xform_ah.c revision 1.41
1/* $NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.41 2013/08/28 15:24:41 riastradh Exp $ */ 2/* $FreeBSD: src/sys/netipsec/xform_ah.c,v 1.1.4.1 2003/01/24 05:11:36 sam Exp $ */ 3/* $OpenBSD: ip_ah.c,v 1.63 2001/06/26 06:18:58 angelos Exp $ */ 4/* 5 * The authors of this code are John Ioannidis (ji@tla.org), 6 * Angelos D. Keromytis (kermit@csd.uch.gr) and 7 * Niels Provos (provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de). 8 * 9 * The original version of this code was written by John Ioannidis 10 * for BSD/OS in Athens, Greece, in November 1995. 11 * 12 * Ported to OpenBSD and NetBSD, with additional transforms, in December 1996, 13 * by Angelos D. Keromytis. 14 * 15 * Additional transforms and features in 1997 and 1998 by Angelos D. Keromytis 16 * and Niels Provos. 17 * 18 * Additional features in 1999 by Angelos D. Keromytis and Niklas Hallqvist. 19 * 20 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 by John Ioannidis, 21 * Angelos D. Keromytis and Niels Provos. 22 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. 23 * Copyright (c) 2001 Angelos D. Keromytis. 24 * 25 * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software with or without fee 26 * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in 27 * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or 28 * modification of this software. 29 * You may use this code under the GNU public license if you so wish. Please 30 * contribute changes back to the authors under this freer than GPL license 31 * so that we may further the use of strong encryption without limitations to 32 * all. 33 * 34 * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR 35 * IMPLIED WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NONE OF THE AUTHORS MAKES ANY 36 * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE 37 * MERCHANTABILITY OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 38 * PURPOSE. 39 */ 40 41#include <sys/cdefs.h> 42__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: xform_ah.c,v 1.41 2013/08/28 15:24:41 riastradh Exp $"); 43 44#include "opt_inet.h" 45#ifdef __FreeBSD__ 46#include "opt_inet6.h" 47#endif 48 49#include <sys/param.h> 50#include <sys/systm.h> 51#include <sys/mbuf.h> 52#include <sys/socket.h> 53#include <sys/syslog.h> 54#include <sys/kernel.h> 55#include <sys/sysctl.h> 56#include <sys/socketvar.h> /* for softnet_lock */ 57 58#include <net/if.h> 59 60#include <netinet/in.h> 61#include <netinet/in_systm.h> 62#include <netinet/ip.h> 63#include <netinet/ip_ecn.h> 64#include <netinet/ip6.h> 65 66#include <net/route.h> 67#include <netipsec/ipsec.h> 68#include <netipsec/ipsec_private.h> 69#include <netipsec/ah.h> 70#include <netipsec/ah_var.h> 71#include <netipsec/xform.h> 72 73#ifdef INET6 74#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h> 75#include <netinet6/scope6_var.h> 76#include <netipsec/ipsec6.h> 77# ifdef __FreeBSD__ 78# include <netinet6/ip6_ecn.h> 79# endif 80#endif 81 82#include <netipsec/key.h> 83#include <netipsec/key_debug.h> 84#include <netipsec/ipsec_osdep.h> 85 86#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h> 87 88/* 89 * Return header size in bytes. The old protocol did not support 90 * the replay counter; the new protocol always includes the counter. 91 */ 92#define HDRSIZE(sav) \ 93 (((sav)->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? \ 94 sizeof (struct ah) : sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t)) 95/* 96 * Return authenticator size in bytes. The old protocol is known 97 * to use a fixed 16-byte authenticator. The new algorithm gets 98 * this size from the xform but is (currently) always 12. 99 */ 100#define AUTHSIZE(sav) \ 101 ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->authsize) 102 103percpu_t *ahstat_percpu; 104 105int ah_enable = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */ 106int ip4_ah_cleartos = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */ 107 108#ifdef __FreeBSD__ 109SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ah); 110SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 111 ah_enable, CTLFLAG_RW, &ah_enable, 0, ""); 112SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ah, OID_AUTO, 113 ah_cleartos, CTLFLAG_RW, &ip4_ah_cleartos, 0, ""); 114SYSCTL_STRUCT(_net_inet_ah, IPSECCTL_STATS, 115 stats, CTLFLAG_RD, &ahstat, ahstat, ""); 116 117#endif /* __FreeBSD__ */ 118 119static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */ 120 121static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*); 122static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*); 123 124/* 125 * NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support. 