1/* 2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10#include <stdio.h> 11#include <limits.h> 12#include <errno.h> 13#include "../ssl_local.h" 14#include <openssl/evp.h> 15#include <openssl/buffer.h> 16#include <openssl/rand.h> 17#include "record_local.h" 18#include "../packet_local.h" 19 20#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ 21 !( defined(AESNI_ASM) && ( \ 22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ 23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ 24 ) 25# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 26# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 27#endif 28 29void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) 30{ 31 rl->s = s; 32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); 33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 34} 35 36void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 37{ 38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 39 40 /* 41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not 42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is 43 * that right? 44 */ 45 46 rl->packet = NULL; 47 rl->packet_length = 0; 48 rl->wnum = 0; 49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); 50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; 51 rl->wpend_tot = 0; 52 rl->wpend_type = 0; 53 rl->wpend_ret = 0; 54 rl->wpend_buf = NULL; 55 56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); 57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 58 rl->numrpipes = 0; 59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 60 61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); 62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); 63 64 if (rl->d) 65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); 66} 67 68void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 69{ 70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) 71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); 72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0) 73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); 74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); 75} 76 77/* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ 78int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 79{ 80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; 81} 82 83/* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ 84int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 85{ 86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); 87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; 88 89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) 90 curr_rec++; 91 92 return curr_rec < num_recs; 93} 94 95int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) 96{ 97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0) 98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; 99} 100 101void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 102{ 103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); 104} 105 106void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 107{ 108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); 109} 110 111size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) 112{ 113 size_t i, num = 0; 114 115 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) 116 return 0; 117 118 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { 119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) 120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 121 return 0; 122 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); 123 } 124 125 return num; 126} 127 128void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) 129{ 130 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; 131} 132 133void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) 134{ 135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); 136} 137 138const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) 139{ 140 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 142 return "read header"; 143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 144 return "read body"; 145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 146 return "read done"; 147 default: 148 return "unknown"; 149 } 150} 151 152const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) 153{ 154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { 155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: 156 return "RH"; 157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: 158 return "RB"; 159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: 160 return "RD"; 161 default: 162 return "unknown"; 163 } 164} 165 166/* 167 * Return values are as per SSL_read() 168 */ 169int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold, 170 size_t *readbytes) 171{ 172 /* 173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase 174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of 175 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If 176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus 177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) 178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if 179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were 180 */ 181 size_t len, left, align = 0; 182 unsigned char *pkt; 183 SSL3_BUFFER *rb; 184 185 if (n == 0) 186 return 0; 187 188 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 189 if (rb->buf == NULL) 190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 191 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 192 return -1; 193 } 194 195 left = rb->left; 196#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 197 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 198 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 199#endif 200 201 if (!extend) { 202 /* start with empty packet ... */ 203 if (left == 0) 204 rb->offset = align; 205 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { 206 /* 207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload 208 * alignment... 209 */ 210 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; 211 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA 212 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { 213 /* 214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field 215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about 216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no 217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer 218 * overrun can be triggered. 219 */ 220 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); 221 rb->offset = align; 222 } 223 } 224 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; 225 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; 226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ 227 } 228 229 len = s->rlayer.packet_length; 230 pkt = rb->buf + align; 231 /* 232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already 233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end 234 */ 235 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { 236 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); 237 s->rlayer.packet = pkt; 238 rb->offset = len + align; 239 } 240 241 /* 242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read 243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into 244 * the buffer). 245 */ 246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 247 if (left == 0 && extend) 248 return 0; 249 if (left > 0 && n > left) 250 n = left; 251 } 252 253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ 254 if (left >= n) { 255 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 256 rb->left = left - n; 257 rb->offset += n; 258 *readbytes = n; 259 return 1; 260 } 261 262 /* else we need to read more data */ 263 264 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { 265 /* does not happen */ 266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 268 return -1; 269 } 270 271 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */ 272 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 273 /* ignore max parameter */ 274 max = n; 275 else { 276 if (max < n) 277 max = n; 278 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset) 279 max = rb->len - rb->offset; 280 } 281 282 while (left < n) { 283 size_t bioread = 0; 284 int ret; 285 286 /* 287 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and 288 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if 289 * possible) 290 */ 291 292 clear_sys_error(); 293 if (s->rbio != NULL) { 294 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 295 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ 296 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); 297 if (ret >= 0) 298 bioread = ret; 299 } else { 300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, 301 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); 302 ret = -1; 303 } 304 305 if (ret <= 0) { 306 rb->left = left; 307 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 308 if (len + left == 0) 309 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 310 return ret; 311 } 312 left += bioread; 313 /* 314 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the 315 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to 316 * byte oriented as in the TLS case. 317 */ 318 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 319 if (n > left) 320 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ 321 } 322 } 323 324 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ 325 rb->offset += n; 326 rb->left = left - n; 327 s->rlayer.packet_length += n; 328 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 329 *readbytes = n; 330 return 1; 331} 332 333/* 334 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if 335 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. 