1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 59#include <stdio.h> 60#include <time.h> 61#include <errno.h> 62 63#include "cryptlib.h" 64#include <openssl/crypto.h> 65#include <openssl/lhash.h> 66#include <openssl/buffer.h> 67#include <openssl/evp.h> 68#include <openssl/asn1.h> 69#include <openssl/x509.h> 70#include <openssl/x509v3.h> 71#include <openssl/objects.h> 72 73/* 74 * If we are using Trust Evaluation Agent, rename the original function 75 */ 76#ifdef __APPLE__ 77#define X509_verify_cert X509_verify_cert_orig 78#endif 79 80static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); 81static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); 82static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); 83static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 84static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 85static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 86static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 87static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 88static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); 89const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 90 91 92static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) 93 { 94 return ok; 95 } 96 97#if 0 98static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) 99 { 100 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); 101 } 102#endif 103 104int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 105 { 106 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; 107 int bad_chain = 0; 108 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; 109 int depth,i,ok=0; 110 int num; 111 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 112 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; 113 if (ctx->cert == NULL) 114 { 115 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); 116 return -1; 117 } 118 119 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 120 121 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is 122 * present and that the first entry is in place */ 123 if (ctx->chain == NULL) 124 { 125 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || 126 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) 127 { 128 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 129 goto end; 130 } 131 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 132 ctx->last_untrusted=1; 133 } 134 135 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ 136 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL 137 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) 138 { 139 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 140 goto end; 141 } 142 143 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 144 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 145 depth=param->depth; 146 147 148 for (;;) 149 { 150 /* If we have enough, we break */ 151 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take 152 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the 153 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error 154 * code later. 155 */ 156 157 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 158 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; 159 160 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ 161 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) 162 { 163 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); 164 if (xtmp != NULL) 165 { 166 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) 167 { 168 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 169 goto end; 170 } 171 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 172 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); 173 ctx->last_untrusted++; 174 x=xtmp; 175 num++; 176 /* reparse the full chain for 177 * the next one */ 178 continue; 179 } 180 } 181 break; 182 } 183 184 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted 185 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, 186 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ 187 188 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it 189 * is self signed. 190 */ 191 192 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 193 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); 194 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) 195 { 196 /* we have a self signed certificate */ 197 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) 198 { 199 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if 200 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact 201 * match to avoid possible impersonation. 202 */ 203 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 204 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 205 { 206 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; 207 ctx->current_cert=x; 208 ctx->error_depth=i-1; 209 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); 210 bad_chain = 1; 211 ok=cb(0,ctx); 212 if (!ok) goto end; 213 } 214 else 215 { 216 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version 217 * so we get any trust settings. 218 */ 219 X509_free(x); 220 x = xtmp; 221 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); 222 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 223 } 224 } 225 else 226 { 227 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ 228 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); 229 ctx->last_untrusted--; 230 num--; 231 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); 232 } 233 } 234 235 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ 236 for (;;) 237 { 238 /* If we have enough, we break */ 239 if (depth < num) break; 240 241 /* If we are self signed, we break */ 242 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; 243 244 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); 245 246 if (ok < 0) return ok; 247 if (ok == 0) break; 248 249 x = xtmp; 250 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) 251 { 252 X509_free(xtmp); 253 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 254 return 0; 255 } 256 num++; 257 } 258 259 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ 260 261 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ 262 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) 263 { 264 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) 265 { 266 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) 267 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; 268 else 269 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; 270 ctx->current_cert=x; 271 } 272 else 273 { 274 275 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); 276 num++; 277 ctx->last_untrusted=num; 278 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; 279 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; 280 chain_ss=NULL; 281 } 282 283 ctx->error_depth=num-1; 284 bad_chain = 1; 285 ok=cb(0,ctx); 286 if (!ok) goto end; 287 } 288 289 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ 290 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); 291 292 if (!ok) goto end; 293 294 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ 295 296 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); 297 298 if (!ok) goto end; 299 300 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ 301 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 302 303 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters 304 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. 