t1_enc.c revision 1.87
1/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.87 2016/11/06 17:21:04 jsing Exp $ */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113 * 114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116 * license. 117 * 118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121 * 122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125 * 126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129 * to make use of the Contribution. 130 * 131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135 * OTHERWISE. 136 */ 137 138#include <stdio.h> 139 140#include "ssl_locl.h" 141 142#include <openssl/evp.h> 143#include <openssl/hmac.h> 144#include <openssl/md5.h> 145 146void 147tls1_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s) 148{ 149 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block != NULL) { 150 explicit_bzero(s->s3->tmp.key_block, 151 s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); 152 free(s->s3->tmp.key_block); 153 s->s3->tmp.key_block = NULL; 154 } 155 s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = 0; 156} 157 158int 159tls1_init_finished_mac(SSL *s) 160{ 161 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 162 tls1_free_digest_list(s); 163 164 s->s3->handshake_buffer = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); 165 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer == NULL) 166 return (0); 167 168 (void)BIO_set_close(s->s3->handshake_buffer, BIO_CLOSE); 169 170 return (1); 171} 172 173void 174tls1_free_digest_list(SSL *s) 175{ 176 int i; 177 178 if (s == NULL) 179 return; 180 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) 181 return; 182 183 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 184 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) 185 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]); 186 } 187 free(s->s3->handshake_dgst); 188 s->s3->handshake_dgst = NULL; 189} 190 191int 192tls1_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, int len) 193{ 194 int i; 195 196 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && 197 !(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 198 BIO_write(s->s3->handshake_buffer, (void *)buf, len); 199 return 1; 200 } 201 202 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 203 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) 204 continue; 205 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], buf, len)) { 206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 207 return 0; 208 } 209 } 210 211 return 1; 212} 213 214int 215tls1_digest_cached_records(SSL *s) 216{ 217 const EVP_MD *md; 218 long hdatalen, mask; 219 void *hdata; 220 int i; 221 222 tls1_free_digest_list(s); 223 224 s->s3->handshake_dgst = calloc(SSL_MAX_DIGEST, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX *)); 225 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst == NULL) { 226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 227 goto err; 228 } 229 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 230 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, 232 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); 233 goto err; 234 } 235 236 /* Loop through bits of the algorithm2 field and create MD contexts. */ 237 for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++) { 238 if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0 || md == NULL) 239 continue; 240 241 s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); 242 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) { 243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, 244 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 245 goto err; 246 } 247 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], md, NULL)) { 248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 249 goto err; 250 } 251 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i], hdata, 252 hdatalen)) { 253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DIGEST_CACHED_RECORDS, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 254 goto err; 255 } 256 } 257 258 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE)) { 259 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 260 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 261 } 262 263 return 1; 264 265 err: 266 tls1_free_digest_list(s); 267 return 0; 268} 269 270void 271tls1_record_sequence_increment(unsigned char *seq) 272{ 273 int i; 274 275 for (i = SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE - 1; i >= 0; i--) { 276 if (++seq[i] != 0) 277 break; 278 } 279} 280 281/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 282static int 283tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, int sec_len, 284 const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len, 285 const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, int seed4_len, 286 const void *seed5, int seed5_len, unsigned char *out, int olen) 287{ 288 int chunk; 289 size_t j; 290 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp; 291 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 292 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 293 size_t A1_len; 294 int ret = 0; 295 296 chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 297 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 298 299 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 300 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); 301 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); 302 if (!mac_key) 303 goto err; 304 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 305 goto err; 306 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 307 goto err; 308 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 309 goto err; 310 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 311 goto err; 312 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 313 goto err; 314 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 315 goto err; 316 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 317 goto err; 318 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 319 goto err; 320 321 for (;;) { 322 /* Reinit mac contexts */ 323 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 324 goto err; 325 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 326 goto err; 327 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 328 goto err; 329 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len)) 330 goto err; 331 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 332 goto err; 333 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 334 goto err; 335 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 336 goto err; 337 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 338 goto err; 339 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 340 goto err; 341 342 if (olen > chunk) { 343 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j)) 344 goto err; 345 out += j; 346 olen -= j; 347 /* calc the next A1 value */ 348 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) 349 goto err; 350 } else { 351 /* last one */ 352 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 353 goto err; 354 memcpy(out, A1, olen); 355 break; 356 } 357 } 358 ret = 1; 359 360err: 361 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 362 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 363 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); 364 explicit_bzero(A1, sizeof(A1)); 365 return ret; 366} 367 368/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 369static int 370tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, 371 int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, 372 int seed4_len, const void *seed5, int seed5_len, const unsigned char *sec, 373 int slen, unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen) 374{ 375 int len, i, idx, count; 376 const unsigned char *S1; 377 long m; 378 const EVP_MD *md; 379 int ret = 0; 380 381 /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ 382 count = 0; 383 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 384 if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) 385 count++; 386 } 387 if (count == 0) { 388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, 389 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 390 goto err; 391 } 392 len = slen / count; 393 if (count == 1) 394 slen = 0; 395 S1 = sec; 396 memset(out1, 0, olen); 397 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 398 if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { 399 if (!md) { 400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, 401 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); 402 goto err; 403 } 404 if (!tls1_P_hash(md , S1, len + (slen&1), seed1, 405 seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, 406 seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len, out2, olen)) 407 goto err; 408 S1 += len; 409 for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) { 410 out1[i] ^= out2[i]; 411 } 412 } 413 } 414 ret = 1; 415 416err: 417 return ret; 418} 419 420static int 421tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, unsigned char *tmp, int num) 422{ 423 int ret; 424 425 ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 426 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 427 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 428 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 429 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 430 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 431 km, tmp, num); 432 return ret; 433} 434 435/* 436 * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success 437 * and 0 on failure. 