xform_ah.c revision 1.82
1/* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.82 2018/02/15 08:38:00 maxv Exp $ */ 2/* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */ 3/* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 4/* 5 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 6 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 7 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 8 * 9 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 10 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 11 * 12 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 13 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 14 * 15 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 16 * and Niels Provos. 17 * 18 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 19 * 20 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 21 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 22 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 23 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 24 * 25 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 26 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 27 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 28 * modification of this software. 29 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 30 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 31 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 32 * all. 33 * 34 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 35 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 36 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 37 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 38 * PURPOSE. 39 */ 40 41#include <sys/cdefs.h> 42__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.82 2018/02/15 08:38:00 maxv Exp $"); 43 44#if defined(_KERNEL_OPT) 45#include "opt_inet.h" 46#include "opt_ipsec.h" 47#endif 48 49#include <sys/param.h> 50#include <sys/systm.h> 51#include <sys/mbuf.h> 52#include <sys/socket.h> 53#include <sys/syslog.h> 54#include <sys/kernel.h> 55#include <sys/sysctl.h> 56#include <sys/pool.h> 57#include <sys/pserialize.h> 58#include <sys/kmem.h> 59 60#include <net/if.h> 61 62#include <netinet/in.h> 63#include <netinet/in_systm.h> 64#include <netinet/ip.h> 65#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 66#include <netinet/ip_var.h> 67#include <netinet/ip6.h> 68 69#include <net/route.h> 70#include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 71#include <netipsec/ipsec_private.h> 72#include <netipsec/ah.h> 73#include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 74#include <netipsec/xform.h> 75 76#ifdef INET6 77#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 78#include <netinet6/scope6_var.h> 79#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 80#endif 81 82#include <netipsec/key.h> 83#include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 84 85#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 86 87/* 88 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 89 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 90 */ 91#define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 92 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 93 sizeof(struct ah) : sizeof(struct ah) + sizeof(uint32_t)) 94/* 95 * Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known 96 * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm gets 97 * this size from the xform but is (currently) always 12. 98 */ 99#define AUTHSIZE(sav) \ 100 ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->authsize) 101 102percpu_t *ahstat_percpu; 103 104int ah_enable = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 105int ip4_ah_cleartos = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 106 107#ifdef __FreeBSD__ 108SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 109SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 110 ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_enable, 0, ""); 111SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 112 ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_cleartos, 0, ""); 113SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, 114 stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ahstat, ahstat, ""); 115#endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ 116 117static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 118 119int ah_max_authsize; /* max authsize over all algorithms */ 120 121static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *); 122static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *); 123 124const uint8_t ah_stats[256] = { SADB_AALG_STATS_INIT }; 125 126static pool_cache_t ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache; 127static size_t ah_pool_item_size; 128 129/* 130 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. 