t1_lib.c revision 337982
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 117#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 118# include <openssl/ec.h> 119#endif 120#endif 121#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 122#include <openssl/rand.h> 123#include "ssl_locl.h" 124 125const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 126 127#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 128static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 130 SSL_SESSION **psess); 131static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); 132int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); 133#endif 134 135#define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \ 136 (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val)) 137 138SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { 139 tls1_enc, 140 tls1_mac, 141 tls1_setup_key_block, 142 tls1_generate_master_secret, 143 tls1_change_cipher_state, 144 tls1_final_finish_mac, 145 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 146 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 147 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 148 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 149 tls1_alert_code, 150 tls1_export_keying_material, 151 0, 152 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 153 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 154 ssl3_handshake_write 155}; 156 157SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { 158 tls1_enc, 159 tls1_mac, 160 tls1_setup_key_block, 161 tls1_generate_master_secret, 162 tls1_change_cipher_state, 163 tls1_final_finish_mac, 164 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 165 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 166 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 167 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 168 tls1_alert_code, 169 tls1_export_keying_material, 170 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, 171 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 172 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 173 ssl3_handshake_write 174}; 175 176SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { 177 tls1_enc, 178 tls1_mac, 179 tls1_setup_key_block, 180 tls1_generate_master_secret, 181 tls1_change_cipher_state, 182 tls1_final_finish_mac, 183 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 184 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 185 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 186 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 187 tls1_alert_code, 188 tls1_export_keying_material, 189 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 190 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, 191 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 192 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 193 ssl3_handshake_write 194}; 195 196long tls1_default_timeout(void) 197{ 198 /* 199 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for 200 * http, the cache would over fill 201 */ 202 return (60 * 60 * 2); 203} 204 205int tls1_new(SSL *s) 206{ 207 if (!ssl3_new(s)) 208 return (0); 209 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 210 return (1); 211} 212 213void tls1_free(SSL *s) 214{ 215#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 216 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { 217 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 218 } 219#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 220 ssl3_free(s); 221} 222 223void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 224{ 225 ssl3_clear(s); 226 s->version = s->method->version; 227} 228 229#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 230 231static int nid_list[] = { 232 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 233 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 234 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 235 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 236 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 237 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 238 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 239 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 240 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 241 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 242 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 243 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 244 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 245 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 246 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 247 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 248 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 249 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 250 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 251 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 252 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 253 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 254 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 255 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 256 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 257 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 258 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 259 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 260}; 261 262static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { 263 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, 264 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, 265 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 266}; 267 268/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */ 269static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = { 270 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 271 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 272 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 273 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 274 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 275 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 276 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 277 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 278 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 279# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 280 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 281 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 282 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 283 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 284 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 285 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 286 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 287# endif 288}; 289 290static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { 291 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 292 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 293 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 294 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 295 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 296 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 297 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 298 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 299 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 300# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 301 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 302 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 303 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 304 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 305 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 306 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 307 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 308# endif 309 /* 310 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set 311 * via an explicit callback or parameters. 312 */ 313 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 314 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 315 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 316 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 317 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 318 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 319 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 320# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 321 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 322 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 323 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 324 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 325 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 326 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 327 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 328 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 329# endif 330}; 331 332static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 333 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 334 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 335}; 336 337# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 338/* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */ 339static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = { 340# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 341 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 342 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 343# endif 344 