336 */ 337int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, 338 size_t *written) 339{ 340 const unsigned char *buf = buf_; 341 size_t tot; 342 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; 343#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 344 size_t nw; 345#endif 346 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 347 int i; 348 size_t tmpwrit; 349 350 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 351 tot = s->rlayer.wnum; 352 /* 353 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out 354 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for 355 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for 356 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be 357 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then 358 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and 359 * report the error in a way the user will notice 360 */ 361 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum) 362 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { 363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 364 SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 365 return -1; 366 } 367 368 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING 369 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) { 370 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 371 return -1; 372 } 373 374 s->rlayer.wnum = 0; 375 376 /* 377 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate then go into init unless we 378 * have writes pending - in which case we should finish doing that first. 379 */ 380 if (wb->left == 0 && s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) 381 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 382 383 /* 384 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in 385 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those 386 * messages yet. 387 */ 388 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) 389 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) { 390 i = s->handshake_func(s); 391 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 392 if (i < 0) 393 return i; 394 if (i == 0) { 395 return -1; 396 } 397 } 398 399 /* 400 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 401 * will happen with non blocking IO 402 */ 403 if (wb->left != 0) { 404 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 405 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot, 406 &tmpwrit); 407 if (i <= 0) { 408 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 409 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 410 return i; 411 } 412 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */ 413 } 414#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 415 /* 416 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* 417 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate 418 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the 419 * compromise is considered worthy. 420 */ 421 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 422 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) && 423 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && 424 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && 425 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & 426 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { 427 unsigned char aad[13]; 428 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; 429 size_t packlen; 430 int packleni; 431 432 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ 433 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) 434 max_send_fragment -= 512; 435 436 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ 437 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 438 439 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 440 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, 441 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL); 442 443 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 444 packlen *= 8; 445 else 446 packlen *= 4; 447 448 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { 449 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 450 return -1; 451 } 452 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 453 /* free jumbo buffer */ 454 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 455 *written = tot; 456 return 1; 457 } 458 459 n = (len - tot); 460 for (;;) { 461 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { 462 /* free jumbo buffer */ 463 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 464 break; 465 } 466 467 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 468 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 469 if (i <= 0) { 470 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 471 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 472 return i; 473 } 474 } 475 476 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) 477 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); 478 else 479 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); 480 481 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); 482 aad[8] = type; 483 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); 484 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); 485 aad[11] = 0; 486 aad[12] = 0; 487 mb_param.out = NULL; 488 mb_param.inp = aad; 489 mb_param.len = nw; 490 491 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 492 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, 493 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); 494 packlen = (size_t)packleni; 495 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */ 496 /* free jumbo buffer */ 497 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 498 break; 499 } 500 501 mb_param.out = wb->buf; 502 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; 503 mb_param.len = nw; 504 505 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, 506 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, 507 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) 508 return -1; 509 510 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; 511 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { 512 int j = 6; 513 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; 514 } 515 516 wb->offset = 0; 517 wb->left = packlen; 518 519 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; 520 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; 521 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 522 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; 523 524 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit); 525 if (i <= 0) { 526 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 527 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { 528 /* free jumbo buffer */ 529 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 530 } 531 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 532 return i; 533 } 534 if (tmpwrit == n) { 535 /* free jumbo buffer */ 536 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 537 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 538 return 1; 539 } 540 n -= tmpwrit; 541 tot += tmpwrit; 542 } 543 } else 544#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */ 545 if (tot == len) { /* done? */ 546 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 547 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 548 549 *written = tot; 550 return 1; 551 } 552 553 n = (len - tot); 554 555 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 556 