131 */ 132const struct auth_hash * 133ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg) 134{ 135 136 switch (alg) { 137 case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: 138 return &auth_hash_null; 139 case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: 140 return &auth_hash_hmac_md5_96; 141 case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: 142 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1_96; 143 case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC: 144 return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160_96; 145 case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: 146 return &auth_hash_key_md5; 147 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: 148 return &auth_hash_key_sha1; 149 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: 150 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; 151 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: 152 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; 153 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: 154 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; 155 case SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC: 156 return &auth_hash_aes_xcbc_mac_96; 157 } 158 return NULL; 159} 160 161size_t 162ah_hdrsiz(const struct secasvar *sav) 163{ 164 size_t size; 165 166 if (sav != NULL) { 167 int authsize; 168 KASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL); 169 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 170 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 171 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof(uint32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 172 } else { 173 /* default guess */ 174 size = sizeof(struct ah) + sizeof(uint32_t) + ah_max_authsize; 175 } 176 return size; 177} 178 179/* 180 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 181 */ 182int 183ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp, 184 struct cryptoini *cria) 185{ 186 const struct auth_hash *thash; 187 int keylen; 188 189 thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 190 if (thash == NULL) { 191 DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 192 __func__, sav->alg_auth)); 193 return EINVAL; 194 } 195 /* 196 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 197 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 198 * later during protocol processing. 199 */ 200 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 201 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 202 DPRINTF(("%s: replay state block inconsistency, " 203 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", __func__, 204 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 205 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 206 return EINVAL; 207 } 208 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 209 DPRINTF(("%s: no authentication key for %s algorithm\n", 210 __func__, thash->name)); 211 return EINVAL; 212 } 213 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 214 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 215 DPRINTF(("%s: invalid keylength %d, algorithm %s requires " 216 "keysize %d\n", __func__, 217 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 218 return EINVAL; 219 } 220 221 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 222 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 223 224 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 225 memset(cria, 0, sizeof(*cria)); 226 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 227 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 228 cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 229 230 return 0; 231} 232 233/* 234 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 235 */ 236static int 237ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp) 238{ 239 struct cryptoini cria; 240 int error; 241 242 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 243 if (!error) 244 error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, 245 &cria, crypto_support); 246 return error; 247} 248 249/* 250 * Paranoia. 251 * 252 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 253 */ 254int 255ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 256{ 257 int err; 258 259 if (sav->key_auth) { 260 explicit_memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), 0, 261 _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 262 } 263 264 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 265 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 266 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 267 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 268 return err; 269} 270 271/* 272 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 273 */ 274static int 275ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 276{ 277 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 278 unsigned char *ptr; 279 int off, count; 280#ifdef INET 281 struct ip *ip; 282#endif 283#ifdef INET6 284 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 285 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 286 struct ip6_rthdr *rh; 287 int alloc, ad, nxt; 288#endif 289 290 switch (proto) { 291#ifdef INET 292 case AF_INET: 293 /* 294 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 295 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 296 * contiguous memory. 297 */ 298 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 299 if (m == NULL) { 300 DPRINTF(("%s: m_pullup failed\n", __func__)); 301 return ENOBUFS; 302 } 303 304 /* Fix the IP header */ 305 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 306 if (ip4_ah_cleartos) 307 ip->ip_tos = 0; 308 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 309 ip->ip_sum = 0; 310 ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & ip4_ah_offsetmask); 311 312 /* 313 * On FreeBSD, ip_off and ip_len assumed in host endian; 314 * they are converted (if necessary) by ip_input(). 315 * On NetBSD, ip_off and ip_len are in network byte order. 