1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 2/* 3 * KFENCE guarded object allocator and fault handling. 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC. 6 */ 7 8#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kfence: " fmt 9 10#include <linux/atomic.h> 11#include <linux/bug.h> 12#include <linux/debugfs.h> 13#include <linux/hash.h> 14#include <linux/irq_work.h> 15#include <linux/jhash.h> 16#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h> 17#include <linux/kfence.h> 18#include <linux/kmemleak.h> 19#include <linux/list.h> 20#include <linux/lockdep.h> 21#include <linux/log2.h> 22#include <linux/memblock.h> 23#include <linux/moduleparam.h> 24#include <linux/notifier.h> 25#include <linux/panic_notifier.h> 26#include <linux/random.h> 27#include <linux/rcupdate.h> 28#include <linux/sched/clock.h> 29#include <linux/seq_file.h> 30#include <linux/slab.h> 31#include <linux/spinlock.h> 32#include <linux/string.h> 33 34#include <asm/kfence.h> 35 36#include "kfence.h" 37 38/* Disables KFENCE on the first warning assuming an irrecoverable error. */ 39#define KFENCE_WARN_ON(cond) \ 40 ({ \ 41 const bool __cond = WARN_ON(cond); \ 42 if (unlikely(__cond)) { \ 43 WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); \ 44 disabled_by_warn = true; \ 45 } \ 46 __cond; \ 47 }) 48 49/* === Data ================================================================= */ 50 51static bool kfence_enabled __read_mostly; 52static bool disabled_by_warn __read_mostly; 53 54unsigned long kfence_sample_interval __read_mostly = CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL; 55EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kfence_sample_interval); /* Export for test modules. */ 56 57#ifdef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX 58#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX 59#endif 60#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "kfence." 61 62static int kfence_enable_late(void); 63static int param_set_sample_interval(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) 64{ 65 unsigned long num; 66 int ret = kstrtoul(val, 0, &num); 67 68 if (ret < 0) 69 return ret; 70 71 /* Using 0 to indicate KFENCE is disabled. */ 72 if (!num && READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) { 73 pr_info("disabled\n"); 74 WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); 75 } 76 77 *((unsigned long *)kp->arg) = num; 78 79 if (num && !READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled) && system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING) 80 return disabled_by_warn ? -EINVAL : kfence_enable_late(); 81 return 0; 82} 83 84static int param_get_sample_interval(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) 85{ 86 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) 87 return sprintf(buffer, "0\n"); 88 89 return param_get_ulong(buffer, kp); 90} 91 92static const struct kernel_param_ops sample_interval_param_ops = { 93 .set = param_set_sample_interval, 94 .get = param_get_sample_interval, 95}; 96module_param_cb(sample_interval, &sample_interval_param_ops, &kfence_sample_interval, 0600); 97 98/* Pool usage% threshold when currently covered allocations are skipped. */ 99static unsigned long kfence_skip_covered_thresh __read_mostly = 75; 100module_param_named(skip_covered_thresh, kfence_skip_covered_thresh, ulong, 0644); 101 102/* If true, use a deferrable timer. */ 103static bool kfence_deferrable __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_DEFERRABLE); 104module_param_named(deferrable, kfence_deferrable, bool, 0444); 105 106/* If true, check all canary bytes on panic. */ 107static bool kfence_check_on_panic __read_mostly; 108module_param_named(check_on_panic, kfence_check_on_panic, bool, 0444); 109 110/* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */ 111char *__kfence_pool __read_mostly; 112EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kfence_pool); /* Export for test modules. */ 113 114/* 115 * Per-object metadata, with one-to-one mapping of object metadata to 116 * backing pages (in __kfence_pool). 117 */ 118static_assert(CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS > 0); 119struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata __read_mostly; 120 121/* 122 * If kfence_metadata is not NULL, it may be accessed by kfence_shutdown_cache(). 123 * So introduce kfence_metadata_init to initialize metadata, and then make 124 * kfence_metadata visible after initialization is successful. This prevents 125 * potential UAF or access to uninitialized metadata. 126 */ 127static struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata_init __read_mostly; 128 129/* Freelist with available objects. */ 130static struct list_head kfence_freelist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist); 131static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */ 132 133/* 134 * The static key to set up a KFENCE allocation; or if static keys are not used 135 * to gate allocations, to avoid a load and compare if KFENCE is disabled. 