1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111/* ==================================================================== 112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 113 * 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. 116 * 117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source 118 * license provided above. 119 * 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by 121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. 122 * 123 */ 124 125#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 126#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 127 128#include <stdio.h> 129#include "ssl_locl.h" 130#include "kssl_lcl.h" 131#include <openssl/buffer.h> 132#include <openssl/rand.h> 133#include <openssl/objects.h> 134#include <openssl/evp.h> 135#include <openssl/hmac.h> 136#include <openssl/x509.h> 137#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 138#include <openssl/dh.h> 139#endif 140#include <openssl/bn.h> 141#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 142#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> 143#endif 144#include <openssl/md5.h> 145 146static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); 147#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 148static int nid2curve_id(int nid); 149#endif 150 151static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) 152 { 153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) 154 return(SSLv3_server_method()); 155 else 156 return(NULL); 157 } 158 159IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, 160 ssl3_accept, 161 ssl_undefined_function, 162 ssl3_get_server_method) 163 164int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) 165 { 166 BUF_MEM *buf; 167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); 168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; 169 int ret= -1; 170 int new_state,state,skip=0; 171 172 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); 173 ERR_clear_error(); 174 clear_sys_error(); 175 176 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 177 cb=s->info_callback; 178 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 179 cb=s->ctx->info_callback; 180 181 /* init things to blank */ 182 s->in_handshake++; 183 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 184 185 if (s->cert == NULL) 186 { 187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); 188 return(-1); 189 } 190 191 for (;;) 192 { 193 state=s->state; 194 195 switch (s->state) 196 { 197 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: 198 s->new_session=1; 199 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ 200 201 case SSL_ST_BEFORE: 202 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 203 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 204 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: 205 206 s->server=1; 207 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); 208 209 if ((s->version>>8) != 3) 210 { 211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 212 return -1; 213 } 214 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; 215 216 if (s->init_buf == NULL) 217 { 218 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) 219 { 220 ret= -1; 221 goto end; 222 } 223 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) 224 { 225 ret= -1; 226 goto end; 227 } 228 s->init_buf=buf; 229 } 230 231 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 232 { 233 ret= -1; 234 goto end; 235 } 236 237 s->init_num=0; 238 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 239 240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) 241 { 242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that 243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) 244 */ 245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } 246 247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; 249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; 250 } 251 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && 252 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 253 { 254 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with 255 * client that doesn't support secure 256 * renegotiation. 257 */ 258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 259 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 260 ret = -1; 261 goto end; 262 } 263 else 264 { 265 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, 266 * we will just send a HelloRequest */ 267 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; 268 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; 269 } 270 break; 271 272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: 273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: 274 275 s->shutdown=0; 276 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); 277 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 278 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; 279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 280 s->init_num=0; 281 282 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); 283 break; 284 285 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: 286 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 287 break; 288 289 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: 290 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: 291 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: 292 293 s->shutdown=0; 294 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); 295 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 296 s->new_session = 2; 297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; 298 s->init_num=0; 299 break; 300 301 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: 302 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: 303 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); 304 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 305#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 306 if (s->hit) 307 { 308 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 310 else 311 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 312 } 313#else 314 if (s->hit) 315 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 316#endif 317 else 318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; 319 s->init_num=0; 320 break; 321 322 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: 323 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: 324 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */ 325 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) 326 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) 327 { 328 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); 329 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 330#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 331 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; 333 else 334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 335 } 336 else 337 { 338 skip = 1; 339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 340 } 341#else 342 } 343 else 344 skip=1; 345 346 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 347#endif 348 s->init_num=0; 349 break; 350 351 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: 352 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: 353 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; 354 355 /* clear this, it may get reset by 356 * send_server_key_exchange */ 357 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) 358#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 359 && !(l & SSL_KRB5) 360#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 361 ) 362 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key 363 * even when forbidden by protocol specs 364 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to 365 * be able to handle this) */ 366 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 367 else 368 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; 369 370 371 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or 372 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate 373 * 374 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange 375 * message only if the cipher suite is either 376 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the 377 * server certificate contains the server's 378 * public key for key exchange. 379 */ 380 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp 381 || (l & SSL_kECDHE) 382 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA)) 383 || ((l & SSL_kRSA) 384 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL 385 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 386 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) 387 ) 388 ) 389 ) 390 ) 391 { 392 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); 393 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 394 } 395 else 396 skip=1; 397 398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; 399 s->init_num=0; 400 break; 401 402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: 403 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: 404 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ 405 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || 406 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, 407 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ 408 ((s->session->peer != NULL) && 409 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || 410 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites 411 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts 412 * and in RFC 2246): */ 413 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) && 414 /* ... except when the application insists on verification 415 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ 416 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || 417 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ 418 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) 419 { 420 /* no cert request */ 421 skip=1; 422 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; 423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 424 } 425 else 426 { 427 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; 428 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); 429 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 430#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; 432#else 433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 434 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 435#endif 436 s->init_num=0; 437 } 438 break; 439 440 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: 441 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: 442 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); 443 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 444 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; 445 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 446 s->init_num=0; 447 break; 448 449 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: 450 451 /* This code originally checked to see if 452 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO 453 * and then flushed. This caused problems 454 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed 455 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue 456 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING 457 * still exist. So instead we just flush 458 * unconditionally. 