438 */ 439static int 440tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) 441{ 442 if (*aead_ctx != NULL) { 443 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); 444 return (1); 445 } 446 447 *aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); 448 if (*aead_ctx == NULL) { 449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_AEAD_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 450 return (0); 451 } 452 453 return (1); 454} 455 456static int 457tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key, 458 unsigned key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len) 459{ 460 const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead; 461 SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; 462 463 if (is_read) { 464 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx)) 465 return 0; 466 aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx; 467 } else { 468 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx)) 469 return 0; 470 aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx; 471 } 472 473 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, 474 EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL)) 475 return (0); 476 if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) { 477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, 478 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 479 return (0); 480 } 481 memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); 482 aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; 483 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */ 484 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record = 485 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & 486 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0; 487 aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce = 488 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305; 489 aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); 490 491 if (aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce) { 492 if (aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) || 493 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len > EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, 495 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 496 return (0); 497 } 498 } else { 499 if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != 500 EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, 502 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 503 return (0); 504 } 505 } 506 507 return (1); 508} 509 510/* 511 * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher 512 * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function 513 * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec 514 * message. In order to support export ciphersuites, use_client_keys indicates 515 * whether the key material provided is in the "client write" direction. 516 */ 517static int 518tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, char use_client_keys, 519 const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size, 520 const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, 521 unsigned int iv_len) 522{ 523 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; 524 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 525 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 526 const EVP_MD *mac; 527 int mac_type; 528 529 cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; 530 mac = s->s3->tmp.new_hash; 531 mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 532 533 if (is_read) { 534 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 535 s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 536 else 537 s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 538 539 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx); 540 s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; 541 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->read_hash); 542 s->read_hash = NULL; 543 544 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 545 goto err; 546 s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx; 547 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 548 goto err; 549 s->read_hash = mac_ctx; 550 } else { 551 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 552 s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 553 else 554 s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 555 556 /* 557 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher 558 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order 559 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write 560 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed 561 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment. 562 */ 563 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 564 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); 565 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; 566 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->write_hash); 567 s->write_hash = NULL; 568 } 569 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 570 goto err; 571 s->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx; 572 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 573 goto err; 574 s->write_hash = mac_ctx; 575 } 576 577 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 578 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL, 579 !is_read); 580 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, 581 iv_len, (unsigned char *)iv); 582 } else 583 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read); 584 585 if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { 586 EVP_PKEY *mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, 587 mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 588 if (mac_key == NULL) 589 goto err; 590 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key); 591 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 592 } else if (mac_secret_size > 0) { 593 /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ 594 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, 595 mac_secret_size, (unsigned char *)mac_secret); 596 } 597 598 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) { 599 int nid; 600 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) 601 nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; 602 else 603 nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z; 604 605 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 606 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC) 607 EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 608 } 609 610 return (1); 611 612err: 613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 614 return (0); 615} 616 617int 618tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 619{ 620 const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret; 621 const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key; 622 const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv; 623 const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv; 624 int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len; 625 unsigned char *key_block, *seq; 626 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 627 const EVP_AEAD *aead; 628 char is_read, use_client_keys; 629 630 631 cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; 632 aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead; 633 634 /* 635 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message, 636 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have 637 * just written one. 638 */ 639 is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; 640 641 /* 642 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client 643 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a 644 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. 645 */ 646 use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 647 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)); 648 649 650 /* 651 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in 652 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(). 