1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124/* ==================================================================== 125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. 126 * 127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by 128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 129 * license. 130 * 131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of 132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites 133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. 134 * 135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in 136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received 137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. 138 * 139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not 140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third 141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights 142 * to make use of the Contribution. 143 * 144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN 145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA 146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY 147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR 148 * OTHERWISE. 149 */ 150 151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 153 154#include <stdio.h> 155#include "ssl_locl.h" 156#include "kssl_lcl.h" 157#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" 158#include <openssl/buffer.h> 159#include <openssl/rand.h> 160#include <openssl/objects.h> 161#include <openssl/evp.h> 162#include <openssl/hmac.h> 163#include <openssl/x509.h> 164#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 165# include <openssl/dh.h> 166#endif 167#include <openssl/bn.h> 168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 169# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 170#endif 171#include <openssl/md5.h> 172 173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 175 176static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 177{ 178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 179 return (SSLv3_server_method()); 180 else 181 return (NULL); 182} 183 184IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 185 ssl3_accept, 186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) 187#endif 188#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 189static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) 190{ 191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; 192 193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 194 195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && 196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { 197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { 198 /* 199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp 200 * login name 201 */ 202 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; 203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 204 } else { 205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); 206 } 207 } 208 return ret; 209} 210#endif 211 212int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 213{ 214 BUF_MEM *buf; 215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); 216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 217 int ret = -1; 218 int new_state, state, skip = 0; 219 220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); 221 ERR_clear_error(); 222 clear_sys_error(); 223 224 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 225 cb = s->info_callback; 226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 228 229 /* init things to blank */ 230 s->in_handshake++; 231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) 232 SSL_clear(s); 233 234 if (s->cert == NULL) { 235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 236 return (-1); 237 } 238#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 239 /* 240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and 241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during 242 * handshakes anyway. 243 */ 244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 246 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 247 } 248#endif 249 250 for (;;) { 251 state = s->state; 252 253 switch (s->state) { 254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 255 s->renegotiate = 1; 256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 257 258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 259 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 262 263 s->server = 1; 264 if (cb != NULL) 265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); 266 267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { 268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 270 return -1; 271 } 272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 273 274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) { 275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { 276 ret = -1; 277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 278 goto end; 279 } 280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { 281 BUF_MEM_free(buf); 282 ret = -1; 283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 284 goto end; 285 } 286 s->init_buf = buf; 287 } 288 289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { 290 ret = -1; 291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 292 goto end; 293 } 294 295 s->init_num = 0; 296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; 297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 298 /* 299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. 300 */ 301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; 302 303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { 304 /* 305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the 306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 307 */ 308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { 309 ret = -1; 310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 311 goto end; 312 } 313 314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 318 !(s->options & 319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 320 /* 321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't 322 * support secure renegotiation. 323 */ 324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, 325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 327 ret = -1; 328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 329 goto end; 330 } else { 331 /* 332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a 333 * HelloRequest 334 */ 335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 337 } 338 break; 339 340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 342 343 s->shutdown = 0; 344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 345 if (ret <= 0) 346 goto end; 347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 349 s->init_num = 0; 350 351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 352 break; 353 354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 356 break; 357 358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 361 362 s->shutdown = 0; 363 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 364 if (ret <= 0) 365 goto end; 366#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; 368 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: 369 { 370 int al; 371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { 372 /* 373 * callback indicates firther work to be done 374 */ 375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 376 goto end; 377 } 378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { 379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 380 /* 381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for 382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported. 383 */ 384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) 385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 386 ret = -1; 387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 388 goto end; 389 } 390 } 391#endif 392 393 s->renegotiate = 2; 394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 395 s->init_num = 0; 396 break; 397 398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 400 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 401 if (ret <= 0) 402 goto end; 403#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 404 if (s->hit) { 405 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 407 else 408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 409 } 410#else 411 if (s->hit) 412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 413#endif 414 else 415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 416 s->init_num = 0; 417 break; 418 419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ 422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ 423 if (! 424 (s->s3->tmp. 425 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | 426 SSL_aSRP)) 427&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 428 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 429 if (ret <= 0) 430 goto end; 431#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 434 else 435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 436 } else { 437 skip = 1; 438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 439 } 440#else 441 } else 442 skip = 1; 443 444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 445#endif 446 s->init_num = 0; 447 break; 448 449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 451 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 452 453 /* 454 * clear this, it may get reset by 455 * send_server_key_exchange 456 */ 457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; 458 459 /* 460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a 461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For 462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if 463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, 464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for 465 * key exchange. 466 */ 467 if (0 468 /* 469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if 470 * provided 471 */ 472#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) 474#endif 475#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ 477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) 478#endif 479 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) 480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) 481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) 482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys 485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * 486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 487 ) 488 ) 489 ) 490 ) { 491 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 492 if (ret <= 0) 493 goto end; 494 } else 495 skip = 1; 496 497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 498 s->init_num = 0; 499 break; 500 501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 505 /* 506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert 507 * during re-negotiation: 508 */ 509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 511 /* 512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see 513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in 514 * RFC 2246): 515 */ 516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && 517 /* 518 * ... except when the application insists on 519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts 520 * this for SSL 3) 521 */ 522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 523 /* 524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites 525 */ 526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || 527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ 528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) 529 /* 530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests 531 * are omitted 532 */ 533 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 534 /* no cert request */ 535 skip = 1; 536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; 537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 540 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 541 return -1; 542 } 543 } 544 } else { 545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; 546 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 547 if (ret <= 0) 548 goto end; 549#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 550 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 551#else 552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 554#endif 555 s->init_num = 0; 556 } 557 break; 558 559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 561 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); 562 if (ret <= 0) 563 goto end; 564 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 566 s->init_num = 0; 567 break; 568 569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 570 571 /* 572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending 573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as 574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely 575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of 576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush 577 * unconditionally. 578 */ 579 580 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 581 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { 582 ret = -1; 583 goto end; 584 } 585 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 586 587 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; 588 break; 589 590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 592 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 593 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 594 if (ret <= 0) 595 goto end; 596 } 597 s->init_num = 0; 598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 599 break; 600 601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 603 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 604 if (ret <= 0) 605 goto end; 606 if (ret == 2) { 607 /* 608 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH 609 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is 610 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses 611 * its key from the certificate for key exchange. 