316 * They must be massaged back to network byte order 317 * before verifying the HMAC. Moreover, on FreeBSD, 318 * we should add `skip' back into the massaged ip_len 319 * (presumably ip_input() deducted it before we got here?) 320 * whereas on NetBSD, we should not. 321 */ 322 if (!out) { 323 uint16_t inlen = ntohs(ip->ip_len); 324 325 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen); 326 327 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 328 ip->ip_off &= htons(IP_DF); 329 else 330 ip->ip_off = 0; 331 } else { 332 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 333 ip->ip_off &= htons(IP_DF); 334 else 335 ip->ip_off = 0; 336 } 337 338 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *); 339 340 /* IPv4 option processing */ 341 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 342 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 343 off + 1 < skip) 344 ; 345 else { 346 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option length for " 347 "option %d\n", __func__, ptr[off])); 348 349 m_freem(m); 350 return EINVAL; 351 } 352 353 switch (ptr[off]) { 354 case IPOPT_EOL: 355 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 356 break; 357 358 case IPOPT_NOP: 359 off++; 360 break; 361 362 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 363 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 364 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 365 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 366 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 367 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 368 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 369 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option " 370 "length for option %d\n", __func__, 371 ptr[off])); 372 373 m_freem(m); 374 return EINVAL; 375 } 376 377 off += ptr[off + 1]; 378 break; 379 380 case IPOPT_LSRR: 381 case IPOPT_SSRR: 382 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 383 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 384 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option " 385 "length for option %d\n", __func__, 386 ptr[off])); 387 388 m_freem(m); 389 return EINVAL; 390 } 391 392 /* 393 * On output, if we have either of the 394 * source routing options, we should 395 * swap the destination address of the 396 * IP header with the last address 397 * specified in the option, as that is 398 * what the destination's IP header 399 * will look like. 400 */ 401 if (out) 402 memcpy(&ip->ip_dst, 403 ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 404 sizeof(struct in_addr), 405 sizeof(struct in_addr)); 406 407 /* Fall through */ 408 default: 409 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 410 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 411 DPRINTF(("%s: illegal IPv4 option " 412 "length for option %d\n", __func__, 413 ptr[off])); 414 m_freem(m); 415 return EINVAL; 416 } 417 418 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 419 count = ptr[off + 1]; 420 memcpy(ptr + off, ipseczeroes, count); 421 off += count; 422 break; 423 } 424 425 /* Sanity check. */ 426 if (off > skip) { 427 DPRINTF(("%s: malformed IPv4 options header\n", 428 __func__)); 429 m_freem(m); 430 return EINVAL; 431 } 432 } 433 434 break; 435#endif /* INET */ 436 437#ifdef INET6 438 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 439 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 440 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 441 442 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 443 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 444 DPRINTF(("%s: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n", __func__)); 445 m_freem(m); 446 return EMSGSIZE; 447 } 448 449 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 450 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 451 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 452 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 453 454 /* Scoped address handling. */ 455 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 456 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 457 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 458 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 459 460 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 461 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), &ip6); 462 463 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 464 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 465 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 466 ptr = malloc(skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 467 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 468 if (ptr == NULL) { 469 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate " 470 "memory for IPv6 headers\n", 471 __func__)); 472 m_freem(m); 473 return ENOBUFS; 474 } 475 476 /* 477 * Copy all the protocol headers after 478 * the IPv6 header. 479 */ 480 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 481 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 482 alloc = 1; 483 } else { 484 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 485 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 486 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 487 alloc = 0; 488 } 489 } else 490 break; 491 492 nxt = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 493 494 for (off = 0; off < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) { 495 int noff; 496 497 switch (nxt) { 498 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 499 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 500 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *)(ptr + off); 501 noff = off + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 502 503 /* Sanity check. */ 504 if (noff > skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { 505 goto error6; 506 } 507 508 /* 509 * Zero out mutable options. 