459 */ 460 461 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; 462 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) 463 { 464 ret= -1; 465 goto end; 466 } 467 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; 468 469 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; 470 break; 471 472 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: 473 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: 474 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ 475 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); 476 if (ret <= 0) 477 goto end; 478 if (ret == 2) 479 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; 480 else { 481 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 482 { 483 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); 484 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 485 } 486 s->init_num=0; 487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; 488 } 489 break; 490 491 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: 492 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: 493 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); 494 if (ret <= 0) 495 goto end; 496 if (ret == 2) 497 { 498 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when 499 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in 500 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify 501 * message is not sent. 502 */ 503 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 504 s->init_num = 0; 505 } 506 else 507 { 508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; 509 s->init_num=0; 510 511 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is 512 * a client cert, it can be verified 513 */ 514 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 515 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), 516 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0])); 517 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, 518 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), 519 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); 520 } 521 break; 522 523 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: 524 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: 525 526 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 527 /* we should decide if we expected this one */ 528 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); 529 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 530 531 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 532 s->init_num=0; 533 break; 534 535 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: 536 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: 537 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 538 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, 539 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); 540 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 541 if (s->hit) 542 s->state=SSL_ST_OK; 543#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 544 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) 545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; 546#endif 547 else 548 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 549 s->init_num=0; 550 break; 551 552#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 553 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: 554 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: 555 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); 556 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 557 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; 558 s->init_num=0; 559 break; 560 561 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: 562 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: 563 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); 564 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 565 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; 566 s->init_num=0; 567 break; 568 569#endif 570 571 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: 572 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: 573 574 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 575 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 576 { ret= -1; goto end; } 577 578 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, 579 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); 580 581 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 582 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; 583 s->init_num=0; 584 585 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 586 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) 587 { 588 ret= -1; 589 goto end; 590 } 591 592 break; 593 594 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: 595 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: 596 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, 597 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, 598 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, 599 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); 600 if (ret <= 0) goto end; 601 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; 602 if (s->hit) 603 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; 604 else 605 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; 606 s->init_num=0; 607 break; 608 609 case SSL_ST_OK: 610 /* clean a few things up */ 611 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 612 613 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 614 s->init_buf=NULL; 615 616 /* remove buffering on output */ 617 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); 618 619 s->init_num=0; 620 621 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 622 { 623 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless 624 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ 625 626 s->new_session=0; 627 628 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 629 630 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; 631 /* s->server=1; */ 632 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; 633 634 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); 635 } 636 637 ret = 1; 638 goto end; 639 /* break; */ 640 641 default: 642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); 643 ret= -1; 644 goto end; 645 /* break; */ 646 } 647 648 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) 649 { 650 if (s->debug) 651 { 652 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) 653 goto end; 654 } 655 656 657 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) 658 { 659 new_state=s->state; 660 s->state=state; 661 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); 662 s->state=new_state; 663 } 664 } 665 skip=0; 666 } 667end: 668 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ 669 670 s->in_handshake--; 671 if (cb != NULL) 672 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); 673 return(ret); 674 } 675 676int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) 677 { 678 unsigned char *p; 679 680 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) 681 { 682 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 683 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; 684 *(p++)=0; 685 *(p++)=0; 686 *(p++)=0; 687 688 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; 689 /* number of bytes to write */ 690 s->init_num=4; 691 s->init_off=0; 692 } 693 694 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ 695 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 696 } 697 698int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) 699 { 700 int ok; 701 long n; 702 703 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, 704 * so permit appropriate message length */ 705 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 706 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 707 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 708 -1, 709 s->max_cert_list, 710 &ok); 711 if (!ok) return((int)n); 712 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; 713 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) 714 { 715 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per 716 * negotiation. */ 717 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) 718 { 719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); 720 return -1; 721 } 722 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, 723 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ 724#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 725 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 726 { 727 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 728 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; 729 } 730#endif 731#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 732 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 733 { 734 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 735 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 736 } 737#endif 738 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; 739 return 2; 740 } 741 return 1; 742} 743 744int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) 745 { 746 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; 747 unsigned int cookie_len; 748 long n; 749 unsigned long id; 750 unsigned char *p,*d,*q; 751 SSL_CIPHER *c; 752#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 753 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; 754#endif 755 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; 756 757 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. 758 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, 759 * This down switching should be handled by a different method. 760 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with 761 * TLSv1. 762 */ 763 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 764 { 765 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; 766 } 767 s->first_packet=1; 768 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 769 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, 770 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, 771 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, 772 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, 773 &ok); 774 775 if (!ok) return((int)n); 776 s->first_packet=0; 777 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 778 779 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header 780 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ 781 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; 782 p+=2; 783 784 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || 785 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) 786 { 787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 788 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) 789 { 790 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ 791 s->version = s->client_version; 792 } 793 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 794 goto f_err; 795 } 796 797 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't 798 * contain one, just return since we do not want to 799 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... 