rsa_oaep.c revision 296465
1/* crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c */ 2/* 3 * Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, 4 * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. 5 */ 6 7/* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */ 8 9/* 10 * See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, <URL: 11 * http://www.shoup.net/papers/oaep.ps.Z> for problems with the security 12 * proof for the original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. A new 13 * proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, 14 * "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", Dec. 2000, <URL: 15 * http://eprint.iacr.org/2000/061/>. The new proof has stronger requirements 16 * for the underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead of 17 * one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is an equivalent notion. 18 */ 19 20#include "constant_time_locl.h" 21 22#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1) 23# include <stdio.h> 24# include "cryptlib.h" 25# include <openssl/bn.h> 26# include <openssl/rsa.h> 27# include <openssl/evp.h> 28# include <openssl/rand.h> 29# include <openssl/sha.h> 30 31int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, 32 const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen); 33 34int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, 35 const unsigned char *from, int flen, 36 const unsigned char *param, int plen) 37{ 38 int i, emlen = tlen - 1; 39 unsigned char *db, *seed; 40 unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 41 42 if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1) { 43 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, 44 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); 45 return 0; 46 } 47 48 if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1) { 49 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); 50 return 0; 51 } 52 53 to[0] = 0; 54 seed = to + 1; 55 db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1; 56 57 EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL); 58 memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, 59 emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1); 60 db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01; 61 memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int)flen); 62 if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0) 63 return 0; 64# ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT 65 memcpy(seed, 66 "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f", 67 20); 68# endif 69 70 dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 71 if (dbmask == NULL) { 72 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 73 return 0; 74 } 75 76 MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 77 for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) 78 db[i] ^= dbmask[i]; 79 80 MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 81 for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) 82 seed[i] ^= seedmask[i]; 83 84 OPENSSL_free(dbmask); 85 return 1; 86} 87 88int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, 89 const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, 90 const unsigned char *param, int plen) 91{ 92 int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index; 93 unsigned int good, found_one_byte; 94 const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb; 95 /* 96 * |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em = 97 * Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB 98 */ 99 unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], 100 phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 101 102 if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) 103 return -1; 104 105 /* 106 * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the 107 * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by 108 * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, 109 * num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2 must hold for the modulus 110 * irrespective of the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. 111 * This does not leak any side-channel information. 112 */ 113 if (num < flen || num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2) 114 goto decoding_err; 115 116 dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1; 117 db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen); 118 em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); 119 if (db == NULL || em == NULL) { 120 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 121 goto cleanup; 122 } 123 124 /* 125 * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid 126 * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel 127 * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access 128 * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. 129 * 130 * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. 131 */ 132 memset(em, 0, num); 133 memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); 134 135 /* 136 * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is 137 * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA 138 * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). 139 */ 140 good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); 141 142 maskedseed = em + 1; 143 maskeddb = em + 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; 144 145 MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen); 146 for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) 147 seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i]; 148 149 MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); 150 for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) 151 db[i] ^= maskeddb[i]; 152 153 EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL); 154 155 good &= 156 constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)); 157 158 found_one_byte = 0; 159 for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++) { 160 /* 161 * Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. 162 */ 163 unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1); 164 unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]); 165 one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1, 166 i, one_index); 167 found_one_byte |= equals1; 168 good &= (found_one_byte | equals0); 169 } 170 171 good &= found_one_byte; 172 173 /* 174 * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid, 175 * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a 176 * concern. 177 */ 178 if (!good) 179 goto decoding_err; 180 181 msg_index = one_index + 1; 182 mlen = dblen - msg_index; 183 184 if (tlen < mlen) { 185 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); 186 mlen = -1; 187 } else { 188 memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen); 189 goto cleanup; 190 } 191 192 decoding_err: 193 /* 194 * To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not 195 * reveal which kind of decoding error happened. 196 */ 197 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); 198 cleanup: 199 if (db != NULL) 200 OPENSSL_free(db); 201 if (em != NULL) 202 OPENSSL_free(em); 203 return mlen; 204} 205 206int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, 207 const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst) 208{ 209 long i, outlen = 0; 210 unsigned char cnt[4]; 211 EVP_MD_CTX c; 212 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 213 int mdlen; 214 215 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c); 216 mdlen = M_EVP_MD_size(dgst); 217 for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) { 218 cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255); 219 cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255); 220 cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255; 221 cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255); 222 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, dgst, NULL); 223 EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen); 224 EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4); 225 if (outlen + mdlen <= len) { 226 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL); 227 outlen += mdlen; 228 } else { 229 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL); 230 memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen); 231 outlen = len; 232 } 233 } 234 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c); 235 return 0; 236} 237 238int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, 239 long seedlen) 240{ 241 return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1()); 242} 243#endif 244