510 */ 511 for (count = off + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 512 count < noff;) { 513 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 514 count++; 515 continue; 516 } 517 518 ad = ptr[count + 1] + 2; 519 520 if (count + ad > noff) { 521 goto error6; 522 } 523 524 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) { 525 memset(ptr + count, 0, ad); 526 } 527 528 count += ad; 529 } 530 531 if (count != noff) { 532 goto error6; 533 } 534 535 /* Advance. */ 536 off += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 537 nxt = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 538 break; 539 540 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 541 /* 542 * Always include routing headers in 543 * computation. 544 */ 545 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + off); 546 rh = (struct ip6_rthdr *)(ptr + off); 547 /* 548 * must adjust content to make it look like 549 * its final form (as seen at the final 550 * destination). 551 * we only know how to massage type 0 routing 552 * header. 553 */ 554 if (out && rh->ip6r_type == IPV6_RTHDR_TYPE_0) { 555 struct ip6_rthdr0 *rh0; 556 struct in6_addr *addr, finaldst; 557 int i; 558 559 rh0 = (struct ip6_rthdr0 *)rh; 560 addr = (struct in6_addr *)(rh0 + 1); 561 562 for (i = 0; i < rh0->ip6r0_segleft; i++) 563 in6_clearscope(&addr[i]); 564 565 finaldst = addr[rh0->ip6r0_segleft - 1]; 566 memmove(&addr[1], &addr[0], 567 sizeof(struct in6_addr) * 568 (rh0->ip6r0_segleft - 1)); 569 570 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 571 addr[0] = ip6.ip6_dst; 572 ip6.ip6_dst = finaldst; 573 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 574 575 rh0->ip6r0_segleft = 0; 576 } 577 578 /* advance */ 579 off += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 580 nxt = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 581 break; 582 583 default: 584 DPRINTF(("%s: unexpected IPv6 header type %d\n", 585 __func__, off)); 586error6: 587 if (alloc) 588 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 589 m_freem(m); 590 return EINVAL; 591 } 592 } 593 594 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 595 if (alloc) { 596 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 597 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 598 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 599 } 600 601 break; 602#endif /* INET6 */ 603 } 604 605 return 0; 606} 607 608/* 609 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 610 * passes authentication. 611 */ 612static int 613ah_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 614{ 615 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 616 struct tdb_crypto *tc = NULL; 617 struct newah *ah; 618 int hl, rplen, authsize, error, stat = AH_STAT_HDROPS; 619 struct cryptodesc *crda; 620 struct cryptop *crp = NULL; 621 bool pool_used; 622 uint8_t nxt; 623 624 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET(__func__); 625 626 KASSERT(sav != NULL); 627 KASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL); 628 KASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL); 629 630 /* Figure out header size. */ 631 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 632 633 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 634 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 635 if (ah == NULL) { 636 DPRINTF(("%s: cannot pullup header\n", __func__)); 637 error = ENOBUFS; 638 stat = AH_STAT_HDROPS; /*XXX*/ 639 goto bad; 640 } 641 642 nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 643 644 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 645 if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) { 646 char buf[IPSEC_LOGSASTRLEN]; 647 DPRINTF(("%s: packet replay failure: %s\n", __func__, 648 ipsec_logsastr(sav, buf, sizeof(buf)))); 649 stat = AH_STAT_REPLAY; 650 error = ENOBUFS; 651 goto bad; 652 } 653 654 /* Verify AH header length. */ 655 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof(uint32_t); 656 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 657 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 658 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah)) { 659 char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; 660 DPRINTF(("%s: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 661 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 662 hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof(struct ah)), 663 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 664 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 665 stat = AH_STAT_BADAUTHL; 666 error = EACCES; 667 goto bad; 668 } 669 if (skip + authsize + rplen > m->m_pkthdr.len) { 670 char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; 671 DPRINTF(("%s: bad mbuf length %u (expecting >= %lu)" 672 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 673 m->m_pkthdr.len, (u_long)(skip + authsize + rplen), 674 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 675 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 676 stat = AH_STAT_BADAUTHL; 677 error = EACCES; 678 goto bad; 679 } 680 681 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 682 683 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 684 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 685 if (crp == NULL) { 686 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n", __func__)); 687 stat = AH_STAT_CRYPTO; 