305 */ 306 307 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); 308 if(!ok) goto end; 309 310 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ 311 if (ctx->verify != NULL) 312 ok=ctx->verify(ctx); 313 else 314 ok=internal_verify(ctx); 315 if(!ok) goto end; 316 317#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 318 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ 319 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); 320 if (!ok) goto end; 321 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); 322 if (!ok) goto end; 323#endif 324 325 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ 326 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)) 327 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); 328 if(!ok) goto end; 329 if (0) 330 { 331end: 332 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); 333 } 334 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); 335 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); 336 return ok; 337 } 338 339 340/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) 341 */ 342 343static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) 344{ 345 int i; 346 X509 *issuer; 347 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) 348 { 349 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); 350 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) 351 return issuer; 352 } 353 return NULL; 354} 355 356/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ 357 358static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) 359{ 360 int ret; 361 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); 362 if (ret == X509_V_OK) 363 return 1; 364 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ 365 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) 366 return 0; 367 368 ctx->error = ret; 369 ctx->current_cert = x; 370 ctx->current_issuer = issuer; 371 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 372 return 0; 373} 374 375/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ 376 377static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 378{ 379 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); 380 if (*issuer) 381 { 382 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 383 return 1; 384 } 385 else 386 return 0; 387} 388 389 390/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency 391 * with the supplied purpose 392 */ 393 394static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 395{ 396#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 397 return 1; 398#else 399 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0; 400 X509 *x; 401 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 402 int proxy_path_length = 0; 403 int allow_proxy_certs = 404 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); 405 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 406 407 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: 408 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct 409 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). 410 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not 411 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. 412 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for 413 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. 414 */ 415 must_be_ca = -1; 416 417 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software 418 happy */ 419 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS")) 420 allow_proxy_certs = 1; 421 422 /* Check all untrusted certificates */ 423 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) 424 { 425 int ret; 426 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 427 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 428 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) 429 { 430 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION; 431 ctx->error_depth = i; 432 ctx->current_cert = x; 433 ok=cb(0,ctx); 434 if (!ok) goto end; 435 } 436 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) 437 { 438 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED; 439 ctx->error_depth = i; 440 ctx->current_cert = x; 441 ok=cb(0,ctx); 442 if (!ok) goto end; 443 } 444 ret = X509_check_ca(x); 445 switch(must_be_ca) 446 { 447 case -1: 448 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 449 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) 450 { 451 ret = 0; 452 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 453 } 454 else 455 ret = 1; 456 break; 457 case 0: 458 if (ret != 0) 459 { 460 ret = 0; 461 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; 462 } 463 else 464 ret = 1; 465 break; 466 default: 467 if ((ret == 0) 468 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 469 && (ret != 1))) 470 { 471 ret = 0; 472 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; 473 } 474 else 475 ret = 1; 476 break; 477 } 478 if (ret == 0) 479 { 480 ctx->error_depth = i; 481 ctx->current_cert = x; 482 ok=cb(0,ctx); 483 if (!ok) goto end; 484 } 485 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) 486 { 487 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose, 488 must_be_ca > 0); 489 if ((ret == 0) 490 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) 491 && (ret != 1))) 492 { 493 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; 494 ctx->error_depth = i; 495 ctx->current_cert = x; 496 ok=cb(0,ctx); 497 if (!ok) goto end; 498 } 499 } 500 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */ 501 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) 502 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) 503 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) 504 { 505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 506 ctx->error_depth = i; 507 ctx->current_cert = x; 508 ok=cb(0,ctx); 509 if (!ok) goto end; 510 } 511 /* Increment path length if not self issued */ 512 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) 513 plen++; 514 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next 515 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE 516 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a 517 CA certificate. */ 518 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) 519 { 520 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) 521 { 522 ctx->error = 523 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; 524 ctx->error_depth = i; 525 ctx->current_cert = x; 526 ok=cb(0,ctx); 527 if (!ok) goto end; 528 } 529 proxy_path_length++; 530 must_be_ca = 0; 531 } 532 else 533 must_be_ca = 1; 534 } 535 ok = 1; 536 end: 537 return ok; 538#endif 539} 540 541static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 542{ 543#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY 544 