612 */ 613#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 614 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 615#else 616 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 617 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 618 else 619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 620#endif 621 s->init_num = 0; 622 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 623 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 624 s->init_num = 0; 625 if (!s->session->peer) 626 break; 627 /* 628 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and 629 * digest cached records. 630 */ 631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 633 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 634 return -1; 635 } 636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 638 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 639 return -1; 640 } 641 } else { 642 int offset = 0; 643 int dgst_num; 644 645 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 646 s->init_num = 0; 647 648 /* 649 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, 650 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for 651 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next 652 * step 653 */ 654 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 656 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 657 return -1; 658 } 659 } 660 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) 661 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { 662 int dgst_size; 663 664 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 665 EVP_MD_CTX_type 666 (s-> 667 s3->handshake_dgst 668 [dgst_num]), 669 &(s->s3-> 670 tmp.cert_verify_md 671 [offset])); 672 dgst_size = 673 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); 674 if (dgst_size < 0) { 675 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 676 ret = -1; 677 goto end; 678 } 679 offset += dgst_size; 680 } 681 } 682 break; 683 684 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 685 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 686 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 687 if (ret <= 0) 688 goto end; 689 690#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 691 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 692#else 693 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) 694 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 695 else 696 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 697#endif 698 s->init_num = 0; 699 break; 700 701#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 702 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: 703 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: 704 /* 705 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 706 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the 707 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be 708 * cautious. 709 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 710 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 711 * the client's Finished message is read. 712 */ 713 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 714 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 715 716 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); 717 if (ret <= 0) 718 goto end; 719 s->init_num = 0; 720 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 721 break; 722#endif 723 724 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 725 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 726 /* 727 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has 728 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make 729 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. 730 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is 731 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until 732 * the client's Finished message is read. 733 */ 734 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 735 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 736 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 737 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 738 if (ret <= 0) 739 goto end; 740 if (s->hit) 741 s->state = SSL_ST_OK; 742#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 743 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 744 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 745#endif 746 else 747 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 748 s->init_num = 0; 749 break; 750 751#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 752 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 753 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 754 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 755 if (ret <= 0) 756 goto end; 757 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 758 s->init_num = 0; 759 break; 760 761 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 762 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 763 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 764 if (ret <= 0) 765 goto end; 766 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 767 s->init_num = 0; 768 break; 769 770#endif 771 772 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 773 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 774 775 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 776 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { 777 ret = -1; 778 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 779 goto end; 780 } 781 782 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 783 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, 784 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 785 786 if (ret <= 0) 787 goto end; 788 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 789 s->init_num = 0; 790 791 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 792 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 793 { 794 ret = -1; 795 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 796 goto end; 797 } 798 799 break; 800 801 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 802 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 803 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, 804 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, 805 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 806 s->method-> 807 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 808 s->method-> 809 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 810 if (ret <= 0) 811 goto end; 812 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 813 if (s->hit) { 814#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) 815 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 816#else 817 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 818 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; 819 } else 820 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 821#endif 822 } else 823 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; 824 s->init_num = 0; 825 break; 826 827 case SSL_ST_OK: 828 /* clean a few things up */ 829 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 830 831 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 832 s->init_buf = NULL; 833 834 /* remove buffering on output */ 835 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 836 837 s->init_num = 0; 838 839 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a 840 * HelloRequest */ 841 s->renegotiate = 0; 842 s->new_session = 0; 843 844 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 845 846 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 847 /* s->server=1; */ 848 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; 849 850 if (cb != NULL) 851 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 852 } 853 854 ret = 1; 855 goto end; 856 /* break; */ 857 858 case SSL_ST_ERR: 859 default: 860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 861 ret = -1; 862 goto end; 863 /* break; */ 864 } 865 866 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { 867 if (s->debug) { 868 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 869 goto end; 870 } 871 872 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { 873 new_state = s->state; 874 s->state = state; 875 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); 876 s->state = new_state; 877 } 878 } 879 skip = 0; 880 } 881 end: 882 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 883 884 s->in_handshake--; 885 if (cb != NULL) 886 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); 887 return (ret); 888} 889 890int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 891{ 892 893 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { 894 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0); 895 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 896 } 897 898 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 899 return ssl_do_write(s); 900} 901 902int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 903{ 904 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; 905 unsigned int cookie_len; 906 long n; 907 unsigned long id; 908 unsigned char *p, *d; 909 SSL_CIPHER *c; 910#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 911 unsigned char *q; 912 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; 913#endif 914 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; 915 916 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet) 917 goto retry_cert; 918 919 /* 920 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are 921 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down 922 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we 923 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. 924 */ 925 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { 926 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 927 } 928 s->first_packet = 1; 929 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 930 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 931 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 932 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 933 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 934 935 if (!ok) 936 return ((int)n); 937 s->first_packet = 0; 938 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 939 940 /* 941 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte 942 * for session id length 943 */ 944 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { 945 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 947 goto f_err; 948 } 949 950 /* 951 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may 952 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) 953 */ 954 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; 955 p += 2; 956 957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version && 958 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) 959 : (s->client_version < s->version)) { 960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 961 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && 962 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { 963 /* 964 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version 965 * number 966 */ 967 s->version = s->client_version; 968 } 969 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 970 goto f_err; 971 } 972 973 /* 974 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just 975 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check 976 * cookie length... 977 */ 978 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { 979 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 980 981 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 982 983 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { 984 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 986 goto f_err; 987 } 988 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 989 990 if (cookie_length == 0) 991 return 1; 992 } 993 994 /* load the client random */ 995 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 996 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 997 998 /* get the session-id */ 999 j = *(p++); 1000 1001 if (p + j > d + n) { 1002 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1004 goto f_err; 1005 } 1006 1007 if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { 1008 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1010 goto f_err; 1011 } 1012 1013 s->hit = 0; 1014 /* 1015 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in 1016 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally 1017 * ignore resumption requests with flag 1018 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather 1019 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this 1020 * for security won't even compile against older library versions). 1021 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to 1022 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains 1023 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the 1024 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. 1025 */ 1026 if ((s->new_session 1027 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { 1028 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1029 goto err; 1030 } else { 1031 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 1032 /* 1033 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated 1034 * version. 1035 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption 1036 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but 1037 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. 1038 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and 1039 * will abort the handshake with an error. 1040 */ 1041 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous 1042 * session */ 1043 s->hit = 1; 1044 } else if (i == -1) 1045 goto err; 1046 else { /* i == 0 */ 1047 1048 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) 1049 goto err; 1050 } 1051 } 1052 1053 p += j; 1054 1055 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1056 /* cookie stuff */ 1057 if (p + 1 > d + n) { 1058 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1060 goto f_err; 1061 } 1062 cookie_len = *(p++); 1063 1064 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { 1065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1067 goto f_err; 1068 } 1069 1070 /* 1071 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 1072 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 1073 * does not cause an overflow. 