688 error = ENOBUFS; 689 goto bad; 690 } 691 692 crda = crp->crp_desc; 693 KASSERT(crda != NULL); 694 695 crda->crd_skip = 0; 696 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 697 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 698 699 /* Authentication operation. */ 700 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 701 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 702 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 703 704 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 705 size_t size = sizeof(*tc); 706 size_t extra = skip + rplen + authsize; 707 size += extra; 708 709 if (__predict_true(size <= ah_pool_item_size)) { 710 tc = pool_cache_get(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, PR_NOWAIT); 711 pool_used = true; 712 } else { 713 /* size can exceed on IPv6 packets with large options. */ 714 tc = kmem_intr_zalloc(size, KM_NOSLEEP); 715 pool_used = false; 716 } 717 if (tc == NULL) { 718 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__)); 719 stat = AH_STAT_CRYPTO; 720 error = ENOBUFS; 721 goto bad; 722 } 723 724 error = m_makewritable(&m, 0, extra, M_NOWAIT); 725 if (error) { 726 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to m_makewritable\n", __func__)); 727 goto bad; 728 } 729 730 /* 731 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 732 * and the AH header. 733 */ 734 m_copydata(m, 0, extra, (tc + 1)); 735 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 736 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 737 738 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 739 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 740 skip, ahx->type, 0); 741 if (error != 0) { 742 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 743 m = NULL; 744 goto bad; 745 } 746 747 { 748 int s = pserialize_read_enter(); 749 750 /* 751 * Take another reference to the SA for opencrypto callback. 752 */ 753 if (__predict_false(sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD)) { 754 pserialize_read_exit(s); 755 stat = AH_STAT_NOTDB; 756 error = ENOENT; 757 goto bad; 758 } 759 KEY_SA_REF(sav); 760 pserialize_read_exit(s); 761 } 762 763 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 764 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 765 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 766 crp->crp_buf = m; 767 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 768 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 769 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 770 771 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 772 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 773 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 774 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 775 tc->tc_nxt = nxt; 776 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 777 tc->tc_skip = skip; 778 tc->tc_sav = sav; 779 780 DPRINTF(("%s: hash over %d bytes, skip %d: " 781 "crda len %d skip %d inject %d\n", __func__, 782 crp->crp_ilen, tc->tc_skip, 783 crda->crd_len, crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_inject)); 784 785 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 786 787bad: 788 if (tc != NULL) { 789 if (__predict_true(pool_used)) 790 pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); 791 else 792 kmem_intr_free(tc, size); 793 } 794 if (crp != NULL) 795 crypto_freereq(crp); 796 if (m != NULL) 797 m_freem(m); 798 AH_STATINC(stat); 799 return error; 800} 801 802#ifdef INET6 803#define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff) do { \ 804 if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \ 805 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff); \ 806 } else { \ 807 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff); \ 808 } \ 809} while (0) 810#else 811#define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff) \ 812 (error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff)) 813#endif 814 815/* 816 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 817 */ 818static int 819ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 820{ 821 char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; 822 int rplen, error, skip, protoff; 823 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 824 struct mbuf *m; 825 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 826 struct secasvar *sav; 827 struct secasindex *saidx; 828 uint8_t nxt; 829 char *ptr; 830 int authsize; 831 uint16_t dport; 832 uint16_t sport; 833 bool pool_used; 834 size_t size; 835 IPSEC_DECLARE_LOCK_VARIABLE; 836 837 KASSERT(crp->crp_opaque != NULL); 838 tc = crp->crp_opaque; 839 skip = tc->tc_skip; 840 nxt = tc->tc_nxt; 841 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 842 m = crp->crp_buf; 843 844 845 /* find the source port for NAT-T */ 846 nat_t_ports_get(m, &dport, &sport); 847 848 IPSEC_ACQUIRE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); 849 850 sav = tc->tc_sav; 851 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 852 KASSERTMSG(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 853 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 854 "unexpected protocol family %u", saidx->dst.sa.sa_family); 855 856 /* Figure out header size. */ 857 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 858 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 859 860 size = sizeof(*tc) + skip + rplen + authsize; 861 if (__predict_true(size <= ah_pool_item_size)) 862 pool_used = true; 863 else 864 pool_used = false; 865 866 