return 1; 545#else 546 int i, ok; 547 X509 *x; 548 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 549 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 550/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ 551 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 552 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 553 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); 554 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) 555 return 1; 556 ctx->error_depth = i; 557 ctx->current_cert = x; 558 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) 559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; 560 else 561 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; 562 ok = cb(0, ctx); 563 return ok; 564#endif 565} 566 567static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 568 { 569 int i, last, ok; 570 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) 571 return 1; 572 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) 573 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 574 else 575 last = 0; 576 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++) 577 { 578 ctx->error_depth = i; 579 ok = check_cert(ctx); 580 if (!ok) return ok; 581 } 582 return 1; 583 } 584 585static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 586 { 587 X509_CRL *crl = NULL; 588 X509 *x; 589 int ok, cnum; 590 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 591 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); 592 ctx->current_cert = x; 593 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ 594 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); 595 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except 596 * notify callback 597 */ 598 if(!ok) 599 { 600 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL; 601 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 602 goto err; 603 } 604 ctx->current_crl = crl; 605 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); 606 if (!ok) goto err; 607 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); 608 err: 609 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 610 X509_CRL_free(crl); 611 return ok; 612 613 } 614 615/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ 616 617static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) 618 { 619 time_t *ptime; 620 int i; 621 ctx->current_crl = crl; 622 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 623 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 624 else 625 ptime = NULL; 626 627 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); 628 if (i == 0) 629 { 630 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD; 631 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 632 return 0; 633 } 634 635 if (i > 0) 636 { 637 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID; 638 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 639 return 0; 640 } 641 642 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) 643 { 644 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); 645 646 if (i == 0) 647 { 648 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD; 649 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 650 return 0; 651 } 652 653 if (i < 0) 654 { 655 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED; 656 if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 657 return 0; 658 } 659 } 660 661 ctx->current_crl = NULL; 662 663 return 1; 664 } 665 666/* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name 667 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one 668 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise 669 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but 670 * was invalid. 671 */ 672 673static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, 674 X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) 675 { 676 int i; 677 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; 678 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) 679 { 680 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); 681 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) 682 continue; 683 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) 684 { 685 *pcrl = crl; 686 CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 687 return 1; 688 } 689 best_crl = crl; 690 } 691 if (best_crl) 692 { 693 *pcrl = best_crl; 694 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 695 } 696 697 return 0; 698 } 699 700/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a 701 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later... 702 */ 703static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x) 704 { 705 int ok; 706 X509_CRL *crl = NULL; 707 X509_OBJECT xobj; 708 X509_NAME *nm; 709 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 710 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls); 711 if (ok) 712 { 713 *pcrl = crl; 714 return 1; 715 } 716 717 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj); 718 719 if (!ok) 720 { 721 /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ 722 if (crl) 723 { 724 *pcrl = crl; 725 return 1; 726 } 727 return 0; 728 } 729 730 *pcrl = xobj.data.crl; 731 if (crl) 732 X509_CRL_free(crl); 733 return 1; 734 } 735 736/* Check CRL validity */ 737static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) 738 { 739 X509 *issuer = NULL; 740 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; 741 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum; 742 cnum = ctx->error_depth; 743 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; 744 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer 745 * is next certificate in chain. 746 */ 747 if(cnum < chnum) 748 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); 749 else 750 { 751 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); 752 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ 753 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) 754 { 755 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER; 756 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 757 if(!ok) goto err; 758 } 759 } 760 761 if(issuer) 762 { 763 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ 764 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && 765 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) 766 { 767 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN; 768 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 769 if(!ok) goto err; 770 } 771 772 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ 773 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer); 774 775 if(!ikey) 776 { 777 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 778 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 779 if (!ok) goto err; 780 } 781 else 782 { 783 /* Verify CRL signature */ 784 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) 785 { 786 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 787 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 788 if (!ok) goto err; 789 } 790 } 791 } 792 793 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1); 794 if (!ok) 795 goto err; 796 797 ok = 1; 798 799 err: 800 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey); 801 return ok; 802 } 803 804/* Check certificate against CRL */ 805static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) 806 { 807 int idx, ok; 808 X509_REVOKED rtmp; 809 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; 810 X509_EXTENSION *ext; 811 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */ 812 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x); 813 /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. 