1/*
2 * EAP server/peer: EAP-EKE shared routines
3 * Copyright (c) 2011-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 *
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
7 */
8
9#include "includes.h"
10
11#include "common.h"
12#include "crypto/aes.h"
13#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
14#include "crypto/crypto.h"
15#include "crypto/dh_groups.h"
16#include "crypto/random.h"
17#include "crypto/sha1.h"
18#include "crypto/sha256.h"
19#include "eap_common/eap_defs.h"
20#include "eap_eke_common.h"
21
22
23static int eap_eke_dh_len(u8 group)
24{
25	switch (group) {
26	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
27		return 128;
28	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
29		return 192;
30	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
31		return 256;
32	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
33		return 384;
34	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
35		return 512;
36	}
37
38	return -1;
39}
40
41
42static int eap_eke_dhcomp_len(u8 dhgroup, u8 encr)
43{
44	int dhlen;
45
46	dhlen = eap_eke_dh_len(dhgroup);
47	if (dhlen < 0 || encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
48		return -1;
49	return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dhlen;
50}
51
52
53static const struct dh_group * eap_eke_dh_group(u8 group)
54{
55	switch (group) {
56	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
57		return dh_groups_get(2);
58	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
59		return dh_groups_get(5);
60	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
61		return dh_groups_get(14);
62	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
63		return dh_groups_get(15);
64	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
65		return dh_groups_get(16);
66	}
67
68	return NULL;
69}
70
71
72static int eap_eke_dh_generator(u8 group)
73{
74	switch (group) {
75	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
76		return 5;
77	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
78		return 31;
79	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
80		return 11;
81	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
82		return 5;
83	case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
84		return 5;
85	}
86
87	return -1;
88}
89
90
91static int eap_eke_pnonce_len(u8 mac)
92{
93	int mac_len;
94
95	if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
96		mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
97	else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
98		mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
99	else
100		return -1;
101
102	return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 16 + mac_len;
103}
104
105
106static int eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(u8 mac)
107{
108	int mac_len;
109
110	if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
111		mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
112	else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
113		mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
114	else
115		return -1;
116
117	return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 * 16 + mac_len;
118}
119
120
121static int eap_eke_prf_len(u8 prf)
122{
123	if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
124		return 20;
125	if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
126		return 32;
127	return -1;
128}
129
130
131static int eap_eke_nonce_len(u8 prf)
132{
133	int prf_len;
134
135	prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
136	if (prf_len < 0)
137		return -1;
138
139	if (prf_len > 2 * 16)
140		return (prf_len + 1) / 2;
141
142	return 16;
143}
144
145
146static int eap_eke_auth_len(u8 prf)
147{
148	switch (prf) {
149	case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1:
150		return SHA1_MAC_LEN;
151	case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256:
152		return SHA256_MAC_LEN;
153	}
154
155	return -1;
156}
157
158
159int eap_eke_dh_init(u8 group, u8 *ret_priv, u8 *ret_pub)
160{
161	int generator;
162	u8 gen;
163	const struct dh_group *dh;
164
165	generator = eap_eke_dh_generator(group);
166	dh = eap_eke_dh_group(group);
167	if (generator < 0 || generator > 255 || !dh)
168		return -1;
169	gen = generator;
170
171	if (crypto_dh_init(gen, dh->prime, dh->prime_len, ret_priv,
172			   ret_pub) < 0)
173		return -1;
174	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH private value",
175			ret_priv, dh->prime_len);
176	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH public value",
177		    ret_pub, dh->prime_len);
178
179	return 0;
180}
181
182
183static int eap_eke_prf(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
184		       size_t data_len, const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len,
185		       u8 *res)
186{
187	const u8 *addr[2];
188	size_t len[2];
189	size_t num_elem = 1;
190
191	addr[0] = data;
192	len[0] = data_len;
193	if (data2) {
194		num_elem++;
195		addr[1] = data2;
196		len[1] = data2_len;
197	}
198
199	if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
200		return hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len, res);
201	if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
202		return hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len,
203					  res);
204	return -1;
205}
206
207
208static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
209				 size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
210{
211	u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
212	u8 idx;
213	const u8 *addr[3];
214	size_t vlen[3];
215	int ret;
216
217	idx = 0;
218	addr[0] = hash;
219	vlen[0] = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
220	addr[1] = data;
221	vlen[1] = data_len;
222	addr[2] = &idx;
223	vlen[2] = 1;
224
225	while (len > 0) {
226		idx++;
227		if (idx == 1)
228			ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
229					       &vlen[1], hash);
230		else
231			ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
232					       hash);
233		if (ret < 0)
234			return -1;
235		if (len > SHA1_MAC_LEN) {
236			os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
237			res += SHA1_MAC_LEN;
238			len -= SHA1_MAC_LEN;
239		} else {
240			os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
241			len = 0;
242		}
243	}
244
245	return 0;
246}
247
248
249static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
250				   size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
251{
252	u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
253	u8 idx;
254	const u8 *addr[3];
255	size_t vlen[3];
256	int ret;
257
258	idx = 0;