126 */ 127const struct auth_hash * 128ah_algorithm_lookup(int alg) 129{ 130 if (alg >= AH_ALG_MAX) 131 return NULL; 132 switch (alg) { 133 case SADB_X_AALG_NULL: 134 return &auth_hash_null; 135 case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC: 136 return &auth_hash_hmac_md5_96; 137 case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC: 138 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha1_96; 139 case SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC: 140 return &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160_96; 141 case SADB_X_AALG_MD5: 142 return &auth_hash_key_md5; 143 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA: 144 return &auth_hash_key_sha1; 145 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256: 146 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256; 147 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384: 148 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384; 149 case SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512: 150 return &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512; 151 case SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC: 152 return &auth_hash_aes_xcbc_mac_96; 153 } 154 return NULL; 155} 156 157size_t 158ah_hdrsiz(const struct secasvar *sav) 159{ 160 size_t size; 161 162 if (sav != NULL) { 163 int authsize; 164 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 165 ("ah_hdrsiz: null xform")); 166 /*XXX not right for null algorithm--does it matter??*/ 167 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 168 size = roundup(authsize, sizeof (u_int32_t)) + HDRSIZE(sav); 169 } else { 170 /* default guess */ 171 size = sizeof (struct ah) + sizeof (u_int32_t) + 16; 172 } 173 return size; 174} 175 176/* 177 * NB: public for use by esp_init. 178 */ 179int 180ah_init0(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp, 181 struct cryptoini *cria) 182{ 183 const struct auth_hash *thash; 184 int keylen; 185 186 thash = ah_algorithm_lookup(sav->alg_auth); 187 if (thash == NULL) { 188 DPRINTF(("ah_init: unsupported authentication algorithm %u\n", 189 sav->alg_auth)); 190 return EINVAL; 191 } 192 /* 193 * Verify the replay state block allocation is consistent with 194 * the protocol type. We check here so we can make assumptions 195 * later during protocol processing. 196 */ 197 /* NB: replay state is setup elsewhere (sigh) */ 198 if (((sav->flags&SADB_X_EXT_OLD) == 0) ^ (sav->replay != NULL)) { 199 DPRINTF(("ah_init: replay state block inconsistency, " 200 "%s algorithm %s replay state\n", 201 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? "old" : "new", 202 sav->replay == NULL ? "without" : "with")); 203 return EINVAL; 204 } 205 if (sav->key_auth == NULL) { 206 DPRINTF(("ah_init: no authentication key for %s " 207 "algorithm\n", thash->name)); 208 return EINVAL; 209 } 210 keylen = _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth); 211 if (keylen != thash->keysize && thash->keysize != 0) { 212 DPRINTF(("ah_init: invalid keylength %d, algorithm " 213 "%s requires keysize %d\n", 214 keylen, thash->name, thash->keysize)); 215 return EINVAL; 216 } 217 218 sav->tdb_xform = xsp; 219 sav->tdb_authalgxform = thash; 220 221 /* Initialize crypto session. */ 222 memset(cria, 0, sizeof (*cria)); 223 cria->cri_alg = sav->tdb_authalgxform->type; 224 cria->cri_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 225 cria->cri_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 226 227 return 0; 228} 229 230/* 231 * ah_init() is called when an SPI is being set up. 232 */ 233static int 234ah_init(struct secasvar *sav, const struct xformsw *xsp) 235{ 236 struct cryptoini cria; 237 int error; 238 239 error = ah_init0(sav, xsp, &cria); 240 if (!error) 241 error = crypto_newsession(&sav->tdb_cryptoid, 242 &cria, crypto_support); 243 return error; 244} 245 246/* 247 * Paranoia. 248 * 249 * NB: public for use by esp_zeroize (XXX). 250 */ 251int 252ah_zeroize(struct secasvar *sav) 253{ 254 int err; 255 256 if (sav->key_auth) 257 memset(_KEYBUF(sav->key_auth), 0, _KEYLEN(sav->key_auth)); 258 259 err = crypto_freesession(sav->tdb_cryptoid); 260 sav->tdb_cryptoid = 0; 261 sav->tdb_authalgxform = NULL; 262 sav->tdb_xform = NULL; 263 return err; 264} 265 266/* 267 * Massage IPv4/IPv6 headers for AH processing. 268 */ 269static int 270ah_massage_headers(struct mbuf **m0, int proto, int skip, int alg, int out) 271{ 272 struct mbuf *m = *m0; 273 unsigned char *ptr; 274 int off, count; 275 276#ifdef INET 277 struct ip *ip; 278#endif /* INET */ 279 280#ifdef INET6 281 struct ip6_ext *ip6e; 282 struct ip6_hdr ip6; 283 int alloc, ad, nxt; 284#endif /* INET6 */ 285 286 switch (proto) { 287#ifdef INET 288 case AF_INET: 289 /* 290 * This is the least painful way of dealing with IPv4 header 291 * and option processing -- just make sure they're in 292 * contiguous memory. 293 */ 294 *m0 = m = m_pullup(m, skip); 295 if (m == NULL) { 296 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: m_pullup failed\n")); 297 return ENOBUFS; 298 } 299 300 /* Fix the IP header */ 301 ip = mtod(m, struct ip *); 302 if (ip4_ah_cleartos) 303 ip->ip_tos = 0; 304 ip->ip_ttl = 0; 305 ip->ip_sum = 0; 306 ip->ip_off = htons(ntohs(ip->ip_off) & ip4_ah_offsetmask); 307 308 /* 309 * On FreeBSD, ip_off and ip_len assumed in host endian; 310 * they are converted (if necessary) by ip_input(). 311 * On NetBSD, ip_off and ip_len are in network byte order. 312 * They must be massaged back to network byte order 313 * before verifying the HMAC. Moreover, on FreeBSD, 314 * we should add `skip' back into the massaged ip_len 315 * (presumably ip_input() deducted it before we got here?) 316 * whereas on NetBSD, we should not. 317 */ 318#ifdef __FreeBSD__ 319 #define TOHOST(x) (x) 320#else 321 #define TOHOST(x) (ntohs(x)) 322#endif 323 if (!out) { 324 u_int16_t inlen = TOHOST(ip->ip_len); 325 326#ifdef __FreeBSD__ 327 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen + skip); 328#else /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 329 ip->ip_len = htons(inlen); 330#endif /*!