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s); 557 /* 558 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to 559 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined 560 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using 561 * explicit IVs 562 */ 563 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; 564 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { 565 /* 566 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we 567 * shouldn't get here 568 */ 569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 570 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 571 return -1; 572 } 573 if (maxpipes == 0 574 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL 575 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) 576 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) 577 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) 578 maxpipes = 1; 579 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0 580 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { 581 /* 582 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send 583 * fragments so we shouldn't get here 584 */ 585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, 586 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 587 return -1; 588 } 589 590 for (;;) { 591 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; 592 size_t numpipes, j; 593 594 if (n == 0) 595 numpipes = 1; 596 else 597 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; 598 if (numpipes > maxpipes) 599 numpipes = maxpipes; 600 601 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) { 602 /* 603 * We have enough data to completely fill all available 604 * pipelines 605 */ 606 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 607 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment; 608 } 609 } else { 610 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ 611 tmppipelen = n / numpipes; 612 remain = n % numpipes; 613 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 614 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; 615 if (j < remain) 616 pipelens[j]++; 617 } 618 } 619 620 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0, 621 &tmpwrit); 622 if (i <= 0) { 623 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 624 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ 625 s->rlayer.wnum = tot; 626 return i; 627 } 628 629 if (tmpwrit == n || 630 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && 631 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { 632 /* 633 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment 634 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: 635 */ 636 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; 637 638 if (tmpwrit == n 639 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0 640 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) 641 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); 642 643 *written = tot + tmpwrit; 644 return 1; 645 } 646 647 n -= tmpwrit; 648 tot += tmpwrit; 649 } 650} 651 652int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, 653 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes, 654 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written) 655{ 656 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 657 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; 658 WPACKET *thispkt; 659 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr; 660 unsigned char *recordstart; 661 int i, mac_size, clear = 0; 662 size_t prefix_len = 0; 663 int eivlen = 0; 664 size_t align = 0; 665 SSL3_BUFFER *wb; 666 SSL_SESSION *sess; 667 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0; 668 size_t j; 669 670 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) 671 totlen += pipelens[j]; 672 /* 673 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This 674 * will happen with non blocking IO 675 */ 676 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 677 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ 678 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 679 } 680 681 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ 682 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { 683 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); 684 if (i <= 0) { 685 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 686 return i; 687 } 688 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ 689 } 690 691 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) { 692 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) { 693 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 694 return -1; 695 } 696 } 697 698 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) 699 return 0; 700 701 sess = s->session; 702 703 if ((sess == NULL) || 704 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { 705 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ 706 mac_size = 0; 707 } else { 708 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */ 709 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); 710 if (mac_size < 0) { 711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 712 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 713 goto err; 714 } 715 } 716 717 /* 718 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself 719 */ 720 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { 721 /* 722 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see 723 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 724 */ 725 726 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { 727 /* 728 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this 729 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these 730 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual 731 * payload) 732 */ 733 size_t tmppipelen = 0; 734 int ret; 735 736 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len); 737 if (ret <= 0) { 738 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 739 goto err; 740 } 741 742 if (prefix_len > 743 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { 744 /* insufficient space */ 745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 746 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 747 goto err; 748 } 749 } 750 751 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; 752 } 753 754 if (create_empty_fragment) { 755 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 756#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 757 /* 758 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be 759 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real 760 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. 761 */ 762 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 763 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 764#endif 765 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 766 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 767 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 768 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { 769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 771 goto err; 772 } 773 wpinited = 1; 774 } else if (prefix_len) { 775 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; 776 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], 777 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 778 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 779 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) 780 + prefix_len, NULL)) { 781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 782 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 783 goto err; 784 } 785 wpinited = 1; 786 } else { 787 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 788 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 789 790 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; 791#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 792 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 793 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); 794#endif 795 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); 796 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), 797 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) 798 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) { 799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 801 goto err; 802 } 803 wpinited++; 804 } 805 } 806 807 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ 808 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) { 809 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); 810 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { 811 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */ 812 