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 867 if (crp->crp_etype) { 868 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 869 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 870 871 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 872 IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); 873 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 874 } 875 876 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 877 DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype)); 878 error = crp->crp_etype; 879 goto bad; 880 } else { 881 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + ah_stats[sav->alg_auth]); 882 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 883 crp = NULL; 884 } 885 886 if (ipsec_debug) 887 memset(calc, 0, sizeof(calc)); 888 889 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 890 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 891 892 ptr = (char *)(tc + 1); 893 const uint8_t *pppp = ptr + skip + rplen; 894 895 /* Verify authenticator. */ 896 if (!consttime_memequal(pppp, calc, authsize)) { 897 DPRINTF(("%s: authentication hash mismatch " \ 898 "over %d bytes " \ 899 "for packet in SA %s/%08lx:\n" \ 900 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x, " \ 901 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 902 __func__, authsize, 903 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 904 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 905 calc[0], calc[1], calc[2], calc[3], 906 calc[4], calc[5], calc[6], calc[7], 907 calc[8], calc[9], calc[10], calc[11], 908 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 909 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 910 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11] 911 )); 912 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTH); 913 error = EACCES; 914 goto bad; 915 } 916 917 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 918 ptr[protoff] = nxt; 919 920 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 921 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 922 923 if (__predict_true(pool_used)) 924 pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); 925 else 926 kmem_intr_free(tc, size); 927 tc = NULL; 928 929 /* 930 * Header is now authenticated. 931 */ 932 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 933 934 /* 935 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 936 */ 937 if (sav->replay) { 938 uint32_t seq; 939 940 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 941 sizeof(seq), &seq); 942 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 943 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 944 error = ENOBUFS; /* XXX as above */ 945 goto bad; 946 } 947 } 948 949 /* 950 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 951 */ 952 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 953 if (error) { 954 DPRINTF(("%s: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 955 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 956 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 957 958 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 959 goto bad; 960 } 961 962 IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff); 963 964 KEY_SA_UNREF(&sav); 965 IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); 966 return error; 967 968bad: 969 if (sav) 970 KEY_SA_UNREF(&sav); 971 IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); 972 if (m != NULL) 973 m_freem(m); 974 if (tc != NULL) { 975 if (pool_used) 976 pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); 977 else 978 kmem_intr_free(tc, size); 979 } 980 if (crp != NULL) 981 crypto_freereq(crp); 982 return error; 983} 984 985/* 986 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). 987 */ 988static int 989ah_output(struct mbuf *m, const struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct secasvar *sav, 990 struct mbuf **mp, int skip, int protoff) 991{ 992 char buf[IPSEC_ADDRSTRLEN]; 993 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 994 struct cryptodesc *crda; 995 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 996 struct mbuf *mi; 997 struct cryptop *crp; 998 uint16_t iplen; 999 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 1000 uint8_t prot; 1001 struct newah *ah; 1002 size_t ipoffs; 1003 1004 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET(__func__); 1005 1006 KASSERT(sav != NULL); 1007 KASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL); 1008 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 1009 1010 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_OUTPUT); 1011 1012 /* Figure out header size. */ 1013 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 1014 1015 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 1016 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1017#ifdef INET 1018 case AF_INET: 1019 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 1020 ipoffs = offsetof(struct ip, ip_len); 1021 break; 1022#endif 1023#ifdef INET6 1024 case AF_INET6: 1025 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 1026 ipoffs = offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen); 1027 break; 1028#endif 1029 default: 1030 DPRINTF(("%s: unknown/unsupported protocol " 1031 "family %u, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 1032 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1033 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 1034 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1035 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOPF); 