259	addr[0] = hash;
260	vlen[0] = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
261	addr[1] = data;
262	vlen[1] = data_len;
263	addr[2] = &idx;
264	vlen[2] = 1;
265
266	while (len > 0) {
267		idx++;
268		if (idx == 1)
269			ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
270						 &vlen[1], hash);
271		else
272			ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
273						 hash);
274		if (ret < 0)
275			return -1;
276		if (len > SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
277			os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
278			res += SHA256_MAC_LEN;
279			len -= SHA256_MAC_LEN;
280		} else {
281			os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
282			len = 0;
283		}
284	}
285
286	return 0;
287}
288
289
290static int eap_eke_prfplus(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
291			   const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
292{
293	if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
294		return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(key, key_len, data, data_len, res,
295					     len);
296	if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
297		return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(key, key_len, data, data_len,
298					       res, len);
299	return -1;
300}
301
302
303int eap_eke_derive_key(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
304		       const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
305		       const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, const u8 *id_p,
306		       size_t id_p_len, u8 *key)
307{
308	u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
309	u8 temp[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
310	size_t key_len = 16; /* Only AES-128-CBC is used here */
311	u8 *id;
312
313	/* temp = prf(0+, password) */
314	os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->prf_len);
315	if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->prf_len,
316			password, password_len, NULL, 0, temp) < 0)
317		return -1;
318	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: temp = prf(0+, password)",
319			temp, sess->prf_len);
320
321	/* key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P) */
322	id = os_malloc(id_s_len + id_p_len);
323	if (id == NULL)
324		return -1;
325	os_memcpy(id, id_s, id_s_len);
326	os_memcpy(id + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
327	wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: ID_S | ID_P",
328			  id, id_s_len + id_p_len);
329	if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, temp, sess->prf_len,
330			    id, id_s_len + id_p_len, key, key_len) < 0) {
331		os_free(id);
332		return -1;
333	}
334	os_free(id);
335	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P)",
336			key, key_len);
337
338	return 0;
339}
340
341
342int eap_eke_dhcomp(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key, const u8 *dhpub,
343		   u8 *ret_dhcomp)
344{
345	u8 pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
346	int dh_len;
347	u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
348
349	dh_len = eap_eke_dh_len(sess->dhgroup);
350	if (dh_len < 0)
351		return -1;
352
353	/*
354	 * DHComponent = Encr(key, y)
355	 *
356	 * All defined DH groups use primes that have length devisible by 16, so
357	 * no need to do extra padding for y (= pub).
358	 */
359	if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
360		return -1;
361	if (random_get_bytes(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
362		return -1;
363	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Encr(key, y)",
364		    iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
365	os_memcpy(pub, dhpub, dh_len);
366	if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(key, iv, pub, dh_len) < 0)
367		return -1;
368	os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
369	os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, pub, dh_len);
370	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DHComponent = Encr(key, y)",
371		    ret_dhcomp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dh_len);
372
373	return 0;
374}
375
376
377int eap_eke_shared_secret(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key,
378			  const u8 *dhpriv, const u8 *peer_dhcomp)
379{
380	u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
381	u8 peer_pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
382	u8 modexp[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
383	size_t len;
384	const struct dh_group *dh;
385
386	dh = eap_eke_dh_group(sess->dhgroup);
387	if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC || !dh)
388		return -1;
389
390	/* Decrypt peer DHComponent */
391	os_memcpy(peer_pub, peer_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dh->prime_len);
392	if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(key, peer_dhcomp, peer_pub, dh->prime_len) < 0) {
393		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt DHComponent");
394		return -1;
395	}
396	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted peer DH pubkey",
397			peer_pub, dh->prime_len);
398
399	/* SharedSecret = prf(0+, g ^ (x_s * x_p) (mod p)) */
400	len = dh->prime_len;
401	if (crypto_dh_derive_secret(*dh->generator, dh->prime, dh->prime_len,
402				    NULL, 0, dhpriv, dh->prime_len, peer_pub,
403				    dh->prime_len, modexp, &len) < 0)
404		return -1;
405	if (len < dh->prime_len) {
406		size_t pad = dh->prime_len - len;
407		os_memmove(modexp + pad, modexp, len);
408		os_memset(modexp, 0, pad);
409	}
410
411	os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->auth_len);
412	if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->auth_len, modexp, dh->prime_len,
413			NULL, 0, sess->shared_secret) < 0)
414		return -1;
415	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: SharedSecret",
416			sess->shared_secret, sess->auth_len);
417
418	return 0;
419}
420
421
422int eap_eke_derive_ke_ki(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
423			 const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
424			 const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len)
425{
426	u8 buf[EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN + EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN];
427	size_t ke_len, ki_len;
428	u8 *data;
429	size_t data_len;
430	const char *label = "EAP-EKE Keys";
431	size_t label_len;
432
433	/*
434	 * Ke | Ki = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Keys" | ID_S | ID_P)
435	 * Ke = encryption key
436	 * Ki = integrity protection key
437	 * Length of each key depends on the selected algorithms.