136 */ 137DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kfence_allocation_key); 138 139/* Gates the allocation, ensuring only one succeeds in a given period. */ 140atomic_t kfence_allocation_gate = ATOMIC_INIT(1); 141 142/* 143 * A Counting Bloom filter of allocation coverage: limits currently covered 144 * allocations of the same source filling up the pool. 145 * 146 * Assuming a range of 15%-85% unique allocations in the pool at any point in 147 * time, the below parameters provide a probablity of 0.02-0.33 for false 148 * positive hits respectively: 149 * 150 * P(alloc_traces) = (1 - e^(-HNUM * (alloc_traces / SIZE)) ^ HNUM 151 */ 152#define ALLOC_COVERED_HNUM 2 153#define ALLOC_COVERED_ORDER (const_ilog2(CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) + 2) 154#define ALLOC_COVERED_SIZE (1 << ALLOC_COVERED_ORDER) 155#define ALLOC_COVERED_HNEXT(h) hash_32(h, ALLOC_COVERED_ORDER) 156#define ALLOC_COVERED_MASK (ALLOC_COVERED_SIZE - 1) 157static atomic_t alloc_covered[ALLOC_COVERED_SIZE]; 158 159/* Stack depth used to determine uniqueness of an allocation. */ 160#define UNIQUE_ALLOC_STACK_DEPTH ((size_t)8) 161 162/* 163 * Randomness for stack hashes, making the same collisions across reboots and 164 * different machines less likely. 165 */ 166static u32 stack_hash_seed __ro_after_init; 167 168/* Statistics counters for debugfs. */ 169enum kfence_counter_id { 170 KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED, 171 KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS, 172 KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES, 173 KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES, 174 KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS, 175 KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT, 176 KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_CAPACITY, 177 KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_COVERED, 178 KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT, 179}; 180static atomic_long_t counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT]; 181static const char *const counter_names[] = { 182 [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED] = "currently allocated", 183 [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS] = "total allocations", 184 [KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES] = "total frees", 185 [KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES] = "zombie allocations", 186 [KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS] = "total bugs", 187 [KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT] = "skipped allocations (incompatible)", 188 [KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_CAPACITY] = "skipped allocations (capacity)", 189 [KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_COVERED] = "skipped allocations (covered)", 190}; 191static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(counter_names) == KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT); 192 193/* === Internals ============================================================ */ 194 195static inline bool should_skip_covered(void) 196{ 197 unsigned long thresh = (CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS * kfence_skip_covered_thresh) / 100; 198 199 return atomic_long_read(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]) > thresh; 200} 201 202static u32 get_alloc_stack_hash(unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_entries) 203{ 204 num_entries = min(num_entries, UNIQUE_ALLOC_STACK_DEPTH); 205 num_entries = filter_irq_stacks(stack_entries, num_entries); 206 return jhash(stack_entries, num_entries * sizeof(stack_entries[0]), stack_hash_seed); 207} 208 209/* 210 * Adds (or subtracts) count @val for allocation stack trace hash 211 * @alloc_stack_hash from Counting Bloom filter. 212 */ 213static void alloc_covered_add(u32 alloc_stack_hash, int val) 214{ 215 int i; 216 217 for (i = 0; i < ALLOC_COVERED_HNUM; i++) { 218 atomic_add(val, &alloc_covered[alloc_stack_hash & ALLOC_COVERED_MASK]); 219 alloc_stack_hash = ALLOC_COVERED_HNEXT(alloc_stack_hash); 220 } 221} 222 223/* 224 * Returns true if the allocation stack trace hash @alloc_stack_hash is 225 * currently contained (non-zero count) in Counting Bloom filter. 226 */ 227static bool alloc_covered_contains(u32 alloc_stack_hash) 228{ 229 int i; 230 231 for (i = 0; i < ALLOC_COVERED_HNUM; i++) { 232 if (!atomic_read(&alloc_covered[alloc_stack_hash & ALLOC_COVERED_MASK])) 233 return false; 234 alloc_stack_hash = ALLOC_COVERED_HNEXT(alloc_stack_hash); 235 } 236 237 return true; 238} 239 240static bool kfence_protect(unsigned long addr) 241{ 242 return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), true)); 243} 244 245static bool kfence_unprotect(unsigned long addr) 246{ 247 return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), false)); 248} 249 250static inline unsigned long metadata_to_pageaddr(const struct kfence_metadata *meta) 251{ 252 unsigned long offset = (meta - kfence_metadata + 1) * PAGE_SIZE * 2; 253 unsigned long pageaddr = (unsigned long)&__kfence_pool[offset]; 254 255 /* The checks do not affect performance; only called from slow-paths. */ 256 257 /* Only call with a pointer into kfence_metadata. */ 258 if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(meta < kfence_metadata || 259 meta >= kfence_metadata + CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)) 260 return 0; 261 262 /* 263 * This metadata object only ever maps to 1 page; verify that the stored 264 * address is in the expected range. 265 */ 266 if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE) != pageaddr)) 267 return 0; 268 269 return pageaddr; 270} 271 272/* 273 * Update the object's metadata state, including updating the alloc/free stacks 274 * depending on the state transition. 275 */ 276static noinline void 277metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_object_state next, 278 unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_stack_entries) 279{ 280 struct kfence_track *track = 281 next == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED ? &meta->free_track : &meta->alloc_track; 282 283 lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock); 284 285 if (stack_entries) { 286 memcpy(track->stack_entries, stack_entries, 287 num_stack_entries * sizeof(stack_entries[0])); 288 } else { 289 /* 290 * Skip over 1 (this) functions; noinline ensures we do not 291 * accidentally skip over the caller by never inlining. 