653 */ 654 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 655 seq = is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence; 656 memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 657 } 658 659 if (aead != NULL) { 660 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 661 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); 662 } else { 663 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 664 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 665 666 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 667 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 668 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 669 } 670 671 mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 672 673 key_block = s->s3->tmp.key_block; 674 client_write_mac_secret = key_block; 675 key_block += mac_secret_size; 676 server_write_mac_secret = key_block; 677 key_block += mac_secret_size; 678 client_write_key = key_block; 679 key_block += key_len; 680 server_write_key = key_block; 681 key_block += key_len; 682 client_write_iv = key_block; 683 key_block += iv_len; 684 server_write_iv = key_block; 685 key_block += iv_len; 686 687 if (use_client_keys) { 688 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; 689 key = client_write_key; 690 iv = client_write_iv; 691 } else { 692 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; 693 key = server_write_key; 694 iv = server_write_iv; 695 } 696 697 if (key_block - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) { 698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 699 goto err2; 700 } 701 702 if (is_read) { 703 memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 704 s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 705 } else { 706 memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 707 s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 708 } 709 710 if (aead != NULL) { 711 return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, 712 iv, iv_len); 713 } 714 715 return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys, 716 mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len); 717 718err2: 719 return (0); 720} 721 722int 723tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 724{ 725 unsigned char *key_block, *tmp_block = NULL; 726 int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 727 int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len; 728 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; 729 const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; 730 const EVP_MD *mac = NULL; 731 int ret = 0; 732 733 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) 734 return (1); 735 736 if (s->session->cipher && 737 (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD)) { 738 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) { 739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, 740 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 741 return (0); 742 } 743 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 744 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); 745 } else { 746 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type, 747 &mac_secret_size)) { 748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, 749 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 750 return (0); 751 } 752 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 753 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 754 755 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 756 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 757 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 758 } 759 760 s->s3->tmp.new_aead = aead; 761 s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher; 762 s->s3->tmp.new_hash = mac; 763 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 764 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 765 766 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); 767 768 if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len, 769 2)) == NULL) { 770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 771 goto err; 772 } 773 key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2; 774 775 s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = key_block_len; 776 s->s3->tmp.key_block = key_block; 777 778 if ((tmp_block = malloc(key_block_len)) == NULL) { 779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 780 goto err; 781 } 782 783 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, tmp_block, key_block_len)) 784 goto err; 785 786 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && 787 s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 788 /* 789 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 790 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 791 */ 792 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; 793 794 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 795 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 796 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 797 798#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 799 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 800 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 801#endif 802 } 803 } 804 805 ret = 1; 806 807err: 808 if (tmp_block) { 809 explicit_bzero(tmp_block, key_block_len); 810 free(tmp_block); 811 } 812 return (ret); 813} 814 815/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 816 * 817 * Returns: 818 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 819 * short etc). 820 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 821 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 822 * an internal error occured. 823 */ 824int 825tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 826{ 827 const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; 828 const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 829 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 830 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 831 unsigned char *seq; 832 unsigned long l; 833 int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; 834 835 if (send) { 836 aead = s->aead_write_ctx; 837 rec = &s->s3->wrec; 838 seq = s->s3->write_sequence; 839 } else { 840 aead = s->aead_read_ctx; 841 rec = &s->s3->rrec; 842 seq = s->s3->read_sequence; 843 } 844 845 if (aead) { 846 unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16]; 847 size_t out_len, pad_len = 0; 848 unsigned int nonce_used; 849 850 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 851 dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq, 852 send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch); 853 } else { 854 memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 855 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 856 } 857 858 ad[8] = rec->type; 859 ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 860 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 861 862 if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8 || 863 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 864 return -1; 865 866 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 867 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || 868 aead->variable_nonce_len > aead->fixed_nonce_len) 869 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 870 pad_len = aead->fixed_nonce_len - aead->variable_nonce_len; 871 } else { 872 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + 873 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) 874 return -1; /* Should never happen. */ 875 } 876 877 if (send) { 878 size_t len = rec->length; 879 size_t eivlen = 0; 880 in = rec->input; 881 out = rec->data; 882 883 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 884 /* 885 * The sequence number is left zero 886 * padded, then xored with the fixed 887 * nonce. 888 */ 889 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 890 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 891 aead->variable_nonce_len); 892 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 893 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 894 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 895 } else { 896 /* 897 * When sending we use the sequence number as 898 * the variable part of the nonce. 899 */ 900 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 901 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 902 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 903 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, 904 aead->variable_nonce_len); 905 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 906 } 907 908 /* 909 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by 910 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the 911 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number 912 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the 913 * plaintext. 914 */ 915 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 916 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); 917 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 918 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; 919 } 920 921 ad[11] = len >> 8; 922 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 923 924 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, 925 out + eivlen, &out_len, len + aead->tag_len, nonce, 926 nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad))) 927 return -1; 928 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) 929 out_len += aead->variable_nonce_len; 930 } else { 931 /* receive */ 932 size_t len = rec->length; 933 934 if (rec->data != rec->input) 935 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 936 out = in = rec->input; 937 938 if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) 939 return 0; 940 941 if (aead->xor_fixed_nonce) { 942 /* 943 * The sequence number is left zero 944 * padded, then xored with the fixed 945 * nonce. 