__FreeBSD__ */ 331 332 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 333 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 334 else 335 ip->ip_off = 0; 336 } else { 337 if (alg == CRYPTO_MD5_KPDK || alg == CRYPTO_SHA1_KPDK) 338 ip->ip_off &= IP_OFF_CONVERT(IP_DF); 339 else 340 ip->ip_off = 0; 341 } 342 343 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *); 344 345 /* IPv4 option processing */ 346 for (off = sizeof(struct ip); off < skip;) { 347 if (ptr[off] == IPOPT_EOL || ptr[off] == IPOPT_NOP || 348 off + 1 < skip) 349 ; 350 else { 351 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: illegal IPv4 " 352 "option length for option %d\n", 353 ptr[off])); 354 355 m_freem(m); 356 return EINVAL; 357 } 358 359 switch (ptr[off]) { 360 case IPOPT_EOL: 361 off = skip; /* End the loop. */ 362 break; 363 364 case IPOPT_NOP: 365 off++; 366 break; 367 368 case IPOPT_SECURITY: /* 0x82 */ 369 case 0x85: /* Extended security. */ 370 case 0x86: /* Commercial security. */ 371 case 0x94: /* Router alert */ 372 case 0x95: /* RFC1770 */ 373 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 374 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 375 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 376 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 377 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 378 379 m_freem(m); 380 return EINVAL; 381 } 382 383 off += ptr[off + 1]; 384 break; 385 386 case IPOPT_LSRR: 387 case IPOPT_SSRR: 388 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 389 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 390 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 391 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 392 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 393 394 m_freem(m); 395 return EINVAL; 396 } 397 398 /* 399 * On output, if we have either of the 400 * source routing options, we should 401 * swap the destination address of the 402 * IP header with the last address 403 * specified in the option, as that is 404 * what the destination's IP header 405 * will look like. 406 */ 407 if (out) 408 bcopy(ptr + off + ptr[off + 1] - 409 sizeof(struct in_addr), 410 &(ip->ip_dst), sizeof(struct in_addr)); 411 412 /* Fall through */ 413 default: 414 /* Sanity check for option length. */ 415 if (ptr[off + 1] < 2) { 416 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: " 417 "illegal IPv4 option length for " 418 "option %d\n", ptr[off])); 419 m_freem(m); 420 return EINVAL; 421 } 422 423 /* Zeroize all other options. */ 424 count = ptr[off + 1]; 425 memcpy(ptr + off, ipseczeroes, count); 426 off += count; 427 break; 428 } 429 430 /* Sanity check. */ 431 if (off > skip) { 432 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers(): malformed " 433 "IPv4 options header\n")); 434 435 m_freem(m); 436 return EINVAL; 437 } 438 } 439 440 break; 441#endif /* INET */ 442 443#ifdef INET6 444 case AF_INET6: /* Ugly... */ 445 /* Copy and "cook" the IPv6 header. */ 446 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 447 448 /* We don't do IPv6 Jumbograms. */ 449 if (ip6.ip6_plen == 0) { 450 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unsupported IPv6 jumbogram\n")); 451 m_freem(m); 452 return EMSGSIZE; 453 } 454 455 ip6.ip6_flow = 0; 456 ip6.ip6_hlim = 0; 457 ip6.ip6_vfc &= ~IPV6_VERSION_MASK; 458 ip6.ip6_vfc |= IPV6_VERSION; 459 460 /* Scoped address handling. */ 461 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_src)) 462 ip6.ip6_src.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 463 if (IN6_IS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL(&ip6.ip6_dst)) 464 ip6.ip6_dst.s6_addr16[1] = 0; 465 466 /* Done with IPv6 header. */ 467 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), &ip6); 468 469 /* Let's deal with the remaining headers (if any). */ 470 if (skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) > 0) { 471 if (m->m_len <= skip) { 472 ptr = (unsigned char *) malloc( 473 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 474 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT); 475 if (ptr == NULL) { 476 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: failed " 477 "to allocate memory for IPv6 " 478 "headers\n")); 479 m_freem(m); 480 return ENOBUFS; 481 } 482 483 /* 484 * Copy all the protocol headers after 485 * the IPv6 header. 486 */ 487 m_copydata(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 488 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 489 alloc = 1; 490 } else { 491 /* No need to allocate memory. */ 492 ptr = mtod(m, unsigned char *) + 493 sizeof(struct ip6_hdr); 494 alloc = 0; 495 } 496 } else 497 break; 498 499 nxt = ip6.ip6_nxt & 0xff; /* Next header type. */ 500 501 for (off = 0; off < skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);) 502 switch (nxt) { 503 case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS: 504 case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS: 505 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + off); 506 507 /* 508 * Process the mutable/immutable 509 * options -- borrows heavily from the 510 * KAME code. 511 */ 512 for (count = off + sizeof(struct ip6_ext); 513 count < off + ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3);) { 514 if (ptr[count] == IP6OPT_PAD1) { 