1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 2/* 3 * linux/kernel/capability.c 4 * 5 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org> 6 * 7 * Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> 8 * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net> 9 */ 10 11#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt 12 13#include <linux/audit.h> 14#include <linux/capability.h> 15#include <linux/mm.h> 16#include <linux/export.h> 17#include <linux/security.h> 18#include <linux/syscalls.h> 19#include <linux/pid_namespace.h> 20#include <linux/user_namespace.h> 21#include <linux/uaccess.h> 22 23int file_caps_enabled = 1; 24 25static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str) 26{ 27 file_caps_enabled = 0; 28 return 1; 29} 30__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable); 31 32#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER 33/* 34 * More recent versions of libcap are available from: 35 * 36 * http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/ 37 */ 38 39static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void) 40{ 41 char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; 42 43 pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities (legacy support in use)\n", 44 get_task_comm(name, current)); 45} 46 47/* 48 * Version 2 capabilities worked fine, but the linux/capability.h file 49 * that accompanied their introduction encouraged their use without 50 * the necessary user-space source code changes. As such, we have 51 * created a version 3 with equivalent functionality to version 2, but 52 * with a header change to protect legacy source code from using 53 * version 2 when it wanted to use version 1. If your system has code 54 * that trips the following warning, it is using version 2 specific 55 * capabilities and may be doing so insecurely. 56 * 57 * The remedy is to either upgrade your version of libcap (to 2.10+, 58 * if the application is linked against it), or recompile your 59 * application with modern kernel headers and this warning will go 60 * away. 61 */ 62 63static void warn_deprecated_v2(void) 64{ 65 char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; 66 67 pr_info_once("warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2 capabilities in a way that may be insecure\n", 68 get_task_comm(name, current)); 69} 70 71/* 72 * Version check. Return the number of u32s in each capability flag 73 * array, or a negative value on error. 74 */ 75static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy) 76{ 77 __u32 version; 78 79 if (get_user(version, &header->version)) 80 return -EFAULT; 81 82 switch (version) { 83 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1: 84 warn_legacy_capability_use(); 85 *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1; 86 break; 87 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: 88 warn_deprecated_v2(); 89 fallthrough; /* v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2 */ 90 case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3: 91 *tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3; 92 break; 93 default: 94 if (put_user((u32)_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) 95 return -EFAULT; 96 return -EINVAL; 97 } 98 99 return 0; 100} 101 102/* 103 * The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current 104 * process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code 105 * at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities 106 * in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of 107 * locks to when we are reading the caps of another process. 108 */ 109static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp, 110 kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp) 111{ 112 int ret; 113 114 if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) { 115 const struct task_struct *target; 116 117 rcu_read_lock(); 118 119 target = find_task_by_vpid(pid); 120 if (!target) 121 ret = -ESRCH; 122 else 123 ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp); 124 125 rcu_read_unlock(); 126 } else 127 ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp); 128 129 return ret; 130} 131 132/** 133 * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process. 134 * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and 135 * target pid data 136 * @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted, 137 * and inheritable capabilities that are returned 138 * 139 * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error. 140 */ 141SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr) 142{ 143 int ret = 0; 144 pid_t pid; 145 unsigned tocopy; 146 kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP; 147 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[2]; 148 149 ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy); 150 if ((dataptr == NULL) || (ret != 0)) 151 return ((dataptr == NULL) && (ret == -EINVAL)) ? 0 : ret; 152 153 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) 154 return -EFAULT; 155 156 if (pid < 0) 157 return -EINVAL; 158 159 ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP); 160 if (ret) 161 return ret; 162 163 /* 164 * Annoying legacy format with 64-bit capabilities exposed 165 * as two sets of 32-bit fields, so we need to split the 166 * capability values up. 167 */ 168 kdata[0].effective = pE.val; kdata[1].effective = pE.val >> 32; 169 kdata[0].permitted = pP.val; kdata[1].permitted = pP.val >> 32; 170 kdata[0].inheritable = pI.val; kdata[1].inheritable = pI.val >> 32; 171 172 /* 173 * Note, in the case, tocopy < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S, 174 * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This 175 * has the effect of making older libcap 176 * implementations implicitly drop upper capability 177 * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset 178 * sequence. 179 * 180 * This behavior is considered fail-safe 181 * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer 182 * version of libcap will enable access to the newer 183 * capabilities. 184 * 185 * An alternative would be to return an error here 186 * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to 187 * unexpectedly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts 188 * before modification is attempted and the application 189 * fails. 190 */ 191 if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy * sizeof(kdata[0]))) 192 return -EFAULT; 193 194 return 0; 195} 196 197static kernel_cap_t mk_kernel_cap(u32 low, u32 high) 198{ 199 return (kernel_cap_t) { (low | ((u64)high << 32)) & CAP_VALID_MASK }; 200} 201 202/** 203 * sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes 204 * @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and 205 * target pid data 206 * @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted, 207 * and inheritable capabilities 208 * 209 * Set capabilities for the current process only. The ability to any other 210 * process(es) has been deprecated and removed. 211 * 212 * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as: 213 * 214 * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted 215 * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted 216 * E: must be set to a subset of new permitted 217 * 218 * Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error. 219 */ 220SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data) 221{ 222 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[2] = { { 0, }, }; 223 unsigned tocopy, copybytes; 224 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; 225 struct cred *new; 226 int ret; 227 pid_t pid; 228 229 ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy); 230 if (ret != 0) 231 return ret; 232 233 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) 234 return -EFAULT; 235 236 /* may only affect current now */ 237 if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) 238 return -EPERM; 239 240 copybytes = tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct); 241 if (copybytes > sizeof(kdata)) 242 return -EFAULT; 243 244 if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, copybytes)) 245 return -EFAULT; 246 247 effective = mk_kernel_cap(kdata[0].effective, kdata[1].effective); 248 permitted = mk_kernel_cap(kdata[0].permitted, kdata[1].permitted); 249 inheritable = mk_kernel_cap(kdata[0].inheritable, kdata[1].inheritable); 250 251 new = prepare_creds(); 252 if (!new) 253 return -ENOMEM; 254 255 ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(), 256 &effective, &inheritable, &permitted); 257 if (ret < 0) 258 goto error; 259 260 audit_log_capset(new, current_cred()); 261 262 return commit_creds(new); 263 264error: 265 abort_creds(new); 266 return ret; 267} 268 269/** 270 * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns 271 * @t: The task in question 272 * @ns: target user namespace 273 * @cap: The capability to be tested for 274 * 275 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability 276 * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. 