1/* 2 * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> 3 * 4 * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any 5 * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above 6 * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. 7 * 8 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES 9 * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 10 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR 11 * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES 12 * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN 13 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF 14 * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. 15 */ 16 17/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.10 2013/02/19 02:12:47 dtucker Exp $ */ 18 19#include "includes.h" 20 21#include <sys/types.h> 22#include <sys/param.h> 23#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" 24#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" 25 26#include <errno.h> 27#include <fcntl.h> 28#include <limits.h> 29#include <string.h> 30#include <time.h> 31#include <unistd.h> 32 33#include "buffer.h" 34#include "key.h" 35#include "authfile.h" 36#include "misc.h" 37#include "log.h" 38#include "xmalloc.h" 39 40#include "krl.h" 41 42/* #define DEBUG_KRL */ 43#ifdef DEBUG_KRL 44# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x 45#else 46# define KRL_DBG(x) 47#endif 48 49/* 50 * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows 51 * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order. 52 */ 53 54/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */ 55struct revoked_serial { 56 u_int64_t lo, hi; 57 RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry; 58}; 59static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b); 60RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial); 61RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp); 62 63/* Tree of key IDs */ 64struct revoked_key_id { 65 char *key_id; 66 RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry; 67}; 68static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b); 69RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id); 70RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp); 71 72/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */ 73struct revoked_blob { 74 u_char *blob; 75 u_int len; 76 RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry; 77}; 78static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b); 79RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob); 80RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp); 81 82/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */ 83struct revoked_certs { 84 Key *ca_key; 85 struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials; 86 struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids; 87 TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry; 88}; 89TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs); 90 91struct ssh_krl { 92 u_int64_t krl_version; 93 u_int64_t generated_date; 94 u_int64_t flags; 95 char *comment; 96 struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys; 97 struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s; 98 struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs; 99}; 100 101/* Return equal if a and b overlap */ 102static int 103serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b) 104{ 105 if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi) 106 return 0; 107 return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1; 108} 109 110static int 111key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b) 112{ 113 return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id); 114} 115 116static int 117blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b) 118{ 119 int r; 120 121 if (a->len != b->len) { 122 if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MIN(a->len, b->len))) != 0) 123 return r; 124 return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1; 125 } else 126 return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len); 127} 128 129struct ssh_krl * 130ssh_krl_init(void) 131{ 132 struct ssh_krl *krl; 133 134 if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL) 135 return NULL; 136 RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys); 137 RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s); 138 TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs); 139 return krl; 140} 141 142static void 143revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc) 144{ 145 struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs; 146 struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki; 147 148 RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) { 149 RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); 150 free(rs); 151 } 152 RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) { 153 RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); 154 free(rki->key_id); 155 free(rki); 156 } 157 if (rc->ca_key != NULL) 158 key_free(rc->ca_key); 159} 160 161void 162ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl) 163{ 164 struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb; 165 struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc; 166 167 if (krl == NULL) 168 return; 169 170 free(krl->comment); 171 RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) { 172 RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb); 173 free(rb->blob); 174 free(rb); 175 } 176 RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) { 177 RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb); 178 free(rb->blob); 179 free(rb); 180 } 181 TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) { 182 TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); 183 revoked_certs_free(rc); 184 } 185} 186 187void 188ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version) 189{ 190 krl->krl_version = version; 191} 192 193void 194ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment) 195{ 196 free(krl->comment); 197 if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL) 198 fatal("%s: strdup", __func__); 199} 200 201/* 202 * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then 203 * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already. 