515 count++; 516 continue; /* Skip padding. */ 517 } 518 519 /* Sanity check. */ 520 if (count > off + 521 ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)) { 522 m_freem(m); 523 524 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 525 if (alloc) 526 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 527 return EINVAL; 528 } 529 530 ad = ptr[count + 1]; 531 532 /* If mutable option, zeroize. */ 533 if (ptr[count] & IP6OPT_MUTABLE) 534 memcpy(ptr + count, ipseczeroes, 535 ptr[count + 1]); 536 537 count += ad; 538 539 /* Sanity check. */ 540 if (count > 541 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) { 542 m_freem(m); 543 544 /* Free, if we allocated. */ 545 if (alloc) 546 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 547 return EINVAL; 548 } 549 } 550 551 /* Advance. */ 552 off += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 553 nxt = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 554 break; 555 556 case IPPROTO_ROUTING: 557 /* 558 * Always include routing headers in 559 * computation. 560 */ 561 { 562 struct ip6_rthdr *rh; 563 564 ip6e = (struct ip6_ext *) (ptr + off); 565 rh = (struct ip6_rthdr *)(ptr + off); 566 /* 567 * must adjust content to make it look like 568 * its final form (as seen at the final 569 * destination). 570 * we only know how to massage type 0 routing 571 * header. 572 */ 573 if (out && rh->ip6r_type == IPV6_RTHDR_TYPE_0) { 574 struct ip6_rthdr0 *rh0; 575 struct in6_addr *addr, finaldst; 576 int i; 577 578 rh0 = (struct ip6_rthdr0 *)rh; 579 addr = (struct in6_addr *)(rh0 + 1); 580 581 for (i = 0; i < rh0->ip6r0_segleft; i++) 582 in6_clearscope(&addr[i]); 583 584 finaldst = addr[rh0->ip6r0_segleft - 1]; 585 memmove(&addr[1], &addr[0], 586 sizeof(struct in6_addr) * 587 (rh0->ip6r0_segleft - 1)); 588 589 m_copydata(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 590 addr[0] = ip6.ip6_dst; 591 ip6.ip6_dst = finaldst; 592 m_copyback(m, 0, sizeof(ip6), &ip6); 593 594 rh0->ip6r0_segleft = 0; 595 } 596 597 /* advance */ 598 off += ((ip6e->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); 599 nxt = ip6e->ip6e_nxt; 600 break; 601 } 602 603 default: 604 DPRINTF(("ah_massage_headers: unexpected " 605 "IPv6 header type %d", off)); 606 if (alloc) 607 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 608 m_freem(m); 609 return EINVAL; 610 } 611 612 /* Copyback and free, if we allocated. */ 613 if (alloc) { 614 m_copyback(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), 615 skip - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), ptr); 616 free(ptr, M_XDATA); 617 } 618 619 break; 620#endif /* INET6 */ 621 } 622 623 return 0; 624} 625 626/* 627 * ah_input() gets called to verify that an input packet 628 * passes authentication. 629 */ 630static int 631ah_input(struct mbuf *m, const struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff) 632{ 633 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 634 struct tdb_ident *tdbi; 635 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 636 struct m_tag *mtag; 637 struct newah *ah; 638 int hl, rplen, authsize, error; 639 640 struct cryptodesc *crda; 641 struct cryptop *crp; 642 643 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_input"); 644 645 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_input: null SA")); 646 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->key_auth != NULL, 647 ("ah_input: null authentication key")); 648 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_authalgxform != NULL, 649 ("ah_input: null authentication xform")); 650 651 /* Figure out header size. */ 652 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 653 654 /* XXX don't pullup, just copy header */ 655 IP6_EXTHDR_GET(ah, struct newah *, m, skip, rplen); 656 if (ah == NULL) { 657 DPRINTF(("ah_input: cannot pullup header\n")); 658 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX*/ 659 m_freem(m); 660 return ENOBUFS; 661 } 662 663 /* Check replay window, if applicable. */ 664 if (sav->replay && !ipsec_chkreplay(ntohl(ah->ah_seq), sav)) { 665 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 666 DPRINTF(("ah_input: packet replay failure: %s\n", 667 ipsec_logsastr(sav))); 668 m_freem(m); 669 return ENOBUFS; 670 } 671 672 /* Verify AH header length. */ 673 hl = ah->ah_len * sizeof (u_int32_t); 674 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 675 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 676 if (hl != authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)) { 677 DPRINTF(("ah_input: bad authenticator length %u (expecting %lu)" 678 " for packet in SA %s/%08lx\n", 679 hl, (u_long) (authsize + rplen - sizeof (struct ah)), 680 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 681 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 682 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTHL); 683 m_freem(m); 684 return EACCES; 685 } 686 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_IBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip - hl); 687 688 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 689 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 690 if (crp == NULL) { 691 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to acquire crypto descriptor\n")); 692 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 693 m_freem(m); 694 return ENOBUFS; 