814 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition. 815 */ 816 if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked)) 817 { 818 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 819 sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked); 820 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL); 821 } 822 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp); 823 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than 824 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs. 825 */ 826 if(idx >= 0) 827 { 828 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED; 829 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 830 if (!ok) return 0; 831 } 832 833 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) 834 return 1; 835 836 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we 837 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be 838 * rejected. 839 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications 840 * shouldn't do this. 841 */ 842 843 exts = crl->crl->extensions; 844 845 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) 846 { 847 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx); 848 if (ext->critical > 0) 849 { 850 ctx->error = 851 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION; 852 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 853 if(!ok) return 0; 854 break; 855 } 856 } 857 return 1; 858 } 859 860static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 861 { 862 int ret; 863 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, 864 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); 865 if (ret == 0) 866 { 867 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 868 return 0; 869 } 870 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ 871 if (ret == -1) 872 { 873 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify 874 * callback. 875 */ 876 X509 *x; 877 int i; 878 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) 879 { 880 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); 881 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) 882 continue; 883 ctx->current_cert = x; 884 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; 885 ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 886 } 887 return 1; 888 } 889 if (ret == -2) 890 { 891 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 892 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; 893 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); 894 } 895 896 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) 897 { 898 ctx->current_cert = NULL; 899 ctx->error = X509_V_OK; 900 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) 901 return 0; 902 } 903 904 return 1; 905 } 906 907static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 908 { 909 time_t *ptime; 910 int i; 911 912 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) 913 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; 914 else 915 ptime = NULL; 916 917 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime); 918 if (i == 0) 919 { 920 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; 921 ctx->current_cert=x; 922 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 923 return 0; 924 } 925 926 if (i > 0) 927 { 928 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; 929 ctx->current_cert=x; 930 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 931 return 0; 932 } 933 934 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime); 935 if (i == 0) 936 { 937 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; 938 ctx->current_cert=x; 939 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 940 return 0; 941 } 942 943 if (i < 0) 944 { 945 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; 946 ctx->current_cert=x; 947 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) 948 return 0; 949 } 950 951 return 1; 952 } 953 954static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 955 { 956 int ok=0,n; 957 X509 *xs,*xi; 958 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; 959 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); 960 961 cb=ctx->verify_cb; 962 963 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); 964 ctx->error_depth=n-1; 965 n--; 966 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 967 968 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) 969 xs=xi; 970 else 971 { 972 if (n <= 0) 973 { 974 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; 975 ctx->current_cert=xi; 976 ok=cb(0,ctx); 977 goto end; 978 } 979 else 980 { 981 n--; 982 ctx->error_depth=n; 983 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 984 } 985 } 986 987/* ctx->error=0; not needed */ 988 while (n >= 0) 989 { 990 ctx->error_depth=n; 991 992 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless 993 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and 994 * just wastes time. 995 */ 996 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) 997 { 998 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) 999 { 1000 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; 1001 ctx->current_cert=xi; 1002 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1003 if (!ok) goto end; 1004 } 1005 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) 1006 { 1007 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; 1008 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1009 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); 1010 if (!ok) 1011 { 1012 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1013 goto end; 1014 } 1015 } 1016 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1017 pkey=NULL; 1018 } 1019 1020 xs->valid = 1; 1021 1022 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs); 1023 if (!ok) 1024 goto end; 1025 1026 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ 1027 ctx->current_issuer=xi; 1028 ctx->current_cert=xs; 1029 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); 1030 if (!ok) goto end; 1031 1032 n--; 1033 if (n >= 0) 1034 { 1035 xi=xs; 1036 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); 1037 } 1038 } 1039 ok=1; 1040end: 1041 return ok; 1042 } 1043 1044int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm) 1045{ 1046 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); 1047} 1048 1049int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) 1050 { 1051 char *str; 1052 ASN1_TIME atm; 1053 long offset; 1054 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; 1055 int i,j; 1056 1057 p=buff1; 1058 i=ctm->length; 1059 str=(char *)ctm->data; 1060 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1061 { 1062 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; 1063 memcpy(p,str,10); 1064 p+=10; 1065 str+=10; 1066 } 1067 else 1068 { 1069 if (i < 13) return 0; 1070 memcpy(p,str,12); 1071 p+=12; 1072 str+=12; 1073 } 1074 1075 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) 1076 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } 1077 else 1078 { 1079 *(p++)= *(str++); 1080 *(p++)= *(str++); 1081 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ 1082 if (*str == '.') 