292 */ 293 num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(track->stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 1); 294 } 295 track->num_stack_entries = num_stack_entries; 296 track->pid = task_pid_nr(current); 297 track->cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); 298 track->ts_nsec = local_clock(); /* Same source as printk timestamps. */ 299 300 /* 301 * Pairs with READ_ONCE() in 302 * kfence_shutdown_cache(), 303 * kfence_handle_page_fault(). 304 */ 305 WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next); 306} 307 308/* Check canary byte at @addr. */ 309static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr) 310{ 311 struct kfence_metadata *meta; 312 unsigned long flags; 313 314 if (likely(*addr == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U8(addr))) 315 return true; 316 317 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); 318 319 meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); 320 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 321 kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, meta, KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION); 322 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 323 324 return false; 325} 326 327static inline void set_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta) 328{ 329 const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE); 330 unsigned long addr = pageaddr; 331 332 /* 333 * The canary may be written to part of the object memory, but it does 334 * not affect it. The user should initialize the object before using it. 335 */ 336 for (; addr < meta->addr; addr += sizeof(u64)) 337 *((u64 *)addr) = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64; 338 339 addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr + meta->size, sizeof(u64)); 340 for (; addr - pageaddr < PAGE_SIZE; addr += sizeof(u64)) 341 *((u64 *)addr) = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64; 342} 343 344static inline void check_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta) 345{ 346 const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE); 347 unsigned long addr = pageaddr; 348 349 /* 350 * We'll iterate over each canary byte per-side until a corrupted byte 351 * is found. However, we'll still iterate over the canary bytes to the 352 * right of the object even if there was an error in the canary bytes to 353 * the left of the object. Specifically, if check_canary_byte() 354 * generates an error, showing both sides might give more clues as to 355 * what the error is about when displaying which bytes were corrupted. 356 */ 357 358 /* Apply to left of object. */ 359 for (; meta->addr - addr >= sizeof(u64); addr += sizeof(u64)) { 360 if (unlikely(*((u64 *)addr) != KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64)) 361 break; 362 } 363 364 /* 365 * If the canary is corrupted in a certain 64 bytes, or the canary 366 * memory cannot be completely covered by multiple consecutive 64 bytes, 367 * it needs to be checked one by one. 368 */ 369 for (; addr < meta->addr; addr++) { 370 if (unlikely(!check_canary_byte((u8 *)addr))) 371 break; 372 } 373 374 /* Apply to right of object. */ 375 for (addr = meta->addr + meta->size; addr % sizeof(u64) != 0; addr++) { 376 if (unlikely(!check_canary_byte((u8 *)addr))) 377 return; 378 } 379 for (; addr - pageaddr < PAGE_SIZE; addr += sizeof(u64)) { 380 if (unlikely(*((u64 *)addr) != KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN_U64)) { 381 382 for (; addr - pageaddr < PAGE_SIZE; addr++) { 383 if (!check_canary_byte((u8 *)addr)) 384 return; 385 } 386 } 387 } 388} 389 390static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, 391 unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_stack_entries, 392 u32 alloc_stack_hash) 393{ 394 struct kfence_metadata *meta = NULL; 395 unsigned long flags; 396 struct slab *slab; 397 void *addr; 398 const bool random_right_allocate = get_random_u32_below(2); 399 const bool random_fault = CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS && 400 !get_random_u32_below(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS); 401 402 /* Try to obtain a free object. */ 403 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 404 if (!list_empty(&kfence_freelist)) { 405 meta = list_entry(kfence_freelist.next, struct kfence_metadata, list); 406 list_del_init(&meta->list); 407 } 408 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 409 if (!meta) { 410 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_CAPACITY]); 411 return NULL; 412 } 413 414 if (unlikely(!raw_spin_trylock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags))) { 415 /* 416 * This is extremely unlikely -- we are reporting on a 417 * use-after-free, which locked meta->lock, and the reporting 418 * code via printk calls kmalloc() which ends up in 419 * kfence_alloc() and tries to grab the same object that we're 420 * reporting on. While it has never been observed, lockdep does 421 * report that there is a possibility of deadlock. Fix it by 422 * using trylock and bailing out gracefully. 