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); 813 if (eivlen <= 1) 814 eivlen = 0; 815 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { 816 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ 817 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 818 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { 819 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; 820 } 821 } 822 823 totlen = 0; 824 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ 825 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); 826 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 827 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION 828 : s->version; 829 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL; 830 size_t maxcomplen; 831 unsigned int rectype; 832 833 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 834 thiswr = &wr[j]; 835 836 /* 837 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the 838 * record type 839 */ 840 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 841 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 842 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 843 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) 844 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; 845 else 846 rectype = type; 847 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype); 848 849 /* 850 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes 851 * and record version number > TLS 1.0 852 */ 853 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO 854 && !s->renegotiate 855 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION 856 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) 857 version = TLS1_VERSION; 858 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version); 859 860 maxcomplen = pipelens[j]; 861 if (s->compress != NULL) 862 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; 863 864 /* write the header */ 865 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype) 866 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version) 867 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt) 868 || (eivlen > 0 869 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL)) 870 || (maxcomplen > 0 871 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen, 872 &compressdata))) { 873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 875 goto err; 876 } 877 878 /* lets setup the record stuff. */ 879 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata); 880 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]); 881 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); 882 totlen += pipelens[j]; 883 884 /* 885 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into 886 * thiswr->data 887 */ 888 889 /* first we compress */ 890 if (s->compress != NULL) { 891 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr) 892 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) { 893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 894 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); 895 goto err; 896 } 897 } else { 898 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) { 899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 901 goto err; 902 } 903 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); 904 } 905 906 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) 907 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL 908 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS 909 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 910 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment; 911 912 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) { 913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 915 goto err; 916 } 917 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1); 918 919 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */ 920 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); 921 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 922 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) { 923 size_t padding = 0; 924 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen; 925 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) { 926 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg); 927 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) { 928 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1; 929 size_t remainder; 930 931 /* optimize for power of 2 */ 932 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0) 933 remainder = rlen & mask; 934 else 935 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding; 936 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */ 937 if (remainder == 0) 938 padding = 0; 939 else 940 padding = s->block_padding - remainder; 941 } 942 if (padding > 0) { 943 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */ 944 if (padding > max_padding) 945 padding = max_padding; 946 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) { 947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 948 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 949 goto err; 950 } 951 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding); 952 } 953 } 954 } 955 956 /* 957 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from 958 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points 959 * in the wb->buf 960 */ 961 962 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 963 unsigned char *mac; 964 965 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 966 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 968 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 969 goto err; 970 } 971 } 972 973 /* 974 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. 975 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using 976 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case. 977 */ 978 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, 979 NULL) 980 /* 981 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this 982 * sub-packet 983 */ 984 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) { 985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 987 goto err; 988 } 989 990 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */ 991 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len; 992 993 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart); 994 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr); 995 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len); 996 } 997 998 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) { 999 /* 1000 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to 1001 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function. 1002 */ 1003 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 1004 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1006 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1007 } 1008 goto err; 1009 } 1010 } else { 1011 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { 1012 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { 1013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1015 } 1016 goto err; 1017 } 1018 } 1019 1020 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { 1021 size_t origlen; 1022 1023 thispkt = &pkt[j]; 1024 thiswr = &wr[j]; 1025 1026 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */ 1027 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen) 1028 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */ 1029 || origlen > thiswr->length 1030 || (thiswr->length > origlen 1031 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, 1032 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) { 1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1035 goto err; 1036 } 1037 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { 1038 unsigned char *mac; 1039 1040 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) 1041 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { 1042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1043 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1044 goto err; 1045 } 1046 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size); 1047 } 1048 1049 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len) 1050 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) { 1051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1052 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1053 goto err; 1054 } 1055 1056 if (s->msg_callback) { 1057 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len 1058 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; 1059 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart, 1060 