1083 { 1084 str++; 1085 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; 1086 } 1087 1088 } 1089 *(p++)='Z'; 1090 *(p++)='\0'; 1091 1092 if (*str == 'Z') 1093 offset=0; 1094 else 1095 { 1096 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-')) 1097 return 0; 1098 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; 1099 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); 1100 if (*str == '-') 1101 offset= -offset; 1102 } 1103 atm.type=ctm->type; 1104 atm.length=sizeof(buff2); 1105 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; 1106 1107 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL) 1108 return 0; 1109 1110 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) 1111 { 1112 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); 1113 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ 1114 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); 1115 if (j < 50) j+=100; 1116 1117 if (i < j) return -1; 1118 if (i > j) return 1; 1119 } 1120 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); 1121 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ 1122 return -1; 1123 else 1124 return i; 1125 } 1126 1127ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) 1128{ 1129 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); 1130} 1131 1132ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm) 1133 { 1134 time_t t; 1135 int type = -1; 1136 1137 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; 1138 else time(&t); 1139 1140 t+=adj; 1141 if (s) type = s->type; 1142 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t); 1143 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t); 1144 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t); 1145 } 1146 1147int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1148 { 1149 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; 1150 int i,j; 1151 1152 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; 1153 1154 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1155 { 1156 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); 1157 if (ktmp == NULL) 1158 { 1159 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); 1160 return 0; 1161 } 1162 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) 1163 break; 1164 else 1165 { 1166 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1167 ktmp=NULL; 1168 } 1169 } 1170 if (ktmp == NULL) 1171 { 1172 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); 1173 return 0; 1174 } 1175 1176 /* first, populate the other certs */ 1177 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) 1178 { 1179 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); 1180 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); 1181 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); 1182 } 1183 1184 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); 1185 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); 1186 return 1; 1187 } 1188 1189int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, 1190 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) 1191 { 1192 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by 1193 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */ 1194 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp, 1195 new_func, dup_func, free_func); 1196 } 1197 1198int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) 1199 { 1200 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); 1201 } 1202 1203void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) 1204 { 1205 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); 1206 } 1207 1208int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1209 { 1210 return ctx->error; 1211 } 1212 1213void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) 1214 { 1215 ctx->error=err; 1216 } 1217 1218int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1219 { 1220 return ctx->error_depth; 1221 } 1222 1223X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1224 { 1225 return ctx->current_cert; 1226 } 1227 1228STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1229 { 1230 return ctx->chain; 1231 } 1232 1233STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1234 { 1235 int i; 1236 X509 *x; 1237 STACK_OF(X509) *chain; 1238 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; 1239 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) 1240 { 1241 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1242 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); 1243 } 1244 return chain; 1245 } 1246 1247void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) 1248 { 1249 ctx->cert=x; 1250 } 1251 1252void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1253 { 1254 ctx->untrusted=sk; 1255 } 1256 1257void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) 1258 { 1259 ctx->crls=sk; 1260 } 1261 1262int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) 1263 { 1264 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); 1265 } 1266 1267int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) 1268 { 1269 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); 1270 } 1271 1272/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust 1273 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its 1274 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by 1275 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default 1276 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. 1277 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own 1278 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they 1279 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. 