204 */ 205static int 206revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key, 207 struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create) 208{ 209 struct revoked_certs *rc; 210 211 *rcp = NULL; 212 TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { 213 if (key_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) { 214 *rcp = rc; 215 return 0; 216 } 217 } 218 if (!allow_create) 219 return 0; 220 /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */ 221 if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL) 222 return -1; 223 if ((rc->ca_key = key_from_private(ca_key)) == NULL) { 224 free(rc); 225 return -1; 226 } 227 RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials); 228 RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids); 229 TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); 230 debug3("%s: new CA %s", __func__, key_type(ca_key)); 231 *rcp = rc; 232 return 0; 233} 234 235static int 236insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) 237{ 238 struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs; 239 240 KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi)); 241 bzero(&rs, sizeof(rs)); 242 rs.lo = lo; 243 rs.hi = hi; 244 ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs); 245 if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) { 246 /* No entry matches. Just insert */ 247 if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL) 248 return -1; 249 memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs)); 250 ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs); 251 if (ers != NULL) { 252 KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__)); 253 /* Shouldn't happen */ 254 free(irs); 255 return -1; 256 } 257 ers = irs; 258 } else { 259 KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__, 260 ers->lo, ers->hi)); 261 /* 262 * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the 263 * existing entry. 264 */ 265 if (ers->lo > lo) 266 ers->lo = lo; 267 if (ers->hi < hi) 268 ers->hi = hi; 269 } 270 /* 271 * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones; 272 * coalesce as necessary. 273 */ 274 275 /* Check predecessors */ 276 while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { 277 KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); 278 if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1) 279 break; 280 /* This entry overlaps. */ 281 if (crs->lo < ers->lo) { 282 ers->lo = crs->lo; 283 KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__, 284 ers->lo, ers->hi)); 285 } 286 RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); 287 free(crs); 288 } 289 /* Check successors */ 290 while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { 291 KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); 292 if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1) 293 break; 294 /* This entry overlaps. */ 295 if (crs->hi > ers->hi) { 296 ers->hi = crs->hi; 297 KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__, 298 ers->lo, ers->hi)); 299 } 300 RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); 301 free(crs); 302 } 303 KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); 304 return 0; 305} 306 307int 308ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key, 309 u_int64_t serial) 310{ 311 return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial); 312} 313 314int 315ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key, 316 u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) 317{ 318 struct revoked_certs *rc; 319 320 if (lo > hi || lo == 0) 321 return -1; 322 if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0) 323 return -1; 324 return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi); 325} 326 327int 328ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key, 329 const char *key_id) 330{ 331 struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki; 332 struct revoked_certs *rc; 333 334 if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0) 335 return -1; 336 337 debug3("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id); 338 if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL || 339 (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) { 340 free(rki); 341 fatal("%s: strdup", __func__); 342 } 343 erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); 344 if (erki != NULL) { 345 free(rki->key_id); 346 free(rki); 347 } 348 return 0; 349} 350 351/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */ 352static int 353plain_key_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blob, u_int *blen) 354{ 355 Key *kcopy; 356 int r; 357 358 if ((kcopy = key_from_private(key)) == NULL) 359 return -1; 360 if (key_is_cert(kcopy)) { 361 if (key_drop_cert(kcopy) != 0) { 362 error("%s: key_drop_cert", __func__); 363 key_free(kcopy); 364 return -1; 365 } 366 } 367 r = key_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen); 368 free(kcopy); 369 return r == 0 ? -1 : 0; 370} 371 372/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */ 373static int 374revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, u_int len) 375{ 376 struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb; 