800 */ 801 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) 802 { 803 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; 804 805 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 806 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); 807 808 if (cookie_length == 0) 809 return 1; 810 } 811 812 /* load the client random */ 813 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 814 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 815 816 /* get the session-id */ 817 j= *(p++); 818 819 s->hit=0; 820 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation 821 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option 822 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. 823 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default, 824 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications 825 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with 826 * an earlier library version) 827 */ 828 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) 829 { 830 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 831 goto err; 832 } 833 else 834 { 835 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); 836 if (i == 1) 837 { /* previous session */ 838 s->hit=1; 839 } 840 else if (i == -1) 841 goto err; 842 else /* i == 0 */ 843 { 844 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) 845 goto err; 846 } 847 } 848 849 p+=j; 850 851 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 852 { 853 /* cookie stuff */ 854 cookie_len = *(p++); 855 856 /* 857 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the 858 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it 859 * does not cause an overflow. 860 */ 861 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) 862 { 863 /* too much data */ 864 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 866 goto f_err; 867 } 868 869 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ 870 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && 871 cookie_len > 0) 872 { 873 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); 874 875 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) 876 { 877 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, 878 cookie_len) == 0) 879 { 880 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 882 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 883 goto f_err; 884 } 885 /* else cookie verification succeeded */ 886 } 887 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, 888 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ 889 { 890 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, 892 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 893 goto f_err; 894 } 895 896 ret = 2; 897 } 898 899 p += cookie_len; 900 } 901 902 n2s(p,i); 903 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) 904 { 905 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ 906 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); 908 goto f_err; 909 } 910 if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) 911 { 912 /* not enough data */ 913 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 915 goto f_err; 916 } 917 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) 918 == NULL)) 919 { 920 goto err; 921 } 922 p+=i; 923 924 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ 925 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) 926 { 927 j=0; 928 id=s->session->cipher->id; 929 930#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 931 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); 932#endif 933 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) 934 { 935 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i); 936#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG 937 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", 938 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); 939#endif 940 if (c->id == id) 941 { 942 j=1; 943 break; 944 } 945 } 946/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade 947 * attack: CVE-2010-4180. 948 */ 949#if 0 950 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) 951 { 952 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may 953 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to 954 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server 955 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not 956 * enabled, though. */ 957 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); 958 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) 959 { 960 s->session->cipher = c; 961 j = 1; 962 } 963 } 964#endif 965 if (j == 0) 966 { 967 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher 968 * list if we are asked to reuse it */ 969 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); 971 goto f_err; 972 } 973 } 974 975 /* compression */ 976 i= *(p++); 977 if ((p+i) > (d+n)) 978 { 979 /* not enough data */ 980 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 982 goto f_err; 983 } 984 q=p; 985 for (j=0; j<i; j++) 986 { 987 if (p[j] == 0) break; 988 } 989 990 p+=i; 991 if (j >= i) 992 { 993 /* no compress */ 994 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); 996 goto f_err; 997 } 998 999#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1000 /* TLS extensions*/ 1001 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1002 { 1003 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) 1004 { 1005 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ 1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); 1007 goto f_err; 1008 } 1009 } 1010 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1012 goto err; 1013 } 1014#endif 1015 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other 1016 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression 1017 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ 1018 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; 1019#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1020 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL) 1021 { /* See if we have a match */ 1022 int m,nn,o,v,done=0; 1023 1024 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); 1025 for (m=0; m<nn; m++) 1026 { 1027 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m); 1028 v=comp->id; 1029 for (o=0; o<i; o++) 1030 { 1031 if (v == q[o]) 1032 { 1033 done=1; 1034 break; 1035 } 1036 } 1037 if (done) break; 1038 } 1039 if (done) 1040 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; 1041 else 1042 comp=NULL; 1043 } 1044#endif 1045 1046 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */ 1047#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test 1048 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b, 1049 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */ 1050 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 1051 { 1052 if (p < (d+n)) 1053 { 1054 /* wrong number of bytes, 1055 * there could be more to follow */ 1056 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1058 goto f_err; 1059 } 1060 } 1061#endif 1062 1063 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must 1064 * pick a cipher */ 1065 1066 if (!s->hit) 1067 { 1068#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1069 s->session->compress_meth=0; 1070#else 1071 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; 1072#endif 1073 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) 1074 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); 1075 s->session->ciphers=ciphers; 1076 if (ciphers == NULL) 1077 { 1078 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); 1080 goto f_err; 1081 } 1082 ciphers=NULL; 1083 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, 1084 SSL_get_ciphers(s)); 1085 1086 if (c == NULL) 1087 { 1088 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); 1090 goto f_err; 1091 } 1092 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; 1093 } 1094 else 1095 { 1096 /* Session-id reuse */ 1097#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG 1098 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; 1099 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; 1100 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; 1101 1102 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) 1103 { 1104 sk=s->session->ciphers; 1105 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) 1106 { 1107 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i); 1108 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL) 1109 nc=c; 1110 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) 1111 ec=c; 1112 } 1113 if (nc != NULL) 1114 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; 1115 else if (ec != NULL) 1116 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; 1117 else 1118 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1119 } 1120 else 1121#endif 1122 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; 1123 } 1124 1125 /* we now have the following setup. 1126 * client_random 1127 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers 1128 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers 1129 * compression - basically ignored right now 1130 * ssl version is set - sslv3 1131 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. 1132 * s->hit - session reuse flag 1133 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. 1134 */ 1135 1136#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1137 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ 1138 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) 1139 { 1140 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) 1141 { 1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 1143 goto err; 1144 } 1145 } 1146#endif 1147 1148 if (ret < 0) ret=1; 1149 if (0) 1150 { 1151f_err: 1152 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1153 } 1154err: 1155 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); 1156 return(ret); 1157 } 1158 1159int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) 1160 { 1161 unsigned char *buf; 1162 unsigned char *p,*d; 1163 int i,sl; 1164 unsigned long l,Time; 1165 1166 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1167 { 1168 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1169 p=s->s3->server_random; 1170 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ 1171 l2n(Time,p); 1172 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) 1173 return -1; 1174 /* Do the message type and length last */ 1175 d=p= &(buf[4]); 1176 1177 *(p++)=s->version>>8; 1178 *(p++)=s->version&0xff; 1179 1180 /* Random stuff */ 1181 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1182 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; 1183 1184 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the 1185 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the 1186 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send 1187 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length 1188 * session-id if we want it to be single use. 1189 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id 1190 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. 