423 */ 424 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 425 /* Put the object back on the freelist. */ 426 list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); 427 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 428 429 return NULL; 430 } 431 432 meta->addr = metadata_to_pageaddr(meta); 433 /* Unprotect if we're reusing this page. */ 434 if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) 435 kfence_unprotect(meta->addr); 436 437 /* 438 * Note: for allocations made before RNG initialization, will always 439 * return zero. We still benefit from enabling KFENCE as early as 440 * possible, even when the RNG is not yet available, as this will allow 441 * KFENCE to detect bugs due to earlier allocations. The only downside 442 * is that the out-of-bounds accesses detected are deterministic for 443 * such allocations. 444 */ 445 if (random_right_allocate) { 446 /* Allocate on the "right" side, re-calculate address. */ 447 meta->addr += PAGE_SIZE - size; 448 meta->addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, cache->align); 449 } 450 451 addr = (void *)meta->addr; 452 453 /* Update remaining metadata. */ 454 metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED, stack_entries, num_stack_entries); 455 /* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in kfence_shutdown_cache(). */ 456 WRITE_ONCE(meta->cache, cache); 457 meta->size = size; 458 meta->alloc_stack_hash = alloc_stack_hash; 459 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 460 461 alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, 1); 462 463 /* Set required slab fields. */ 464 slab = virt_to_slab((void *)meta->addr); 465 slab->slab_cache = cache; 466 slab->objects = 1; 467 468 /* Memory initialization. */ 469 set_canary(meta); 470 471 /* 472 * We check slab_want_init_on_alloc() ourselves, rather than letting 473 * SL*B do the initialization, as otherwise we might overwrite KFENCE's 474 * redzone. 475 */ 476 if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp, cache))) 477 memzero_explicit(addr, size); 478 if (cache->ctor) 479 cache->ctor(addr); 480 481 if (random_fault) 482 kfence_protect(meta->addr); /* Random "faults" by protecting the object. */ 483 484 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]); 485 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS]); 486 487 return addr; 488} 489 490static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool zombie) 491{ 492 struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive; 493 unsigned long flags; 494 bool init; 495 496 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 497 498 if (meta->state != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED || meta->addr != (unsigned long)addr) { 499 /* Invalid or double-free, bail out. */ 500 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); 501 kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, meta, 502 KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE); 503 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 504 return; 505 } 506 507 /* Detect racy use-after-free, or incorrect reallocation of this page by KFENCE. */ 508 kcsan_begin_scoped_access((void *)ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)addr, PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE, 509 KCSAN_ACCESS_SCOPED | KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT, 510 &assert_page_exclusive); 511 512 if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS) 513 kfence_unprotect((unsigned long)addr); /* To check canary bytes. */ 514 515 /* Restore page protection if there was an OOB access. */ 516 if (meta->unprotected_page) { 517 memzero_explicit((void *)ALIGN_DOWN(meta->unprotected_page, PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE); 518 kfence_protect(meta->unprotected_page); 519 meta->unprotected_page = 0; 520 } 521 522 /* Mark the object as freed. */ 523 metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, NULL, 0); 524 init = slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache); 525 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 526 527 alloc_covered_add(meta->alloc_stack_hash, -1); 528 529 /* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */ 530 check_canary(meta); 531 532 /* 533 * Clear memory if init-on-free is set. While we protect the page, the 534 * data is still there, and after a use-after-free is detected, we 535 * unprotect the page, so the data is still accessible. 536 */ 537 if (!zombie && unlikely(init)) 538 memzero_explicit(addr, meta->size); 539 540 /* Protect to detect use-after-frees. */ 541 kfence_protect((unsigned long)addr); 542 543 kcsan_end_scoped_access(&assert_page_exclusive); 544 if (!zombie) { 545 /* Add it to the tail of the freelist for reuse. */ 546 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 547 KFENCE_WARN_ON(!list_empty(&meta->list)); 548 list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); 549 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); 550 551 atomic_long_dec(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]); 552 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES]); 553 } else { 554 /* See kfence_shutdown_cache(). */ 555 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES]); 556 } 557} 558 559static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h) 560{ 561 struct kfence_metadata *meta = container_of(h, struct kfence_metadata, rcu_head); 562 563 kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, false); 564} 565 566/* 567 * Initialization of the KFENCE pool after its allocation. 568 * Returns 0 on success; otherwise returns the address up to 569 * which partial initialization succeeded. 