377 378 if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL) 379 return -1; 380 rb->blob = blob; 381 rb->len = len; 382 erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb); 383 if (erb != NULL) { 384 free(rb->blob); 385 free(rb); 386 } 387 return 0; 388} 389 390int 391ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) 392{ 393 u_char *blob; 394 u_int len; 395 396 debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, key_type(key)); 397 if (plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len) != 0) 398 return -1; 399 return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len); 400} 401 402int 403ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) 404{ 405 u_char *blob; 406 u_int len; 407 408 debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, key_type(key)); 409 if ((blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &len)) == NULL) 410 return -1; 411 return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_sha1s, blob, len); 412} 413 414int 415ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) 416{ 417 if (!key_is_cert(key)) 418 return ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key); 419 420 if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) { 421 return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, 422 key->cert->signature_key, 423 key->cert->key_id); 424 } else { 425 return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, 426 key->cert->signature_key, 427 key->cert->serial); 428 } 429} 430 431/* 432 * Select a copact next section type to emit in a KRL based on the 433 * current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial 434 * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial. 435 * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type 436 * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL. 437 */ 438static int 439choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final, 440 u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section) 441{ 442 int new_state; 443 u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart; 444 445 /* 446 * Avoid unsigned overflows. 447 * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations. 448 */ 449 contig = MIN(contig, 1ULL<<31); 450 last_gap = MIN(last_gap, 1ULL<<31); 451 next_gap = MIN(next_gap, 1ULL<<31); 452 453 /* 454 * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates. 455 * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their 456 * switching cost is independent of the current_state. 457 */ 458 cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0; 459 cost_range = 8; 460 switch (current_state) { 461 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: 462 cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; 463 break; 464 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: 465 cost_list = 8; 466 cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64; 467 break; 468 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: 469 case 0: 470 cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; 471 cost_list = 8; 472 } 473 474 /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */ 475 cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64); 476 cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64); 477 cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64)); 478 cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64)); 479 480 /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */ 481 cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8; 482 cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8; 483 cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8; 484 cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8; 485 486 /* Now pick the best choice */ 487 *force_new_section = 0; 488 new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; 489 cost = cost_bitmap; 490 if (cost_range < cost) { 491 new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE; 492 cost = cost_range; 493 } 494 if (cost_list < cost) { 495 new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST; 496 cost = cost_list; 497 } 498 if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) { 499 new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; 500 *force_new_section = 1; 501 cost = cost_bitmap_restart; 502 } 503 debug3("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:" 504 "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, " 505 "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, contig, last_gap, next_gap, final, 506 cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart, new_state, 507 *force_new_section ? " restart" : ""); 508 return new_state; 509} 510 511/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */ 512static int 513revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf) 514{ 515 int final, force_new_sect, r = -1; 516 u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0; 517 struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs; 518 struct revoked_key_id *rki; 519 int next_state, state = 0; 520 Buffer sect; 521 u_char *kblob = NULL; 522 u_int klen; 523 BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL; 524 525 /* Prepare CA scope key blob if we have one supplied */ 526 if (key_to_blob(rc->ca_key, &kblob, &klen) == 0) 527 return -1; 528 529 buffer_init(§); 530 531 /* Store the header */ 532 buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen); 533 buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0); /* Reserved */ 534 535 free(kblob); 536 537 /* Store the revoked serials. */ 538 for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials); 539 rs != NULL; 540 rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) { 