1074 */ 1075 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { 1076 /* too much data */ 1077 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1079 goto f_err; 1080 } 1081 1082 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 1083 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { 1084 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 1085 1086 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { 1087 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 1088 cookie_len) == 0) { 1089 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1091 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1092 goto f_err; 1093 } 1094 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 1095 } 1096 /* default verification */ 1097 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 1098 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { 1099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 1101 goto f_err; 1102 } 1103 cookie_valid = 1; 1104 } 1105 1106 p += cookie_len; 1107 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { 1108 /* Select version to use */ 1109 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && 1110 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { 1111 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; 1112 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); 1113 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1115 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); 1116 s->version = s->client_version; 1117 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1118 goto f_err; 1119 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && 1120 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) { 1121 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; 1122 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method(); 1123 } else { 1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1125 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 1126 s->version = s->client_version; 1127 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 1128 goto f_err; 1129 } 1130 s->session->ssl_version = s->version; 1131 } 1132 } 1133 1134 if (p + 2 > d + n) { 1135 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 1137 goto f_err; 1138 } 1139 n2s(p, i); 1140 1141 if (i == 0) { 1142 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 1144 goto f_err; 1145 } 1146 1147 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ 1148 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { 1149 /* not enough data */ 1150 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1152 goto f_err; 1153 } 1154 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { 1155 goto err; 1156 } 1157 p += i; 1158 1159 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 1160 if (s->hit) { 1161 j = 0; 1162 id = s->session->cipher->id; 1163 1164#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1165 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", 1166 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); 1167#endif 1168 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 1169 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 1170#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 1171 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 1172 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 1173#endif 1174 if (c->id == id) { 1175 j = 1; 1176 break; 1177 } 1178 } 1179 /* 1180 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: 1181 * CVE-2010-4180. 1182 */ 1183#if 0 1184 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1185 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { 1186 /* 1187 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used 1188 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead 1189 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't 1190 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the 1191 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. 1192 */ 1193 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 1194 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { 1195 s->session->cipher = c; 1196 j = 1; 1197 } 1198 } 1199#endif 1200 if (j == 0) { 1201 /* 1202 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked 1203 * to reuse it 1204 */ 1205 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1207 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 1208 goto f_err; 1209 } 1210 } 1211 1212 /* compression */ 1213 i = *(p++); 1214 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { 1215 /* not enough data */ 1216 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1218 goto f_err; 1219 } 1220#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1221 q = p; 1222#endif 1223 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { 1224 if (p[j] == 0) 1225 break; 1226 } 1227 1228 p += i; 1229 if (j >= i) { 1230 /* no compress */ 1231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 1233 goto f_err; 1234 } 1235#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1236 /* TLS extensions */ 1237 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1238 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) { 1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1240 goto err; 1241 } 1242 } 1243 1244 /* 1245 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake 1246 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before 1247 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket 1248 * processing to use it in key derivation. 1249 */ 1250 { 1251 unsigned char *pos; 1252 pos = s->s3->server_random; 1253 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1254 goto f_err; 1255 } 1256 } 1257 1258 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 1259 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; 1260 1261 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); 1262 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, 1263 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, 1264 &pref_cipher, 1265 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { 1266 s->hit = 1; 1267 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1268 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; 1269 1270 ciphers = NULL; 1271 1272 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ 1273 pref_cipher = 1274 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, 1275 s-> 1276 session->ciphers, 1277 SSL_get_ciphers 1278 (s)); 1279 if (pref_cipher == NULL) { 1280 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1282 goto f_err; 1283 } 1284 1285 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; 1286 1287 if (s->cipher_list) 1288 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); 1289 1290 if (s->cipher_list_by_id) 1291 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); 1292 1293 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1294 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); 1295 } 1296 } 1297#endif 1298 1299 /* 1300 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1301 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1302 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. 1303 */ 1304 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; 1305#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1306 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ 1307 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1308 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; 1309 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ 1310 /* Can't disable compression */ 1311 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { 1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1313 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1314 goto f_err; 1315 } 1316 /* Look for resumed compression method */ 1317 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { 1318 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1319 if (comp_id == comp->id) { 1320 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1321 break; 1322 } 1323 } 1324 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { 1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1326 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 1327 goto f_err; 1328 } 1329 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ 1330 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { 1331 if (q[m] == comp_id) 1332 break; 1333 } 1334 if (m >= i) { 1335 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 1337 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); 1338 goto f_err; 1339 } 1340 } else if (s->hit) 1341 comp = NULL; 1342 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { 1343 /* See if we have a match */ 1344 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; 1345 1346 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1347 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { 1348 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); 1349 v = comp->id; 1350 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { 1351 if (v == q[o]) { 1352 done = 1; 1353 break; 1354 } 1355 } 1356 if (done) 1357 break; 1358 } 1359 if (done) 1360 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; 1361 else 1362 comp = NULL; 1363 } 1364#else 1365 /* 1366 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session 1367 * using compression. 1368 */ 1369 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { 1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); 1371 goto f_err; 1372 } 1373#endif 1374 1375 /* 1376 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher 1377 */ 1378 1379 if (!s->hit) { 1380#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1381 s->session->compress_meth = 0; 1382#else 1383 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; 1384#endif 1385 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1386 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1387 s->session->ciphers = ciphers; 1388 if (ciphers == NULL) { 1389 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1391 goto f_err; 1392 } 1393 ciphers = NULL; 1394 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { 1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1396 goto err; 1397 } 1398 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ 1399 retry_cert: 1400 if (s->cert->cert_cb) { 1401 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); 1402 if (rv == 0) { 1403 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); 1405 goto f_err; 1406 } 1407 if (rv < 0) { 1408 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; 1409 return -1; 1410 } 1411 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1412 } 1413 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1414 1415 if (c == NULL) { 1416 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1418 goto f_err; 1419 } 1420 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; 1421 } else { 1422 /* Session-id reuse */ 1423#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1424 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1425 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; 1426 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; 1427 1428 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { 1429 sk = s->session->ciphers; 1430 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { 1431 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); 1432 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) 1433 nc = c; 1434 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1435 ec = c; 1436 } 1437 if (nc != NULL) 1438 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; 1439 else if (ec != NULL) 1440 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; 1441 else 1442 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1443 } else 1444#endif 1445 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; 1446 } 1447 1448 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { 1449 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) 1450 goto f_err; 1451 } 1452 1453 /*- 1454 * we now have the following setup. 1455 * client_random 1456 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1457 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1458 * compression - basically ignored right now 1459 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1460 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1461 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1462 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1463 */ 1464 1465 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1466 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { 1467 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { 1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1469 goto err; 1470 } 1471 } 1472 1473 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; 1474 if (0) { 1475 f_err: 1476 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1477 err: 1478 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1479 } 1480 1481 if (ciphers != NULL) 1482 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1483 return ret; 1484} 1485 1486int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1487{ 1488 unsigned char *buf; 1489 unsigned char *p, *d; 1490 int i, sl; 1491 int al = 0; 1492 unsigned long l; 1493 1494 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { 1495 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1496#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1497 p = s->s3->server_random; 1498 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { 1499 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1500 return -1; 1501 } 1502#endif 1503 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1504 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 1505 1506 *(p++) = s->version >> 8; 1507 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 1508 1509 /* Random stuff */ 1510 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1511 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1512 1513 /*- 1514 * There are several cases for the session ID to send 1515 * back in the server hello: 1516 * - For session reuse from the session cache, 1517 * we send back the old session ID. 1518 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) 1519 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" 1520 * (which doesn't actually identify the session). 