1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later 2/* Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631] 3 * 4 * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation 5 * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com> 6 */ 7 8#include <linux/fips.h> 9#include <linux/module.h> 10#include <crypto/internal/kpp.h> 11#include <crypto/kpp.h> 12#include <crypto/dh.h> 13#include <crypto/rng.h> 14#include <linux/mpi.h> 15 16struct dh_ctx { 17 MPI p; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ 18 MPI g; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ 19 MPI xa; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ 20}; 21 22static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx) 23{ 24 mpi_free(ctx->p); 25 mpi_free(ctx->g); 26 mpi_free(ctx->xa); 27 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); 28} 29 30/* 31 * If base is g we compute the public key 32 * ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] 33 * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret 34 * ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] 35 */ 36static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val) 37{ 38 /* val = base^xa mod p */ 39 return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p); 40} 41 42static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 43{ 44 return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 45} 46 47static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len) 48{ 49 if (fips_enabled) 50 return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0; 51 52 return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0; 53} 54 55static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params) 56{ 57 if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3)) 58 return -EINVAL; 59 60 ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size); 61 if (!ctx->p) 62 return -EINVAL; 63 64 ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size); 65 if (!ctx->g) 66 return -EINVAL; 67 68 return 0; 69} 70 71static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf, 72 unsigned int len) 73{ 74 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); 75 struct dh params; 76 77 /* Free the old MPI key if any */ 78 dh_clear_ctx(ctx); 79 80 if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0) 81 goto err_clear_ctx; 82 83 if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0) 84 goto err_clear_ctx; 85 86 ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size); 87 if (!ctx->xa) 88 goto err_clear_ctx; 89 90 return 0; 91 92err_clear_ctx: 93 dh_clear_ctx(ctx); 94 return -EINVAL; 95} 96 97/* 98 * SP800-56A public key verification: 99 * 100 * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed 101 * trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A 102 * section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed. 103 * 104 * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation 105 * according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed. 106 */ 107static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y) 108{ 109 MPI val, q; 110 int ret; 111 112 if (!fips_enabled) 113 return 0; 114 115 if (unlikely(!ctx->p)) 116 return -EINVAL; 117 118 /* 119 * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2. 120 * 121 * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1 122 * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that 123 * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and 124 * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1. 125 */ 126 if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0) 127 return -EINVAL; 128 129 /* 130 * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p 131 * 132 * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2. 133 */ 134 val = mpi_alloc(0); 135 if (!val) 136 return -ENOMEM; 137 138 q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p)); 139 if (!q) { 140 mpi_free(val); 141 return -ENOMEM; 142 } 143 144 /* 145 * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one 146 * from it before shifting to the right. 147 */ 148 mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1); 149 150 ret = mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p); 151 mpi_free(q); 152 if (ret) { 153 mpi_free(val); 154 return ret; 155 } 156 157 ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1); 158 159 mpi_free(val); 160 161 if (ret != 0) 162 return -EINVAL; 163 164 return 0; 165} 166 167static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req) 168{ 169 struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req); 170 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); 171 MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0); 172 int ret = 0; 173 int sign; 174 175 if (!val) 176 return -ENOMEM; 177 178 if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) { 179 ret = -EINVAL; 180 goto err_free_val; 181 } 182 183 if (req->src) { 184 base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len); 185 if (!base) { 186 ret = -EINVAL; 187 goto err_free_val; 188 } 189 ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base); 190 if (ret) 191 goto err_free_base; 192 } else { 193 base = ctx->g; 194 } 195 196 ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val); 197 if (ret) 198 goto err_free_base; 199 200 if (fips_enabled) { 201 /* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */ 202 if (req->src) { 203 MPI pone; 204 205 /* z <= 1 */ 206 if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) { 207 ret = -EBADMSG; 208 goto err_free_base; 209 } 210 211 /* z == p - 1 */ 212 pone = mpi_alloc(0); 213 214 if (!pone) { 215 ret = -ENOMEM; 216 goto err_free_base; 217 } 218 219 ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1); 220 if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val)) 221 ret = -EBADMSG; 222 223 mpi_free(pone); 224 225 if (ret) 226 goto err_free_base; 227 228 /* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */ 229 } else { 230 if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) { 231 ret = -EAGAIN; 232 goto err_free_val; 233 } 234 } 235 } 236 237 ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign); 238 if (ret) 239 goto err_free_base; 240 241 if (sign < 0) 242 ret = -EBADMSG; 243err_free_base: 244 if (req->src) 245 mpi_free(base); 246err_free_val: 247 mpi_free(val); 248 return ret; 249} 250 251static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 252{ 253 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); 254 255 return mpi_get_size(ctx->p); 256} 257 258static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 259{ 260 struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); 261 262 dh_clear_ctx(ctx); 263} 264 265static struct kpp_alg dh = { 266 .set_secret = dh_set_secret, 267 .generate_public_key = dh_compute_value, 268 .compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value, 269 .max_size = dh_max_size, 270 .exit = dh_exit_tfm, 271 .base = { 272 .cra_name = "dh", 273 .cra_driver_name = "dh-generic", 274 .cra_priority = 100, 275 .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, 276 .