1036 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 1037 goto bad; 1038 } 1039 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1040 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 1041 DPRINTF(("%s: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 1042 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", __func__, 1043 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 1044 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 1045 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 1046 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_TOOBIG); 1047 error = EMSGSIZE; 1048 goto bad; 1049 } 1050 1051 /* Update the counters. */ 1052 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_OBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 1053 1054 m = m_clone(m); 1055 if (m == NULL) { 1056 DPRINTF(("%s: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", __func__, 1057 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 1058 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1059 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 1060 error = ENOBUFS; 1061 goto bad; 1062 } 1063 1064 /* Inject AH header. */ 1065 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 1066 if (mi == NULL) { 1067 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 1068 "%s/%08lx\n", __func__, 1069 rplen + authsize, 1070 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, sizeof(buf)), 1071 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1072 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 1073 error = ENOBUFS; 1074 goto bad; 1075 } 1076 1077 /* 1078 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 1079 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 1080 */ 1081 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, char *) + roff); 1082 1083 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 1084 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(uint8_t), &ah->ah_nxt); 1085 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(uint32_t); 1086 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 1087 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 1088 1089 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 1090 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 1091 1092 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 1093 if (sav->replay) { 1094 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 1095 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 1096 DPRINTF(("%s: replay counter wrapped for SA %s/%08lx\n", 1097 __func__, ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst, buf, 1098 sizeof(buf)), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1099 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_WRAP); 1100 error = EINVAL; 1101 goto bad; 1102 } 1103#ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1104 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 1105 if (!ipsec_replay) 1106#endif 1107 sav->replay->count++; 1108 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 1109 } 1110 1111 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 1112 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 1113 if (crp == NULL) { 1114 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n", 1115 __func__)); 1116 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1117 error = ENOBUFS; 1118 goto bad; 1119 } 1120 1121 crda = crp->crp_desc; 1122 1123 crda->crd_skip = 0; 1124 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 1125 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 1126 1127 /* Authentication operation. */ 1128 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 1129 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 1130 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 1131 1132 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 1133 tc = pool_cache_get(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, PR_NOWAIT); 1134 if (tc == NULL) { 1135 crypto_freereq(crp); 1136 DPRINTF(("%s: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n", __func__)); 1137 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1138 error = ENOBUFS; 1139 goto bad; 1140 } 1141 1142 uint8_t *pext = (char *)(tc + 1); 1143 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 1144 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, pext); 1145 1146 /* 1147 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 1148 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 1149 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 1150 */ 1151 memcpy(&iplen, pext + ipoffs, sizeof(iplen)); 1152 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1153 m_copyback(m, ipoffs, sizeof(iplen), &iplen); 1154 1155 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1156 pext[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1157 1158 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1159 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1160 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(prot), &prot); 1161 1162 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1163 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1164 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1165 if (error != 0) { 1166 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1167 pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); 1168 crypto_freereq(crp); 1169 goto bad; 1170 } 1171 1172 { 1173 int s = pserialize_read_enter(); 1174 1175 /* 1176 * Take another reference to the SP and the SA for opencrypto callback. 