1521 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new 1522 * session ID. 1523 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, 1524 * we send back a 0-length session ID. 1525 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, 1526 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed 1527 * to send back. 1528 */ 1529 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1530 && !s->hit) 1531 s->session->session_id_length = 0; 1532 1533 sl = s->session->session_id_length; 1534 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { 1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1536 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1537 return -1; 1538 } 1539 *(p++) = sl; 1540 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); 1541 p += sl; 1542 1543 /* put the cipher */ 1544 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); 1545 p += i; 1546 1547 /* put the compression method */ 1548#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1549 *(p++) = 0; 1550#else 1551 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1552 *(p++) = 0; 1553 else 1554 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1555#endif 1556#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1557 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 1559 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1560 return -1; 1561 } 1562 if ((p = 1563 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 1564 &al)) == NULL) { 1565 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1567 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 1568 return -1; 1569 } 1570#endif 1571 /* do the header */ 1572 l = (p - d); 1573 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l); 1574 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1575 } 1576 1577 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1578 return ssl_do_write(s); 1579} 1580 1581int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1582{ 1583 1584 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { 1585 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0); 1586 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1587 } 1588 1589 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1590 return ssl_do_write(s); 1591} 1592 1593int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1594{ 1595#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1596 unsigned char *q; 1597 int j, num; 1598 RSA *rsa; 1599 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1600 unsigned int u; 1601#endif 1602#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1603 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; 1604#endif 1605#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1606 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; 1607 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1608 int encodedlen = 0; 1609 int curve_id = 0; 1610 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1611#endif 1612 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1613 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1614 unsigned char *p, *d; 1615 int al, i; 1616 unsigned long type; 1617 int n; 1618 CERT *cert; 1619 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1620 int nr[4], kn; 1621 BUF_MEM *buf; 1622 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1623 1624 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1625 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { 1626 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1627 cert = s->cert; 1628 1629 buf = s->init_buf; 1630 1631 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; 1632 n = 0; 1633#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1634 if (type & SSL_kRSA) { 1635 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; 1636 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { 1637 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1638 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1639 tmp.new_cipher), 1640 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1641 tmp.new_cipher)); 1642 if (rsa == NULL) { 1643 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1645 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1646 goto f_err; 1647 } 1648 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1649 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; 1650 } 1651 if (rsa == NULL) { 1652 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1654 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1655 goto f_err; 1656 } 1657 r[0] = rsa->n; 1658 r[1] = rsa->e; 1659 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; 1660 } else 1661#endif 1662#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1663 if (type & SSL_kEDH) { 1664 dhp = cert->dh_tmp; 1665 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1666 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1667 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1668 tmp.new_cipher), 1669 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> 1670 tmp.new_cipher)); 1671 if (dhp == NULL) { 1672 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1674 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1675 goto f_err; 1676 } 1677 1678 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { 1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1681 goto err; 1682 } 1683 1684 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { 1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1686 goto err; 1687 } 1688 1689 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; 1690 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { 1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1692 goto err; 1693 } 1694 r[0] = dh->p; 1695 r[1] = dh->g; 1696 r[2] = dh->pub_key; 1697 } else 1698#endif 1699#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1700 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1701 const EC_GROUP *group; 1702 1703 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; 1704 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 1705 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ 1706 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); 1707 if (nid != NID_undef) 1708 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); 1709 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) { 1710 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1711 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> 1712 tmp.new_cipher), 1713 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> 1714 s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1715 } 1716 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1717 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1719 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1720 goto f_err; 1721 } 1722 1723 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { 1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1725 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1726 goto err; 1727 } 1728 1729 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1730 if (ecdhp == NULL) { 1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1732 goto err; 1733 } 1734 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) 1735 ecdh = ecdhp; 1736 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { 1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1738 goto err; 1739 } 1740 1741 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; 1742 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1743 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1744 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { 1745 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { 1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1747 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1748 goto err; 1749 } 1750 } 1751 1752 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1753 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1754 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { 1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1756 goto err; 1757 } 1758 1759 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1760 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { 1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1762 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1763 goto err; 1764 } 1765 1766 /* 1767 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named 1768 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is 1769 * non-zero. 1770 */ 1771 if ((curve_id = 1772 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1773 == 0) { 1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1775 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1776 goto err; 1777 } 1778 1779 /* 1780 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and 1781 * allocate memory accordingly. 1782 */ 1783 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1784 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1785 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1786 NULL, 0, NULL); 1787 1788 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1789 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); 1790 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1791 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { 1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1793 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1794 goto err; 1795 } 1796 1797 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1798 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1799 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1800 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1801 1802 if (encodedlen == 0) { 1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1804 goto err; 1805 } 1806 1807 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1808 bn_ctx = NULL; 1809 1810 /* 1811 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in 1812 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four 1813 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1814 * structure. 1815 */ 1816 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1817 1818 /* 1819 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we 1820 * can set these to NULLs 1821 */ 1822 r[0] = NULL; 1823 r[1] = NULL; 1824 r[2] = NULL; 1825 r[3] = NULL; 1826 } else 1827#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1828#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1829 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1830 /* 1831 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint 1832 */ 1833 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1834 } else 1835#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1836#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1837 if (type & SSL_kSRP) { 1838 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || 1839 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || 1840 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { 1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1842 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); 1843 goto err; 1844 } 1845 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; 1846 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; 1847 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; 1848 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; 1849 } else 1850#endif 1851 { 1852 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1854 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1855 goto f_err; 1856 } 1857 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1858 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1859#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1860 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) 1861 n += 1 + nr[i]; 1862 else 1863#endif 1864 n += 2 + nr[i]; 1865 } 1866 1867 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) 1868 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { 1869 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) 1870 == NULL) { 1871 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1872 goto f_err; 1873 } 1874 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1875 } else { 1876 pkey = NULL; 1877 kn = 0; 1878 } 1879 1880 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { 1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); 1882 goto err; 1883 } 1884 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 1885 1886 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { 1887#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1888 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { 1889 *p = nr[i]; 1890 p++; 1891 } else 1892#endif 1893 s2n(nr[i], p); 1894 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); 1895 p += nr[i]; 1896 } 1897 1898#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1899 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { 1900 /* 1901 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In 1902 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte 1903 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded 1904 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself 1905 */ 1906 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1907 p += 1; 1908 *p = 0; 1909 p += 1; 1910 *p = curve_id; 1911 p += 1; 1912 *p = encodedlen; 1913 p += 1; 1914 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, 1915 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); 1916 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1917 encodedPoint = NULL; 1918 p += encodedlen; 1919 } 1920#endif 1921 1922#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1923 if (type & SSL_kPSK) { 1924 /* copy PSK identity hint */ 1925 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); 1926 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, 1927 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); 1928 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 1929 } 1930#endif 1931 1932 /* not anonymous */ 1933 if (pkey != NULL) { 1934 /* 1935 