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, 1061 s->msg_callback_arg); 1062 1063 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { 1064 unsigned char ctype = type; 1065 1066 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, 1067 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); 1068 } 1069 } 1070 1071 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) { 1072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1073 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1074 goto err; 1075 } 1076 1077 /* 1078 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which 1079 * is thiswr->length long 1080 */ 1081 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for 1082 * debugging */ 1083 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); 1084 1085 if (create_empty_fragment) { 1086 /* 1087 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write 1088 * out anything here 1089 */ 1090 if (j > 0) { 1091 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ 1092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, 1093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1094 goto err; 1095 } 1096 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); 1097 return 1; 1098 } 1099 1100 /* now let's set up wb */ 1101 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], 1102 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr)); 1103 } 1104 1105 /* 1106 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write 1107 * retries later 1108 */ 1109 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; 1110 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; 1111 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; 1112 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; 1113 1114 /* we now just need to write the buffer */ 1115 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); 1116 err: 1117 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++) 1118 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]); 1119 return -1; 1120} 1121 1122/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this 1123 * 1124 * Return values are as per SSL_write() 1125 */ 1126int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, 1127 size_t *written) 1128{ 1129 int i; 1130 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; 1131 size_t currbuf = 0; 1132 size_t tmpwrit = 0; 1133 1134 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len) 1135 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) 1136 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) 1137 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { 1138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1139 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); 1140 return -1; 1141 } 1142 1143 for (;;) { 1144 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ 1145 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 1146 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { 1147 currbuf++; 1148 continue; 1149 } 1150 clear_sys_error(); 1151 if (s->wbio != NULL) { 1152 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; 1153 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ 1154 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) 1155 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) 1156 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), 1157 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); 1158 if (i >= 0) 1159 tmpwrit = i; 1160 } else { 1161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, 1162 SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); 1163 i = -1; 1164 } 1165 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { 1166 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1167 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1168 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) 1169 continue; 1170 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1171 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret; 1172 return 1; 1173 } else if (i <= 0) { 1174 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1175 /* 1176 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in 1177 * using a datagram service 1178 */ 1179 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); 1180 } 1181 return i; 1182 } 1183 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1184 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); 1185 } 1186} 1187 1188/*- 1189 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. 1190 * 'type' is one of the following: 1191 * 1192 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) 1193 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) 1194 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) 1195 * 1196 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first 1197 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). 1198 * 1199 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as 1200 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec 1201 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| 1202 * argument is non NULL. 1203 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store 1204 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol 1205 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): 1206 * Change cipher spec protocol 1207 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored 1208 * Alert protocol 1209 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) 1210 * Handshake protocol 1211 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have 1212 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages 1213 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers 1214 * Application data protocol 1215 * none of our business 1216 */ 1217int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, 1218 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) 1219{ 1220 int i, j, ret; 1221 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes; 1222 SSL3_RECORD *rr; 1223 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; 1224 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; 1225 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s); 1226 1227 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; 1228 1229 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { 1230 /* Not initialized yet */ 1231 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { 1232 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1233 return -1; 1234 } 1235 } 1236 1237 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) 1238 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek 1239 && (type != 1240 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { 1241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1243 return -1; 1244 } 1245 1246 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) 1247 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ 1248 { 1249 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1250 unsigned char *dst = buf; 1251 unsigned int k; 1252 1253 /* peek == 0 */ 1254 n = 0; 1255 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { 1256 *dst++ = *src++; 1257 len--; 1258 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; 1259 n++; 1260 } 1261 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ 1262 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) 1263 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; 1264 1265 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1266 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1267 1268 *readbytes = n; 1269 return 1; 1270 } 1271 1272 /* 1273 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. 1274 */ 1275 1276 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { 1277 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ 1278 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1279 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1280 if (i < 0) 1281 return i; 1282 if (i == 0) 1283 return -1; 1284 } 1285 start: 1286 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1287 1288 /*- 1289 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] 1290 * rr[i].type - is the type of record 1291 * rr[i].data, - data 1292 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read 1293 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. 