s3_pkt.c revision 296465
1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <limits.h> 114#include <errno.h> 115#define USE_SOCKETS 116#include "ssl_locl.h" 117#include <openssl/evp.h> 118#include <openssl/buffer.h> 119 120static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); 122static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); 123 124int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) 125{ 126 /* 127 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 128 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of 129 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If 130 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus 131 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 132 */ 133 int i, off, newb; 134 135 if (!extend) { 136 /* start with empty packet ... */ 137 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) 138 s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0; 139 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset; 140 s->packet_length = 0; 141 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 142 } 143 144 /* 145 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read 146 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into 147 * the buffer). 148 */ 149 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { 150 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0 && extend) 151 return 0; 152 if (s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left) 153 n = s->s3->rbuf.left; 154 } 155 156 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 157 if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n) { 158 s->packet_length += n; 159 s->s3->rbuf.left -= n; 160 s->s3->rbuf.offset += n; 161 return (n); 162 } 163 164 /* else we need to read more data */ 165 if (!s->read_ahead) 166 max = n; 167 168 { 169 /* avoid buffer overflow */ 170 int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length; 171 if (max > max_max) 172 max = max_max; 173 } 174 if (n > max) { /* does not happen */ 175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 176 return -1; 177 } 178 179 off = s->packet_length; 180 newb = s->s3->rbuf.left; 181 /* 182 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'off' bytes already 183 * pointed to by 'packet', 'newb' extra ones at the end 184 */ 185 if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf) { 186 /* off > 0 */ 187 memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off + newb); 188 s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf; 189 } 190 191 while (newb < n) { 192 /* 193 * Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and 194 * need to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if 195 * possible) 196 */ 197 198 clear_sys_error(); 199 if (s->rbio != NULL) { 200 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 201 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off + newb]), max - newb); 202 } else { 203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 204 i = -1; 205 } 206 207 if (i <= 0) { 208 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb; 209 return (i); 210 } 211 newb += i; 212 /* 213 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the 214 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to 215 * byte oriented as in the TLS case. 216 */ 217 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { 218 if (n > newb) 219 n = newb; /* makes the while condition false */ 220 } 221 } 222 223 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 224 s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n; 225 s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n; 226 s->packet_length += n; 227 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 228 return (n); 229} 230 231/* 232 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that 233 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an 234 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and 235 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. 236 */ 237#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 238 239/*- 240 * Call this to get a new input record. 241 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error 242 * or non-blocking IO. 243 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in 244 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 245 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data 246 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes 247 */ 248/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ 249static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) 250{ 251 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; 252 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; 253 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 254 SSL_SESSION *sess; 255 unsigned char *p; 256 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 257 short version; 258 unsigned mac_size, orig_len; 259 size_t extra; 260 unsigned empty_record_count = 0; 261 262 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 263 sess = s->session; 264 265 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) 266 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; 267 else 268 extra = 0; 269 if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { 270 /* 271 * actually likely an application error: 272 * SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after ssl3_setup_buffers() 273 * was done 274 */ 275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 276 return -1; 277 } 278 279 again: 280 /* check if we have the header */ 281 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || 282 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { 283 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); 284 if (n <= 0) 285 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ 286 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; 287 288 p = s->packet; 289 290 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ 291 rr->type = *(p++); 292 ssl_major = *(p++); 293 ssl_minor = *(p++); 294 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; 295 n2s(p, rr->length); 296 297 /* Lets check version */ 298 if (!s->first_packet) { 299 if (version != s->version) { 300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 301 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) 302 /* 303 * Send back error using their minor version number :-) 304 */ 305 s->version = (unsigned short)version; 306 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; 307 goto f_err; 308 } 309 } 310 311 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { 312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); 313 goto err; 314 } 315 316 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { 317 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 319 goto f_err; 320 } 321 322 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ 323 } 324 325 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ 326 327 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 328 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ 329 i = rr->length; 330 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); 331 if (n <= 0) 332 return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ 333 /* 334 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 335 * + rr->length 336 */ 337 } 338 339 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ 340 341 /* 342 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, 343 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet 344 */ 345 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); 346 347 /* 348 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points 349 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either 350 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into 351 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer 352 */ 353 354 /* 355 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length 356 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. 357 */ 358 359 /* check is not needed I believe */ 360 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { 361 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 363 goto f_err; 364 } 365 366 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ 367 rr->data = rr->input; 368 369 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); 370 /*- 371 * enc_err is: 372 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. 