695 } 696 697 crda = crp->crp_desc; 698 IPSEC_ASSERT(crda != NULL, ("ah_input: null crypto descriptor")); 699 700 crda->crd_skip = 0; 701 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 702 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 703 704 /* Authentication operation. */ 705 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 706 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 707 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 708 709 /* Find out if we've already done crypto. */ 710 for (mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, NULL); 711 mtag != NULL; 712 mtag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPSEC_IN_CRYPTO_DONE, mtag)) { 713 tdbi = (struct tdb_ident *) (mtag + 1); 714 if (tdbi->proto == sav->sah->saidx.proto && 715 tdbi->spi == sav->spi && 716 !memcmp(&tdbi->dst, &sav->sah->saidx.dst, 717 sizeof (union sockaddr_union))) 718 break; 719 } 720 721 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 722 if (mtag == NULL) { 723 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto) + 724 skip + rplen + authsize, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 725 } else { 726 /* Hash verification has already been done successfully. */ 727 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc(sizeof (struct tdb_crypto), 728 M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 729 } 730 if (tc == NULL) { 731 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 732 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 733 crypto_freereq(crp); 734 m_freem(m); 735 return ENOBUFS; 736 } 737 738 error = m_makewritable(&m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, M_NOWAIT); 739 if (error) { 740 m_freem(m); 741 DPRINTF(("ah_input: failed to copyback_cow\n")); 742 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 743 free(tc, M_XDATA); 744 crypto_freereq(crp); 745 return error; 746 } 747 748 /* Only save information if crypto processing is needed. */ 749 if (mtag == NULL) { 750 /* 751 * Save the authenticator, the skipped portion of the packet, 752 * and the AH header. 753 */ 754 m_copydata(m, 0, skip + rplen + authsize, (tc + 1)); 755 756 /* Zeroize the authenticator on the packet. */ 757 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 758 759 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 760 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 761 skip, ahx->type, 0); 762 if (error != 0) { 763 /* NB: mbuf is free'd by ah_massage_headers */ 764 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 765 free(tc, M_XDATA); 766 crypto_freereq(crp); 767 return error; 768 } 769 } 770 771 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 772 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 773 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 774 crp->crp_buf = m; 775 crp->crp_callback = ah_input_cb; 776 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 777 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 778 779 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 780 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 781 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 782 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 783 tc->tc_nxt = ah->ah_nxt; 784 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 785 tc->tc_skip = skip; 786 tc->tc_ptr = mtag; /* Save the mtag we've identified. */ 787 788 DPRINTF(("ah: hash over %d bytes, skip %d: " 789 "crda len %d skip %d inject %d\n", 790 crp->crp_ilen, tc->tc_skip, 791 crda->crd_len, crda->crd_skip, crda->crd_inject)); 792 793 if (mtag == NULL) 794 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 795 else 796 return ah_input_cb(crp); 797} 798 799#ifdef INET6 800#define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) do { \ 801 if (saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { \ 802 error = ipsec6_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 803 } else { \ 804 error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); \ 805 } \ 806} while (0) 807#else 808#define IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag) \ 809 (error = ipsec4_common_input_cb(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag)) 810#endif 811 812/* 813 * AH input callback from the crypto driver. 814 */ 815static int 816ah_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 817{ 818 int rplen, error, skip, protoff; 819 unsigned char calc[AH_ALEN_MAX]; 820 struct mbuf *m; 821 struct cryptodesc *crd; 822 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 823 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 824 struct m_tag *mtag; 825 struct secasvar *sav; 826 struct secasindex *saidx; 827 u_int8_t nxt; 828 char *ptr; 829 int s, authsize; 830 u_int16_t dport; 831 u_int16_t sport; 832 833 crd = crp->crp_desc; 834 835 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 836 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_input_cb: null opaque crypto data area!")); 837 skip = tc->tc_skip; 838 nxt = tc->tc_nxt; 839 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 840 mtag = (struct m_tag *) tc->tc_ptr; 841 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 842 843 844 /* find the source port for NAT-T */ 845 nat_t_ports_get(m, &dport, &sport); 846 847 s = splsoftnet(); 848 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 849 850 