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 345# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 346 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 347 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 348# endif 349 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 350# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 351 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 352 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 353# endif 354 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 355 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 356# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 357 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 358 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 359 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 360# endif 361 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 362 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 363# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 364 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 365 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 366# endif 367 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 368 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 369# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 370 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 371 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 372 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 373# endif 374 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 375 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 376 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 377}; 378# endif 379 380int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 381{ 382 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 383 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 384 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 385 return 0; 386 return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; 387} 388 389int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 390{ 391 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 392 switch (nid) { 393 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 394 return 1; 395 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 396 return 2; 397 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 398 return 3; 399 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 400 return 4; 401 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 402 return 5; 403 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 404 return 6; 405 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 406 return 7; 407 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 408 return 8; 409 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 410 return 9; 411 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 412 return 10; 413 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 414 return 11; 415 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 416 return 12; 417 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 418 return 13; 419 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 420 return 14; 421 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 422 return 15; 423 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 424 return 16; 425 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 426 return 17; 427 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 428 return 18; 429 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 430 return 19; 431 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 432 return 20; 433 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 434 return 21; 435 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 436 return 22; 437 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 438 return 23; 439 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 440 return 24; 441 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 442 return 25; 443 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 444 return 26; 445 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 446 return 27; 447 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 448 return 28; 449 default: 450 return 0; 451 } 452} 453 454/* 455 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise 456 * preferred list. 457 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e., 458 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves. 459 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format. 460 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such 461 * lists in the first place. 462 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly 463 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility 464 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) 465 */ 466static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, 467 const unsigned char **pcurves, 468 size_t *num_curves) 469{ 470 size_t pcurveslen = 0; 471 if (sess) { 472 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 473 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 474 } else { 475 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ 476 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 477 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 478 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 479 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); 480 break; 481 482 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 483 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 484 pcurveslen = 2; 485 break; 486 487 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 488 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; 489 pcurveslen = 2; 490 break; 491 default: 492 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 493 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 494 } 495 if (!*pcurves) { 496# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 497 if (FIPS_mode()) { 498 *pcurves = fips_curves_default; 499 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default); 500 } else 501# endif 502 { 503 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 504 *pcurves = eccurves_auto; 505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto); 506 } else { 507 *pcurves = eccurves_all; 508 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all); 509 } 510 } 511 } 512 } 513 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */ 514 if (pcurveslen & 1) { 515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 516 *num_curves = 0; 517 return 0; 518 } else { 519 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; 520 return 1; 521 } 522} 523 524/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */ 525int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) 526{ 527 const unsigned char *curves; 528 size_t num_curves, i; 529 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 530 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) 531 return 0; 532 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */ 533 if (suiteb_flags) { 534 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 535 if (p[1]) 536 return 0; 537 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { 538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 539 return 0; 540 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { 541 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 542 return 0; 543 } else /* Should never happen */ 544 return 0; 545 } 546 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) 547 return 0; 548 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) { 549 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1]) 550 return 1; 551 } 552 return 0; 553} 554 555/*- 556 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match. 557 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches 558 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for 559 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. 560 */ 561int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) 562{ 563 const unsigned char *pref, *supp; 564 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; 565 int k; 566 /* Can't do anything on client side */ 567 if (s->server == 0) 568 return -1; 569 if (nmatch == -2) { 570 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 571 /* 572 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know 573 * these are acceptable due to previous checks. 574 */ 575 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 576 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 577 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ 578 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 579 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ 580 /* Should never happen */ 581 return NID_undef; 582 } 583 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ 584 nmatch = 0; 585 } 586 /* 587 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int 588 * but s->options is a long... 589 */ 590 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 591 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, 592 &num_supp)) 593 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ 594 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 595 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 596 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, 597 &num_pref)) 598 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 599 600 /* 601 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them 602 * are allowed. 