1177 */ 1178 if (__predict_false(isr->sp->state == IPSEC_SPSTATE_DEAD || 1179 sav->state == SADB_SASTATE_DEAD)) { 1180 pserialize_read_exit(s); 1181 pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); 1182 crypto_freereq(crp); 1183 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 1184 error = ENOENT; 1185 goto bad; 1186 } 1187 KEY_SP_REF(isr->sp); 1188 KEY_SA_REF(sav); 1189 pserialize_read_exit(s); 1190 } 1191 1192 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1193 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1194 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 1195 crp->crp_buf = m; 1196 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1197 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 1198 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 1199 1200 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1201 tc->tc_isr = isr; 1202 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 1203 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 1204 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 1205 tc->tc_skip = skip; 1206 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 1207 tc->tc_sav = sav; 1208 1209 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1210bad: 1211 if (m) 1212 m_freem(m); 1213 return (error); 1214} 1215 1216/* 1217 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1218 */ 1219static int 1220ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1221{ 1222 int skip, error; 1223 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1224 const struct ipsecrequest *isr; 1225 struct secasvar *sav; 1226 struct mbuf *m; 1227 void *ptr; 1228 int err; 1229 IPSEC_DECLARE_LOCK_VARIABLE; 1230 1231 KASSERT(crp->crp_opaque != NULL); 1232 tc = crp->crp_opaque; 1233 skip = tc->tc_skip; 1234 ptr = (tc + 1); 1235 m = crp->crp_buf; 1236 1237 IPSEC_ACQUIRE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); 1238 1239 isr = tc->tc_isr; 1240 sav = tc->tc_sav; 1241 1242 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1243 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1244 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 1245 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1246 1247 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1248 IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); 1249 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1250 } 1251 1252 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 1253 DPRINTF(("%s: crypto error %d\n", __func__, crp->crp_etype)); 1254 error = crp->crp_etype; 1255 goto bad; 1256 } 1257 1258 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + ah_stats[sav->alg_auth]); 1259 1260 /* 1261 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1262 * in place. 1263 */ 1264 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1265 1266 /* No longer needed. */ 1267 pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); 1268 crypto_freereq(crp); 1269 1270#ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1271 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1272 if (ipsec_integrity) { 1273 int alen; 1274 1275 /* 1276 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1277 * the other side. 1278 */ 1279 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1280 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1281 } 1282#endif 1283 1284 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1285 err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr, sav); 1286 KEY_SA_UNREF(&sav); 1287 KEY_SP_UNREF(&isr->sp); 1288 IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); 1289 return err; 1290bad: 1291 if (sav) 1292 KEY_SA_UNREF(&sav); 1293 KEY_SP_UNREF(&isr->sp); 1294 IPSEC_RELEASE_GLOBAL_LOCKS(); 1295 if (m) 1296 m_freem(m); 1297 pool_cache_put(ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache, tc); 1298 crypto_freereq(crp); 1299 return error; 1300} 1301 1302static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1303 .xf_type = XF_AH, 1304 .xf_flags = XFT_AUTH, 1305 .xf_name = "IPsec AH", 1306 .xf_init = ah_init, 1307 .xf_zeroize = ah_zeroize, 1308 .xf_input = ah_input, 1309 .xf_output = ah_output, 1310 .xf_next = NULL, 1311}; 1312 1313void 1314ah_attach(void) 1315{ 1316 ahstat_percpu = percpu_alloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * AH_NSTATS); 1317 1318#define MAXAUTHSIZE(name) \ 1319 if ((auth_hash_ ## name).authsize > ah_max_authsize) \ 1320 ah_max_authsize = (auth_hash_ ## name).authsize 1321 1322 ah_max_authsize = 0; 1323 MAXAUTHSIZE(null); 1324 MAXAUTHSIZE(md5); 1325 MAXAUTHSIZE(sha1); 1326 MAXAUTHSIZE(key_md5); 1327 MAXAUTHSIZE(key_sha1); 1328 MAXAUTHSIZE(hmac_md5); 1329 MAXAUTHSIZE(hmac_sha1); 1330 MAXAUTHSIZE(hmac_ripemd_160); 1331 MAXAUTHSIZE(hmac_md5_96); 1332 MAXAUTHSIZE(hmac_sha1_96); 1333 MAXAUTHSIZE(hmac_ripemd_160_96); 1334 MAXAUTHSIZE(hmac_sha2_256); 1335 MAXAUTHSIZE(hmac_sha2_384); 1336 MAXAUTHSIZE(hmac_sha2_512); 1337 MAXAUTHSIZE(aes_xcbc_mac_96); 1338 MAXAUTHSIZE(gmac_aes_128); 1339 MAXAUTHSIZE(gmac_aes_192); 1340 MAXAUTHSIZE(gmac_aes_256); 1341 IPSECLOG(LOG_DEBUG, "ah_max_authsize=%d\n", ah_max_authsize); 1342 1343#undef MAXAUTHSIZE 1344 1345 ah_pool_item_size = sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + 1346 sizeof(struct ip) + MAX_IPOPTLEN + 1347 sizeof(struct ah) + sizeof(uint32_t) + ah_max_authsize; 1348 ah_tdb_crypto_pool_cache = pool_cache_init(ah_pool_item_size, 1349 coherency_unit, 0, 0, "ah_tdb_crypto", NULL, IPL_SOFTNET, 1350 NULL, NULL, NULL); 1351 1352 xform_register(&ah_xformsw); 1353} 1354