438	 */
439
440	if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
441		ke_len = 16;
442	else
443		return -1;
444
445	if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
446		ki_len = 20;
447	else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
448		ki_len = 32;
449	else
450		return -1;
451
452	label_len = os_strlen(label);
453	data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len;
454	data = os_malloc(data_len);
455	if (data == NULL)
456		return -1;
457	os_memcpy(data, label, label_len);
458	os_memcpy(data + label_len, id_s, id_s_len);
459	os_memcpy(data + label_len + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
460	if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
461			    data, data_len, buf, ke_len + ki_len) < 0) {
462		os_free(data);
463		return -1;
464	}
465
466	os_memcpy(sess->ke, buf, ke_len);
467	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ke", sess->ke, ke_len);
468	os_memcpy(sess->ki, buf + ke_len, ki_len);
469	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ki", sess->ki, ki_len);
470
471	os_free(data);
472	return 0;
473}
474
475
476int eap_eke_derive_ka(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
477		      const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
478		      const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
479		      const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s)
480{
481	u8 *data, *pos;
482	size_t data_len;
483	const char *label = "EAP-EKE Ka";
484	size_t label_len;
485
486	/*
487	 * Ka = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Ka" | ID_S | ID_P | Nonce_P |
488	 *	     Nonce_S)
489	 * Ka = authentication key
490	 * Length of the key depends on the selected algorithms.
491	 */
492
493	label_len = os_strlen(label);
494	data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
495	data = os_malloc(data_len);
496	if (data == NULL)
497		return -1;
498	pos = data;
499	os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
500	pos += label_len;
501	os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
502	pos += id_s_len;
503	os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
504	pos += id_p_len;
505	os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
506	pos += sess->nonce_len;
507	os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
508	if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
509			    data, data_len, sess->ka, sess->prf_len) < 0) {
510		os_free(data);
511		return -1;
512	}
513	os_free(data);
514
515	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka", sess->ka, sess->prf_len);
516
517	return 0;
518}
519
520
521int eap_eke_derive_msk(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
522		       const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
523		       const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
524		       const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s,
525		       u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
526{
527	u8 *data, *pos;
528	size_t data_len;
529	const char *label = "EAP-EKE Exported Keys";
530	size_t label_len;
531	u8 buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
532
533	/*
534	 * MSK | EMSK = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Exported Keys" | ID_S |
535	 *		     ID_P | Nonce_P | Nonce_S)
536	 */
537
538	label_len = os_strlen(label);
539	data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
540	data = os_malloc(data_len);
541	if (data == NULL)
542		return -1;
543	pos = data;
544	os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
545	pos += label_len;
546	os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
547	pos += id_s_len;
548	os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
549	pos += id_p_len;
550	os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
551	pos += sess->nonce_len;
552	os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
553	if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
554			    data, data_len, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) <
555	    0) {
556		os_free(data);
557		return -1;
558	}
559	os_free(data);
560
561	os_memcpy(msk, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN);
562	os_memcpy(emsk, buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
563	os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
564
565	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
566	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: EMSK", msk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
567
568	return 0;
569}
570
571
572static int eap_eke_mac(u8 mac, const u8 *key, const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
573		       u8 *res)
574{
575	if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
576		return hmac_sha1(key, SHA1_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
577	if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
578		return hmac_sha256(key, SHA256_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
579	return -1;
580}
581
582
583int eap_eke_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