603 */ 604 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { 605 supp = eccurves_all; 606 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 607 } else if (num_pref == 0 && 608 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { 609 pref = eccurves_all; 610 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 611 } 612 613 k = 0; 614 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { 615 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; 616 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { 617 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { 618 if (nmatch == k) { 619 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; 620 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); 621 } 622 k++; 623 } 624 } 625 } 626 if (nmatch == -1) 627 return k; 628 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ 629 return NID_undef; 630} 631 632int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 633 int *curves, size_t ncurves) 634{ 635 unsigned char *clist, *p; 636 size_t i; 637 /* 638 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve 639 * ids < 32 640 */ 641 unsigned long dup_list = 0; 642# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 643 EC_GROUP *curve; 644# endif 645 646 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); 647 if (!clist) 648 return 0; 649 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { 650 unsigned long idmask; 651 int id; 652 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); 653# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 654 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */ 655 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) { 656 OPENSSL_free(clist); 657 return 0; 658 } 659# endif 660# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 661 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]); 662 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve)) 663 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { 664 if (curve) 665 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 666 OPENSSL_free(clist); 667 return 0; 668 } else 669 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 670# endif 671 idmask = 1L << id; 672 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { 673 OPENSSL_free(clist); 674 return 0; 675 } 676 dup_list |= idmask; 677 s2n(id, p); 678 } 679 if (*pext) 680 OPENSSL_free(*pext); 681 *pext = clist; 682 *pextlen = ncurves * 2; 683 return 1; 684} 685 686# define MAX_CURVELIST 28 687 688typedef struct { 689 size_t nidcnt; 690 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; 691} nid_cb_st; 692 693static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 694{ 695 nid_cb_st *narg = arg; 696 size_t i; 697 int nid; 698 char etmp[20]; 699 if (elem == NULL) 700 return 0; 701 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) 702 return 0; 703 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 704 return 0; 705 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 706 etmp[len] = 0; 707 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); 708 if (nid == NID_undef) 709 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); 710 if (nid == NID_undef) 711 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); 712 if (nid == NID_undef) 713 return 0; 714 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) 715 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) 716 return 0; 717 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; 718 return 1; 719} 720 721/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ 722int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 723 const char *str) 724{ 725 nid_cb_st ncb; 726 ncb.nidcnt = 0; 727 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) 728 return 0; 729 if (pext == NULL) 730 return 1; 731 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); 732} 733 734/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ 735static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, 736 EC_KEY *ec) 737{ 738 int is_prime, id; 739 const EC_GROUP *grp; 740 const EC_METHOD *meth; 741 if (!ec) 742 return 0; 743 /* Determine if it is a prime field */ 744 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); 745 if (!grp) 746 return 0; 747 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); 748 if (!meth) 749 return 0; 750 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) 751 is_prime = 1; 752 else 753 is_prime = 0; 754 /* Determine curve ID */ 755 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 756 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); 757 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ 758 if (id) { 759 curve_id[0] = 0; 760 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; 761 } else { 762 curve_id[0] = 0xff; 763 if (is_prime) 764 curve_id[1] = 0x01; 765 else 766 curve_id[1] = 0x02; 767 } 768 if (comp_id) { 769 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) 770 return 0; 771 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { 772 if (is_prime) 773 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 774 else 775 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 776 } else 777 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 778 } 779 return 1; 780} 781 782/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ 783static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, 784 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) 785{ 786 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves; 787 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i; 788 int j; 789 /* 790 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is 791 * supported (see RFC4492). 792 */ 793 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 794 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 795 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 796 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { 797 if (*comp_id == *pformats) 798 break; 799 } 800 if (i == num_formats) 801 return 0; 802 } 803 if (!curve_id) 804 return 1; 805 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ 806 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { 807 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 808 return 0; 809 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) { 810 /* 811 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check. 812 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension 813 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. 814 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves 815 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension. 816 */ 817 break; 818 } 819 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { 820 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1]) 821 break; 822 } 823 if (i == num_curves) 824 return 0; 825 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ 826 if (!s->server) 827 return 1; 828 } 829 return 1; 830} 831 832static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, 833 size_t *num_formats) 834{ 835 /* 836 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default 837 */ 838 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 839 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 840 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 841 } else { 842 *pformats = ecformats_default; 843 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ 844 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 845 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; 846 else 847 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); 848 } 849} 850 851/* 852 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC 853 * certificates have compatible curves and compression. 854 */ 855static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 856{ 857 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; 858 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 859 int rv; 860 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); 861 if (!pkey) 862 return 0; 863 /* If not EC nothing to do */ 864 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { 865 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 866 return 1; 867 } 868 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); 869 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 870 if (!rv) 871 return 0; 872 /* 873 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported 874 * curves extension. 875 */ 876 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); 877 if (!rv) 878 return 0; 879 /* 880 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or 881 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary. 882 */ 883 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { 884 int check_md; 885 size_t i; 886 CERT *c = s->cert; 887 if (curve_id[0]) 888 return 0; 889 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ 890 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 891 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; 892 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 893 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; 894 else 895 return 0; /* Should never happen */ 896 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 897 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 898 break; 899 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen) 900 return 0; 901 if (set_ee_md == 2) { 902 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 903 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256(); 904 else 905 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384(); 906 } 907 } 908 return rv; 909} 910 911# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 912/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ 913int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) 914{ 915 unsigned char curve_id[2]; 916 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; 917# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 918 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ 919 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) 920 return 1; 921# endif 922 /* 923 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other 924 * curves permitted. 