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p 1936 * points to the space at the end. 1937 */ 1938#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1939 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1940 q = md_buf; 1941 j = 0; 1942 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { 1943 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1944 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1945 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, 1946 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 1947 : s->ctx->sha1, 1948 NULL) <= 0 1949 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1950 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1951 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1952 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1953 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 1954 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, 1955 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) { 1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1957 ERR_LIB_EVP); 1958 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1959 goto f_err; 1960 } 1961 q += i; 1962 j += i; 1963 } 1964 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1965 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { 1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); 1967 goto err; 1968 } 1969 s2n(u, p); 1970 n += u + 2; 1971 } else 1972#endif 1973 if (md) { 1974 /* send signature algorithm */ 1975 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1976 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { 1977 /* Should never happen */ 1978 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1981 goto f_err; 1982 } 1983 p += 2; 1984 } 1985#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 1986 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 1987#endif 1988 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 1989 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), 1990 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1991 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), 1992 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 1993 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 1994 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), 1995 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { 1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); 1997 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1998 goto f_err; 1999 } 2000 s2n(i, p); 2001 n += i + 2; 2002 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 2003 n += 2; 2004 } else { 2005 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 2006 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2008 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 2009 goto f_err; 2010 } 2011 } 2012 2013 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); 2014 } 2015 2016 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 2017 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2018 return ssl_do_write(s); 2019 f_err: 2020 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2021 err: 2022#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2023 if (encodedPoint != NULL) 2024 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 2025 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2026#endif 2027 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 2028 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2029 return (-1); 2030} 2031 2032int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 2033{ 2034 unsigned char *p, *d; 2035 int i, j, nl, off, n; 2036 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; 2037 X509_NAME *name; 2038 BUF_MEM *buf; 2039 2040 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { 2041 buf = s->init_buf; 2042 2043 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 2044 2045 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 2046 p++; 2047 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); 2048 d[0] = n; 2049 p += n; 2050 n++; 2051 2052 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 2053 const unsigned char *psigs; 2054 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs); 2055 s2n(nl, p); 2056 memcpy(p, psigs, nl); 2057 p += nl; 2058 n += nl + 2; 2059 } 2060 2061 off = n; 2062 p += 2; 2063 n += 2; 2064 2065 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 2066 nl = 0; 2067 if (sk != NULL) { 2068 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { 2069 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); 2070 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); 2071 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean 2072 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { 2073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, 2074 ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2075 goto err; 2076 } 2077 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; 2078 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { 2079 s2n(j, p); 2080 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2081 n += 2 + j; 2082 nl += 2 + j; 2083 } else { 2084 d = p; 2085 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); 2086 j -= 2; 2087 s2n(j, d); 2088 j += 2; 2089 n += j; 2090 nl += j; 2091 } 2092 } 2093 } 2094 /* else no CA names */ 2095 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; 2096 s2n(nl, p); 2097 2098 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n); 2099 2100#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 2101 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 2102 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { 2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 2104 goto err; 2105 } 2106 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 2107 /* do the header */ 2108 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 2109 *(p++) = 0; 2110 *(p++) = 0; 2111 *(p++) = 0; 2112 s->init_num += 4; 2113 } 2114#endif 2115 2116 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 2117 } 2118 2119 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 2120 return ssl_do_write(s); 2121 err: 2122 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2123 return (-1); 2124} 2125 2126int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 2127{ 2128 int i, al, ok; 2129 long n; 2130 unsigned long alg_k; 2131 unsigned char *p; 2132#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2133 RSA *rsa = NULL; 2134 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2135#endif 2136#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2137 BIGNUM *pub = NULL; 2138 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL; 2139#endif 2140#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2141 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 2142#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2143 2144#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2145 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 2146 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 2147 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 2148 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 2149#endif 2150 2151 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2152 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 2153 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 2154 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); 2155 2156 if (!ok) 2157 return ((int)n); 2158 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2159 2160 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2161 2162#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2163 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { 2164 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; 2165 int decrypt_len; 2166 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; 2167 size_t j; 2168 2169 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 2170 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { 2171 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 2172 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; 2173 /* 2174 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already 2175 */ 2176 if (rsa == NULL) { 2177 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2179 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 2180 goto f_err; 2181 2182 } 2183 } else { 2184 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 2185 if ((pkey == NULL) || 2186 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { 2187 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2189 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2190 goto f_err; 2191 } 2192 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; 2193 } 2194 2195 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ 2196 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2197 n2s(p, i); 2198 if (n != i + 2) { 2199 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { 2200 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2202 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2203 goto f_err; 2204 } else 2205 p -= 2; 2206 } else 2207 n = i; 2208 } 2209 2210 /* 2211 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure 2212 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire 2213 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The 2214 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the 2215 * bound is sufficient to be safe. 2216 */ 2217 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2218 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2220 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2221 goto f_err; 2222 } 2223 2224 /* 2225 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of 2226 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, 2227 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and 2228 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt 2229 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 2230 */ 2231 2232 /* 2233 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. 2234 */ 2235 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, 2236 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) 2237 goto err; 2238 decrypt_len = 2239 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 2240 ERR_clear_error(); 2241 2242 /* 2243 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will 2244 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. 2245 */ 2246 decrypt_good = 2247 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); 2248 2249 /* 2250 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then 2251 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The 2252 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 2253 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number 2254 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in 2255 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. 2256 */ 2257 version_good = 2258 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); 2259 version_good &= 2260 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); 2261 2262 /* 2263 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2264 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2265 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2266 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 2267 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 2268 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such 2269 * clients. 2270 */ 2271 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { 2272 unsigned char workaround_good; 2273 workaround_good = 2274 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); 2275 workaround_good &= 2276 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); 2277 version_good |= workaround_good; 2278 } 2279 2280 /* 2281 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to 2282 * remain non-zero (0xff). 2283 */ 2284 decrypt_good &= version_good; 2285 2286 /* 2287 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using 2288 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not 2289 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees 2290 * it is still sufficiently large to read from. 2291 */ 2292 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { 2293 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], 2294 rand_premaster_secret[j]); 2295 } 2296 2297 s->session->master_key_length = 2298 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2299 s-> 2300 session->master_key, 2301 p, 2302 sizeof 2303 (rand_premaster_secret)); 2304 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); 2305 } else 2306#endif 2307#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2308 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { 2309 int idx = -1; 2310 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; 2311 if (n > 1) { 2312 n2s(p, i); 2313 } else { 2314 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { 2315 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2317 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2318 goto f_err; 2319 } 2320 i = 0; 2321 } 2322 if (n && n != i + 2) { 2323 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { 2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2325 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 2326 goto err; 2327 } else { 2328 p -= 2; 2329 i = (int)n; 2330 } 2331 } 2332 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) 2333 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; 2334 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) 2335 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; 2336 if (idx >= 0) { 2337 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey; 2338 if ((skey == NULL) || 2339 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) { 2340 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2342 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 2343 goto f_err; 2344 } 2345 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh; 2346 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { 2347 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2349 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2350 goto f_err; 2351 } else 2352 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; 2353 