#
281480 |
|
12-Apr-2015 |
eadler |
MFC r281383:
iwn, wlan: fix typos Fxi tow typos
|
#
264948 |
|
25-Apr-2014 |
marius |
MFC: r260086
- Probe with BUS_PROBE_DEFAULT instead of 0. - Remove clearing PCIM_CMD_INTxDIS; pci(4) will do that as appropriate since r189367.
|
#
264945 |
|
25-Apr-2014 |
marius |
MFC: r260053
- There's no need to keep track of resource IDs. - Simplify MSI allocation and release. For a single one, we don't need to fiddle with the MSI count and pci_release_msi(9) is smart enough to just do nothing in case of INTx. - Don't allocate MSI as RF_SHAREABLE. - Use DEVMETHOD_END. - Use NULL instead of 0 for pointers.
|
#
262007 |
|
16-Feb-2014 |
kevlo |
MFC r260444:
Rename definition of IEEE80211_FC1_WEP to IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED.
The origin of WEP comes from IEEE Std 802.11-1997 where it defines whether the frame body of MAC frame has been encrypted using WEP algorithm or not. IEEE Std. 802.11-2007 changes WEP to Protected Frame, indicates whether the frame is protected by a cryptographic encapsulation algorithm.
Reviewed by: adrian, rpaulo
|
#
281480 |
|
12-Apr-2015 |
eadler |
MFC r281383:
iwn, wlan: fix typos Fxi tow typos
|
#
264948 |
|
25-Apr-2014 |
marius |
MFC: r260086
- Probe with BUS_PROBE_DEFAULT instead of 0. - Remove clearing PCIM_CMD_INTxDIS; pci(4) will do that as appropriate since r189367.
|
#
264945 |
|
25-Apr-2014 |
marius |
MFC: r260053
- There's no need to keep track of resource IDs. - Simplify MSI allocation and release. For a single one, we don't need to fiddle with the MSI count and pci_release_msi(9) is smart enough to just do nothing in case of INTx. - Don't allocate MSI as RF_SHAREABLE. - Use DEVMETHOD_END. - Use NULL instead of 0 for pointers.
|
#
262007 |
|
16-Feb-2014 |
kevlo |
MFC r260444:
Rename definition of IEEE80211_FC1_WEP to IEEE80211_FC1_PROTECTED.
The origin of WEP comes from IEEE Std 802.11-1997 where it defines whether the frame body of MAC frame has been encrypted using WEP algorithm or not. IEEE Std. 802.11-2007 changes WEP to Protected Frame, indicates whether the frame is protected by a cryptographic encapsulation algorithm.
Reviewed by: adrian, rpaulo
|