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, sport, dport); 851 if (sav == NULL) { 852 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 853 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 854 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 855 goto bad; 856 } 857 858 saidx = &sav->sah->saidx; 859 IPSEC_ASSERT(saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET || 860 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6, 861 ("ah_input_cb: unexpected protocol family %u", 862 saidx->dst.sa.sa_family)); 863 864 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 865 866 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 867 if (crp->crp_etype) { 868 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 869 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 870 871 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 872 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 873 splx(s); 874 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 875 } 876 877 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 878 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 879 error = crp->crp_etype; 880 goto bad; 881 } else { 882 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 883 crypto_freereq(crp); /* No longer needed. */ 884 crp = NULL; 885 } 886 887 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 888 if (m == NULL) { 889 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 890 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 891 error = EINVAL; 892 goto bad; 893 } 894 895 /* Figure out header size. */ 896 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 897 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 898 899 if (ipsec_debug) 900 memset(calc, 0, sizeof(calc)); 901 902 /* Copy authenticator off the packet. */ 903 m_copydata(m, skip + rplen, authsize, calc); 904 905 /* 906 * If we have an mtag, we don't need to verify the authenticator -- 907 * it has been verified by an IPsec-aware NIC. 908 */ 909 if (mtag == NULL) { 910 ptr = (char *) (tc + 1); 911 912 /* Verify authenticator. */ 913 if (!consttime_memequal(ptr + skip + rplen, calc, authsize)) { 914 u_int8_t *pppp = ptr + skip+rplen; 915 DPRINTF(("ah_input: authentication hash mismatch " \ 916 "over %d bytes " \ 917 "for packet in SA %s/%08lx:\n" \ 918 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x, " \ 919 "%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x:%02x%02x\n", 920 authsize, 921 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), 922 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 923 calc[0], calc[1], calc[2], calc[3], 924 calc[4], calc[5], calc[6], calc[7], 925 calc[8], calc[9], calc[10], calc[11], 926 pppp[0], pppp[1], pppp[2], pppp[3], 927 pppp[4], pppp[5], pppp[6], pppp[7], 928 pppp[8], pppp[9], pppp[10], pppp[11] 929 )); 930 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_BADAUTH); 931 error = EACCES; 932 goto bad; 933 } 934 935 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 936 ((u_int8_t *) ptr)[protoff] = nxt; 937 938 /* Copyback the saved (uncooked) network headers. */ 939 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 940 } else { 941 /* Fix the Next Protocol field. */ 942 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &nxt); 943 } 944 945 free(tc, M_XDATA), tc = NULL; /* No longer needed */ 946 947 /* 948 * Header is now authenticated. 949 */ 950 m->m_flags |= M_AUTHIPHDR|M_AUTHIPDGM; 951 952 /* 953 * Update replay sequence number, if appropriate. 954 */ 955 if (sav->replay) { 956 u_int32_t seq; 957 958 m_copydata(m, skip + offsetof(struct newah, ah_seq), 959 sizeof (seq), &seq); 960 if (ipsec_updatereplay(ntohl(seq), sav)) { 961 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_REPLAY); 962 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX as above*/ 963 goto bad; 964 } 965 } 966 967 /* 968 * Remove the AH header and authenticator from the mbuf. 969 */ 970 error = m_striphdr(m, skip, rplen + authsize); 971 if (error) { 972 DPRINTF(("ah_input_cb: mangled mbuf chain for SA %s/%08lx\n", 973 ipsec_address(&saidx->dst), (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 974 975 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 976 goto bad; 977 } 978 979 IPSEC_COMMON_INPUT_CB(m, sav, skip, protoff, mtag); 980 981 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 982 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 983 splx(s); 984 return error; 985bad: 986 if (sav) 987 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 988 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 989 splx(s); 990 if (m != NULL) 991 m_freem(m); 992 if (tc != NULL) 993 free(tc, M_XDATA); 994 if (crp != NULL) 995 crypto_freereq(crp); 996 return error; 997} 998 999/* 1000 * AH output routine, called by ipsec[46]_process_packet(). 