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285830 |
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23-Jul-2015 |
gjb |
- Copy stable/10@285827 to releng/10.2 in preparation for 10.2-RC1 builds. - Update newvers.sh to reflect RC1. - Update __FreeBSD_version to reflect 10.2. - Update default pkg(8) configuration to use the quarterly branch.[1]
Discussed with: re, portmgr [1] Approved by: re (implicit) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation |
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256281 |
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10-Oct-2013 |
gjb |
Copy head (r256279) to stable/10 as part of the 10.0-RELEASE cycle.
Approved by: re (implicit) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
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132232 |
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16-Jul-2004 |
rwatson |
Rename Biba and MLS _single label elements to _effective, which more accurately represents the intention of the 'single' label element in Biba and MLS labels. It also approximates the use of 'effective' in traditional UNIX credentials, and avoids confusion with 'singlelabel' in the context of file systems.
Inspired by: trhodes
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126097 |
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22-Feb-2004 |
rwatson |
Update my personal copyrights and NETA copyrights in the kernel to use the "year1-year3" format, as opposed to "year1, year2, year3". This seems to make lawyers more happy, but also prevents the lines from getting excessively long as the years start to add up.
Suggested by: imp
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106393 |
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04-Nov-2002 |
rwatson |
License and wording updates: NAI has authorized the removal of clause three from their BSD-style license. Also, s/NAI Labs/Network Associates Laboratories/.
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106094 |
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28-Oct-2002 |
rwatson |
Correct a typo in a previously commented include entry that was made visible in the recent commit.
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106093 |
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28-Oct-2002 |
rwatson |
Remove all reference to 'struct oldmac', since it's no longer required with the new VFS/EA semantics in the MAC framework. Move the per-policy structures out to per-policy include files, removing all policy-specific defines and structures out of the base framework includes and implementation, making mac_biba and mac_mls entirely self-contained.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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105696 |
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22-Oct-2002 |
rwatson |
Adapt MAC policies for the new user API changes; teach policies how to parse their own label elements (some cleanup to occur here in the future to use the newly added kernel strsep()). Policies now entirely encapsulate their notion of label in the policy module.
Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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105643 |
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21-Oct-2002 |
rwatson |
Add compartment support to Biba and MLS policies. The logic of the policies remains the same: subjects and objects are labeled for integrity or sensitivity, and a dominance operator determines whether or not subject/object accesses are permitted to limit inappropriate information flow. Compartments are a non-hierarchal component to the label, so add a bitfield to the label element for each, and a set check as part of the dominance operator. This permits the implementation of "need to know" elements of MLS.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
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101099 |
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31-Jul-2002 |
rwatson |
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
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