373 * 1: if the padding is valid 374 * -1: if the padding is invalid 375 */ 376 if (enc_err == 0) { 377 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; 378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); 379 goto f_err; 380 } 381#ifdef TLS_DEBUG 382 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); 383 { 384 unsigned int z; 385 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) 386 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); 387 } 388 printf("\n"); 389#endif 390 391 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ 392 if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (s->read_hash != NULL)) { 393 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ 394 unsigned char *mac = NULL; 395 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 396 mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); 397 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); 398 399 /* 400 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type 401 */ 402 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8); 403 404 /* 405 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was 406 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, 407 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount 408 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. 409 */ 410 if (orig_len < mac_size || 411 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ 412 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && 413 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { 414 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); 416 goto f_err; 417 } 418 419 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 420 /* 421 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be 422 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in 423 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the 424 * contents of the padding bytes. 425 */ 426 mac = mac_tmp; 427 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); 428 rr->length -= mac_size; 429 } else { 430 /* 431 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals 432 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for 433 * |mac_size| above. 434 */ 435 rr->length -= mac_size; 436 mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; 437 } 438 439 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); 440 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL 441 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) 442 enc_err = -1; 443 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) 444 enc_err = -1; 445 } 446 447 if (enc_err < 0) { 448 /* 449 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, 450 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption 451 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should 452 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become 453 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) 454 */ 455 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; 456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, 457 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); 458 goto f_err; 459 } 460 461 /* r->length is now just compressed */ 462 if (s->expand != NULL) { 463 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { 464 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 466 goto f_err; 467 } 468 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { 469 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; 470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 471 goto f_err; 472 } 473 } 474 475 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { 476 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; 477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); 478 goto f_err; 479 } 480 481 rr->off = 0; 482 /*- 483 * So at this point the following is true 484 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record 485 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record 486 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte 487 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment 488 * after use :-). 489 */ 490 491 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ 492 s->packet_length = 0; 493 494 /* just read a 0 length packet */ 495 if (rr->length == 0) { 496 empty_record_count++; 497 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { 498 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); 500 goto f_err; 501 } 502 goto again; 503 } 504 505 return (1); 506 507 f_err: 508 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 509 err: 510 return (ret); 511} 512 513int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) 514{ 515#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 516 int i; 517 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 518 519 rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec); 520 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, 521 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, 522 (int)rr->length); 523 if (i < 0) 524 return (0); 525 else 526 rr->length = i; 527 rr->data = rr->comp; 528#endif 529 return (1); 530} 531 532int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) 533{ 534#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP 535 int i; 536 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 537 538 wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec); 539 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, 540 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, 541 wr->input, (int)wr->length); 542 if (i < 0) 543 return (0); 544 else 545 wr->length = i; 546 547 wr->input = wr->data; 548#endif 549 return (1); 550} 551 552/* 553 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if 554 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 555 */ 556int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) 557{ 558 const unsigned char *buf = buf_; 559 unsigned int n, nw; 560 int i, tot; 561 562 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 563 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); 564 tot = s->s3->wnum; 565 s->s3->wnum = 0; 566 567 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { 568 i = s->handshake_func(s); 569 if (i < 0) 570 return (i); 571 if (i == 0) { 572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 573 return -1; 574 } 575 } 576 577 /* 578 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out 579 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for 580 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for 581 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be 582 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then 583 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and 584 * report the error in a way the user will notice 585 */ 586 if (len < tot) { 587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 588 return (-1); 589 } 590 591 n = (len - tot); 592 for (;;) { 593 if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) 594 nw = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; 595 else 596 nw = n; 597 598 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); 599 if (i <= 0) { 600 s->s3->wnum = tot; 601 return i; 602 } 603 604 if ((i == (int)n) || 605 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 606 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { 607 /* 608 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 609 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: 610 */ 611 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 612 613 return tot + i; 614 } 615 616 n -= i; 617 tot += i; 618 } 619} 620 621static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 622 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) 623{ 624 unsigned char *p, *plen; 625 int i, mac_size, clear = 0; 626 int prefix_len = 0; 627 SSL3_RECORD *wr; 628 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; 629 SSL_SESSION *sess; 630 631 /* 632 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 633 * will happen with non blocking IO 634 */ 635 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) 636 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len)); 637 638 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 639 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 640 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 641 if (i <= 0) 642 return (i); 643 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 644 } 645 646 