584		 const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
585		 u8 *prot, size_t *prot_len)
586{
587	size_t block_size, icv_len, pad;
588	u8 *pos, *iv, *e;
589
590	if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
591		block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
592	else
593		return -1;
594
595	if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
596		icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
597	else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
598		icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
599	else
600		return -1;
601
602	pad = data_len % block_size;
603	if (pad)
604		pad = block_size - pad;
605
606	if (*prot_len < block_size + data_len + pad + icv_len) {
607		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for Prot() data");
608		return -1;
609	}
610	pos = prot;
611
612	if (random_get_bytes(pos, block_size))
613		return -1;
614	iv = pos;
615	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Prot()", iv, block_size);
616	pos += block_size;
617
618	e = pos;
619	os_memcpy(pos, data, data_len);
620	pos += data_len;
621	if (pad) {
622		if (random_get_bytes(pos, pad))
623			return -1;
624		pos += pad;
625	}
626
627	if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(sess->ke, iv, e, data_len + pad) < 0 ||
628	    eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, e, data_len + pad, pos) < 0)
629		return -1;
630	pos += icv_len;
631
632	*prot_len = pos - prot;
633	return 0;
634}
635
636
637int eap_eke_decrypt_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
638			 const u8 *prot, size_t prot_len,
639			 u8 *data, size_t *data_len)
640{
641	size_t block_size, icv_len;
642	u8 icv[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
643
644	if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
645		block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
646	else
647		return -1;
648
649	if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
650		icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
651	else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
652		icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
653	else
654		return -1;
655
656	if (prot_len < 2 * block_size + icv_len ||
657	    (prot_len - icv_len) % block_size)
658		return -1;
659
660	if (eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, prot + block_size,
661			prot_len - block_size - icv_len, icv) < 0)
662		return -1;
663	if (os_memcmp_const(icv, prot + prot_len - icv_len, icv_len) != 0) {
664		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: ICV mismatch in Prot() data");
665		return -1;
666	}
667
668	if (*data_len < prot_len - block_size - icv_len) {
669		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for decrypted Prot() data");
670		return -1;
671	}
672
673	*data_len = prot_len - block_size - icv_len;
674	os_memcpy(data, prot + block_size, *data_len);
675	if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(sess->ke, prot, data, *data_len) < 0) {
676		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt Prot() data");
677		return -1;
678	}
679	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted Prot() data",
680			data, *data_len);
681
682	return 0;
683}
684
685
686int eap_eke_auth(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const char *label,
687		 const struct wpabuf *msgs, u8 *auth)
688{
689	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth(%s)", label);
690	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka for Auth",
691			sess->ka, sess->auth_len);
692	wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-EKE: Messages for Auth", msgs);
693	return eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, sess->ka, sess->auth_len,
694			   (const u8 *) label, os_strlen(label),
695			   wpabuf_head(msgs), wpabuf_len(msgs), auth);
696}
697
698
699int eap_eke_session_init(struct eap_eke_session *sess, u8 dhgroup, u8 encr,
700			 u8 prf, u8 mac)
701{
702	sess->dhgroup = dhgroup;
703	sess->encr = encr;
704	sess->prf = prf;
705	sess->mac = mac;
706
707	sess->prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
708	sess->nonce_len = eap_eke_nonce_len(prf);
709	sess->auth_len = eap_eke_auth_len(prf);
710	sess->dhcomp_len = eap_eke_dhcomp_len(sess->dhgroup, sess->encr);
711	sess->pnonce_len = eap_eke_pnonce_len(sess->mac);
712	sess->pnonce_ps_len = eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(sess->mac);
713	if (sess->prf_len < 0 || sess->nonce_len < 0 || sess->auth_len < 0 ||
714	    sess->dhcomp_len < 0 || sess->pnonce_len < 0 ||
715	    sess->pnonce_ps_len < 0)
716		return -1;
717
718	return 0;
719}
720
721
722void eap_eke_session_clean(struct eap_eke_session *sess)
723{
724	os_memset(sess->shared_secret, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN);
725	os_memset(sess->ke, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN);
726	os_memset(sess->ki, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN);
727	os_memset(sess->ka, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KA_LEN);
728}
729