1191 * 1192 * We also have an additional case where stateless session 1193 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old 1194 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can 1195 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful 1196 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality 1197 * is unaffected. 1198 */ 1199 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) 1200 && !s->hit) 1201 s->session->session_id_length=0; 1202 1203 sl=s->session->session_id_length; 1204 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) 1205 { 1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1207 return -1; 1208 } 1209 *(p++)=sl; 1210 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); 1211 p+=sl; 1212 1213 /* put the cipher */ 1214 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); 1215 p+=i; 1216 1217 /* put the compression method */ 1218#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 1219 *(p++)=0; 1220#else 1221 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) 1222 *(p++)=0; 1223 else 1224 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; 1225#endif 1226#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 1227 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) 1228 { 1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1230 return -1; 1231 } 1232#endif 1233 /* do the header */ 1234 l=(p-d); 1235 d=buf; 1236 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; 1237 l2n3(l,d); 1238 1239 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; 1240 /* number of bytes to write */ 1241 s->init_num=p-buf; 1242 s->init_off=0; 1243 } 1244 1245 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ 1246 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1247 } 1248 1249int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) 1250 { 1251 unsigned char *p; 1252 1253 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) 1254 { 1255 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1256 1257 /* do the header */ 1258 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1259 *(p++)=0; 1260 *(p++)=0; 1261 *(p++)=0; 1262 1263 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; 1264 /* number of bytes to write */ 1265 s->init_num=4; 1266 s->init_off=0; 1267 } 1268 1269 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ 1270 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1271 } 1272 1273int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1274 { 1275#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1276 unsigned char *q; 1277 int j,num; 1278 RSA *rsa; 1279 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 1280 unsigned int u; 1281#endif 1282#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1283 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; 1284#endif 1285#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1286 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; 1287 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; 1288 int encodedlen = 0; 1289 int curve_id = 0; 1290 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1291#endif 1292 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1293 unsigned char *p,*d; 1294 int al,i; 1295 unsigned long type; 1296 int n; 1297 CERT *cert; 1298 BIGNUM *r[4]; 1299 int nr[4],kn; 1300 BUF_MEM *buf; 1301 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; 1302 1303 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); 1304 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) 1305 { 1306 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK; 1307 cert=s->cert; 1308 1309 buf=s->init_buf; 1310 1311 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; 1312 n=0; 1313#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1314 if (type & SSL_kRSA) 1315 { 1316 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; 1317 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1318 { 1319 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, 1320 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1321 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1322 if(rsa == NULL) 1323 { 1324 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1326 goto f_err; 1327 } 1328 RSA_up_ref(rsa); 1329 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; 1330 } 1331 if (rsa == NULL) 1332 { 1333 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); 1335 goto f_err; 1336 } 1337 r[0]=rsa->n; 1338 r[1]=rsa->e; 1339 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; 1340 } 1341 else 1342#endif 1343#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1344 if (type & SSL_kEDH) 1345 { 1346 dhp=cert->dh_tmp; 1347 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1348 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 1349 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1350 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1351 if (dhp == NULL) 1352 { 1353 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1355 goto f_err; 1356 } 1357 1358 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) 1359 { 1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1361 goto err; 1362 } 1363 1364 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) 1365 { 1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1367 goto err; 1368 } 1369 1370 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; 1371 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || 1372 dhp->priv_key == NULL || 1373 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) 1374 { 1375 if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) 1376 { 1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1378 ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1379 goto err; 1380 } 1381 } 1382 else 1383 { 1384 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); 1385 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); 1386 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || 1387 (dh->priv_key == NULL)) 1388 { 1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1390 goto err; 1391 } 1392 } 1393 r[0]=dh->p; 1394 r[1]=dh->g; 1395 r[2]=dh->pub_key; 1396 } 1397 else 1398#endif 1399#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1400 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 1401 { 1402 const EC_GROUP *group; 1403 1404 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; 1405 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) 1406 { 1407 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 1408 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), 1409 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); 1410 } 1411 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1412 { 1413 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 1415 goto f_err; 1416 } 1417 1418 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) 1419 { 1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1421 goto err; 1422 } 1423 1424 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ 1425 if (ecdhp == NULL) 1426 { 1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1428 goto err; 1429 } 1430 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) 1431 { 1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1433 goto err; 1434 } 1435 1436 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; 1437 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1438 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1439 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) 1440 { 1441 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) 1442 { 1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1444 goto err; 1445 } 1446 } 1447 1448 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || 1449 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || 1450 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) 1451 { 1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1453 goto err; 1454 } 1455 1456 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && 1457 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) 1458 { 1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); 1460 goto err; 1461 } 1462 1463 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH 1464 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For 1465 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. 1466 */ 1467 if ((curve_id = 1468 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) 1469 == 0) 1470 { 1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); 1472 goto err; 1473 } 1474 1475 /* Encode the public key. 1476 * First check the size of encoding and 1477 * allocate memory accordingly. 1478 */ 1479 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1480 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1481 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1482 NULL, 0, NULL); 1483 1484 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 1485 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); 1486 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); 1487 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) 1488 { 1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1490 goto err; 1491 } 1492 1493 1494 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, 1495 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), 1496 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 1497 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); 1498 1499 if (encodedlen == 0) 1500 { 1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 1502 goto err; 1503 } 1504 1505 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; 1506 1507 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not 1508 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. 1509 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes 1510 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams 1511 * structure. 