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx), 277 }, 278}; 279 280 281struct dh_safe_prime { 282 unsigned int max_strength; 283 unsigned int p_size; 284 const char *p; 285}; 286 287static const char safe_prime_g[] = { 2 }; 288 289struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx { 290 struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn; 291 const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime; 292}; 293 294struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx { 295 struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm; 296}; 297 298static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst) 299{ 300 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); 301 302 crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn); 303 kfree(inst); 304} 305 306static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx( 307 struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 308{ 309 return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm)); 310} 311 312static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 313{ 314 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = 315 dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); 316 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 317 318 tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn); 319 if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm)) 320 return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); 321 322 kpp_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct kpp_request) + 323 crypto_kpp_reqsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm)); 324 325 return 0; 326} 327 328static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 329{ 330 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 331 332 crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); 333} 334 335static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val) 336{ 337 unsigned int i; 338 339 for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) { 340 u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]); 341 342 tmp += val; 343 val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1; 344 dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp); 345 } 346 347 return val; 348} 349 350static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime, 351 unsigned int *key_size) 352{ 353 unsigned int n, oversampling_size; 354 __be64 *key; 355 int err; 356 u64 h, o; 357 358 /* 359 * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3, 360 * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp.. 361 * 362 * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that 363 * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1 364 * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups. 365 * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to 366 * avoid excessively large private keys while still 367 * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in 368 * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[], 369 * the following holds for such N: 370 * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64 371 * bits and 372 * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound. 373 */ 374 n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength); 375 WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1)); 376 n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */ 377 378 /* 379 * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits 380 * required as per 5.6.1.1.3. 381 */ 382 oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64); 383 key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL); 384 if (!key) 385 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); 386 387 /* 388 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64 389 * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer. 390 */ 391 err = -EFAULT; 392 if (crypto_get_default_rng()) 393 goto out_err; 394 395 err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, (u8 *)key, 396 oversampling_size); 397 crypto_put_default_rng(); 398 if (err) 399 goto out_err; 400 401 /* 402 * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus, 403 * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N. 404 * 405 * For step 6, calculate 406 * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1. 407 * 408 * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that 409 * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h, 410 * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds. 411 * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words 412 * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0] 413 * representing the 64 most significant bits and l 414 * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark 415 * from above, 416 * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1). 417 * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after 418 * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2. 419 * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as 420 * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one, 421 * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will 422 * be zero after a second reduction: 423 * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1). 424 * At this point, it is still possible that 425 * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1) 426 * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of 427 * the final increment overflowing in this case. 428 */ 429 h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]); 430 h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h); 431 h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h); 432 WARN_ON_ONCE(h); 433 434 /* Increment to obtain the final result. */ 435 o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1); 436 /* 437 * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or 438 * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian 439 * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to 440 * one, c.f. above. 441 */ 442 if (o) 443 key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1); 444 445 /* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */ 446 *key_size = n << 3; 447 /* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */ 448 memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size); 449 450 return key; 451 452out_err: 453 kfree_sensitive(key); 454 return ERR_PTR(err); 455} 456 457static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer, 458 unsigned int len) 459{ 460 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = 461 dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); 462 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 463 struct dh params = {}; 464 void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL; 465 unsigned int buf_size; 466 int err; 467 468 if (buffer) { 469 err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, ¶ms); 470 if (err) 471 return err; 472 if (params.p_size || params.g_size) 473 return -EINVAL; 474 } 475 476 params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p; 477 params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size; 478 params.g = safe_prime_g; 479 params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g); 480 481 if (!params.key_size) { 482 key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime, 483 ¶ms.key_size); 484 if (IS_ERR(key)) 485 return PTR_ERR(key); 486 params.key = key; 487 } 488 489 buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(¶ms); 490 buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); 491 if (!buf) { 492 err = -ENOMEM; 493 goto out; 494 } 495 496 err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, ¶ms); 497 if (err) 498 goto out; 499 500 err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size); 501out: 502 kfree_sensitive(buf); 503 kfree_sensitive(key); 504 return err; 505} 506 507static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(void *data, int err) 508{ 509 struct kpp_request *req = data; 510 511 kpp_request_complete(req, err); 512} 513 514static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req) 515{ 516 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = 517 kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req)); 518 struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req); 519 520 kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); 521 kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags, 522 dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req); 523 524 kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len); 525 kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len); 526 527 return dh_req; 528} 529 530static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req) 531{ 532 struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); 533 534 return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req); 535} 536 537static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req) 538{ 539 struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); 540 541 return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req); 542} 543 544static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) 545{ 546 struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); 547 548 return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); 