2354 if (n == 0L) { 2355 /* Get pubkey from cert */ 2356 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2357 if (clkey) { 2358 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1) 2359 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); 2360 } 2361 if (dh_clnt == NULL) { 2362 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2364 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 2365 goto f_err; 2366 } 2367 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey); 2368 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key; 2369 } else 2370 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); 2371 if (pub == NULL) { 2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); 2373 goto err; 2374 } 2375 2376 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); 2377 2378 if (i <= 0) { 2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); 2380 BN_clear_free(pub); 2381 goto err; 2382 } 2383 2384 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 2385 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 2386 if (dh_clnt) 2387 DH_free(dh_clnt); 2388 else 2389 BN_clear_free(pub); 2390 pub = NULL; 2391 s->session->master_key_length = 2392 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2393 s-> 2394 session->master_key, 2395 p, i); 2396 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2397 if (dh_clnt) 2398 return 2; 2399 } else 2400#endif 2401#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2402 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { 2403 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2404 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2405 krb5_data authenticator; 2406 krb5_data enc_pms; 2407 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2408 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2409 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2410 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2411 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2412 int padl, outl; 2413 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2414 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2415 int kerr = 0; 2416 2417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2418 2419 if (!kssl_ctx) 2420 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2421 2422 n2s(p, i); 2423 enc_ticket.length = i; 2424 2425 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { 2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2427 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2428 goto err; 2429 } 2430 2431 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2432 p += enc_ticket.length; 2433 2434 n2s(p, i); 2435 authenticator.length = i; 2436 2437 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { 2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2439 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2440 goto err; 2441 } 2442 2443 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2444 p += authenticator.length; 2445 2446 n2s(p, i); 2447 enc_pms.length = i; 2448 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2449 p += enc_pms.length; 2450 2451 /* 2452 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption 2453 */ 2454 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { 2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2456 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2457 goto err; 2458 } 2459 2460 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2461 enc_pms.length + 6)) { 2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2463 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2464 goto err; 2465 } 2466 2467 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2468 &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2469# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2470 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2471 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2472 if (kssl_err.text) 2473 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2474# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2476 goto err; 2477 } 2478 2479 /* 2480 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will 2481 * return authtime == 0. 2482 */ 2483 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2484 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { 2485# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2486 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2487 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2488 if (kssl_err.text) 2489 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2490# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); 2492 goto err; 2493 } 2494 2495 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { 2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2497 goto err; 2498 } 2499# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2500 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2501# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2502 2503 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2504 if (enc == NULL) 2505 goto err; 2506 2507 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2508 2509 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { 2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2511 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2512 goto err; 2513 } 2514 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, 2515 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2516 { 2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2518 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2519 kerr = 1; 2520 goto kclean; 2521 } 2522 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2524 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2525 kerr = 1; 2526 goto kclean; 2527 } 2528 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { 2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2530 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2531 kerr = 1; 2532 goto kclean; 2533 } 2534 outl += padl; 2535 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { 2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2537 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2538 kerr = 1; 2539 goto kclean; 2540 } 2541 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) 2542 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { 2543 /* 2544 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as 2545 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, 2546 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH 2547 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random 2548 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If 2549 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2550 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos 2551 * cipher) 2552 */ 2553 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { 2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2555 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2556 kerr = 1; 2557 goto kclean; 2558 } 2559 } 2560 2561 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2562 2563 s->session->master_key_length = 2564 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2565 s-> 2566 session->master_key, 2567 pms, outl); 2568 2569 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { 2570 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2571 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { 2572 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2573 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, 2574 len); 2575 } 2576 } 2577 2578 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2579 * but it caused problems for apache. 2580 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2581 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2582 */ 2583 2584 kclean: 2585 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); 2586 if (kerr) 2587 goto err; 2588 } else 2589#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2590 2591#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2592 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2593 int ret = 1; 2594 int field_size = 0; 2595 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2596 const EC_GROUP *group; 2597 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2598 2599 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2600 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { 2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2602 goto err; 2603 } 2604 2605 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2606 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { 2607 /* use the certificate */ 2608 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2609 } else { 2610 /* 2611 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the 2612 * ServerKeyExchange msg. 2613 */ 2614 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2615 } 2616 2617 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2618 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2619 2620 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2621 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { 2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2623 goto err; 2624 } 2625 2626 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2627 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { 2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2629 goto err; 2630 } 2631 2632 if (n == 0L) { 2633 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2634 2635 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { 2636 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2638 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2639 goto f_err; 2640 } 2641 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2642 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { 2643 /* 2644 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication 2645 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the 2646 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we 2647 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is 2648 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly 2649 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. 2650 */ 2651 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2653 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2654 goto f_err; 2655 } 2656 2657 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2658 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> 2659 pkey.ec)) == 0) { 2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2661 goto err; 2662 } 2663 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2664 } else { 2665 /* 2666 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the 2667 * ClientKeyExchange message. 2668 */ 2669 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { 2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2671 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2672 goto err; 2673 } 2674 2675 /* Get encoded point length */ 2676 i = *p; 2677 p += 1; 2678 if (n != 1 + i) { 2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2680 goto err; 2681 } 2682 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { 2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2684 goto err; 2685 } 2686 /* 2687 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it 2688 * to the start 2689 */ 2690 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2691 } 2692 2693 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2694 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2695 if (field_size <= 0) { 2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2697 goto err; 2698 } 2699 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, 2700 NULL); 2701 if (i <= 0) { 2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2703 goto err; 2704 } 2705 2706 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2707 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2708 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2709 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2710 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 2711 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 2712 2713 /* Compute the master secret */ 2714 s->session->master_key_length = 2715 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2716 s-> 2717 session->master_key, 2718 p, i); 2719 2720 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2721 return (ret); 2722 } else 2723#endif 2724#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 2725 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { 2726 unsigned char *t = NULL; 2727 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; 2728 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; 2729 int psk_err = 1; 2730 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; 2731 2732 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2733 2734 n2s(p, i); 2735 if (n != i + 2) { 2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2737 goto psk_err; 2738 } 2739 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2741 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2742 goto psk_err; 2743 } 2744 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { 2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2746 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); 2747 goto psk_err; 2748 } 2749 2750 /* 2751 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback 2752 */ 2753 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); 2754 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); 2755 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, 2756 psk_or_pre_ms, 2757 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2758 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); 2759 2760 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2762 goto psk_err; 2763 } else if (psk_len == 0) { 2764 /* 2765 * PSK related to the given identity not found 2766 */ 2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2768 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); 2769 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; 2770 goto psk_err; 2771 } 2772 2773 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ 2774 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; 