eap_pwd_common.c revision 1.1.1.4
1/*
2 * EAP server/peer: EAP-pwd shared routines
3 * Copyright (c) 2010, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
4 *
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
7 */
8
9#include "includes.h"
10#include "common.h"
11#include "crypto/sha256.h"
12#include "crypto/crypto.h"
13#include "eap_defs.h"
14#include "eap_pwd_common.h"
15
16/* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
17struct crypto_hash * eap_pwd_h_init(void)
18{
19	u8 allzero[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
20	os_memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
21	return crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256, allzero,
22				SHA256_MAC_LEN);
23}
24
25
26void eap_pwd_h_update(struct crypto_hash *hash, const u8 *data, size_t len)
27{
28	crypto_hash_update(hash, data, len);
29}
30
31
32void eap_pwd_h_final(struct crypto_hash *hash, u8 *digest)
33{
34	size_t len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
35	crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &len);
36}
37
38
39/* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
40static int eap_pwd_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, const u8 *label,
41		       size_t labellen, u8 *result, size_t resultbitlen)
42{
43	struct crypto_hash *hash;
44	u8 digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
45	u16 i, ctr, L;
46	size_t resultbytelen, len = 0, mdlen;
47
48	resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7) / 8;
49	ctr = 0;
50	L = htons(resultbitlen);
51	while (len < resultbytelen) {
52		ctr++;
53		i = htons(ctr);
54		hash = crypto_hash_init(CRYPTO_HASH_ALG_HMAC_SHA256,
55					key, keylen);
56		if (hash == NULL)
57			return -1;
58		if (ctr > 1)
59			crypto_hash_update(hash, digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
60		crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &i, sizeof(u16));
61		crypto_hash_update(hash, label, labellen);
62		crypto_hash_update(hash, (u8 *) &L, sizeof(u16));
63		mdlen = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
64		if (crypto_hash_finish(hash, digest, &mdlen) < 0)
65			return -1;
66		if ((len + mdlen) > resultbytelen)
67			os_memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len);
68		else
69			os_memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
70		len += mdlen;
71	}
72
73	/* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
74	if (resultbitlen % 8) {
75		u8 mask = 0xff;
76		mask <<= (8 - (resultbitlen % 8));
77		result[resultbytelen - 1] &= mask;
78	}
79
80	return 0;
81}
82
83
84/*
85 * compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based
86 * on the password and identities.
87 */
88int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
89			     u8 *password, int password_len,
90			     u8 *id_server, int id_server_len,
91			     u8 *id_peer, int id_peer_len, u8 *token)
92{
93	BIGNUM *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
94	struct crypto_hash *hash;
95	unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
96	int nid, is_odd, ret = 0;
97	size_t primebytelen, primebitlen;
98
99	switch (num) { /* from IANA registry for IKE D-H groups */
100        case 19:
101		nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
102		break;
103        case 20:
104		nid = NID_secp384r1;
105		break;
106        case 21:
107		nid = NID_secp521r1;
108		break;
109#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
110        case 25:
111		nid = NID_X9_62_prime192v1;
112		break;
113#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
114        case 26:
115		nid = NID_secp224r1;
116		break;
117        default:
118		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsupported group %d", num);
119		return -1;
120	}
121
122	grp->pwe = NULL;
123	grp->order = NULL;
124	grp->prime = NULL;
125
126	if ((grp->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) {
127		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create EC_GROUP");
128		goto fail;
129	}
130
131	if (((rnd = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
132	    ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
133	    ((grp->pwe = EC_POINT_new(grp->group)) == NULL) ||
134	    ((grp->order = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
135	    ((grp->prime = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
136	    ((x_candidate = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
137		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums");
138		goto fail;
139	}
140
141	if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(grp->group, grp->prime, NULL, NULL, NULL))
142	{
143		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get prime for GFp "
144			   "curve");
145		goto fail;
146	}
147	if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(grp->group, grp->order, NULL)) {
148		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get order for curve");
149		goto fail;
150	}
151	if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(grp->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
152		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get cofactor for "
153			   "curve");
154		goto fail;
155	}
156	primebitlen = BN_num_bits(grp->prime);
157	primebytelen = BN_num_bytes(grp->prime);
158	if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
159		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf "
160			   "buffer");
161		goto fail;
162	}
163	os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
164	ctr = 0;
165	while (1) {
166		if (ctr > 30) {
167			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to find random "
168				   "point on curve for group %d, something's "
169				   "fishy", num);
170			goto fail;
171		}
172		ctr++;
173
174		/*
175		 * compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime
176		 *    pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
177		 *		   counter)
178		 */
179		hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
180		if (hash == NULL)
181			goto fail;
182		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, token, sizeof(u32));
183		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_peer, id_peer_len);
184		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, id_server, id_server_len);
185		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, password, password_len);
186		eap_pwd_h_update(hash, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
187		eap_pwd_h_final(hash, pwe_digest);
188
189		BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN, rnd);
190
191		if (eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
192				(u8 *) "EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking",
193				os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting And Pecking"),
194				prfbuf, primebitlen) < 0)
195			goto fail;
196
197		BN_bin2bn(prfbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate);
198
199		/*
200		 * eap_pwd_kdf() returns a string of bits 0..primebitlen but
201		 * BN_bin2bn will treat that string of bits as a big endian
202		 * number. If the primebitlen is not an even multiple of 8
203		 * then excessive bits-- those _after_ primebitlen-- so now
204		 * we have to shift right the amount we masked off.