549} 550 551static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create( 552 struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb, 553 const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime) 554{ 555 struct kpp_instance *inst; 556 struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx; 557 const char *dh_name; 558 struct kpp_alg *dh_alg; 559 u32 mask; 560 int err; 561 562 err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask); 563 if (err) 564 return err; 565 566 dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]); 567 if (IS_ERR(dh_name)) 568 return PTR_ERR(dh_name); 569 570 inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); 571 if (!inst) 572 return -ENOMEM; 573 574 ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); 575 576 err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst), 577 dh_name, 0, mask); 578 if (err) 579 goto err_free_inst; 580 581 err = -EINVAL; 582 dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn); 583 if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh")) 584 goto err_free_inst; 585 586 ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime; 587 588 err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst), 589 tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base); 590 if (err) 591 goto err_free_inst; 592 593 inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret; 594 inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key; 595 inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret; 596 inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size; 597 inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm; 598 inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm; 599 inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority; 600 inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE; 601 inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx); 602 603 inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance; 604 605 err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst); 606 if (err) 607 goto err_free_inst; 608 609 return 0; 610 611err_free_inst: 612 dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst); 613 614 return err; 615} 616 617#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS 618 619static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = { 620 .max_strength = 112, 621 .p_size = 256, 622 .p = 623 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 624 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 625 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 626 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 627 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 628 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 629 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 630 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 631 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 632 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 633 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 634 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 635 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 636 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 637 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 638 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 639}; 640 641static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = { 642 .max_strength = 128, 643 .p_size = 384, 644 .p = 645 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 646 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 647 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 648 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 649 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 650 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 651 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 652 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 653 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 654 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 655 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 656 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 657 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 658 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 659 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 660 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" 661 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" 662 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" 663 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" 664 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" 665 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" 666 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" 667 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" 668 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 669}; 670 671static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = { 672 .max_strength = 152, 673 .p_size = 512, 674 .p = 675 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 676 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 677 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 678 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 679 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 680 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 681 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 682 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 683 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 684 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 685 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 686 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 687 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 688 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 689 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 690 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" 691 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" 692 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" 693 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" 694 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" 695 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" 696 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" 697 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" 698 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" 699 "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" 700 "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" 701 "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" 702 "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" 703 "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" 704 "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" 705 "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" 706 "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 707}; 708 709static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = { 710 .max_strength = 176, 711 .p_size = 768, 712 .p = 713 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 714 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 715 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 716 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 717 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 718 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 719 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 720 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 721 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 722 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 723 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 724 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 725 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 726 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 727 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 728 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" 729 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" 730 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" 731 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" 732 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" 733 