1001 */ 1002static int 1003ah_output( 1004 struct mbuf *m, 1005 struct ipsecrequest *isr, 1006 struct mbuf **mp, 1007 int skip, 1008 int protoff 1009) 1010{ 1011 const struct secasvar *sav; 1012 const struct auth_hash *ahx; 1013 struct cryptodesc *crda; 1014 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1015 struct mbuf *mi; 1016 struct cryptop *crp; 1017 u_int16_t iplen; 1018 int error, rplen, authsize, maxpacketsize, roff; 1019 u_int8_t prot; 1020 struct newah *ah; 1021 1022 IPSEC_SPLASSERT_SOFTNET("ah_output"); 1023 1024 sav = isr->sav; 1025 IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("ah_output: null SA")); 1026 ahx = sav->tdb_authalgxform; 1027 IPSEC_ASSERT(ahx != NULL, ("ah_output: null authentication xform")); 1028 1029 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_OUTPUT); 1030 1031 /* Figure out header size. */ 1032 rplen = HDRSIZE(sav); 1033 1034 /* Check for maximum packet size violations. */ 1035 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1036#ifdef INET 1037 case AF_INET: 1038 maxpacketsize = IP_MAXPACKET; 1039 break; 1040#endif /* INET */ 1041#ifdef INET6 1042 case AF_INET6: 1043 maxpacketsize = IPV6_MAXPACKET; 1044 break; 1045#endif /* INET6 */ 1046 default: 1047 DPRINTF(("ah_output: unknown/unsupported protocol " 1048 "family %u, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1049 sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1050 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1051 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1052 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOPF); 1053 error = EPFNOSUPPORT; 1054 goto bad; 1055 } 1056 authsize = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1057 if (rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len > maxpacketsize) { 1058 DPRINTF(("ah_output: packet in SA %s/%08lx got too big " 1059 "(len %u, max len %u)\n", 1060 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1061 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi), 1062 rplen + authsize + m->m_pkthdr.len, maxpacketsize)); 1063 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_TOOBIG); 1064 error = EMSGSIZE; 1065 goto bad; 1066 } 1067 1068 /* Update the counters. */ 1069 AH_STATADD(AH_STAT_OBYTES, m->m_pkthdr.len - skip); 1070 1071 m = m_clone(m); 1072 if (m == NULL) { 1073 DPRINTF(("ah_output: cannot clone mbuf chain, SA %s/%08lx\n", 1074 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1075 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1076 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); 1077 error = ENOBUFS; 1078 goto bad; 1079 } 1080 1081 /* Inject AH header. */ 1082 mi = m_makespace(m, skip, rplen + authsize, &roff); 1083 if (mi == NULL) { 1084 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to inject %u byte AH header for SA " 1085 "%s/%08lx\n", 1086 rplen + authsize, 1087 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1088 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1089 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HDROPS); /*XXX differs from openbsd */ 1090 error = ENOBUFS; 1091 goto bad; 1092 } 1093 1094 /* 1095 * The AH header is guaranteed by m_makespace() to be in 1096 * contiguous memory, at roff bytes offset into the returned mbuf. 1097 */ 1098 ah = (struct newah *)(mtod(mi, char *) + roff); 1099 1100 /* Initialize the AH header. */ 1101 m_copydata(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &ah->ah_nxt); 1102 ah->ah_len = (rplen + authsize - sizeof(struct ah)) / sizeof(u_int32_t); 1103 ah->ah_reserve = 0; 1104 ah->ah_spi = sav->spi; 1105 1106 /* Zeroize authenticator. */ 1107 m_copyback(m, skip + rplen, authsize, ipseczeroes); 1108 1109 /* Insert packet replay counter, as requested. */ 1110 if (sav->replay) { 1111 if (sav->replay->count == ~0 && 1112 (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ) == 0) { 1113 DPRINTF(("ah_output: replay counter wrapped for SA " 1114 "%s/%08lx\n", 1115 ipsec_address(&sav->sah->saidx.dst), 1116 (u_long) ntohl(sav->spi))); 1117 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_WRAP); 1118 error = EINVAL; 1119 goto bad; 1120 } 1121#ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1122 /* Emulate replay attack when ipsec_replay is TRUE. */ 1123 if (!ipsec_replay) 1124#endif 1125 sav->replay->count++; 1126 ah->ah_seq = htonl(sav->replay->count); 1127 } 1128 1129 /* Get crypto descriptors. */ 1130 crp = crypto_getreq(1); 1131 if (crp == NULL) { 1132 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to acquire crypto descriptors\n")); 1133 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1134 error = ENOBUFS; 1135 goto bad; 1136 } 1137 1138 crda = crp->crp_desc; 1139 1140 crda->crd_skip = 0; 1141 crda->crd_inject = skip + rplen; 1142 crda->crd_len = m->m_pkthdr.len; 1143 1144 /* Authentication operation. */ 1145 crda->crd_alg = ahx->type; 1146 crda->crd_key = _KEYBUF(sav->key_auth); 1147 crda->crd_klen = _KEYBITS(sav->key_auth); 1148 1149 /* Allocate IPsec-specific opaque crypto info. */ 1150 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) malloc( 1151 sizeof(struct tdb_crypto) + skip, M_XDATA, M_NOWAIT|M_ZERO); 1152 if (tc == NULL) { 1153 crypto_freereq(crp); 1154 DPRINTF(("ah_output: failed to allocate tdb_crypto\n")); 1155 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1156 error = ENOBUFS; 1157 goto bad; 1158 } 1159 1160 /* Save the skipped portion of the packet. */ 1161 m_copydata(m, 0, skip, (tc + 1)); 1162 1163 /* 1164 * Fix IP header length on the header used for 1165 * authentication. We don't need to fix the original 1166 * header length as it will be fixed by our caller. 