205		 */
206		if (primebitlen % 8)
207			BN_rshift(x_candidate, x_candidate,
208				  (8 - (primebitlen % 8)));
209
210		if (BN_ucmp(x_candidate, grp->prime) >= 0)
211			continue;
212
213		wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
214			    prfbuf, primebytelen);
215
216		/*
217		 * need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
218		 * one...
219		 */
220		if (BN_is_odd(rnd))
221			is_odd = 1;
222		else
223			is_odd = 0;
224
225		/*
226		 * solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we
227		 * don't have a point
228		 */
229		if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(grp->group,
230							     grp->pwe,
231							     x_candidate,
232							     is_odd, NULL))
233			continue;
234		/*
235		 * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be
236		 * on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code
237		 * says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't
238		 * hurt just to be sure.
239		 */
240		if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL)) {
241			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
242			continue;
243		}
244
245		if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
246			/* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
247			if (!EC_POINT_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL, grp->pwe,
248					  cofactor, NULL)) {
249				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: cannot "
250					   "multiply generator by order");
251				continue;
252			}
253			if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
254				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at "
255					   "infinity");
256				continue;
257			}
258		}
259		/* if we got here then we have a new generator. */
260		break;
261	}
262	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
263	grp->group_num = num;
264	if (0) {
265 fail:
266		EC_GROUP_free(grp->group);
267		grp->group = NULL;
268		EC_POINT_clear_free(grp->pwe);
269		grp->pwe = NULL;
270		BN_clear_free(grp->order);
271		grp->order = NULL;
272		BN_clear_free(grp->prime);
273		grp->prime = NULL;
274		ret = 1;
275	}
276	/* cleanliness and order.... */
277	BN_clear_free(cofactor);
278	BN_clear_free(x_candidate);
279	BN_clear_free(rnd);
280	os_free(prfbuf);
281
282	return ret;
283}
284
285
286int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, BIGNUM *k,
287		 BIGNUM *peer_scalar, BIGNUM *server_scalar,
288		 u8 *confirm_peer, u8 *confirm_server,
289		 u32 *ciphersuite, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk, u8 *session_id)
290{
291	struct crypto_hash *hash;
292	u8 mk[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft;
293	u8 msk_emsk[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
294	int offset;
295
296	if ((cruft = os_malloc(BN_num_bytes(grp->prime))) == NULL)
297		return -1;
298
299	/*
300	 * first compute the session-id = TypeCode | H(ciphersuite | scal_p |
301	 *	scal_s)
302	 */
303	session_id[0] = EAP_TYPE_PWD;
304	hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
305	if (hash == NULL) {
306		os_free(cruft);
307		return -1;
308	}
309	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, (u8 *) ciphersuite, sizeof(u32));
310	offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->order) - BN_num_bytes(peer_scalar);
311	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
312	BN_bn2bin(peer_scalar, cruft + offset);
313	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
314	offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->order) - BN_num_bytes(server_scalar);
315	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
316	BN_bn2bin(server_scalar, cruft + offset);
317	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
318	eap_pwd_h_final(hash, &session_id[1]);
319
320	/* then compute MK = H(k | confirm-peer | confirm-server) */
321	hash = eap_pwd_h_init();
322	if (hash == NULL) {
323		os_free(cruft);
324		return -1;
325	}
326	offset = BN_num_bytes(grp->prime) - BN_num_bytes(k);
327	os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
328	BN_bn2bin(k, cruft + offset);
329	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
330	os_free(cruft);
331	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_peer, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
332	eap_pwd_h_update(hash, confirm_server, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
333	eap_pwd_h_final(hash, mk);
334
335	/* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */
336	if (eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_MAC_LEN,
337			session_id, SHA256_MAC_LEN + 1,
338			msk_emsk, (EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) * 8) < 0) {
339		return -1;
340	}
341
342	os_memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
343	os_memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
344
345	return 1;
346}
347