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" 734 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" 735 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" 736 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" 737 "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" 738 "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" 739 "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" 740 "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" 741 "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" 742 "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" 743 "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" 744 "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" 745 "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" 746 "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" 747 "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" 748 "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" 749 "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" 750 "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" 751 "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" 752 "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" 753 "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" 754 "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" 755 "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" 756 "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" 757 "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" 758 "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" 759 "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" 760 "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 761}; 762 763static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = { 764 .max_strength = 200, 765 .p_size = 1024, 766 .p = 767 "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" 768 "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" 769 "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" 770 "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" 771 "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" 772 "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" 773 "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" 774 "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" 775 "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" 776 "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" 777 "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" 778 "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" 779 "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" 780 "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" 781 "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" 782 "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" 783 "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" 784 "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" 785 "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" 786 "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" 787 "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" 788 "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" 789 "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" 790 "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" 791 "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" 792 "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" 793 "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" 794 "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" 795 "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" 796 "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" 797 "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" 798 "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" 799 "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" 800 "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" 801 "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" 802 "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" 803 "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" 804 "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" 805 "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" 806 "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" 807 "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" 808 "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" 809 "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" 810 "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" 811 "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" 812 "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" 813 "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" 814 "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38" 815 "\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43" 816 "\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef" 817 "\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65" 818 "\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4" 819 "\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c" 820 "\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22" 821 "\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee" 822 "\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc" 823 "\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9" 824 "\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31" 825 "\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8" 826 "\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30" 827 "\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe" 828 "\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d" 829 "\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c" 830 "\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", 831}; 832 833static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 834 struct rtattr **tb) 835{ 836 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime); 837} 838 839static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 840 struct rtattr **tb) 841{ 842 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime); 843} 844 845static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 846 struct rtattr **tb) 847{ 848 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime); 849} 850 851static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 852 struct rtattr **tb) 853{ 854 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime); 855} 856 857static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, 858 struct rtattr **tb) 859{ 860 return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime); 861} 862 863static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = { 864 { 865 .name = "ffdhe2048", 866 .create = dh_ffdhe2048_create, 867 .module = THIS_MODULE, 868 }, 869 { 870 .name = "ffdhe3072", 871 .create = dh_ffdhe3072_create, 872 .module = THIS_MODULE, 873 }, 874 { 875 .name = "ffdhe4096", 876 .create = dh_ffdhe4096_create, 877 .module = THIS_MODULE, 878 }, 879 { 880 .name = "ffdhe6144", 881 .create = dh_ffdhe6144_create, 882 .module = THIS_MODULE, 883 }, 884 { 885 .name = "ffdhe8192", 886 .create = dh_ffdhe8192_create, 887 .module = THIS_MODULE, 888 }, 889}; 890 891#else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ 892 893static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {}; 894 895#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ 896 897 898static int __init dh_init(void) 899{ 900 int err; 901 902 err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh); 903 if (err) 904 return err; 905 906 err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates, 907 ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); 908 if (err) { 909 crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh); 910 return err; 911 } 912 913 return 0; 914} 915 916static void __exit dh_exit(void) 917{ 918 crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates, 919 ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); 920 crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh); 921} 922 923subsys_initcall(dh_init); 924module_exit(dh_exit); 925MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh"); 926MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); 927MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm"); 928