1512 */ 1513 n = 4 + encodedlen; 1514 1515 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message 1516 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs 1517 */ 1518 r[0]=NULL; 1519 r[1]=NULL; 1520 r[2]=NULL; 1521 r[3]=NULL; 1522 } 1523 else 1524#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 1525 { 1526 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); 1528 goto f_err; 1529 } 1530 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1531 { 1532 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); 1533 n+=2+nr[i]; 1534 } 1535 1536 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) 1537 { 1538 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) 1539 == NULL) 1540 { 1541 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1542 goto f_err; 1543 } 1544 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 1545 } 1546 else 1547 { 1548 pkey=NULL; 1549 kn=0; 1550 } 1551 1552 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) 1553 { 1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); 1555 goto err; 1556 } 1557 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1558 p= &(d[4]); 1559 1560 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) 1561 { 1562 s2n(nr[i],p); 1563 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); 1564 p+=nr[i]; 1565 } 1566 1567#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1568 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) 1569 { 1570 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. 1571 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: 1572 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] 1573 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by 1574 * the actual encoded point itself 1575 */ 1576 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; 1577 p += 1; 1578 *p = 0; 1579 p += 1; 1580 *p = curve_id; 1581 p += 1; 1582 *p = encodedlen; 1583 p += 1; 1584 memcpy((unsigned char*)p, 1585 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 1586 encodedlen); 1587 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1588 encodedPoint = NULL; 1589 p += encodedlen; 1590 } 1591#endif 1592 1593 /* not anonymous */ 1594 if (pkey != NULL) 1595 { 1596 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) 1597 * and p points to the space at the end. */ 1598#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1599 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 1600 { 1601 q=md_buf; 1602 j=0; 1603 for (num=2; num > 0; num--) 1604 { 1605 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, 1606 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); 1607 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) 1608 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); 1609 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1610 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1611 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1612 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, 1613 (unsigned int *)&i); 1614 q+=i; 1615 j+=i; 1616 } 1617 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, 1618 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) 1619 { 1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); 1621 goto err; 1622 } 1623 s2n(u,p); 1624 n+=u+2; 1625 } 1626 else 1627#endif 1628#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) 1629 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 1630 { 1631 /* lets do DSS */ 1632 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); 1633 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1634 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1635 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1636 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1637 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1638 { 1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); 1640 goto err; 1641 } 1642 s2n(i,p); 1643 n+=i+2; 1644 } 1645 else 1646#endif 1647#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) 1648 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 1649 { 1650 /* let's do ECDSA */ 1651 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); 1652 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1653 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 1654 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); 1655 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), 1656 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) 1657 { 1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); 1659 goto err; 1660 } 1661 s2n(i,p); 1662 n+=i+2; 1663 } 1664 else 1665#endif 1666 { 1667 /* Is this error check actually needed? */ 1668 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); 1670 goto f_err; 1671 } 1672 } 1673 1674 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; 1675 l2n3(n,d); 1676 1677 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1678 * it off */ 1679 s->init_num=n+4; 1680 s->init_off=0; 1681 } 1682 1683 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; 1684 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1685 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1686f_err: 1687 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1688err: 1689#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1690 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1691 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 1692#endif 1693 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); 1694 return(-1); 1695 } 1696 1697int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) 1698 { 1699 unsigned char *p,*d; 1700 int i,j,nl,off,n; 1701 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; 1702 X509_NAME *name; 1703 BUF_MEM *buf; 1704 1705 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) 1706 { 1707 buf=s->init_buf; 1708 1709 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); 1710 1711 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ 1712 p++; 1713 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); 1714 d[0]=n; 1715 p+=n; 1716 n++; 1717 1718 off=n; 1719 p+=2; 1720 n+=2; 1721 1722 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); 1723 nl=0; 1724 if (sk != NULL) 1725 { 1726 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) 1727 { 1728 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); 1729 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); 1730 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) 1731 { 1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1733 goto err; 1734 } 1735 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]); 1736 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) 1737 { 1738 s2n(j,p); 1739 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1740 n+=2+j; 1741 nl+=2+j; 1742 } 1743 else 1744 { 1745 d=p; 1746 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); 1747 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; 1748 n+=j; 1749 nl+=j; 1750 } 1751 } 1752 } 1753 /* else no CA names */ 1754 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); 1755 s2n(nl,p); 1756 1757 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; 1758 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; 1759 l2n3(n,d); 1760 1761 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send 1762 * it off */ 1763 1764 s->init_num=n+4; 1765 s->init_off=0; 1766#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG 1767 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) 1768 { 1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1770 goto err; 1771 } 1772 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; 1773 1774 /* do the header */ 1775 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; 1776 *(p++)=0; 1777 *(p++)=0; 1778 *(p++)=0; 1779 s->init_num += 4; 1780#endif 1781 1782 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; 1783 } 1784 1785 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ 1786 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 1787err: 1788 return(-1); 1789 } 1790 1791int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) 1792 { 1793 int i,al,ok; 1794 long n; 1795 unsigned long l; 1796 unsigned char *p; 1797#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1798 RSA *rsa=NULL; 1799 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 1800#endif 1801#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1802 BIGNUM *pub=NULL; 1803 DH *dh_srvr; 1804#endif 1805#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1806 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; 1807#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 1808 1809#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 1810 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; 1811 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; 1812 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; 1813 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 1814#endif 1815 1816 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 1817 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, 1818 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, 1819 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 1820 2048, /* ??? */ 1821 &ok); 1822 1823 if (!ok) return((int)n); 1824 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 1825 1826 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; 1827 1828#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1829 if (l & SSL_kRSA) 1830 { 1831 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ 1832 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) 1833 { 1834 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) 1835 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; 1836 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should 1837 * be sent already */ 1838 if (rsa == NULL) 1839 { 1840 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); 1842 goto f_err; 1843 1844 } 1845 } 1846 else 1847 { 1848 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; 1849 if ( (pkey == NULL) || 1850 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || 1851 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) 1852 { 1853 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); 1855 goto f_err; 1856 } 1857 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; 1858 } 1859 1860 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */ 1861 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && 1862 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1863 { 1864 n2s(p,i); 1865 if (n != i+2) 1866 { 1867 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) 1868 { 1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1870 goto err; 1871 } 1872 else 1873 p-=2; 1874 } 1875 else 1876 n=i; 1877 } 1878 1879 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); 1880 1881 al = -1; 1882 1883 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 1884 { 1885 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1886 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ 1887 } 1888 1889 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 1890 { 1891 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 1892 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 1893 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 1894 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol 1895 * version instead if the server does not support the requested 1896 * protocol version. 