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 647 return 0; 648 649 wr = &(s->s3->wrec); 650 wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); 651 sess = s->session; 652 653 if ((sess == NULL) || 654 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (s->write_hash == NULL)) 655 clear = 1; 656 657 if (clear) 658 mac_size = 0; 659 else 660 mac_size = EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); 661 662 /* 663 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself 664 */ 665 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { 666 /* 667 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see 668 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 669 */ 670 671 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 672 /* 673 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this 674 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these 675 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual 676 * payload) 677 */ 678 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); 679 if (prefix_len <= 0) 680 goto err; 681 682 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < 683 (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { 684 /* insufficient space */ 685 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 686 goto err; 687 } 688 } 689 690 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 691 } 692 693 p = wb->buf + prefix_len; 694 695 /* write the header */ 696 697 *(p++) = type & 0xff; 698 wr->type = type; 699 700 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8); 701 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; 702 703 /* field where we are to write out packet length */ 704 plen = p; 705 p += 2; 706 707 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 708 wr->data = p; 709 wr->length = (int)len; 710 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf; 711 712 /* 713 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data 714 */ 715 716 /* first we compress */ 717 if (s->compress != NULL) { 718 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { 719 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 720 goto err; 721 } 722 } else { 723 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length); 724 wr->input = wr->data; 725 } 726 727 /* 728 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from 729 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the 730 * wb->buf 731 */ 732 733 if (mac_size != 0) { 734 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length]), 1); 735 wr->length += mac_size; 736 wr->input = p; 737 wr->data = p; 738 } 739 740 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ 741 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1); 742 743 /* record length after mac and block padding */ 744 s2n(wr->length, plen); 745 746 /* 747 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is 748 * wr->length long 749 */ 750 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ 751 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 752 753 if (create_empty_fragment) { 754 /* 755 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write 756 * out anything here 757 */ 758 return wr->length; 759 } 760 761 /* now let's set up wb */ 762 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; 763 wb->offset = 0; 764 765 /* 766 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write 767 * retries later 768 */ 769 s->s3->wpend_tot = len; 770 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; 771 s->s3->wpend_type = type; 772 s->s3->wpend_ret = len; 773 774 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 775 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); 776 err: 777 return -1; 778} 779 780/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ 781int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 782 unsigned int len) 783{ 784 int i; 785 786/* XXXX */ 787 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) 788 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && 789 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) 790 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { 791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 792 return (-1); 793 } 794 795 for (;;) { 796 clear_sys_error(); 797 if (s->wbio != NULL) { 798 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 799 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, 800 (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]), 801 (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left); 802 } else { 803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 804 i = -1; 805 } 806 if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left) { 807 s->s3->wbuf.left = 0; 808 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 809 return (s->s3->wpend_ret); 810 } else if (i <= 0) { 811 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 812 /* 813 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in 814 * using a datagram service 815 */ 816 s->s3->wbuf.left = 0; 817 } 818 return (i); 819 } 820 s->s3->wbuf.offset += i; 821 s->s3->wbuf.left -= i; 822 } 823} 824 825/*- 826 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 827 * 'type' is one of the following: 828 * 829 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 830 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 831 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 832 * 833 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 834 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 835 * 836 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 837 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really 838 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. 839 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 840 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 841 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 842 * Change cipher spec protocol 843 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 844 * Alert protocol 845 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 846 * Handshake protocol 847 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 848 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 849 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 850 * Application data protocol 851 * none of our business 852 */ 853int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) 854{ 855 int al, i, j, ret; 856 unsigned int n; 857 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 858 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; 859 860 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ 861 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) 862 return (-1); 863 864 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 865 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek 866 && (type != 867 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { 868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 869 return -1; 870 } 871 872 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 873 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 874 { 875 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 876 unsigned char *dst = buf; 877 unsigned int k; 878 879 /* peek == 0 */ 880 n = 0; 881 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { 882 *dst++ = *src++; 883 len--; 884 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; 885 n++; 886 } 887 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 888 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) 889 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 890 return n; 891 } 892 893 /* 894 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. 895 */ 896 897 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { 898 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 899 i = s->handshake_func(s); 900 if (i < 0) 901 return (i); 902 if (i == 0) { 903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 904 return (-1); 905 } 906 } 907 start: 908 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 909 910 /*- 911 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record 912 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data 913 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read 914 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. 