1280 */ 1281 1282int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, 1283 int purpose, int trust) 1284{ 1285 int idx; 1286 /* If purpose not set use default */ 1287 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; 1288 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ 1289 if (purpose) 1290 { 1291 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; 1292 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); 1293 if (idx == -1) 1294 { 1295 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1296 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1297 return 0; 1298 } 1299 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1300 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) 1301 { 1302 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); 1303 if (idx == -1) 1304 { 1305 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1306 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); 1307 return 0; 1308 } 1309 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); 1310 } 1311 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ 1312 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; 1313 } 1314 if (trust) 1315 { 1316 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); 1317 if (idx == -1) 1318 { 1319 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, 1320 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); 1321 return 0; 1322 } 1323 } 1324 1325 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; 1326 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; 1327 return 1; 1328} 1329 1330X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) 1331{ 1332 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; 1333 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1334 if (!ctx) 1335 { 1336 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1337 return NULL; 1338 } 1339 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); 1340 return ctx; 1341} 1342 1343void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1344{ 1345 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); 1346 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1347} 1348 1349int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, 1350 STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 1351 { 1352 int ret = 1; 1353 ctx->ctx=store; 1354 ctx->current_method=0; 1355 ctx->cert=x509; 1356 ctx->untrusted=chain; 1357 ctx->crls = NULL; 1358 ctx->last_untrusted=0; 1359 ctx->other_ctx=NULL; 1360 ctx->valid=0; 1361 ctx->chain=NULL; 1362 ctx->error=0; 1363 ctx->explicit_policy=0; 1364 ctx->error_depth=0; 1365 ctx->current_cert=NULL; 1366 ctx->current_issuer=NULL; 1367 ctx->tree = NULL; 1368 1369 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); 1370 1371 if (!ctx->param) 1372 { 1373 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1374 return 0; 1375 } 1376 1377 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set 1378 * use defaults. 1379 */ 1380 1381 1382 if (store) 1383 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); 1384 else 1385 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; 1386 1387 if (store) 1388 { 1389 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 1390 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; 1391 } 1392 else 1393 ctx->cleanup = 0; 1394 1395 if (ret) 1396 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, 1397 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); 1398 1399 if (ret == 0) 1400 { 1401 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1402 return 0; 1403 } 1404 1405 if (store && store->check_issued) 1406 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; 1407 else 1408 ctx->check_issued = check_issued; 1409 1410 if (store && store->get_issuer) 1411 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; 1412 else 1413 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; 1414 1415 if (store && store->verify_cb) 1416 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; 1417 else 1418 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; 1419 1420 if (store && store->verify) 1421 ctx->verify = store->verify; 1422 else 1423 ctx->verify = internal_verify; 1424 1425 if (store && store->check_revocation) 1426 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; 1427 else 1428 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; 1429 1430 if (store && store->get_crl) 1431 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; 1432 else 1433 ctx->get_crl = get_crl; 1434 1435 if (store && store->check_crl) 1436 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; 1437 else 1438 ctx->check_crl = check_crl; 1439 1440 if (store && store->cert_crl) 1441 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; 1442 else 1443 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; 1444 1445 ctx->check_policy = check_policy; 1446 1447 1448 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As 1449 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a 1450 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */ 1451 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */ 1452 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, 1453 &(ctx->ex_data))) 1454 { 1455 OPENSSL_free(ctx); 1456 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1457 return 0; 1458 } 1459 return 1; 1460 } 1461 1462/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. 1463 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. 1464 */ 1465 1466void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) 1467{ 1468 ctx->other_ctx = sk; 1469 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; 1470} 1471 1472void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1473 { 1474 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); 1475 if (ctx->param != NULL) 1476 { 1477 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 1478 ctx->param=NULL; 1479 } 1480 if (ctx->tree != NULL) 1481 { 1482 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); 1483 ctx->tree=NULL; 1484 } 1485 if (ctx->chain != NULL) 1486 { 1487 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); 1488 ctx->chain=NULL; 1489 } 1490 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); 1491 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); 1492 } 1493 1494void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) 1495 { 1496 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); 1497 } 1498 1499void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) 1500 { 1501 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); 1502 } 1503 1504void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) 1505 { 1506 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); 1507 } 1508 1509void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, 1510 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) 1511 { 1512 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb; 1513 } 1514 1515X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1516 { 1517 return ctx->tree; 1518 } 1519 1520int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1521 { 1522 return ctx->explicit_policy; 1523 } 1524 1525int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) 1526 { 1527 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; 1528 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); 1529 if (!param) 1530 return 0; 1531 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); 1532 } 1533 1534X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 1535 { 1536 return ctx->param; 1537 } 1538 1539void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) 1540 { 1541 if (ctx->param) 1542 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); 1543 ctx->param = param; 1544 } 1545 1546IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) 1547IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) 1548 1549IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) 1550 1551IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 1552IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) 1553