541 debug3("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__, 542 rs->lo, rs->hi, state); 543 544 /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */ 545 nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); 546 final = nrs == NULL; 547 gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi; 548 contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo); 549 550 /* Choose next state based on these */ 551 next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final, 552 state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect); 553 554 /* 555 * If the current section is a range section or has a different 556 * type to the next section, then finish it off now. 557 */ 558 if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state || 559 state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) { 560 debug3("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state); 561 switch (state) { 562 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: 563 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: 564 break; 565 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: 566 buffer_put_bignum2(§, bitmap); 567 BN_free(bitmap); 568 bitmap = NULL; 569 break; 570 } 571 buffer_put_char(buf, state); 572 buffer_put_string(buf, 573 buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§)); 574 } 575 576 /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */ 577 if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) { 578 debug3("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, next_state); 579 state = next_state; 580 buffer_clear(§); 581 switch (state) { 582 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: 583 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: 584 break; 585 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: 586 if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL) 587 goto out; 588 bitmap_start = rs->lo; 589 buffer_put_int64(§, bitmap_start); 590 break; 591 } 592 } 593 594 /* Perform section-specific processing */ 595 switch (state) { 596 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: 597 for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) 598 buffer_put_int64(§, rs->lo + i); 599 break; 600 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: 601 buffer_put_int64(§, rs->lo); 602 buffer_put_int64(§, rs->hi); 603 break; 604 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: 605 if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { 606 error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__); 607 goto out; 608 } 609 for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { 610 if (BN_set_bit(bitmap, 611 rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 1) 612 goto out; 613 } 614 break; 615 } 616 last = rs->hi; 617 } 618 /* Flush the remaining section, if any */ 619 if (state != 0) { 620 debug3("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x", 621 __func__, state); 622 switch (state) { 623 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: 624 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: 625 break; 626 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: 627 buffer_put_bignum2(§, bitmap); 628 BN_free(bitmap); 629 bitmap = NULL; 630 break; 631 } 632 buffer_put_char(buf, state); 633 buffer_put_string(buf, 634 buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§)); 635 } 636 debug3("%s: serial done ", __func__); 637 638 /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */ 639 buffer_clear(§); 640 RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { 641 debug3("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id); 642 buffer_put_cstring(§, rki->key_id); 643 } 644 if (buffer_len(§) != 0) { 645 buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID); 646 buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), 647 buffer_len(§)); 648 } 649 r = 0; 650 out: 651 if (bitmap != NULL) 652 BN_free(bitmap); 653 buffer_free(§); 654 return r; 655} 656 657int 658ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, Buffer *buf, const Key **sign_keys, 659 u_int nsign_keys) 660{ 661 int r = -1; 662 struct revoked_certs *rc; 663 struct revoked_blob *rb; 664 Buffer sect; 665 u_char *kblob = NULL, *sblob = NULL; 666 u_int klen, slen, i; 667 668 if (krl->generated_date == 0) 669 krl->generated_date = time(NULL); 670 671 buffer_init(§); 672 673 /* Store the header */ 674 buffer_append(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1); 675 buffer_put_int(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION); 676 buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->krl_version); 677 buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->generated_date); 678 buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->flags); 679 buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0); 680 buffer_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment ? krl->comment : ""); 681 682 /* Store sections for revoked certificates */ 683 TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { 684 if (revoked_certs_generate(rc, §) != 0) 685 goto out; 686 buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES); 687 buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), 688 buffer_len(§)); 689 } 690 691 /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */ 692 buffer_clear(§); 693 RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { 694 debug3("%s: key len %u ", __func__, rb->len); 695 buffer_put_string(§, rb->blob, rb->len); 696 } 697 if (buffer_len(§) != 0) { 698 buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY); 699 buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), 700 buffer_len(§)); 701 } 702 buffer_clear(§); 703 RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { 704 debug3("%s: hash len %u ", __func__, rb->len); 705 buffer_put_string(§, rb->blob, rb->len); 706 } 707 if (buffer_len(§) != 0) { 708 buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1); 709 buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), 710 buffer_len(§)); 711 } 712 713 for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) { 714 if (key_to_blob(sign_keys[i], &kblob, &klen) == 0) 715 goto out; 716 717 debug3("%s: signature key len %u", __func__, klen); 718 buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE); 719 buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen); 720 721 if (key_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, 722 buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf)) == -1) 723 goto out; 724 debug3("%s: signature sig len %u", __func__, slen); 725 buffer_put_string(buf, sblob, slen); 726 } 727 728 r = 0; 729 out: 730 free(kblob); 731 free(sblob); 732 buffer_free(§); 733 return r; 734} 735 736static void 737format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts) 738{ 739 time_t t; 740 struct tm *tm; 741 742 t = timestamp; 743 tm = localtime(&t); 744 *ts = '\0'; 745 strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm); 746} 747 748static int 749parse_revoked_certs(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl) 750{ 751 int ret = -1, nbits; 752 u_char type, *blob; 753 u_int blen; 754 Buffer subsect; 755 u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi; 756 BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL; 757 char *key_id = NULL; 758 Key *ca_key = NULL; 759 760 buffer_init(&subsect); 761 762 if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL || 763 buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, NULL) == NULL) { /* reserved */ 764 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 765 goto out; 766 } 767 if ((ca_key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) 768 goto out; 769 770 while (buffer_len(buf) > 0) { 771 if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, buf) != 0 || 772 (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL) { 773 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 774 goto out; 775 } 776 buffer_clear(&subsect); 777 buffer_append(&subsect, blob, blen); 778 debug3("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type); 779 /* buffer_dump(&subsect); */ 780 781 switch (type) { 782 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: 783 while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) { 784 if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial, 785 &subsect) != 0) { 786 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 787 goto out; 788 } 789 if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, 790 serial) != 0) { 791 error("%s: update failed", __func__); 792 goto out; 793 } 794 } 795 break; 796 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: 797 if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 || 798 buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_hi, &subsect) != 0) { 799 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 800 goto out; 801 } 802 if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, 803 serial_lo, serial_hi) != 0) { 804 error("%s: update failed", __func__); 805 goto out; 806 } 807 break; 808 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: 809 if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL) { 810 error("%s: BN_new", __func__); 811 goto out; 812 } 813 if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 || 814 buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&subsect, bitmap) != 0) { 815 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 816 goto out; 817 } 818 if ((nbits = BN_num_bits(bitmap)) < 0) { 819 error("%s: bitmap bits < 0", __func__); 820 goto out; 821 } 822 for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int)nbits; serial++) { 823 if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) { 824 error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__); 825 goto out; 826 } 827 if (!BN_is_bit_set(bitmap, serial)) 828 continue; 829 if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, 830 serial_lo + serial) != 0) { 831 error("%s: update failed", __func__); 832 goto out; 833 } 834 } 835 BN_free(bitmap); 836 bitmap = NULL; 837 break; 838 case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID: 839 while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) { 840 if ((key_id = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&subsect, 841 NULL)) == NULL) { 842 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 843 goto out; 844 } 845 if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca_key, 846 key_id) != 0) { 847 error("%s: update failed", __func__); 848 goto out; 849 } 850 free(key_id); 851 key_id = NULL; 852 } 853 break; 854 default: 855 error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type); 856 goto out; 857 } 858 if (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) { 859 error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data"); 860 goto out; 861 } 862 } 863 864 ret = 0; 865 out: 866 if (ca_key != NULL) 867 key_free(ca_key); 868 if (bitmap != NULL) 869 BN_free(bitmap); 870 free(key_id); 871 buffer_free(&subsect); 872 return ret; 873} 874 875 876/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */ 877int 878ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, 879 const Key **sign_ca_keys, u_int nsign_ca_keys) 880{ 881 Buffer copy, sect; 882 struct ssh_krl *krl; 883 char timestamp[64]; 884 int ret = -1, r, sig_seen; 885 Key *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL; 886 u_char type, *blob; 887 u_int