1897 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ 1898 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) && 1899 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) 1900 { 1901 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1902 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ 1903 1904 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack 1905 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version 1906 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would 1907 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext 1908 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except 1909 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, 1910 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ 1911 } 1912 } 1913 1914 if (al != -1) 1915 { 1916 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure 1917 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding 1918 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ 1919 ERR_clear_error(); 1920 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; 1921 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; 1922 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; 1923 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ 1924 goto err; 1925 } 1926 1927 s->session->master_key_length= 1928 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 1929 s->session->master_key, 1930 p,i); 1931 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 1932 } 1933 else 1934#endif 1935#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1936 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) 1937 { 1938 n2s(p,i); 1939 if (n != i+2) 1940 { 1941 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) 1942 { 1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); 1944 goto err; 1945 } 1946 else 1947 { 1948 p-=2; 1949 i=(int)n; 1950 } 1951 } 1952 1953 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ 1954 { 1955 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); 1957 goto f_err; 1958 } 1959 else 1960 { 1961 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) 1962 { 1963 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); 1965 goto f_err; 1966 } 1967 else 1968 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; 1969 } 1970 1971 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); 1972 if (pub == NULL) 1973 { 1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); 1975 goto err; 1976 } 1977 1978 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); 1979 1980 if (i <= 0) 1981 { 1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); 1983 BN_clear_free(pub); 1984 goto err; 1985 } 1986 1987 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); 1988 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; 1989 1990 BN_clear_free(pub); 1991 pub=NULL; 1992 s->session->master_key_length= 1993 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 1994 s->session->master_key,p,i); 1995 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); 1996 } 1997 else 1998#endif 1999#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 2000 if (l & SSL_kKRB5) 2001 { 2002 krb5_error_code krb5rc; 2003 krb5_data enc_ticket; 2004 krb5_data authenticator; 2005 krb5_data enc_pms; 2006 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; 2007 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; 2008 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; 2009 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2010 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 2011 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 2012 int padl, outl; 2013 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; 2014 krb5_ticket_times ttimes; 2015 2016 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); 2017 2018 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); 2019 2020 n2s(p,i); 2021 enc_ticket.length = i; 2022 2023 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6) 2024 { 2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2026 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2027 goto err; 2028 } 2029 2030 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; 2031 p+=enc_ticket.length; 2032 2033 n2s(p,i); 2034 authenticator.length = i; 2035 2036 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6) 2037 { 2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2039 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2040 goto err; 2041 } 2042 2043 authenticator.data = (char *)p; 2044 p+=authenticator.length; 2045 2046 n2s(p,i); 2047 enc_pms.length = i; 2048 enc_pms.data = (char *)p; 2049 p+=enc_pms.length; 2050 2051 /* Note that the length is checked again below, 2052 ** after decryption 2053 */ 2054 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) 2055 { 2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2057 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2058 goto err; 2059 } 2060 2061 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 2062 enc_pms.length + 6)) 2063 { 2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2065 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2066 goto err; 2067 } 2068 2069 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, 2070 &kssl_err)) != 0) 2071 { 2072#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2073 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", 2074 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2075 if (kssl_err.text) 2076 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2077#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2079 kssl_err.reason); 2080 goto err; 2081 } 2082 2083 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, 2084 ** but will return authtime == 0. 2085 */ 2086 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, 2087 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) 2088 { 2089#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2090 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", 2091 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); 2092 if (kssl_err.text) 2093 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); 2094#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2096 kssl_err.reason); 2097 goto err; 2098 } 2099 2100 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) 2101 { 2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); 2103 goto err; 2104 } 2105 2106#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG 2107 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); 2108#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ 2109 2110 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); 2111 if (enc == NULL) 2112 goto err; 2113 2114 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ 2115 2116 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) 2117 { 2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2119 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2120 goto err; 2121 } 2122 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, 2123 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) 2124 { 2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2126 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2127 goto err; 2128 } 2129 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2130 { 2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2132 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2133 goto err; 2134 } 2135 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) 2136 { 2137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2138 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); 2139 goto err; 2140 } 2141 outl += padl; 2142 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) 2143 { 2144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2145 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 2146 goto err; 2147 } 2148 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) 2149 { 2150 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the 2151 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the 2152 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). 2153 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of 2154 * the protocol version. 2155 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 2156 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) 2157 */ 2158 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) 2159 { 2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2161 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); 2162 goto err; 2163 } 2164 } 2165 2166 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); 2167 2168 s->session->master_key_length= 2169 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 2170 s->session->master_key, pms, outl); 2171 2172 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 2173 { 2174 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); 2175 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) 2176 { 2177 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; 2178 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); 2179 } 2180 } 2181 2182 2183 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, 2184 ** but it caused problems for apache. 2185 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); 2186 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; 2187 */ 2188 } 2189 else 2190#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ 2191 2192#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2193 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE)) 2194 { 2195 int ret = 1; 2196 int field_size = 0; 2197 const EC_KEY *tkey; 2198 const EC_GROUP *group; 2199 const BIGNUM *priv_key; 2200 2201 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ 2202 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 2203 { 2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2205 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2206 goto err; 2207 } 2208 2209 /* Let's get server private key and group information */ 2210 if (l & SSL_kECDH) 2211 { 2212 /* use the certificate */ 2213 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; 2214 } 2215 else 2216 { 2217 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when 2218 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. 