946 */ 947 memset(nonce, 0, pad_len); 948 memcpy(nonce + pad_len, ad, 949 aead->variable_nonce_len); 950 for (i = 0; i < aead->fixed_nonce_len; i++) 951 nonce[i] ^= aead->fixed_nonce[i]; 952 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 953 } else { 954 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, 955 aead->fixed_nonce_len); 956 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 957 958 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, 959 aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad, 960 aead->variable_nonce_len); 961 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 962 } 963 964 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 965 in += aead->variable_nonce_len; 966 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 967 out += aead->variable_nonce_len; 968 } 969 970 if (len < aead->tag_len) 971 return 0; 972 len -= aead->tag_len; 973 974 ad[11] = len >> 8; 975 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 976 977 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &out_len, len, 978 nonce, nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, 979 sizeof(ad))) 980 return -1; 981 982 rec->data = rec->input = out; 983 } 984 985 rec->length = out_len; 986 987 return 1; 988 } 989 990 if (send) { 991 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { 992 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 993 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 994 } 995 ds = s->enc_write_ctx; 996 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 997 enc = NULL; 998 else { 999 int ivlen = 0; 1000 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); 1001 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 1002 EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 1003 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 1004 if (ivlen > 1) { 1005 if (rec->data != rec->input) { 1006#ifdef DEBUG 1007 /* we can't write into the input stream: 1008 * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 1009 */ 1010 fprintf(stderr, 1011 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 1012 __FILE__, __LINE__); 1013#endif 1014 } else 1015 arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen); 1016 } 1017 } 1018 } else { 1019 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 1020 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 1021 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 1022 } 1023 ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 1024 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 1025 enc = NULL; 1026 else 1027 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 1028 } 1029 1030 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 1031 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 1032 rec->input = rec->data; 1033 ret = 1; 1034 } else { 1035 l = rec->length; 1036 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 1037 1038 if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { 1039 unsigned char buf[13]; 1040 1041 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1042 dtls1_build_sequence_number(buf, seq, 1043 send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch); 1044 } else { 1045 memcpy(buf, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 1046 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1047 } 1048 1049 buf[8] = rec->type; 1050 buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 1051 buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 1052 buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; 1053 buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; 1054 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf); 1055 if (send) { 1056 l += pad; 1057 rec->length += pad; 1058 } 1059 } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { 1060 i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 1061 1062 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 1063 1064 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 1065 j = i - 1; 1066 for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 1067 rec->input[k] = j; 1068 l += i; 1069 rec->length += i; 1070 } 1071 1072 if (!send) { 1073 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 1074 return 0; 1075 } 1076 1077 i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 1078 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & 1079 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) 1080 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 1081 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) { 1082 rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1083 rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1084 rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 1085 } 1086 1087 ret = 1; 1088 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 1089 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 1090 if ((bs != 1) && !send) 1091 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 1092 if (pad && !send) 1093 rec->length -= pad; 1094 } 1095 return ret; 1096} 1097 1098int 1099tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) 1100{ 1101 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL; 1102 unsigned int ret; 1103 int i; 1104 1105 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 1106 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) 1107 return 0; 1108 1109 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 1110 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] && 1111 EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) { 1112 d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; 1113 break; 1114 } 1115 } 1116 if (d == NULL) { 1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); 1118 return 0; 1119 } 1120 1121 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 1122 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d)) 1123 return 0; 1124 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret); 1125 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1126 1127 return ((int)ret); 1128} 1129 1130int 1131tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) 1132{ 1133 unsigned int i; 1134 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 1135 unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 1136 unsigned char *q, buf2[12]; 1137 int idx; 1138 long mask; 1139 int err = 0; 1140 const EVP_MD *md; 1141 1142 q = buf; 1143 1144 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 1145 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) 1146 return 0; 1147 1148 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 1149 1150 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) { 1151 if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & mask) { 1152 int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); 1153 EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]; 1154 if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || 1155 hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) { 1156 /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */ 1157 err = 1; 1158 } else { 1159 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) || 1160 !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) || 1161 (i != (unsigned int)hashsize)) 1162 err = 1; 1163 q += hashsize; 1164 } 1165 } 1166 } 1167 1168 if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), 1169 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 1170 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1171 out, buf2, sizeof buf2)) 1172 err = 1; 1173 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1174 1175 if (err) 1176 return 0; 1177 else 1178 return sizeof buf2; 1179} 1180 1181int 1182tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 1183{ 1184 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 1185 unsigned char *seq; 1186 EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 1187 size_t md_size, orig_len; 1188 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 1189 unsigned char header[13]; 1190 int stream_mac = (send ? 