2775 t = psk_or_pre_ms; 2776 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); 2777 s2n(psk_len, t); 2778 memset(t, 0, psk_len); 2779 t += psk_len; 2780 s2n(psk_len, t); 2781 2782 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) 2783 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); 2784 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); 2785 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { 2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2787 goto psk_err; 2788 } 2789 2790 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) 2791 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); 2792 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); 2793 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && 2794 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { 2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2796 goto psk_err; 2797 } 2798 2799 s->session->master_key_length = 2800 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2801 s-> 2802 session->master_key, 2803 psk_or_pre_ms, 2804 pre_ms_len); 2805 psk_err = 0; 2806 psk_err: 2807 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); 2808 if (psk_err != 0) 2809 goto f_err; 2810 } else 2811#endif 2812#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2813 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { 2814 int param_len; 2815 2816 n2s(p, i); 2817 param_len = i + 2; 2818 if (param_len > n) { 2819 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2821 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); 2822 goto f_err; 2823 } 2824 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { 2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); 2826 goto err; 2827 } 2828 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 2829 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { 2830 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2832 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); 2833 goto f_err; 2834 } 2835 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) 2836 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); 2837 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); 2838 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { 2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2840 goto err; 2841 } 2842 2843 if ((s->session->master_key_length = 2844 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, 2845 s->session->master_key)) < 0) { 2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2847 goto err; 2848 } 2849 2850 p += i; 2851 } else 2852#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ 2853 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { 2854 int ret = 0; 2855 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; 2856 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; 2857 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; 2858 size_t outlen = 32, inlen; 2859 unsigned long alg_a; 2860 int Ttag, Tclass; 2861 long Tlen; 2862 2863 /* Get our certificate private key */ 2864 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2865 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) 2866 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; 2867 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) 2868 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; 2869 2870 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); 2871 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { 2872 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2874 goto f_err; 2875 } 2876 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { 2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2878 goto gerr; 2879 } 2880 /* 2881 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe 2882 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from 2883 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a 2884 * client certificate for authorization only. 2885 */ 2886 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); 2887 if (client_pub_pkey) { 2888 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) 2889 ERR_clear_error(); 2890 } 2891 /* Decrypt session key */ 2892 if (ASN1_get_object 2893 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, 2894 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 2895 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { 2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2897 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2898 goto gerr; 2899 } 2900 start = p; 2901 inlen = Tlen; 2902 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt 2903 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { 2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2905 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2906 goto gerr; 2907 } 2908 /* Generate master secret */ 2909 s->session->master_key_length = 2910 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2911 s-> 2912 session->master_key, 2913 premaster_secret, 32); 2914 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); 2915 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ 2916 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl 2917 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) 2918 ret = 2; 2919 else 2920 ret = 1; 2921 gerr: 2922 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); 2923 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); 2924 if (ret) 2925 return ret; 2926 else 2927 goto err; 2928 } else { 2929 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2931 goto f_err; 2932 } 2933 2934 return (1); 2935 f_err: 2936 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2937#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) 2938 err: 2939#endif 2940#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2941 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2942 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2943 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2944 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2945 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2946#endif 2947 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 2948 return (-1); 2949} 2950 2951int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2952{ 2953 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 2954 unsigned char *p; 2955 int al, ok, ret = 0; 2956 long n; 2957 int type = 0, i, j; 2958 X509 *peer; 2959 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 2960 EVP_MD_CTX mctx; 2961 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); 2962 2963 /* 2964 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received 2965 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non 2966 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even 2967 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static 2968 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the 2969 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. 2970 */ 2971 if (s->session->peer == NULL) { 2972 ret = 1; 2973 goto end; 2974 } 2975 2976 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2977 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2978 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2979 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, 2980 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); 2981 2982 if (!ok) 2983 return ((int)n); 2984 2985 peer = s->session->peer; 2986 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2987 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); 2988 2989 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { 2990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2991 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2992 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2993 goto f_err; 2994 } 2995 2996 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2997 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2998 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 2999 /* 3000 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without 3001 * length field 3002 */ 3003 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || 3004 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { 3005 i = 64; 3006 } else { 3007 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 3008 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); 3009 if (rv == -1) { 3010 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3011 goto f_err; 3012 } else if (rv == 0) { 3013 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3014 goto f_err; 3015 } 3016#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3017 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); 3018#endif 3019 p += 2; 3020 n -= 2; 3021 } 3022 n2s(p, i); 3023 n -= 2; 3024 if (i > n) { 3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3026 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3027 goto f_err; 3028 } 3029 } 3030 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 3031 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { 3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 3033 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3034 goto f_err; 3035 } 3036 3037 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 3038 long hdatalen = 0; 3039 void *hdata; 3040 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); 3041 if (hdatalen <= 0) { 3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3043 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3044 goto f_err; 3045 } 3046#ifdef SSL_DEBUG 3047 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", 3048 EVP_MD_name(md)); 3049#endif 3050 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) 3051 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { 3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 3053 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3054 goto f_err; 3055 } 3056 3057 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { 3058 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 3060 goto f_err; 3061 } 3062 } else 3063#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3064 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { 3065 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3066 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 3067 pkey->pkey.rsa); 3068 if (i < 0) { 3069 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 3071 goto f_err; 3072 } 3073 if (i == 0) { 3074 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 3076 goto f_err; 3077 } 3078 } else 3079#endif 3080#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3081 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { 3082 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3083 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3084 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); 3085 if (j <= 0) { 3086 /* bad signature */ 3087 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 3089 goto f_err; 3090 } 3091 } else 3092#endif 3093#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3094 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 3095 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 3096 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 3097 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); 3098 if (j <= 0) { 3099 /* bad signature */ 3100 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3102 goto f_err; 3103 } 3104 } else 3105#endif 3106 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 3107 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { 3108 unsigned char signature[64]; 3109 int idx; 3110 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); 3111 if (pctx == NULL) { 3112 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3114 goto f_err; 3115 } 3116 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) { 3117 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3118 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3120 goto f_err; 3121 } 3122 if (i != 64) { 3123 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); 3124 } 3125 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { 3126 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; 3127 } 3128 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 3129 32); 3130 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); 3131 if (j <= 0) { 3132 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 3134 goto f_err; 3135 } 3136 } else { 3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3138 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 3139 goto f_err; 3140 } 3141 3142 ret = 1; 3143 if (0) { 3144 f_err: 3145 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3146 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3147 } 3148 end: 3149 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { 3150 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); 3151 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; 3152 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; 3153 } 3154 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); 3155 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 3156 return (ret); 3157} 3158 3159int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 3160{ 3161 int i, ok, al, ret = -1; 3162 X509 *x = NULL; 3163 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; 3164 const unsigned char *p, *q; 3165 unsigned char *d; 3166 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; 3167 3168 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3169 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 3170 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 3171 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); 3172 3173 if (!ok) 3174 return ((int)n); 3175 3176 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { 3177 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3178 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3180 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3181 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3182 goto f_err; 3183 } 3184 /* 3185 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list 3186 */ 3187 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { 3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3189 