2219 */ 2220 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; 2221 } 2222 2223 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); 2224 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); 2225 2226 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || 2227 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) 2228 { 2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2230 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2231 goto err; 2232 } 2233 2234 /* Let's get client's public key */ 2235 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) 2236 { 2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2238 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2239 goto err; 2240 } 2241 2242 if (n == 0L) 2243 { 2244 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ 2245 2246 if (l & SSL_kECDHE) 2247 { 2248 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); 2250 goto f_err; 2251 } 2252 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) 2253 == NULL) || 2254 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) 2255 { 2256 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client 2257 * authentication using ECDH certificates 2258 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is 2259 * never executed. When that support is 2260 * added, we ought to ensure the key 2261 * received in the certificate is 2262 * authorized for key agreement. 2263 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that 2264 * the two ECDH shares are for the same 2265 * group. 2266 */ 2267 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2269 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); 2270 goto f_err; 2271 } 2272 2273 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, 2274 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) 2275 { 2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2277 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2278 goto err; 2279 } 2280 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ 2281 } 2282 else 2283 { 2284 /* Get client's public key from encoded point 2285 * in the ClientKeyExchange message. 2286 */ 2287 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) 2288 { 2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2290 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2291 goto err; 2292 } 2293 2294 /* Get encoded point length */ 2295 i = *p; 2296 p += 1; 2297 if (n != 1 + i) 2298 { 2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2300 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2301 goto err; 2302 } 2303 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 2304 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) 2305 { 2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2307 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 2308 goto err; 2309 } 2310 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer 2311 * currently, so set it to the start 2312 */ 2313 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2314 } 2315 2316 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ 2317 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); 2318 if (field_size <= 0) 2319 { 2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2321 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2322 goto err; 2323 } 2324 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); 2325 if (i <= 0) 2326 { 2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2328 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); 2329 goto err; 2330 } 2331 2332 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2333 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2334 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2335 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2336 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2337 2338 /* Compute the master secret */ 2339 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ 2340 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); 2341 2342 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); 2343 return (ret); 2344 } 2345 else 2346#endif 2347 { 2348 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2350 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); 2351 goto f_err; 2352 } 2353 2354 return(1); 2355f_err: 2356 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2357#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) 2358err: 2359#endif 2360#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2361 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); 2362 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); 2363 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 2364 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); 2365 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); 2366#endif 2367 return(-1); 2368 } 2369 2370int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) 2371 { 2372 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 2373 unsigned char *p; 2374 int al,ok,ret=0; 2375 long n; 2376 int type=0,i,j; 2377 X509 *peer; 2378 2379 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2380 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, 2381 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, 2382 -1, 2383 514, /* 514? */ 2384 &ok); 2385 2386 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2387 2388 if (s->session->peer != NULL) 2389 { 2390 peer=s->session->peer; 2391 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); 2392 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); 2393 } 2394 else 2395 { 2396 peer=NULL; 2397 pkey=NULL; 2398 } 2399 2400 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) 2401 { 2402 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2403 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2404 { 2405 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); 2407 goto f_err; 2408 } 2409 ret=1; 2410 goto end; 2411 } 2412 2413 if (peer == NULL) 2414 { 2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); 2416 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2417 goto f_err; 2418 } 2419 2420 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) 2421 { 2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 2423 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2424 goto f_err; 2425 } 2426 2427 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) 2428 { 2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 2430 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2431 goto f_err; 2432 } 2433 2434 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ 2435 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2436 n2s(p,i); 2437 n-=2; 2438 if (i > n) 2439 { 2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2441 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2442 goto f_err; 2443 } 2444 2445 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); 2446 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) 2447 { 2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); 2449 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2450 goto f_err; 2451 } 2452 2453#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2454 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) 2455 { 2456 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, 2457 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, 2458 pkey->pkey.rsa); 2459 if (i < 0) 2460 { 2461 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); 2463 goto f_err; 2464 } 2465 if (i == 0) 2466 { 2467 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); 2469 goto f_err; 2470 } 2471 } 2472 else 2473#endif 2474#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2475 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) 2476 { 2477 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2478 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2479 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); 2480 if (j <= 0) 2481 { 2482 /* bad signature */ 2483 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); 2485 goto f_err; 2486 } 2487 } 2488 else 2489#endif 2490#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2491 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) 2492 { 2493 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, 2494 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), 2495 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); 2496 if (j <= 0) 2497 { 2498 /* bad signature */ 2499 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; 2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, 2501 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); 2502 goto f_err; 2503 } 2504 } 2505 else 2506#endif 2507 { 2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2509 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; 2510 goto f_err; 2511 } 2512 2513 2514 ret=1; 2515 if (0) 2516 { 2517f_err: 2518 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2519 } 2520end: 2521 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 2522 return(ret); 2523 } 2524 2525int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) 2526 { 2527 int i,ok,al,ret= -1; 2528 X509 *x=NULL; 2529 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; 2530 const unsigned char *p,*q; 2531 unsigned char *d; 2532 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; 2533 2534 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, 2535 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, 2536 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, 2537 -1, 2538 s->max_cert_list, 2539 &ok); 2540 2541 if (!ok) return((int)n); 2542 2543 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) 2544 { 2545 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2546 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2547 { 2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2549 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2550 goto f_err; 2551 } 2552 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ 2553 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) 2554 { 2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); 2556 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2557 goto f_err; 2558 } 2559 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; 2560 return(1); 2561 } 2562 2563 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) 2564 { 2565 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); 2567 goto f_err; 2568 } 2569 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; 2570 2571 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) 2572 { 2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2574 goto err; 2575 } 2576 2577 n2l3(p,llen); 2578 if (llen+3 != n) 2579 { 2580 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2582 goto f_err; 2583 } 2584 for (nc=0; nc<llen; ) 2585 { 2586 n2l3(p,l); 2587 if ((l+nc+3) > llen) 2588 { 2589 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2591 goto f_err; 2592 } 2593 2594 q=p; 2595 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); 2596 if (x == NULL) 2597 { 2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2599 goto