t1_enc.c revision 1.79
1/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.79 2015/07/17 07:04:41 doug Exp $ */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 113 * 114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 116 * license. 117 * 118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 121 * 122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 125 * 126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 129 * to make use of the Contribution. 130 * 131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 135 * OTHERWISE. 136 */ 137 138#include <stdio.h> 139 140#include "ssl_locl.h" 141 142#include <openssl/evp.h> 143#include <openssl/hmac.h> 144#include <openssl/md5.h> 145 146/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 147static int 148tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, int sec_len, 149 const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, int seed2_len, 150 const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, int seed4_len, 151 const void *seed5, int seed5_len, unsigned char *out, int olen) 152{ 153 int chunk; 154 size_t j; 155 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp; 156 EVP_PKEY *mac_key; 157 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 158 size_t A1_len; 159 int ret = 0; 160 161 chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); 162 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); 163 164 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 165 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); 166 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); 167 if (!mac_key) 168 goto err; 169 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 170 goto err; 171 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 172 goto err; 173 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 174 goto err; 175 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 176 goto err; 177 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 178 goto err; 179 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 180 goto err; 181 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 182 goto err; 183 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 184 goto err; 185 186 for (;;) { 187 /* Reinit mac contexts */ 188 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 189 goto err; 190 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) 191 goto err; 192 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) 193 goto err; 194 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len)) 195 goto err; 196 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) 197 goto err; 198 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) 199 goto err; 200 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) 201 goto err; 202 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) 203 goto err; 204 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) 205 goto err; 206 207 if (olen > chunk) { 208 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j)) 209 goto err; 210 out += j; 211 olen -= j; 212 /* calc the next A1 value */ 213 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) 214 goto err; 215 } else { 216 /* last one */ 217 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) 218 goto err; 219 memcpy(out, A1, olen); 220 break; 221 } 222 } 223 ret = 1; 224 225err: 226 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 227 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 228 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); 229 OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1)); 230 return ret; 231} 232 233/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ 234static int 235tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, const void *seed1, int seed1_len, const void *seed2, 236 int seed2_len, const void *seed3, int seed3_len, const void *seed4, 237 int seed4_len, const void *seed5, int seed5_len, const unsigned char *sec, 238 int slen, unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen) 239{ 240 int len, i, idx, count; 241 const unsigned char *S1; 242 long m; 243 const EVP_MD *md; 244 int ret = 0; 245 246 /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ 247 count = 0; 248 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 249 if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) 250 count++; 251 } 252 if (count == 0) { 253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, 254 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 255 goto err; 256 } 257 len = slen / count; 258 if (count == 1) 259 slen = 0; 260 S1 = sec; 261 memset(out1, 0, olen); 262 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { 263 if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { 264 if (!md) { 265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, 266 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); 267 goto err; 268 } 269 if (!tls1_P_hash(md , S1, len + (slen&1), seed1, 270 seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, seed3_len, 271 seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len, out2, olen)) 272 goto err; 273 S1 += len; 274 for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) { 275 out1[i] ^= out2[i]; 276 } 277 } 278 } 279 ret = 1; 280 281err: 282 return ret; 283} 284 285static int 286tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, unsigned char *tmp, int num) 287{ 288 int ret; 289 290 ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 291 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, 292 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 293 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 294 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 295 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 296 km, tmp, num); 297 return ret; 298} 299 300/* 301 * tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates aead_ctx, if needed. It returns 1 on success 302 * and 0 on failure. 303 */ 304static int 305tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) 306{ 307 if (*aead_ctx != NULL) { 308 EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); 309 return (1); 310 } 311 312 *aead_ctx = malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); 313 if (*aead_ctx == NULL) { 314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_AEAD_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 315 return (0); 316 } 317 318 return (1); 319} 320 321static int 322tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, const unsigned char *key, 323 unsigned key_len, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len) 324{ 325 const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead; 326 SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; 327 328 if (is_read) { 329 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx)) 330 return 0; 331 aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx; 332 } else { 333 if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx)) 334 return 0; 335 aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx; 336 } 337 338 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, 339 EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL)) 340 return (0); 341 if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) { 342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, 343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 344 return (0); 345 } 346 memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); 347 aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; 348 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* always the case, currently. */ 349 aead_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record = 350 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & 351 SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_IN_RECORD) != 0; 352 if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != 353 EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) { 354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_AEAD, 355 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 356 return (0); 357 } 358 aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); 359 360 return (1); 361} 362 363/* 364 * tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher 365 * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument is_read is true iff this function 366 * is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a ChangeCipherSpec 367 * message. In order to support export ciphersuites, use_client_keys indicates 368 * whether the key material provided is in the "client write" direction. 369 */ 370static int 371tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(SSL *s, char is_read, char use_client_keys, 372 const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned int mac_secret_size, 373 const unsigned char *key, unsigned int key_len, const unsigned char *iv, 374 unsigned int iv_len) 375{ 376 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; 377 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 378 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; 379 const EVP_MD *mac; 380 int mac_type; 381 382 cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; 383 mac = s->s3->tmp.new_hash; 384 mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; 385 386 if (is_read) { 387 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 388 s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 389 else 390 s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; 391 392 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx); 393 s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; 394 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->read_hash); 395 s->read_hash = NULL; 396 397 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 398 goto err; 399 s->enc_read_ctx = cipher_ctx; 400 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 401 goto err; 402 s->read_hash = mac_ctx; 403 } else { 404 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) 405 s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 406 else 407 s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; 408 409 /* 410 * DTLS fragments retain a pointer to the compression, cipher 411 * and hash contexts, so that it can restore state in order 412 * to perform retransmissions. As such, we cannot free write 413 * contexts that are used for DTLS - these are instead freed 414 * by DTLS when its frees a ChangeCipherSpec fragment. 415 */ 416 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); 418 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; 419 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(s->write_hash); 420 s->write_hash = NULL; 421 } 422 if ((cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) 423 goto err; 424 s->enc_write_ctx = cipher_ctx; 425 if ((mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create()) == NULL) 426 goto err; 427 s->write_hash = mac_ctx; 428 } 429 430 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 431 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL, 432 !is_read); 433 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, 434 iv_len, (unsigned char *)iv); 435 } else 436 EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, !is_read); 437 438 if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { 439 EVP_PKEY *mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, 440 mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 441 if (mac_key == NULL) 442 goto err; 443 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, mac, NULL, mac_key); 444 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); 445 } else if (mac_secret_size > 0) { 446 /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ 447 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, 448 mac_secret_size, (unsigned char *)mac_secret); 449 } 450 451 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT) { 452 int nid; 453 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) 454 nid = NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet; 455 else 456 nid = NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z; 457 458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cipher_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 459 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_GOST89MAC) 460 EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_GOST_SET_SBOX, nid, 0); 461 } 462 463 return (1); 464 465err: 466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE_CIPHER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 467 return (0); 468} 469 470int 471tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) 472{ 473 const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret; 474 const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key; 475 const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv; 476 const unsigned char *mac_secret, *key, *iv; 477 int mac_secret_size, key_len, iv_len; 478 unsigned char *key_block, *seq; 479 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; 480 const EVP_AEAD *aead; 481 char is_read, use_client_keys; 482 483 484 cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; 485 aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead; 486 487 /* 488 * is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message, 489 * that is we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have 490 * just written one. 491 */ 492 is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; 493 494 /* 495 * use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client 496 * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a 497 * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. 498 */ 499 use_client_keys = ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || 500 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)); 501 502 503 /* 504 * Reset sequence number to zero - for DTLS this is handled in 505 * dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(). 506 */ 507 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 508 seq = is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence; 509 memset(seq, 0, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 510 } 511 512 if (aead != NULL) { 513 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 514 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); 515 } else { 516 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 517 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 518 519 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 520 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 521 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 522 } 523 524 mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; 525 526 key_block = s->s3->tmp.key_block; 527 client_write_mac_secret = key_block; 528 key_block += mac_secret_size; 529 server_write_mac_secret = key_block; 530 key_block += mac_secret_size; 531 client_write_key = key_block; 532 key_block += key_len; 533 server_write_key = key_block; 534 key_block += key_len; 535 client_write_iv = key_block; 536 key_block += iv_len; 537 server_write_iv = key_block; 538 key_block += iv_len; 539 540 if (use_client_keys) { 541 mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; 542 key = client_write_key; 543 iv = client_write_iv; 544 } else { 545 mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; 546 key = server_write_key; 547 iv = server_write_iv; 548 } 549 550 if (key_block - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) { 551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 552 goto err2; 553 } 554 555 if (is_read) { 556 memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 557 s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 558 } else { 559 memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_size); 560 s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 561 } 562 563 if (aead != NULL) { 564 return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, 565 iv, iv_len); 566 } 567 568 return tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys, 