1167 */ 1168 switch (sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family) { 1169#ifdef INET 1170 case AF_INET: 1171 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1172 offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1173 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1174 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1175 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip, ip_len), 1176 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1177 break; 1178#endif /* INET */ 1179 1180#ifdef INET6 1181 case AF_INET6: 1182 bcopy(((char *)(tc + 1)) + 1183 offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1184 &iplen, sizeof(u_int16_t)); 1185 iplen = htons(ntohs(iplen) + rplen + authsize); 1186 m_copyback(m, offsetof(struct ip6_hdr, ip6_plen), 1187 sizeof(u_int16_t), &iplen); 1188 break; 1189#endif /* INET6 */ 1190 } 1191 1192 /* Fix the Next Header field in saved header. */ 1193 ((u_int8_t *) (tc + 1))[protoff] = IPPROTO_AH; 1194 1195 /* Update the Next Protocol field in the IP header. */ 1196 prot = IPPROTO_AH; 1197 m_copyback(m, protoff, sizeof(u_int8_t), &prot); 1198 1199 /* "Massage" the packet headers for crypto processing. */ 1200 error = ah_massage_headers(&m, sav->sah->saidx.dst.sa.sa_family, 1201 skip, ahx->type, 1); 1202 if (error != 0) { 1203 m = NULL; /* mbuf was free'd by ah_massage_headers. */ 1204 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1205 crypto_freereq(crp); 1206 goto bad; 1207 } 1208 1209 /* Crypto operation descriptor. */ 1210 crp->crp_ilen = m->m_pkthdr.len; /* Total input length. */ 1211 crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_IMBUF; 1212 crp->crp_buf = m; 1213 crp->crp_callback = ah_output_cb; 1214 crp->crp_sid = sav->tdb_cryptoid; 1215 crp->crp_opaque = tc; 1216 1217 /* These are passed as-is to the callback. */ 1218 tc->tc_isr = isr; 1219 tc->tc_spi = sav->spi; 1220 tc->tc_dst = sav->sah->saidx.dst; 1221 tc->tc_proto = sav->sah->saidx.proto; 1222 tc->tc_skip = skip; 1223 tc->tc_protoff = protoff; 1224 1225 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1226bad: 1227 if (m) 1228 m_freem(m); 1229 return (error); 1230} 1231 1232/* 1233 * AH output callback from the crypto driver. 1234 */ 1235static int 1236ah_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp) 1237{ 1238 int skip, protoff, error; 1239 struct tdb_crypto *tc; 1240 struct ipsecrequest *isr; 1241 struct secasvar *sav; 1242 struct mbuf *m; 1243 void *ptr; 1244 int s, err; 1245 1246 tc = (struct tdb_crypto *) crp->crp_opaque; 1247 IPSEC_ASSERT(tc != NULL, ("ah_output_cb: null opaque data area!")); 1248 skip = tc->tc_skip; 1249 protoff = tc->tc_protoff; 1250 ptr = (tc + 1); 1251 m = (struct mbuf *) crp->crp_buf; 1252 1253 s = splsoftnet(); 1254 mutex_enter(softnet_lock); 1255 1256 isr = tc->tc_isr; 1257 sav = KEY_ALLOCSA(&tc->tc_dst, tc->tc_proto, tc->tc_spi, 0, 0); 1258 if (sav == NULL) { 1259 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOTDB); 1260 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: SA expired while in crypto\n")); 1261 error = ENOBUFS; /*XXX*/ 1262 goto bad; 1263 } 1264 IPSEC_ASSERT(isr->sav == sav, ("ah_output_cb: SA changed\n")); 1265 1266 /* Check for crypto errors. */ 1267 if (crp->crp_etype) { 1268 if (sav->tdb_cryptoid != 0) 1269 sav->tdb_cryptoid = crp->crp_sid; 1270 1271 if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { 1272 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1273 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1274 splx(s); 1275 return crypto_dispatch(crp); 1276 } 1277 1278 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_NOXFORM); 1279 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: crypto error %d\n", crp->crp_etype)); 1280 error = crp->crp_etype; 1281 goto bad; 1282 } 1283 1284 /* Shouldn't happen... */ 1285 if (m == NULL) { 1286 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_CRYPTO); 1287 DPRINTF(("ah_output_cb: bogus returned buffer from crypto\n")); 1288 error = EINVAL; 1289 goto bad; 1290 } 1291 AH_STATINC(AH_STAT_HIST + sav->alg_auth); 1292 1293 /* 1294 * Copy original headers (with the new protocol number) back 1295 * in place. 1296 */ 1297 m_copyback(m, 0, skip, ptr); 1298 1299 /* No longer needed. */ 1300 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1301 crypto_freereq(crp); 1302 1303#ifdef IPSEC_DEBUG 1304 /* Emulate man-in-the-middle attack when ipsec_integrity is TRUE. */ 1305 if (ipsec_integrity) { 1306 int alen; 1307 1308 /* 1309 * Corrupt HMAC if we want to test integrity verification of 1310 * the other side. 1311 */ 1312 alen = AUTHSIZE(sav); 1313 m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, ipseczeroes); 1314 } 1315#endif 1316 1317 /* NB: m is reclaimed by ipsec_process_done. */ 1318 err = ipsec_process_done(m, isr); 1319 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1320 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1321 splx(s); 1322 return err; 1323bad: 1324 if (sav) 1325 KEY_FREESAV(&sav); 1326 mutex_exit(softnet_lock); 1327 splx(s); 1328 if (m) 1329 m_freem(m); 1330 free(tc, M_XDATA); 1331 crypto_freereq(crp); 1332 return error; 1333} 1334 1335static struct xformsw ah_xformsw = { 1336 XF_AH, XFT_AUTH, "IPsec AH", 1337 ah_init, ah_zeroize, ah_input, ah_output, 1338 NULL, 1339}; 1340 1341INITFN void 1342ah_attach(void) 1343{ 1344 ahstat_percpu = percpu_alloc(sizeof(uint64_t) * AH_NSTATS); 1345 xform_register(&ah_xformsw); 1346} 1347 1348#ifdef __FreeBSD__ 1349SYSINIT(ah_xform_init, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_MIDDLE, ah_attach, NULL); 1350#endif 1351