570 */ 571static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void) 572{ 573 unsigned long addr; 574 struct page *pages; 575 int i; 576 577 if (!arch_kfence_init_pool()) 578 return (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; 579 580 addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; 581 pages = virt_to_page(__kfence_pool); 582 583 /* 584 * Set up object pages: they must have PG_slab set, to avoid freeing 585 * these as real pages. 586 * 587 * We also want to avoid inserting kfence_free() in the kfree() 588 * fast-path in SLUB, and therefore need to ensure kfree() correctly 589 * enters __slab_free() slow-path. 590 */ 591 for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) { 592 struct slab *slab = page_slab(nth_page(pages, i)); 593 594 if (!i || (i % 2)) 595 continue; 596 597 __folio_set_slab(slab_folio(slab)); 598#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG 599 slab->memcg_data = (unsigned long)&kfence_metadata_init[i / 2 - 1].objcg | 600 MEMCG_DATA_OBJCGS; 601#endif 602 } 603 604 /* 605 * Protect the first 2 pages. The first page is mostly unnecessary, and 606 * merely serves as an extended guard page. However, adding one 607 * additional page in the beginning gives us an even number of pages, 608 * which simplifies the mapping of address to metadata index. 609 */ 610 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { 611 if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr))) 612 return addr; 613 614 addr += PAGE_SIZE; 615 } 616 617 for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { 618 struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata_init[i]; 619 620 /* Initialize metadata. */ 621 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&meta->list); 622 raw_spin_lock_init(&meta->lock); 623 meta->state = KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED; 624 meta->addr = addr; /* Initialize for validation in metadata_to_pageaddr(). */ 625 list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); 626 627 /* Protect the right redzone. */ 628 if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + PAGE_SIZE))) 629 goto reset_slab; 630 631 addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE; 632 } 633 634 /* 635 * Make kfence_metadata visible only when initialization is successful. 636 * Otherwise, if the initialization fails and kfence_metadata is freed, 637 * it may cause UAF in kfence_shutdown_cache(). 638 */ 639 smp_store_release(&kfence_metadata, kfence_metadata_init); 640 return 0; 641 642reset_slab: 643 for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) { 644 struct slab *slab = page_slab(nth_page(pages, i)); 645 646 if (!i || (i % 2)) 647 continue; 648#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG 649 slab->memcg_data = 0; 650#endif 651 __folio_clear_slab(slab_folio(slab)); 652 } 653 654 return addr; 655} 656 657static bool __init kfence_init_pool_early(void) 658{ 659 unsigned long addr; 660 661 if (!__kfence_pool) 662 return false; 663 664 addr = kfence_init_pool(); 665 666 if (!addr) { 667 /* 668 * The pool is live and will never be deallocated from this point on. 669 * Ignore the pool object from the kmemleak phys object tree, as it would 670 * otherwise overlap with allocations returned by kfence_alloc(), which 671 * are registered with kmemleak through the slab post-alloc hook. 672 */ 673 kmemleak_ignore_phys(__pa(__kfence_pool)); 674 return true; 675 } 676 677 /* 678 * Only release unprotected pages, and do not try to go back and change 679 * page attributes due to risk of failing to do so as well. If changing 680 * page attributes for some pages fails, it is very likely that it also 681 * fails for the first page, and therefore expect addr==__kfence_pool in 682 * most failure cases. 683 */ 684 memblock_free_late(__pa(addr), KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool)); 685 __kfence_pool = NULL; 686 687 memblock_free_late(__pa(kfence_metadata_init), KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE); 688 kfence_metadata_init = NULL; 689 690 return false; 691} 692 693/* === DebugFS Interface ==================================================== */ 694 695static int stats_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) 696{ 697 int i; 698 699 seq_printf(seq, "enabled: %i\n", READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)); 700 for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT; i++) 701 seq_printf(seq, "%s: %ld\n", counter_names[i], atomic_long_read(&counters[i])); 702 703 return 0; 704} 705DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(stats); 706 707/* 708 * debugfs seq_file operations for /sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects. 709 * start_object() and next_object() return the object index + 1, because NULL is used 710 * to stop iteration. 711 */ 712static void *start_object(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) 713{ 714 if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) 715 return (void *)((long)*pos + 1); 716 return NULL; 717} 718 719static void stop_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) 720{ 721} 722 723static void *next_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) 724{ 725 ++*pos; 726 if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) 727 return (void *)((long)*pos + 1); 728 return NULL; 729} 730 731static int show_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) 732{ 733 struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[(long)v - 1]; 734 unsigned long flags; 735 736 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 737 kfence_print_object(seq, meta); 738 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 739 seq_puts(seq, "---------------------------------\n"); 740 741 return 0; 742} 