569 mac_secret, mac_secret_size, key, key_len, iv, iv_len); 570 571err2: 572 return (0); 573} 574 575int 576tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) 577{ 578 unsigned char *key_block, *tmp_block = NULL; 579 int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; 580 int key_block_len, key_len, iv_len; 581 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; 582 const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; 583 const EVP_MD *mac = NULL; 584 int ret = 0; 585 586 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) 587 return (1); 588 589 if (s->session->cipher && 590 (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD)) { 591 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) { 592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, 593 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 594 return (0); 595 } 596 key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); 597 iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); 598 } else { 599 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session, &cipher, &mac, &mac_type, 600 &mac_secret_size)) { 601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, 602 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); 603 return (0); 604 } 605 key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); 606 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); 607 608 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF. */ 609 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) 610 iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; 611 } 612 613 s->s3->tmp.new_aead = aead; 614 s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = cipher; 615 s->s3->tmp.new_hash = mac; 616 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; 617 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; 618 619 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 620 621 if ((key_block = reallocarray(NULL, mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len, 622 2)) == NULL) { 623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 624 goto err; 625 } 626 key_block_len = (mac_secret_size + key_len + iv_len) * 2; 627 628 s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = key_block_len; 629 s->s3->tmp.key_block = key_block; 630 631 if ((tmp_block = malloc(key_block_len)) == NULL) { 632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 633 goto err; 634 } 635 636 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, key_block, tmp_block, key_block_len)) 637 goto err; 638 639 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) && 640 s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { 641 /* 642 * Enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with 643 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 644 */ 645 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; 646 647 if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { 648 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) 649 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 650 651#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 652 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) 653 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; 654#endif 655 } 656 } 657 658 ret = 1; 659 660err: 661 if (tmp_block) { 662 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_block, key_block_len); 663 free(tmp_block); 664 } 665 return (ret); 666} 667 668/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. 669 * 670 * Returns: 671 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too 672 * short etc). 673 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. 674 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, 675 * an internal error occured. 676 */ 677int 678tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) 679{ 680 const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; 681 const EVP_CIPHER *enc; 682 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; 683 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 684 unsigned char *seq; 685 unsigned long l; 686 int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; 687 688 if (send) { 689 aead = s->aead_write_ctx; 690 rec = &s->s3->wrec; 691 seq = s->s3->write_sequence; 692 } else { 693 aead = s->aead_read_ctx; 694 rec = &s->s3->rrec; 695 seq = s->s3->read_sequence; 696 } 697 698 if (aead) { 699 unsigned char ad[13], *in, *out, nonce[16]; 700 unsigned nonce_used; 701 ssize_t n; 702 703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 704 dtls1_build_sequence_number(ad, seq, 705 send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch); 706 } else { 707 memcpy(ad, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 708 ssl3_record_sequence_increment(seq); 709 } 710 711 ad[8] = rec->type; 712 ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 713 ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 714 715 if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + 716 aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || 717 aead->variable_nonce_len > 8) 718 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 719 720 memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, aead->fixed_nonce_len); 721 nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; 722 723 if (send) { 724 size_t len = rec->length; 725 size_t eivlen = 0; 726 in = rec->input; 727 out = rec->data; 728 729 /* 730 * When sending we use the sequence number as the 731 * variable part of the nonce. 732 */ 733 if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8) 734 return -1; 735 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, 736 aead->variable_nonce_len); 737 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 738 739 /* 740 * In do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by 741 * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the 742 * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number 743 * bytes into place without overwriting any of the 744 * plaintext. 745 */ 746 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 747 memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); 748 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 749 eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; 750 } 751 752 ad[11] = len >> 8; 753 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 754 755 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, 756 out + eivlen, &n, len + aead->tag_len, nonce, 757 nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, sizeof(ad))) 758 return -1; 759 if (n >= 0 && aead->variable_nonce_in_record) 760 n += aead->variable_nonce_len; 761 } else { 762 /* receive */ 763 size_t len = rec->length; 764 765 if (rec->data != rec->input) 766 return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ 767 out = in = rec->input; 768 769 if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) 770 return 0; 771 memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, 772 aead->variable_nonce_in_record ? in : ad, 773 aead->variable_nonce_len); 774 nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; 775 776 if (aead->variable_nonce_in_record) { 777 in += aead->variable_nonce_len; 778 len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; 779 out += aead->variable_nonce_len; 780 } 781 782 if (len < aead->tag_len) 783 return 0; 784 len -= aead->tag_len; 785 786 ad[11] = len >> 8; 787 ad[12] = len & 0xff; 788 789 if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &n, len, nonce, 790 nonce_used, in, len + aead->tag_len, ad, 791 sizeof(ad))) 792 return -1; 793 794 rec->data = rec->input = out; 795 } 796 797 if (n == -1) 798 return -1; 799 rec->length = n; 800 801 return 1; 802 } 803 804 if (send) { 805 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { 806 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 807 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 808 } 809 ds = s->enc_write_ctx; 810 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) 811 enc = NULL; 812 else { 813 int ivlen = 0; 814 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); 815 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 816 EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) 817 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); 818 if (ivlen > 1) { 819 if (rec->data != rec->input) 820 /* we can't write into the input stream: 821 * Can this ever happen?? (steve) 822 */ 823 fprintf(stderr, 824 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", 825 __FILE__, __LINE__); 826 else 827 arc4random_buf(rec->input, ivlen); 828 } 829 } 830 } else { 831 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { 832 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 833 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); 834 } 835 ds = s->enc_read_ctx; 836 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) 837 enc = NULL; 838 else 839 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); 840 } 841 842 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { 843 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); 844 rec->input = rec->data; 845 ret = 1; 846 } else { 847 l = rec->length; 848 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); 849 850 if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { 851 unsigned char buf[13]; 852 853 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 854 dtls1_build_sequence_number(buf, seq, 855 send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch); 856 } else { 857 memcpy(buf, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 858 ssl3_record_sequence_increment(seq); 859 } 860 861 buf[8] = rec->type; 862 buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 863 buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 864 buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; 865 buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; 866 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, 13, buf); 867 if (send) { 868 l += pad; 869 rec->length += pad; 870 } 871 } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { 872 i = bs - ((int)l % bs); 873 874 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ 875 876 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ 877 j = i - 1; 878 for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) 879 rec->input[k] = j; 880 l += i; 881 rec->length += i; 882 } 883 884 if (!send) { 885 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) 886 return 0; 887 } 888 889 i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); 890 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & 891 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (i < 0) : (i == 0)) 892 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ 893 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) { 894 rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 895 rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 896 rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 897 } 898 899 ret = 1; 900 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) 901 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); 902 if ((bs != 1) && !send) 903 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); 904 if (pad && !send) 905 rec->length -= pad; 906 } 907 return ret; 908} 909 910int 911tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) 912{ 913 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL; 914 unsigned int ret; 915 int i; 916 917 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 918 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 919 return 0; 920 921 for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { 922 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] && 923 EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) { 924 d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; 925 break; 926 } 927 } 928 if (d == NULL) { 929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); 930 return 0; 931 } 932 933 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 934 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d)) 935 return 0; 936 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret); 937 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 938 939 return ((int)ret); 940} 941 942int 943tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) 944{ 945 unsigned int i; 946 EVP_MD_CTX ctx; 947 unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 948 unsigned char *q, buf2[12]; 949 int idx; 950 long mask; 951 int err = 0; 952 const EVP_MD *md; 953 954 q = buf; 955 956 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) 957 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 958 return 0; 959 960 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); 961 962 for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) { 963 if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & mask) { 964 int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); 965 EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]; 966 if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 || 967 hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) { 968 /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */ 969 err = 1; 970 } else { 971 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) || 972 !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) || 973 (i != (unsigned int)hashsize)) 974 err = 1; 975 q += hashsize; 976 } 977 } 978 } 979 980 if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), 981 NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 982 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 983 out, buf2, sizeof buf2)) 984 err = 1; 985 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 986 987 if (err) 988 return 0; 989 else 990 return sizeof buf2; 991} 992 993int 994tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) 995{ 996 SSL3_RECORD *rec; 997 unsigned char *seq; 998 EVP_MD_CTX *hash; 999 size_t md_size, orig_len; 1000 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; 1001 unsigned char header[13]; 1002 int stream_mac = (send ? 1003 (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : 1004 (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); 1005 int t; 1006 1007 if (send) { 1008 rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec); 1009 seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); 1010 hash = ssl->write_hash; 1011 } else { 1012 rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec); 1013 seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); 1014 hash = ssl->read_hash; 1015 } 1016 1017 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); 1018 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); 1019 md_size = t; 1020 1021 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ 1022 if (stream_mac) { 1023 mac_ctx = hash; 1024 } else { 1025 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) 1026 return -1; 1027 mac_ctx = &hmac; 1028 } 1029 1030 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1031 dtls1_build_sequence_number(header, seq, 1032 send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch); 1033 else 1034 memcpy(header, seq, SSL3_SEQUENCE_SIZE); 1035 1036 /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ 1037 orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); 1038 rec->type &= 0xff; 1039 1040 header[8] = rec->type; 1041 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); 1042 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); 1043 header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; 1044 header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; 1045 1046 if (!send && 1047 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 1048 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { 1049 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any 1050 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of 1051 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a 1052 * timing-oracle. */ 1053 if (!ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, 1054 md, &md_size, header, rec->input, 1055 rec->length + md_size, orig_len, 1056 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, 1057 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 1058 0 /* not SSLv3 */)) 1059 return -1; 1060 } else { 1061 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); 1062 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); 1063 t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); 1064 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); 1065 } 1066 1067 if (!stream_mac) 1068 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); 1069 1070 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) 1071 ssl3_record_sequence_increment(seq); 1072 1073 return (md_size); 1074} 1075 1076int 1077tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, 1078 int len) 1079{ 1080 unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 1081 1082 tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1083 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, 1084 s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1085 s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, NULL, 0, 1086 p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); 1087 1088 return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); 1089} 1090 1091int 1092tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, 1093 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, 1094 size_t contextlen, int use_context) 1095{ 1096 unsigned char *buff; 1097 unsigned char *val = NULL; 1098 size_t vallen, currentvalpos; 1099 int rv; 1100 1101 buff = malloc(olen); 1102 if (buff == NULL) 1103 goto err2; 1104 1105 /* construct PRF arguments 1106 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate 1107 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values 1108 * does not create a prohibited label. 1109 */ 1110 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; 1111 if (use_context) { 1112 vallen += 2 + contextlen; 1113 } 1114 1115 val = malloc(vallen); 1116 if (val == NULL) 1117 goto err2; 1118 currentvalpos = 0; 1119 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); 1120 currentvalpos += llen; 1121 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1122 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1123 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1124 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1125 1126 if (use_context) { 1127 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; 1128 currentvalpos++; 1129 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; 1130 currentvalpos++; 1131 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { 1132 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); 1133 } 1134 } 1135 1136 /* disallow prohibited labels 1137 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = 1138 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the 1139 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow 1140 */ 1141 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, 1142 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1143 goto err1; 1144 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, 1145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1146 goto err1; 1147 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, 1148 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1149 goto err1; 1150 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, 1151 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) 1152 goto err1; 1153 1154 rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), 1155 val, vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 1156 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, 1157 out, buff, olen); 1158 1159 goto ret; 1160err1: 1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, 1162 SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); 1163 rv = 0; 1164 goto ret; 1165err2: 1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1167 rv = 0; 1168ret: 1169 free(buff); 1170 free(val); 1171 1172 return (rv); 1173} 1174 1175int 1176tls1_alert_code(int code) 1177{ 1178 switch (code) { 1179 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: 1180 return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1181 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: 1182 return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1183 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: 1184 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 1185 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: 1186 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 1187 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: 1188 return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); 1189 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: 1190 return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); 1191 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: 1192 return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1193 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: 1194 return (-1); 1195 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: 1196 return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); 1197 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: 1198 return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); 1199 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: 1200 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); 1201 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: 1202 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); 1203 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: 1204 return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); 1205 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: 1206 return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); 1207 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: 1208 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); 1209 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: 1210 return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); 1211 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: 1212 return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 1213 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: 1214 return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); 1215 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: 1216 return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); 1217 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: 1218 return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); 1219 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: 1220 return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); 1221 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: 1222 return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1223 case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: 1224 return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 1225 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: 1226 return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); 1227 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: 1228 return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1229 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: 1230 return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); 1231 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: 1232 return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); 1233 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: 1234 return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); 1235 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: 1236 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); 1237 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: 1238 return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); 1239 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: 1240 return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); 1241 default: 1242 return (-1); 1243 } 1244} 1245