1191 (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : 1192 (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 1193 int t; 1194 1195 if (send) { 1196 rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec); 1197 seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); 1198 hash = ssl->write_hash; 1199 } else { 1200 rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec); 1201 seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); 1202 hash = ssl->read_hash; 1203 } 1204 1205 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 1206 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 1207 md_size = t; 1208 1209 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 1210 if (stream_mac) { 1211 mac_ctx = hash; 1212 } else { 1213 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 1214 return -1; 1215 mac_ctx = &hmac; 1216 } 1217 1218 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1219 dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq, 1220 send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch); 1221 else 1222 memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 1223 1224 /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ 1225 orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); 1226 rec->type &= 0xff; 1227 1228 header[8] = rec->type; 1229 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 1230 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 1231 header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 1232 header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 1233 1234 if (!send && 1235 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 1236 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 1237 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 1238 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of 1239 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a 1240 * timing-oracle. */ 1241 if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 1242 md, &md_size, header, rec->input, 1243 rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 1244 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, 1245 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size)) 1246 return -1; 1247 } else { 1248 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1249 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1250 t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1251 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1252 } 1253 1254 if (!stream_mac) 1255 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 1256 1257 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1258 tls1_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1259 1260 return (md_size); 1261} 1262 1263int 1264tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1265 int len) 1266{ 1267 unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1268 1269 tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1270 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1271 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1272 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1273 p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); 1274 1275 return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); 1276} 1277 1278int 1279tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1280 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1281 size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1282{ 1283 unsigned char *buff; 1284 unsigned char *val = NULL; 1285 size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1286 int rv; 1287 1288 buff = malloc(olen); 1289 if (buff == NULL) 1290 goto err2; 1291 1292 /* construct PRF arguments 1293 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1294 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1295 * does not create a prohibited label. 1296 */ 1297 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1298 if (use_context) { 1299 vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1300 } 1301 1302 val = malloc(vallen); 1303 if (val == NULL) 1304 goto err2; 1305 currentvalpos = 0; 1306 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1307 currentvalpos += llen; 1308 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1309 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1310 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1311 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1312 1313 if (use_context) { 1314 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1315 currentvalpos++; 1316 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1317 currentvalpos++; 1318 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1319 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1320 } 1321 } 1322 1323 /* disallow prohibited labels 1324 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1325 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1326 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1327 */ 1328 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1329 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1330 goto err1; 1331 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1332 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1333 goto err1; 1334 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1335 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1336 goto err1; 1337 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1338 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1339 goto err1; 1340 1341 rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1342 val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 1343 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1344 out, buff, olen); 1345 1346 goto ret; 1347err1: 1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, 1349 SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1350 rv = 0; 1351 goto ret; 1352err2: 1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1354 rv = 0; 1355ret: 1356 free(buff); 1357 free(val); 1358 1359 return (rv); 1360} 1361 1362int 1363tls1_alert_code(int code) 1364{ 1365 switch (code) { 1366 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1367 return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1368 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1369 return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1370 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1371 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1372 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1373 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1374 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1375 return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1376 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1377 return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1378 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1379 return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1380 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1381 return (-1); 1382 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1383 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1384 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1385 return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1386 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1387 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1388 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1389 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1390 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1391 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1392 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1393 return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1394 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1395 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1396 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1397 return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1398 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1399 return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1400 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1401 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1402 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1403 return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1404 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1405 return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1406 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1407 return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1408 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1409 return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1410 case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1411 return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1412 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1413 return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1414 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1415 return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1416 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1417 return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1418 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1419 return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1420 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1421 return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1422 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1423 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1424 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1425 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1426 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1427 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1428 default: 1429 return (-1); 1430 } 1431} 1432