743 744static const struct seq_operations objects_sops = { 745 .start = start_object, 746 .next = next_object, 747 .stop = stop_object, 748 .show = show_object, 749}; 750DEFINE_SEQ_ATTRIBUTE(objects); 751 752static int kfence_debugfs_init(void) 753{ 754 struct dentry *kfence_dir; 755 756 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) 757 return 0; 758 759 kfence_dir = debugfs_create_dir("kfence", NULL); 760 debugfs_create_file("stats", 0444, kfence_dir, NULL, &stats_fops); 761 debugfs_create_file("objects", 0400, kfence_dir, NULL, &objects_fops); 762 return 0; 763} 764 765late_initcall(kfence_debugfs_init); 766 767/* === Panic Notifier ====================================================== */ 768 769static void kfence_check_all_canary(void) 770{ 771 int i; 772 773 for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { 774 struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; 775 776 if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) 777 check_canary(meta); 778 } 779} 780 781static int kfence_check_canary_callback(struct notifier_block *nb, 782 unsigned long reason, void *arg) 783{ 784 kfence_check_all_canary(); 785 return NOTIFY_OK; 786} 787 788static struct notifier_block kfence_check_canary_notifier = { 789 .notifier_call = kfence_check_canary_callback, 790}; 791 792/* === Allocation Gate Timer ================================================ */ 793 794static struct delayed_work kfence_timer; 795 796#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS 797/* Wait queue to wake up allocation-gate timer task. */ 798static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(allocation_wait); 799 800static void wake_up_kfence_timer(struct irq_work *work) 801{ 802 wake_up(&allocation_wait); 803} 804static DEFINE_IRQ_WORK(wake_up_kfence_timer_work, wake_up_kfence_timer); 805#endif 806 807/* 808 * Set up delayed work, which will enable and disable the static key. We need to 809 * use a work queue (rather than a simple timer), since enabling and disabling a 810 * static key cannot be done from an interrupt. 811 * 812 * Note: Toggling a static branch currently causes IPIs, and here we'll end up 813 * with a total of 2 IPIs to all CPUs. If this ends up a problem in future (with 814 * more aggressive sampling intervals), we could get away with a variant that 815 * avoids IPIs, at the cost of not immediately capturing allocations if the 816 * instructions remain cached. 817 */ 818static void toggle_allocation_gate(struct work_struct *work) 819{ 820 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) 821 return; 822 823 atomic_set(&kfence_allocation_gate, 0); 824#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS 825 /* Enable static key, and await allocation to happen. */ 826 static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key); 827 828 wait_event_idle(allocation_wait, atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate)); 829 830 /* Disable static key and reset timer. */ 831 static_branch_disable(&kfence_allocation_key); 832#endif 833 queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 834 msecs_to_jiffies(kfence_sample_interval)); 835} 836 837/* === Public interface ===================================================== */ 838 839void __init kfence_alloc_pool_and_metadata(void) 840{ 841 if (!kfence_sample_interval) 842 return; 843 844 /* 845 * If the pool has already been initialized by arch, there is no need to 846 * re-allocate the memory pool. 847 */ 848 if (!__kfence_pool) 849 __kfence_pool = memblock_alloc(KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE); 850 851 if (!__kfence_pool) { 852 pr_err("failed to allocate pool\n"); 853 return; 854 } 855 856 /* The memory allocated by memblock has been zeroed out. */ 857 kfence_metadata_init = memblock_alloc(KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE); 858 if (!kfence_metadata_init) { 859 pr_err("failed to allocate metadata\n"); 860 memblock_free(__kfence_pool, KFENCE_POOL_SIZE); 861 __kfence_pool = NULL; 862 } 863} 864 865static void kfence_init_enable(void) 866{ 867 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS)) 868 static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key); 869 870 if (kfence_deferrable) 871 INIT_DEFERRABLE_WORK(&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); 872 else 873 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); 874 875 if (kfence_check_on_panic) 876 atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, &kfence_check_canary_notifier); 877 878 WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true); 879 queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0); 880 881 pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects at 0x%p-0x%p\n", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, 882 CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS, (void *)__kfence_pool, 883 (void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE)); 884} 885 886void __init kfence_init(void) 887{ 888 stack_hash_seed = get_random_u32(); 889 890 /* Setting kfence_sample_interval to 0 on boot disables KFENCE. */ 891 if (!kfence_sample_interval) 892 return; 893 894 if (!kfence_init_pool_early()) { 895 pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__); 896 return; 897 } 898 899 kfence_init_enable(); 900} 901 902static int kfence_init_late(void) 903{ 904 const unsigned long nr_pages_pool = KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; 905 const unsigned long nr_pages_meta = KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; 906 unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; 907 unsigned long free_size = KFENCE_POOL_SIZE; 908 int err = -ENOMEM; 909 910#ifdef CONFIG_CONTIG_ALLOC 911 struct page *pages; 912 913 pages = alloc_contig_pages(nr_pages_pool, GFP_KERNEL, first_online_node, 914 NULL); 915 if (!pages) 916 return -ENOMEM; 917 918 __kfence_pool = page_to_virt(pages); 919 pages = alloc_contig_pages(nr_pages_meta, GFP_KERNEL, first_online_node, 920 NULL); 921 if (pages) 922 kfence_metadata_init = page_to_virt(pages); 923#else 924 if (nr_pages_pool > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES || 925 nr_pages_meta > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES) { 926 pr_warn("KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS too large for buddy allocator\n"); 927 return -EINVAL; 928 } 929 930 __kfence_pool = alloc_pages_exact(KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); 931 if (!