the chain.

Instead of using pattern "LOCK(); refcnt++; UNLOCK();", use refcount(9)
API to implement refcounting in SPD. Merge code from key_delsp() and
_key_delsp() into _key_freesp(). And use KEY_FREESP() macro in all cases
when we want to release reference or just delete SP entry.

Obtained from: Yandex LLC
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC

Remove __P() macro.

Suggested by: kevlo
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC

ANSIfy function declarations.

Sponsored by: Yandex LLC

Remove route chaching support from ipsec code. It isn't used for some time.
* remove sa_route_union declaration and route_cache member from struct secashead;
* remove key_sa_routechange() call from ICMP and ICMPv6 code;
* simplify ip_ipsec_mtu();
* remove #include <net/route.h>;

Sponsored by: Yandex LLC

Fix style bug: rename the refcount field of m_ext to ext_cnt, to match
other members.

Sponsored by: Nginx, Inc.

Build on Jeff Roberson's linker-set based dynamic per-CPU allocator
(DPCPU), as suggested by Peter Wemm, and implement a new per-virtual
network stack memory allocator. Modify vnet to use the allocator
instead of monolithic global container structures (vinet, ...). This
change solves many binary compatibility problems associated with
VIMAGE, and restores ELF symbols for virtualized global variables.

Each virtualized global variable exists as a "reference copy", and also
once per virtual network stack. Virtualized global variables are
tagged at compile-time, placing the in a special linker set, which is
loaded into a contiguous region of kernel memory. Virtualized global
variables in the base kernel are linked as normal, but those in modules
are copied and relocated to a reserved portion of the kernel's vnet
region with the help of a the kernel linker.

Virtualized global variables exist in per-vnet memory set up when the
network stack instance is created, and are initialized statically from
the reference copy. Run-time access occurs via an accessor macro, which
converts from the current vnet and requested symbol to a per-vnet
address. When "options VIMAGE" is not compiled into the kernel, normal
global ELF symbols will be used instead and indirection is avoided.

This change restores static initialization for network stack global
variables, restores support for non-global symbols and types, eliminates
the need for many subsystem constructors, eliminates large per-subsystem
structures that caused many binary compatibility issues both for
monitoring applications (netstat) and kernel modules, removes the
per-function INIT_VNET_*() macros throughout the stack, eliminates the
need for vnet_symmap ksym(2) munging, and eliminates duplicate
definitions of virtualized globals under VIMAGE_GLOBALS.

Bump __FreeBSD_version and update UPDATING.

Portions submitted by: bz
Reviewed by: bz, zec
Discussed with: gnn, jamie, jeff, jhb, julian, sam
Suggested by: peter
Approved by: re (kensmith)

Shuffle the vimage.h includes or add where missing.

Fix bugs when allocating and passing information of current lifetime and
soft lifetime [1] introduced in rev. 1.21 of key.c.

Along with that, fix a related problem in key_debug
printing the correct data.
While there replace a printf by panic in a sanity check.

PR: 120751
Submitted by: Kazuaki ODA (kazuaki aliceblue.jp) [1]
MFC after: 5 days

Commit IPv6 support for FAST_IPSEC to the tree.
This commit includes only the kernel files, the rest of the files
will follow in a second commit.

Reviewed by: bz
Approved by: re
Supported by: Secure Computing

Fix -Wundef warnings found when compiling i386 LINT, GENERIC and
custom kernels.

/* -> /*- for license, minor formatting changes

MFp4: portability work, general cleanup, locking fixes

change 38496
o add ipsec_osdep.h that holds os-specific definitions for portability
o s/KASSERT/IPSEC_ASSERT/ for portability
o s/SPLASSERT/IPSEC_SPLASSERT/ for portability
o remove function names from ASSERT strings since line#+file pinpints
the location
o use __func__ uniformly to reduce string storage
o convert some random #ifdef DIAGNOSTIC code to assertions
o remove some debuggging assertions no longer needed

change 38498
o replace numerous bogus panic's with equally bogus assertions
that at least go away on a production system

change 38502 + 38530
o change explicit mtx operations to #defines to simplify
future changes to a different lock type

change 38531
o hookup ipv4 ctlinput paths to a noop routine; we should be
handling path mtu changes at least
o correct potential null pointer deref in ipsec4_common_input_cb

chnage 38685
o fix locking for bundled SA's and for when key exchange is required

change 38770
o eliminate recursion on the SAHTREE lock

change 38804
o cleanup some types: long -> time_t
o remove refrence to dead #define

change 38805
o correct some types: long -> time_t
o add scan generation # to secpolicy to deal with locking issues

change 38806
o use LIST_FOREACH_SAFE instead of handrolled code
o change key_flush_spd to drop the sptree lock before purging
an entry to avoid lock recursion and to avoid holding the lock
over a long-running operation
o misc cleanups of tangled and twisty code

There is still much to do here but for now things look to be
working again.

Supported by: FreeBSD Foundation

"Fast IPsec": this is an experimental IPsec implementation that is derived
from the KAME IPsec implementation, but with heavy borrowing and influence
of openbsd. A key feature of this implementation is that it uses the kernel
crypto framework to do all crypto work so when h/w crypto support is present
IPsec operation is automatically accelerated. Otherwise the protocol
implementations are rather differet while the SADB and policy management
code is very similar to KAME (for the moment).

Note that this implementation is enabled with a FAST_IPSEC option. With this
you get all protocols; i.e. there is no FAST_IPSEC_ESP option.

FAST_IPSEC and IPSEC are mutually exclusive; you cannot build both into a
single system.

This software is well tested with IPv4 but should be considered very
experimental (i.e. do not deploy in production environments). This software
does NOT currently support IPv6. In fact do not configure FAST_IPSEC and
INET6 in the same system.

Obtained from: KAME + openbsd
Supported by: Vernier Networks