i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, format_version, nca_used = 0; 888 889 *krlp = NULL; 890 if (buffer_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 || 891 memcmp(buffer_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { 892 debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__); 893 /* 894 * Return success but a NULL *krlp here to signal that the 895 * file might be a simple list of keys. 896 */ 897 return 0; 898 } 899 900 /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */ 901 buffer_init(©); 902 buffer_append(©, buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf)); 903 904 buffer_init(§); 905 buffer_consume(©, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1); 906 907 if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { 908 error("%s: alloc failed", __func__); 909 goto out; 910 } 911 912 if (buffer_get_int_ret(&format_version, ©) != 0) { 913 error("%s: KRL truncated", __func__); 914 goto out; 915 } 916 if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) { 917 error("%s: KRL unsupported format version %u", 918 __func__, format_version); 919 goto out; 920 } 921 if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->krl_version, ©) != 0 || 922 buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->generated_date, ©) != 0 || 923 buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->flags, ©) != 0 || 924 buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, NULL) == NULL || /* reserved */ 925 (krl->comment = buffer_get_cstring_ret(©, NULL)) == NULL) { 926 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 927 goto out; 928 } 929 930 format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); 931 debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", krl->krl_version, 932 timestamp, *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment); 933 934 /* 935 * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid 936 * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified. 937 */ 938 sig_seen = 0; 939 sects_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(©); 940 while (buffer_len(©) > 0) { 941 if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, ©) != 0 || 942 (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) { 943 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 944 goto out; 945 } 946 debug3("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type); 947 if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) { 948 if (sig_seen) { 949 error("KRL contains non-signature section " 950 "after signature"); 951 goto out; 952 } 953 /* Not interested for now. */ 954 continue; 955 } 956 sig_seen = 1; 957 /* First string component is the signing key */ 958 if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) { 959 error("%s: invalid signature key", __func__); 960 goto out; 961 } 962 sig_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(©); 963 /* Second string component is the signature itself */ 964 if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) { 965 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 966 goto out; 967 } 968 /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */ 969 if (key_verify(key, blob, blen, 970 buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf) - sig_off) == -1) { 971 error("bad signaure on KRL"); 972 goto out; 973 } 974 /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */ 975 for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { 976 if (key_equal(ca_used[i], key)) { 977 error("KRL signed more than once with " 978 "the same key"); 979 goto out; 980 } 981 } 982 /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ 983 ca_used = xrealloc(ca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used)); 984 ca_used[nca_used++] = key; 985 key = NULL; 986 break; 987 } 988 989 /* 990 * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point 991 * where the section start. 992 */ 993 buffer_append(©, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(buf) + sects_off, 994 buffer_len(buf) - sects_off); 995 while (buffer_len(©) > 0) { 996 if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, ©) != 0 || 997 (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) { 998 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 999 goto out; 1000 } 1001 debug3("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type); 1002 buffer_clear(§); 1003 buffer_append(§, blob, blen); 1004 1005 switch (type) { 1006 case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES: 1007 if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(§, krl)) != 0) 1008 goto out; 1009 break; 1010 case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY: 1011 case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1: 1012 while (buffer_len(§) > 0) { 1013 if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ret(§, 1014 &blen)) == NULL) { 1015 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 1016 goto out; 1017 } 1018 if (type == KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 && 1019 blen != 20) { 1020 error("%s: bad SHA1 length", __func__); 1021 goto out; 1022 } 1023 if (revoke_blob( 1024 type == KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY ? 