915 */ 916 rr = &(s->s3->rrec); 917 918 /* get new packet if necessary */ 919 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { 920 ret = ssl3_get_record(s); 921 if (ret <= 0) 922 return (ret); 923 } 924 925 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 926 927 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 928 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 929 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { 930 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 932 goto f_err; 933 } 934 935 /* 936 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in 937 * 'peek' mode) 938 */ 939 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { 940 rr->length = 0; 941 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 942 return (0); 943 } 944 945 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or 946 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ 947 /* 948 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are 949 * doing a handshake for the first time 950 */ 951 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 952 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { 953 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 955 goto f_err; 956 } 957 958 if (len <= 0) 959 return (len); 960 961 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) 962 n = rr->length; 963 else 964 n = (unsigned int)len; 965 966 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 967 if (!peek) { 968 rr->length -= n; 969 rr->off += n; 970 if (rr->length == 0) { 971 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 972 rr->off = 0; 973 } 974 } 975 return (n); 976 } 977 978 /* 979 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, 980 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). 981 */ 982 983 /* 984 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill 985 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. 986 */ 987 { 988 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; 989 unsigned char *dest = NULL; 990 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; 991 992 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 993 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; 994 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; 995 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; 996 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 997 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; 998 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; 999 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; 1000 } 1001 1002 if (dest_maxlen > 0) { 1003 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1004 if (rr->length < n) 1005 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ 1006 1007 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1008 while (n-- > 0) { 1009 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; 1010 rr->length--; 1011 } 1012 1013 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1014 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1015 } 1016 } 1017 1018 /*- 1019 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1020 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. 1021 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 1022 */ 1023 1024 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ 1025 if ((!s->server) && 1026 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1027 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && 1028 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { 1029 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1030 1031 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || 1032 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || 1033 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { 1034 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); 1036 goto f_err; 1037 } 1038 1039 if (s->msg_callback) 1040 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 1041 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, 1042 s->msg_callback_arg); 1043 1044 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1045 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && 1046 !s->s3->renegotiate) { 1047 ssl3_renegotiate(s); 1048 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { 1049 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1050 if (i < 0) 1051 return (i); 1052 if (i == 0) { 1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1054 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1055 return (-1); 1056 } 1057 1058 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1059 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ 1060 BIO *bio; 1061 /* 1062 * In the case where we try to read application data, 1063 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with 1064 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may 1065 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world 1066 */ 1067 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1068 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1069 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1070 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1071 return (-1); 1072 } 1073 } 1074 } 1075 } 1076 /* 1077 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try 1078 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for 1079 */ 1080 goto start; 1081 } 1082 /* 1083 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't 1084 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING: 1085 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) 1086 */ 1087 if (s->server && 1088 SSL_is_init_finished(s) && 1089 !s->s3->send_connection_binding && 1090 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && 1091 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && 1092 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && 1093 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && 1094 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 1095 /* 1096 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 1097 */ 1098 rr->length = 0; 1099 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1100 goto start; 1101 } 1102 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { 1103 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; 1104 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; 1105 1106 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; 1107 1108 if (s->msg_callback) 1109 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, 1110 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1111 1112 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1113 cb = s->info_callback; 1114 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1115 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1116 1117 if (cb != NULL) { 1118 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1119 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1120 } 1121 1122 if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */ 1123 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1124 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { 1125 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1126 return (0); 1127 } 1128 /* 1129 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1130 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal 1131 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it 1132 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In 1133 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if 1134 * the peer refused it where we carry on. 1135 */ 1136 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { 1137 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1139 goto f_err; 1140 } 1141 } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */ 1142 char tmp[16]; 1143 1144 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1145 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1147 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); 1148 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); 1149 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1150 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); 1151 return (0); 1152 } else { 1153 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1155 goto f_err; 1156 } 1157 1158 goto start; 1159 } 1160 1161 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a 1162 * shutdown */ 1163 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1164 rr->length = 0; 1165 return (0); 1166 } 1167 1168 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1169 /* 1170 