1294 */ 1295 rr = s->rlayer.rrec; 1296 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1297 1298 do { 1299 /* get new records if necessary */ 1300 if (num_recs == 0) { 1301 ret = ssl3_get_record(s); 1302 if (ret <= 0) { 1303 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1304 return ret; 1305 } 1306 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); 1307 if (num_recs == 0) { 1308 /* Shouldn't happen */ 1309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1310 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1311 return -1; 1312 } 1313 } 1314 /* Skip over any records we have already read */ 1315 for (curr_rec = 0; 1316 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); 1317 curr_rec++) ; 1318 if (curr_rec == num_recs) { 1319 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); 1320 num_recs = 0; 1321 curr_rec = 0; 1322 } 1323 } while (num_recs == 0); 1324 rr = &rr[curr_rec]; 1325 1326 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0 1327 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1328 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1330 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA); 1331 return -1; 1332 } 1333 1334 /* 1335 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty 1336 * record that isn't an alert. 1337 */ 1338 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT 1339 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) 1340 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; 1341 1342 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ 1343 1344 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, 1345 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ 1346 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { 1347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1348 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); 1349 return -1; 1350 } 1351 1352 /* 1353 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in 1354 * 'peek' mode) 1355 */ 1356 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { 1357 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1358 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1359 return 0; 1360 } 1361 1362 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) 1363 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1364 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL 1365 && !is_tls13)) { 1366 /* 1367 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or 1368 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or 1369 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1370 */ 1371 /* 1372 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are 1373 * doing a handshake for the first time 1374 */ 1375 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && 1376 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { 1377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1378 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); 1379 return -1; 1380 } 1381 1382 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 1383 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 1384 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { 1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1386 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1387 return -1; 1388 } 1389 1390 if (recvd_type != NULL) 1391 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); 1392 1393 if (len == 0) { 1394 /* 1395 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to 1396 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause 1397 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. 1398 */ 1399 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1400 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1401 return 0; 1402 } 1403 1404 totalbytes = 0; 1405 do { 1406 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1407 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); 1408 else 1409 n = len - totalbytes; 1410 1411 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); 1412 buf += n; 1413 if (peek) { 1414 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ 1415 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1416 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1417 } else { 1418 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1419 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1420 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { 1421 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; 1422 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); 1423 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1424 } 1425 } 1426 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 1427 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { 1428 curr_rec++; 1429 rr++; 1430 } 1431 totalbytes += n; 1432 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs 1433 && totalbytes < len); 1434 if (totalbytes == 0) { 1435 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ 1436 goto start; 1437 } 1438 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs 1439 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) 1440 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) 1441 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); 1442 *readbytes = totalbytes; 1443 return 1; 1444 } 1445 1446 /* 1447 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, 1448 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we 1449 * were actually expecting a CCS). 1450 */ 1451 1452 /* 1453 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record 1454 */ 1455 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { 1456 /* 1457 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 1458 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an 1459 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to 1460 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong 1461 */ 1462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1464 return -1; 1465 } 1466 1467 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION 1468 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { 1469 /* 1470 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version 1471 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with 1472 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything 1473 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server. 1474 */ 1475 s->version = rr->rec_version; 1476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1477 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 1478 return -1; 1479 } 1480 1481 /*- 1482 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; 1483 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) 1484 */ 1485 1486 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { 1487 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; 1488 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) 1489 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr); 1490 PACKET alert; 1491 1492 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) 1493 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) 1494 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) 1495 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { 1496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1497 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); 1498 return -1; 1499 } 1500 1501 if (s->msg_callback) 1502 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, 1503 s->msg_callback_arg); 1504 1505 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1506 cb = s->info_callback; 1507 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) 1508 cb = s->ctx->info_callback; 1509 1510 if (cb != NULL) { 1511 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; 1512 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); 1513 } 1514 1515 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING 1516 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) { 1517 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; 1518 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1519 1520 s->rlayer.alert_count++; 1521 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { 1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1523 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); 1524 return -1; 1525 } 1526 } 1527 1528 /* 1529 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3 1530 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore. 1531 */ 1532 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) { 1533 goto start; 1534 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1535 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) { 1536 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1537 return 0; 1538 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) { 1539 char tmp[16]; 1540 1541 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; 1542 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; 1543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1544 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); 1545 