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 3190 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3191 goto f_err; 3192 } 3193 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 3194 return (1); 3195 } 3196 3197 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { 3198 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 3199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 3200 goto f_err; 3201 } 3202 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3203 3204 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { 3205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3206 goto err; 3207 } 3208 3209 n2l3(p, llen); 3210 if (llen + 3 != n) { 3211 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3213 goto f_err; 3214 } 3215 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { 3216 n2l3(p, l); 3217 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { 3218 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3220 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3221 goto f_err; 3222 } 3223 3224 q = p; 3225 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); 3226 if (x == NULL) { 3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 3228 goto err; 3229 } 3230 if (p != (q + l)) { 3231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3233 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 3234 goto f_err; 3235 } 3236 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { 3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3238 goto err; 3239 } 3240 x = NULL; 3241 nc += l + 3; 3242 } 3243 3244 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { 3245 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 3246 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 3247 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3249 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 3250 goto f_err; 3251 } 3252 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 3253 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 3254 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { 3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3256 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 3257 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3258 goto f_err; 3259 } 3260 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ 3261 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { 3262 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3263 goto f_err; 3264 } 3265 } else { 3266 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); 3267 if (i <= 0) { 3268 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, 3270 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); 3271 goto f_err; 3272 } 3273 } 3274 3275 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 3276 X509_free(s->session->peer); 3277 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); 3278 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 3279 3280 /* 3281 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we 3282 * arrive here. 3283 */ 3284 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3285 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 3286 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { 3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3288 goto err; 3289 } 3290 } 3291 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 3292 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 3293 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; 3294 /* 3295 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own 3296 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c 3297 */ 3298 3299 sk = NULL; 3300 3301 ret = 1; 3302 if (0) { 3303 f_err: 3304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3305 err: 3306 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3307 } 3308 3309 if (x != NULL) 3310 X509_free(x); 3311 if (sk != NULL) 3312 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); 3313 return (ret); 3314} 3315 3316int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 3317{ 3318 CERT_PKEY *cpk; 3319 3320 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { 3321 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 3322 if (cpk == NULL) { 3323 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 3324 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || 3325 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { 3326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, 3327 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3329 return (0); 3330 } 3331 } 3332 3333 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { 3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 3335 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3336 return (0); 3337 } 3338 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 3339 } 3340 3341 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 3342 return ssl_do_write(s); 3343} 3344 3345#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 3346/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ 3347int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 3348{ 3349 unsigned char *senc = NULL; 3350 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3351 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3352 3353 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { 3354 unsigned char *p, *macstart; 3355 const unsigned char *const_p; 3356 int len, slen_full, slen; 3357 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3358 unsigned int hlen; 3359 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3360 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 3361 unsigned char key_name[16]; 3362 3363 /* get session encoding length */ 3364 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 3365 /* 3366 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too 3367 * long 3368 */ 3369 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { 3370 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3371 return -1; 3372 } 3373 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); 3374 if (!senc) { 3375 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3376 return -1; 3377 } 3378 3379 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3380 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3381 3382 p = senc; 3383 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) 3384 goto err; 3385 3386 /* 3387 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up 3388 */ 3389 const_p = senc; 3390 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); 3391 if (sess == NULL) 3392 goto err; 3393 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ 3394 3395 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); 3396 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ 3397 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3398 goto err; 3399 } 3400 p = senc; 3401 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { 3402 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3403 goto err; 3404 } 3405 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3406 3407 /*- 3408 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3409 * follows handshake_header_length + 3410 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 3411 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 3412 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 3413 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 3414 */ 3415 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 3416 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 3417 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 3418 goto err; 3419 3420 p = ssl_handshake_start(s); 3421 /* 3422 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does 3423 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. 3424 */ 3425 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3426 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 3427 &hctx, 1) < 0) 3428 goto err; 3429 } else { 3430 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) 3431 goto err; 3432 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3433 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) 3434 goto err; 3435 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3436 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) 3437 goto err; 3438 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 3439 } 3440 3441 /* 3442 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified 3443 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for 3444 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. 3445 */ 3446 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); 3447 3448 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 3449 p += 2; 3450 /* Output key name */ 3451 macstart = p; 3452 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 3453 p += 16; 3454 /* output IV */ 3455 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 3456 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3457 /* Encrypt session data */ 3458 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) 3459 goto err; 3460 p += len; 3461 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) 3462 goto err; 3463 p += len; 3464 3465 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) 3466 goto err; 3467 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) 3468 goto err; 3469 3470 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3471 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3472 3473 p += hlen; 3474 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 3475 /* Total length */ 3476 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); 3477 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ 3478 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; 3479 s2n(len - 6, p); 3480 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len); 3481 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 3482 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3483 } 3484 3485 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 3486 return ssl_do_write(s); 3487 err: 3488 if (senc) 3489 OPENSSL_free(senc); 3490 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3491 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3492 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3493 return -1; 3494} 3495 3496int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 3497{ 3498 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { 3499 unsigned char *p; 3500 /*- 3501 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 3502 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 3503 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 3504 * + (ocsp response) 3505 */ 3506 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) { 3507 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3508 return -1; 3509 } 3510 3511 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 3512 3513 /* do the header */ 3514 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 3515 /* message length */ 3516 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 3517 /* status type */ 3518 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; 3519 /* length of OCSP response */ 3520 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 3521 /* actual response */ 3522 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 3523 /* number of bytes to write */ 3524 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 3525 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 3526 s->init_off = 0; 3527 } 3528 3529 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 3530 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 3531} 3532 3533# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 3534/* 3535 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. 3536 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found 3537 */ 3538int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) 3539{ 3540 int ok; 3541 int proto_len, padding_len; 3542 long n; 3543 const unsigned char *p; 3544 3545 /* 3546 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the 3547 * extension in their ClientHello 3548 */ 3549 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { 3550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, 3551 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); 3552 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3553 return -1; 3554 } 3555 3556 /* See the payload format below */ 3557 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 3558 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, 3559 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, 3560 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); 3561 3562 if (!ok) 3563 return ((int)n); 3564 3565 /* 3566 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in 3567 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by 3568 * ssl3_get_finished). 3569 */ 3570 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { 3571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); 3572 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3573 return -1; 3574 } 3575 3576 if (n < 2) { 3577 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3578 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ 3579 } 3580 3581 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 3582 3583 /*- 3584 * The payload looks like: 3585 * uint8 proto_len; 3586 * uint8 proto[proto_len]; 3587 * uint8 padding_len; 3588 * uint8 padding[padding_len]; 3589 */ 3590 proto_len = p[0]; 3591 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { 3592 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3593 return 0; 3594 } 3595 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; 3596 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { 3597 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3598 return 0; 3599 } 3600 3601 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); 3602 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 3603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3604 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; 3605 return 0; 3606 } 3607 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); 3608 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; 3609 3610 return 1; 3611} 3612# endif 3613 3614#endif 3615