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly 1171 * what the record payload has to look like 1172 */ 1173 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || 1174 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { 1175 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 1177 goto f_err; 1178 } 1179 1180 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ 1181 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { 1182 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1184 goto f_err; 1185 } 1186 1187 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { 1188 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1190 goto f_err; 1191 } 1192 1193 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; 1194 1195 rr->length = 0; 1196 1197 if (s->msg_callback) 1198 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1199 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1200 1201 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; 1202 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) 1203 goto err; 1204 else 1205 goto start; 1206 } 1207 1208 /* 1209 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) 1210 */ 1211 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { 1212 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && 1213 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { 1214#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences 1215 * are not as expected (and because this is 1216 * not really needed for clients except for 1217 * detecting protocol violations): */ 1218 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server) 1219 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1220#else 1221 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; 1222#endif 1223 s->new_session = 1; 1224 } 1225 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1226 if (i < 0) 1227 return (i); 1228 if (i == 0) { 1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); 1230 return (-1); 1231 } 1232 1233 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1234 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */ 1235 BIO *bio; 1236 /* 1237 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we 1238 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry 1239 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty 1240 * problems in the blocking world 1241 */ 1242 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1243 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1244 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1245 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1246 return (-1); 1247 } 1248 } 1249 goto start; 1250 } 1251 1252 switch (rr->type) { 1253 default: 1254#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS 1255 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ 1256 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { 1257 rr->length = 0; 1258 goto start; 1259 } 1260#endif 1261 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1263 goto f_err; 1264 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1265 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1266 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1267 /* 1268 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of 1269 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not 1270 * happen when type != rr->type 1271 */ 1272 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1274 goto f_err; 1275 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1276 /* 1277 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have 1278 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() 1279 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read 1280 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet 1281 * started), we will indulge it. 1282 */ 1283 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && 1284 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && 1285 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && 1286 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && 1287 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) 1288 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && 1289 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && 1290 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1291 ) 1292 )) { 1293 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; 1294 return (-1); 1295 } else { 1296 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; 1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1298 goto f_err; 1299 } 1300 } 1301 /* not reached */ 1302 1303 f_err: 1304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 1305 err: 1306 return (-1); 1307} 1308 1309int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) 1310{ 1311 int i; 1312 const char *sender; 1313 int slen; 1314 1315 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) 1316 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; 1317 else 1318 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; 1319 1320 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { 1321 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { 1322 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ 1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 1324 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1325 return (0); 1326 } 1327 1328 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; 1329 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) 1330 return (0); 1331 } 1332 1333 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i)) 1334 return (0); 1335 1336 /* 1337 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it 1338 * before we read the finished message 1339 */ 1340 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { 1341 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; 1342 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; 1343 } else { 1344 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; 1345 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; 1346 } 1347 1348 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, 1349 & 1350 (s->s3->finish_dgst1), 1351 & 1352 (s->s3->finish_dgst2), 1353 sender, 1354 slen, 1355 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); 1356 1357 return (1); 1358} 1359 1360int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) 1361{ 1362 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ 1363 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); 1364 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) 1365 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have 1366 * protocol_version alerts */ 1367 if (desc < 0) 1368 return -1; 1369 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ 1370 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) 1371 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); 1372 1373 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; 1374 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; 1375 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; 1376 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ 1377 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 1378 /* 1379 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in 1380 * the future 1381 */ 1382 return -1; 1383} 1384 1385int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) 1386{ 1387 int i, j; 1388 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 1389 1390 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; 1391 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); 1392 if (i <= 0) { 1393 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; 1394 } else { 1395 /* 1396 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the 1397 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not 1398 * worry too much. 1399 */ 1400 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) 1401 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); 1402 1403 if (s->msg_callback) 1404 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 1405 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1406 1407 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1408 cb = s->info_callback; 1409 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1410 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1411 1412 if (cb != NULL) { 1413 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; 1414 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); 1415 } 1416 } 1417 return (i); 1418} 1419