277 * 278 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. 279 */ 280bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, 281 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) 282{ 283 int ret; 284 285 rcu_read_lock(); 286 ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); 287 rcu_read_unlock(); 288 289 return (ret == 0); 290} 291 292/** 293 * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns 294 * @t: The task in question 295 * @cap: The capability to be tested for 296 * 297 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability 298 * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not. 299 * 300 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. 301 */ 302bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap) 303{ 304 return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap); 305} 306EXPORT_SYMBOL(has_capability); 307 308/** 309 * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) 310 * in a specific user ns. 311 * @t: The task in question 312 * @ns: target user namespace 313 * @cap: The capability to be tested for 314 * 315 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability 316 * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not. 317 * Do not write an audit message for the check. 318 * 319 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. 320 */ 321bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, 322 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) 323{ 324 int ret; 325 326 rcu_read_lock(); 327 ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); 328 rcu_read_unlock(); 329 330 return (ret == 0); 331} 332 333/** 334 * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the 335 * initial user ns 336 * @t: The task in question 337 * @cap: The capability to be tested for 338 * 339 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability 340 * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an 341 * audit message for the check. 342 * 343 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task. 344 */ 345bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) 346{ 347 return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); 348} 349EXPORT_SYMBOL(has_capability_noaudit); 350 351static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, 352 int cap, 353 unsigned int opts) 354{ 355 int capable; 356 357 if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) { 358 pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap); 359 BUG(); 360 } 361 362 capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts); 363 if (capable == 0) { 364 current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; 365 return true; 366 } 367 return false; 368} 369 370/** 371 * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect 372 * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in 373 * @cap: The capability to be tested for 374 * 375 * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently 376 * available for use, false if not. 377 * 378 * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the 379 * assumption that it's about to be used. 380 */ 381bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) 382{ 383 return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE); 384} 385EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); 386 387/** 388 * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior capability 389 * (unaudited) in effect 390 * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in 391 * @cap: The capability to be tested for 392 * 393 * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently 394 * available for use, false if not. 395 * 396 * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the 397 * assumption that it's about to be used. 398 */ 399bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) 400{ 401 return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); 402} 403EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit); 404 405/** 406 * ns_capable_setid - Determine if the current task has a superior capability 407 * in effect, while signalling that this check is being done from within a 408 * setid or setgroups syscall. 409 * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in 410 * @cap: The capability to be tested for 411 * 412 * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently 413 * available for use, false if not. 414 * 415 * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the 416 * assumption that it's about to be used. 417 */ 418bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) 419{ 420 return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_INSETID); 421} 422EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_setid); 423 424/** 425 * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect 426 * @cap: The capability to be tested for 427 * 428 * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently 429 * available for use, false if not. 430 * 431 * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the 432 * assumption that it's about to be used. 433 */ 434bool capable(int cap) 435{ 436 return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap); 437} 438EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); 439#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */ 440 441/** 442 * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect 443 * @file: The file we want to check 444 * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in 445 * @cap: The capability to be tested for 446 * 447 * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect 448 * when the file was opened. 449 * 450 * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not 451 * actually be privileged. 452 */ 453bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, 454 int cap) 455{ 456 457 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) 458 return false; 459 460 if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0) 461 return true; 462 463 return false; 464} 465EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable); 466 467/** 468 * privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid - Do capabilities in the namespace work over the inode? 469 * @ns: The user namespace in question 470 * @idmap: idmap of the mount @inode was found from 471 * @inode: The inode in question 472 * 473 * Return true if the inode uid and gid are within the namespace. 474 */ 475bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, 476 struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 477 const struct inode *inode) 478{ 479 return vfsuid_has_mapping(ns, i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode)) && 480 vfsgid_has_mapping(ns, i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode)); 481} 482 483/** 484 * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped 485 * @idmap: idmap of the mount @inode was found from 486 * @inode: The inode in question 487 * @cap: The capability in question 488 * 489 * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at 490 * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are 491 * mapped into the current user namespace. 492 */ 493bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 494 const struct inode *inode, int cap) 495{ 496 struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); 497 498 return ns_capable(ns, cap) && 499 privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(ns, idmap, inode); 500} 501EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid); 502 503/** 504 * ptracer_capable - Determine if the ptracer holds CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the namespace 505 * @tsk: The task that may be ptraced 506 * @ns: The user namespace to search for CAP_SYS_PTRACE in 507 * 508 * Return true if the task that is ptracing the current task had CAP_SYS_PTRACE 509 * in the specified user namespace. 510 */ 511bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) 512{ 513 int ret = 0; /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */ 514 const struct cred *cred; 515 516 rcu_read_lock(); 517 cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred); 518 if (cred) 519 ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 520 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); 521 rcu_read_unlock(); 522 return (ret == 0); 523} 524