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); 1546 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); 1547 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; 1548 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1549 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 1550 return 0; 1551 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { 1552 /* 1553 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested 1554 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal 1555 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it 1556 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In 1557 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if 1558 * the peer refused it where we carry on. 1559 */ 1560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1561 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); 1562 return -1; 1563 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { 1564 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */ 1565 goto start; 1566 } 1567 1568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1569 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); 1570 return -1; 1571 } 1572 1573 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { 1574 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1575 BIO *rbio; 1576 1577 /* 1578 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are 1579 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other 1580 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them 1581 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already 1582 * sent close_notify. 1583 */ 1584 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1585 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1586 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1587 1588 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0) 1589 goto start; 1590 1591 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1592 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1593 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); 1594 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); 1595 return -1; 1596 } 1597 } else { 1598 /* 1599 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have 1600 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have 1601 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled 1602 * above. 1603 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify 1604 */ 1605 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); 1606 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1608 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY); 1609 return -1; 1610 } 1611 } 1612 1613 /* 1614 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we 1615 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the 1616 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data 1617 * that we're just going to discard. 1618 */ 1619 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1620 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); 1621 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; 1622 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; 1623 1624 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ 1625 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) 1626 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ 1627 1628 /* now move 'n' bytes: */ 1629 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, 1630 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n); 1631 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); 1632 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); 1633 *dest_len += n; 1634 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) 1635 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1636 1637 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) 1638 goto start; /* fragment was too small */ 1639 } 1640 1641 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1643 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1644 return -1; 1645 } 1646 1647 /* 1648 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or 1649 * protocol violation) 1650 */ 1651 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) 1652 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { 1653 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING); 1654 1655 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ 1656 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 1657 1658 i = s->handshake_func(s); 1659 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ 1660 if (i < 0) 1661 return i; 1662 if (i == 0) { 1663 return -1; 1664 } 1665 1666 /* 1667 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a 1668 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read 1669 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now. 1670 */ 1671 if (ined) 1672 return -1; 1673 1674 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { 1675 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { 1676 /* no read-ahead left? */ 1677 BIO *bio; 1678 /* 1679 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we 1680 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry 1681 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty 1682 * problems in the blocking world 1683 */ 1684 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1685 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); 1686 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); 1687 BIO_set_retry_read(bio); 1688 return -1; 1689 } 1690 } 1691 goto start; 1692 } 1693 1694 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { 1695 default: 1696 /* 1697 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but 1698 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the 1699 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where 1700 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised 1701 * record types, using up resources processing them. 1702 */ 1703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1704 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1705 return -1; 1706 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: 1707 case SSL3_RT_ALERT: 1708 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: 1709 /* 1710 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of 1711 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but 1712 * that should not happen when type != rr->type 1713 */ 1714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1715 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1716 return -1; 1717 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: 1718 /* 1719 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have 1720 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() 1721 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read 1722 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet 1723 * started), we will indulge it. 1724 */ 1725 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { 1726 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; 1727 return -1; 1728 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { 1729 /* 1730 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data, 1731 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server 1732 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a 1733 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be 1734 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null 1735 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next 1736 * record. 1737 */ 1738 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length, 1739 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { 1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1741 return -1; 1742 } 1743 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); 1744 goto start; 1745 } else { 1746 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, 1747 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); 1748 return -1; 1749 } 1750 } 1751} 1752 1753void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) 1754{ 1755 int i; 1756 1757 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { 1758 ++seq[i]; 1759 if (seq[i] != 0) 1760 break; 1761 } 1762} 1763 1764/* 1765 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible 1766 * format and false otherwise. 1767 */ 1768int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1769{ 1770 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); 1771} 1772 1773/* 1774 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec 1775 */ 1776size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) 1777{ 1778 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); 1779} 1780