__kfence_pool) 932 return -ENOMEM; 933 934 kfence_metadata_init = alloc_pages_exact(KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); 935#endif 936 937 if (!kfence_metadata_init) 938 goto free_pool; 939 940 memzero_explicit(kfence_metadata_init, KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE); 941 addr = kfence_init_pool(); 942 if (!addr) { 943 kfence_init_enable(); 944 kfence_debugfs_init(); 945 return 0; 946 } 947 948 pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__); 949 free_size = KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool); 950 err = -EBUSY; 951 952#ifdef CONFIG_CONTIG_ALLOC 953 free_contig_range(page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)kfence_metadata_init)), 954 nr_pages_meta); 955free_pool: 956 free_contig_range(page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)addr)), 957 free_size / PAGE_SIZE); 958#else 959 free_pages_exact((void *)kfence_metadata_init, KFENCE_METADATA_SIZE); 960free_pool: 961 free_pages_exact((void *)addr, free_size); 962#endif 963 964 kfence_metadata_init = NULL; 965 __kfence_pool = NULL; 966 return err; 967} 968 969static int kfence_enable_late(void) 970{ 971 if (!__kfence_pool) 972 return kfence_init_late(); 973 974 WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true); 975 queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0); 976 pr_info("re-enabled\n"); 977 return 0; 978} 979 980void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) 981{ 982 unsigned long flags; 983 struct kfence_metadata *meta; 984 int i; 985 986 /* Pairs with release in kfence_init_pool(). */ 987 if (!smp_load_acquire(&kfence_metadata)) 988 return; 989 990 for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { 991 bool in_use; 992 993 meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; 994 995 /* 996 * If we observe some inconsistent cache and state pair where we 997 * should have returned false here, cache destruction is racing 998 * with either kmem_cache_alloc() or kmem_cache_free(). Taking 999 * the lock will not help, as different critical section 1000 * serialization will have the same outcome. 1001 */ 1002 if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || 1003 READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) 1004 continue; 1005 1006 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 1007 in_use = meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED; 1008 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 1009 1010 if (in_use) { 1011 /* 1012 * This cache still has allocations, and we should not 1013 * release them back into the freelist so they can still 1014 * safely be used and retain the kernel's default 1015 * behaviour of keeping the allocations alive (leak the 1016 * cache); however, they effectively become "zombie 1017 * allocations" as the KFENCE objects are the only ones 1018 * still in use and the owning cache is being destroyed. 1019 * 1020 * We mark them freed, so that any subsequent use shows 1021 * more useful error messages that will include stack 1022 * traces of the user of the object, the original 1023 * allocation, and caller to shutdown_cache(). 1024 */ 1025 kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, /*zombie=*/true); 1026 } 1027 } 1028 1029 for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { 1030 meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; 1031 1032 /* See above. */ 1033 if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) 1034 continue; 1035 1036 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); 1037 if (meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) 1038 meta->cache = NULL; 1039 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); 1040 } 1041} 1042 1043void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags) 1044{ 1045 unsigned long stack_entries[KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH]; 1046 size_t num_stack_entries; 1047 u32 alloc_stack_hash; 1048 1049 /* 1050 * Perform size check before switching kfence_allocation_gate, so that 1051 * we don't disable KFENCE without making an allocation. 1052 */ 1053 if (size > PAGE_SIZE) { 1054 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT]); 1055 return NULL; 1056 } 1057 1058 /* 1059 * Skip allocations from non-default zones, including DMA. We cannot 1060 * guarantee that pages in the KFENCE pool will have the requested 1061 * properties (e.g. reside in DMAable memory). 1062 */ 1063 if ((flags & GFP_ZONEMASK) || 1064 (s->flags & (SLAB_CACHE_DMA | SLAB_CACHE_DMA32))) { 1065 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT]); 1066 return NULL; 1067 } 1068 1069 /* 1070 * Skip allocations for this slab, if KFENCE has been disabled for 1071 * this slab. 1072 */ 1073 if (s->flags & SLAB_SKIP_KFENCE) 1074 return NULL; 1075 1076 if (atomic_inc_return(&kfence_allocation_gate) > 1) 1077 return NULL; 1078#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS 1079 /* 1080 * waitqueue_active() is fully ordered after the update of 1081 * kfence_allocation_gate per atomic_inc_return(). 