err; 2600 } 2601 if (p != (q+l)) 2602 { 2603 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2605 goto f_err; 2606 } 2607 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) 2608 { 2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2610 goto err; 2611 } 2612 x=NULL; 2613 nc+=l+3; 2614 } 2615 2616 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) 2617 { 2618 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ 2619 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) 2620 { 2621 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); 2623 goto f_err; 2624 } 2625 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ 2626 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && 2627 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) 2628 { 2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); 2630 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2631 goto f_err; 2632 } 2633 } 2634 else 2635 { 2636 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); 2637 if (i <= 0) 2638 { 2639 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); 2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); 2641 goto f_err; 2642 } 2643 } 2644 2645 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ 2646 X509_free(s->session->peer); 2647 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); 2648 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; 2649 2650 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL 2651 * when we arrive here. */ 2652 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2653 { 2654 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); 2655 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 2656 { 2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2658 goto err; 2659 } 2660 } 2661 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) 2662 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); 2663 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; 2664 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the 2665 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ 2666 2667 sk=NULL; 2668 2669 ret=1; 2670 if (0) 2671 { 2672f_err: 2673 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2674 } 2675err: 2676 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); 2677 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); 2678 return(ret); 2679 } 2680 2681int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) 2682 { 2683 unsigned long l; 2684 X509 *x; 2685 2686 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) 2687 { 2688 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); 2689 if (x == NULL && 2690 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ 2691 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms 2692 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) 2693 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)) 2694 { 2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2696 return(0); 2697 } 2698 2699 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); 2700 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; 2701 s->init_num=(int)l; 2702 s->init_off=0; 2703 } 2704 2705 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ 2706 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2707 } 2708 2709 2710#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 2711/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */ 2712static int nid2curve_id(int nid) 2713{ 2714 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) 2715 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */ 2716 switch (nid) { 2717 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 2718 return 1; 2719 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 2720 return 2; 2721 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 2722 return 3; 2723 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 2724 return 4; 2725 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 2726 return 5; 2727 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 2728 return 6; 2729 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 2730 return 7; 2731 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 2732 return 8; 2733 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 2734 return 9; 2735 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 2736 return 10; 2737 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 2738 return 11; 2739 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 2740 return 12; 2741 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 2742 return 13; 2743 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 2744 return 14; 2745 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 2746 return 15; 2747 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 2748 return 16; 2749 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 2750 return 17; 2751 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 2752 return 18; 2753 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 2754 return 19; 2755 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 2756 return 20; 2757 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 2758 return 21; 2759 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 2760 return 22; 2761 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 2762 return 23; 2763 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 2764 return 24; 2765 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 2766 return 25; 2767 default: 2768 return 0; 2769 } 2770} 2771#endif 2772#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 2773int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) 2774 { 2775 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) 2776 { 2777 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; 2778 int len, slen; 2779 unsigned int hlen; 2780 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2781 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2782 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2783 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; 2784 unsigned char key_name[16]; 2785 2786 /* get session encoding length */ 2787 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); 2788 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is 2789 * too long 2790 */ 2791 if (slen > 0xFF00) 2792 return -1; 2793 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2794 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length 2795 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + 2796 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + 2797 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session 2798 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). 2799 */ 2800 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 2801 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + 2802 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) 2803 return -1; 2804 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); 2805 if (!senc) 2806 return -1; 2807 p = senc; 2808 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); 2809 2810 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2811 /* do the header */ 2812 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; 2813 /* Skip message length for now */ 2814 p += 3; 2815 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2816 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2817 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present 2818 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values 2819 * from parent ctx. 2820 */ 2821 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2822 { 2823 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, 2824 &hctx, 1) < 0) 2825 { 2826 OPENSSL_free(senc); 2827 return -1; 2828 } 2829 } 2830 else 2831 { 2832 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); 2833 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2834 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); 2835 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2836 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2837 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); 2838 } 2839 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); 2840 /* Skip ticket length for now */ 2841 p += 2; 2842 /* Output key name */ 2843 macstart = p; 2844 memcpy(p, key_name, 16); 2845 p += 16; 2846 /* output IV */ 2847 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); 2848 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2849 /* Encrypt session data */ 2850 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); 2851 p += len; 2852 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); 2853 p += len; 2854 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2855 2856 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); 2857 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); 2858 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2859 2860 p += hlen; 2861 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ 2862 /* Total length */ 2863 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2864 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; 2865 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ 2866 p += 4; 2867 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ 2868 2869 /* number of bytes to write */ 2870 s->init_num= len; 2871 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; 2872 s->init_off=0; 2873 OPENSSL_free(senc); 2874 } 2875 2876 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ 2877 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2878 } 2879 2880int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) 2881 { 2882 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) 2883 { 2884 unsigned char *p; 2885 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as 2886 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + 2887 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) 2888 * + (ocsp response) 2889 */ 2890 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) 2891 return -1; 2892 2893 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 2894 2895 /* do the header */ 2896 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; 2897 /* message length */ 2898 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); 2899 /* status type */ 2900 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; 2901 /* length of OCSP response */ 2902 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); 2903 /* actual response */ 2904 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); 2905 /* number of bytes to write */ 2906 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; 2907 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; 2908 s->init_off = 0; 2909 } 2910 2911 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ 2912 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); 2913 } 2914#endif 2915