1025 &krl->revoked_keys : &krl->revoked_sha1s, 1026 blob, blen) != 0) 1027 goto out; /* revoke_blob frees blob */ 1028 } 1029 break; 1030 case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE: 1031 /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */ 1032 buffer_clear(§); 1033 if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, 1034 &blen)) == NULL) { 1035 error("%s: buffer error", __func__); 1036 goto out; 1037 } 1038 break; 1039 default: 1040 error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type); 1041 goto out; 1042 } 1043 if (buffer_len(§) > 0) { 1044 error("KRL section contains unparsed data"); 1045 goto out; 1046 } 1047 } 1048 1049 /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */ 1050 sig_seen = 0; 1051 for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { 1052 if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0) 1053 sig_seen = 1; 1054 else { 1055 key_free(ca_used[i]); 1056 ca_used[i] = NULL; 1057 } 1058 } 1059 if (nca_used && !sig_seen) { 1060 error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked"); 1061 goto out; 1062 } 1063 1064 /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */ 1065 if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) { 1066 sig_seen = 0; 1067 for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) { 1068 for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) { 1069 if (ca_used[j] == NULL) 1070 continue; 1071 if (key_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) { 1072 sig_seen = 1; 1073 break; 1074 } 1075 } 1076 } 1077 if (!sig_seen) { 1078 error("KRL not signed with any trusted key"); 1079 goto out; 1080 } 1081 } 1082 1083 *krlp = krl; 1084 ret = 0; 1085 out: 1086 if (ret != 0) 1087 ssh_krl_free(krl); 1088 for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { 1089 if (ca_used[i] != NULL) 1090 key_free(ca_used[i]); 1091 } 1092 free(ca_used); 1093 if (key != NULL) 1094 key_free(key); 1095 buffer_free(©); 1096 buffer_free(§); 1097 return ret; 1098} 1099 1100/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */ 1101static int 1102is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) 1103{ 1104 struct revoked_blob rb, *erb; 1105 struct revoked_serial rs, *ers; 1106 struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki; 1107 struct revoked_certs *rc; 1108 1109 /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */ 1110 bzero(&rb, sizeof(rb)); 1111 if ((rb.blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &rb.len)) == NULL) 1112 return -1; 1113 erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); 1114 free(rb.blob); 1115 if (erb != NULL) { 1116 debug("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__); 1117 return -1; 1118 } 1119 1120 /* Next, explicit keys */ 1121 bzero(&rb, sizeof(rb)); 1122 if (plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len) != 0) 1123 return -1; 1124 erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); 1125 free(rb.blob); 1126 if (erb != NULL) { 1127 debug("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__); 1128 return -1; 1129 } 1130 1131 if (!key_is_cert(key)) 1132 return 0; 1133 1134 /* Check cert revocation */ 1135 if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key, 1136 &rc, 0) != 0) 1137 return -1; 1138 if (rc == NULL) 1139 return 0; /* No entry for this CA */ 1140 1141 /* Check revocation by cert key ID */ 1142 bzero(&rki, sizeof(rki)); 1143 rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id; 1144 erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki); 1145 if (erki != NULL) { 1146 debug("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__); 1147 return -1; 1148 } 1149 1150 /* 1151 * Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers. Zero serials numbers 1152 * are ignored (it's the default when the CA doesn't specify one). 1153 */ 1154 if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) 1155 return 0; 1156 1157 bzero(&rs, sizeof(rs)); 1158 rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial; 1159 ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs); 1160 if (ers != NULL) { 1161 KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__, 1162 key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi)); 1163 debug("%s: revoked by serial", __func__); 1164 return -1; 1165 } 1166 KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial)); 1167 1168 return 0; 1169} 1170 1171int 1172ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) 1173{ 1174 int r; 1175 1176 debug2("%s: checking key", __func__); 1177 if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0) 1178 return r; 1179 if (key_is_cert(key)) { 1180 debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__); 1181 if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0) 1182 return r; 1183 } 1184 debug3("%s: key okay", __func__); 1185 return 0; 1186} 1187 1188/* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error or key revoked, -2 if path is not a KRL */ 1189int 1190ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const Key *key) 1191{ 1192 Buffer krlbuf; 1193 struct ssh_krl *krl; 1194 int revoked, fd; 1195 1196 if (path == NULL) 1197 return 0; 1198 1199 if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { 1200 error("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); 1201 error("Revoked keys file not accessible - refusing public key " 1202 "authentication"); 1203 return -1; 1204 } 1205 buffer_init(&krlbuf); 1206 if (!key_load_file(fd, path, &krlbuf)) { 1207 close(fd); 1208 buffer_free(&krlbuf); 1209 error("Revoked keys file not readable - refusing public key " 1210 "authentication"); 1211 return -1; 1212 } 1213 close(fd); 1214 if (ssh_krl_from_blob(&krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0) != 0) { 1215 buffer_free(&krlbuf); 1216 error("Invalid KRL, refusing public key " 1217 "authentication"); 1218 return -1; 1219 } 1220 buffer_free(&krlbuf); 1221 if (krl == NULL) { 1222 debug3("%s: %s is not a KRL file", __func__, path); 1223 return -2; 1224 } 1225 debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path); 1226 revoked = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key) != 0; 1227 ssh_krl_free(krl); 1228 return revoked ? -1 : 0; 1229} 1230