1082 */ 1083 if (waitqueue_active(&allocation_wait)) { 1084 /* 1085 * Calling wake_up() here may deadlock when allocations happen 1086 * from within timer code. Use an irq_work to defer it. 1087 */ 1088 irq_work_queue(&wake_up_kfence_timer_work); 1089 } 1090#endif 1091 1092 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) 1093 return NULL; 1094 1095 num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 0); 1096 1097 /* 1098 * Do expensive check for coverage of allocation in slow-path after 1099 * allocation_gate has already become non-zero, even though it might 1100 * mean not making any allocation within a given sample interval. 1101 * 1102 * This ensures reasonable allocation coverage when the pool is almost 1103 * full, including avoiding long-lived allocations of the same source 1104 * filling up the pool (e.g. pagecache allocations). 1105 */ 1106 alloc_stack_hash = get_alloc_stack_hash(stack_entries, num_stack_entries); 1107 if (should_skip_covered() && alloc_covered_contains(alloc_stack_hash)) { 1108 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_COVERED]); 1109 return NULL; 1110 } 1111 1112 return kfence_guarded_alloc(s, size, flags, stack_entries, num_stack_entries, 1113 alloc_stack_hash); 1114} 1115 1116size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr) 1117{ 1118 const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); 1119 1120 /* 1121 * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is 1122 * either a use-after-free or invalid access. 1123 */ 1124 return meta ? meta->size : 0; 1125} 1126 1127void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr) 1128{ 1129 const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); 1130 1131 /* 1132 * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is 1133 * either a use-after-free or invalid access. 1134 */ 1135 return meta ? (void *)meta->addr : NULL; 1136} 1137 1138void __kfence_free(void *addr) 1139{ 1140 struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); 1141 1142#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG 1143 KFENCE_WARN_ON(meta->objcg); 1144#endif 1145 /* 1146 * If the objects of the cache are SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, defer freeing 1147 * the object, as the object page may be recycled for other-typed 1148 * objects once it has been freed. meta->cache may be NULL if the cache 1149 * was destroyed. 1150 */ 1151 if (unlikely(meta->cache && (meta->cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))) 1152 call_rcu(&meta->rcu_head, rcu_guarded_free); 1153 else 1154 kfence_guarded_free(addr, meta, false); 1155} 1156 1157bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *regs) 1158{ 1159 const int page_index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / PAGE_SIZE; 1160 struct kfence_metadata *to_report = NULL; 1161 enum kfence_error_type error_type; 1162 unsigned long flags; 1163 1164 if (!is_kfence_address((void *)addr)) 1165 return false; 1166 1167 if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) /* If disabled at runtime ... */ 1168 return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* ... unprotect and proceed. */ 1169 1170 atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); 1171 1172 if (page_index % 2) { 1173 /* This is a redzone, report a buffer overflow. */ 1174 struct kfence_metadata *meta; 1175 int distance = 0; 1176 1177 meta = addr_to_metadata(addr - PAGE_SIZE); 1178 if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) { 1179 to_report = meta; 1180 /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */ 1181 distance = addr - data_race(meta->addr + meta->size); 1182 } 1183 1184 meta = addr_to_metadata(addr + PAGE_SIZE); 1185 if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) { 1186 /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */ 1187 if (!to_report || distance > data_race(meta->addr) - addr) 1188 to_report = meta; 1189 } 1190 1191 if (!to_report) 1192 goto out; 1193 1194 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); 1195 to_report->unprotected_page = addr; 1196 error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB; 1197 1198 /* 1199 * If the object was freed before we took the look we can still 1200 * report this as an OOB -- the report will simply show the 1201 * stacktrace of the free as well. 1202 */ 1203 } else { 1204 to_report = addr_to_metadata(addr); 1205 if (!to_report) 1206 goto out; 1207 1208 raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); 1209 error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF; 1210 /* 1211 * We may race with __kfence_alloc(), and it is possible that a 1212 * freed object may be reallocated. We simply report this as a 1213 * use-after-free, with the stack trace showing the place where 1214 * the object was re-allocated. 1215 */ 1216 } 1217 1218out: 1219 if (to_report) { 1220 kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, to_report, error_type); 1221 raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_report->lock, flags); 1222 } else { 1223 /* This may be a UAF or OOB access, but we can't be sure. */ 1224 kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, NULL, KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID); 1225 } 1226 1227 return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* Unprotect and let access proceed. */ 1228} 1229