925 */ 926 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 927 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ 928 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 929 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; 930 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 931 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; 932 else 933 return 0; 934 curve_id[0] = 0; 935 /* Check this curve is acceptable */ 936 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) 937 return 0; 938 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */ 939 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 940 return 1; 941 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */ 942 else { 943 unsigned char curve_tmp[2]; 944 if (!ec) 945 return 0; 946 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) 947 return 0; 948 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1]) 949 return 1; 950 return 0; 951 } 952 953 } 954 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 955 /* Need a shared curve */ 956 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) 957 return 1; 958 else 959 return 0; 960 } 961 if (!ec) { 962 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 963 return 1; 964 else 965 return 0; 966 } 967 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec)) 968 return 0; 969/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ 970# if 0 971 return 1; 972# else 973 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); 974# endif 975} 976# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 977 978#else 979 980static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 981{ 982 return 1; 983} 984 985#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 986 987#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 988 989/* 990 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 991 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 992 */ 993 994# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 995# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 996# else 997# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 998# endif 999 1000# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1001# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 1002# else 1003# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 1004# endif 1005 1006# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1007# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1008 /* */ 1009# else 1010# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 1011# endif 1012 1013# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 1014 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 1015 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 1016 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1017 1018static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 1019# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 1020 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1022# endif 1023# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 1024 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 1026# endif 1027# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 1028 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 1029# endif 1030}; 1031 1032# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1033static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { 1034 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1035 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1036}; 1037# endif 1038size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs) 1039{ 1040 /* 1041 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other 1042 * preferences. 1043 */ 1044# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1045 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1046 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 1047 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1048 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); 1049 1050 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 1051 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1052 return 2; 1053 1054 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 1055 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; 1056 return 2; 1057 } 1058# endif 1059 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ 1060 if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { 1061 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; 1062 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; 1063 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { 1064 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; 1065 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; 1066 } else { 1067 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; 1068 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 1069 } 1070} 1071 1072/* 1073 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature 1074 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. 1075 */ 1076int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, 1077 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) 1078{ 1079 const unsigned char *sent_sigs; 1080 size_t sent_sigslen, i; 1081 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 1082 /* Should never happen */ 1083 if (sigalg == -1) 1084 return -1; 1085 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 1086 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { 1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1088 return 0; 1089 } 1090# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1091 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 1092 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; 1093 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ 1094 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) 1095 return 0; 1096 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { 1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); 1098 return 0; 1099 } 1100 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ 1101 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1102 if (curve_id[0]) 1103 return 0; 1104 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { 1105 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { 1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1107 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1108 return 0; 1109 } 1110 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { 1111 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { 1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1113 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1114 return 0; 1115 } 1116 } else 1117 return 0; 1118 } 1119 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 1120 return 0; 1121# endif 1122 1123 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ 1124 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs); 1125 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { 1126 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) 1127 break; 1128 } 1129 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ 1130 if (i == sent_sigslen 1131 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 1132 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1134 return 0; 1135 } 1136 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); 1137 if (*pmd == NULL) { 1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 1139 return 0; 1140 } 1141 /* 1142 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. 1143 */ 1144 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert) 1145 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd; 1146 return 1; 1147} 1148 1149/* 1150 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't 1151 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike 1152 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global 1153 * settings. 1154 */ 1155void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) 1156{ 1157 CERT *c = s->cert; 1158 const unsigned char *sigalgs; 1159 size_t i, sigalgslen; 1160 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; 1161 c->mask_a = 0; 1162 c->mask_k = 0; 1163 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ 1164 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) 1165 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; 1166 else 1167 c->mask_ssl = 0; 1168 /* 1169 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for 1170 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. 1171 */ 1172 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs); 1173 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { 1174 switch (sigalgs[1]) { 1175# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1176 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 1177 have_rsa = 1; 1178 break; 1179# endif 1180# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1181 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 1182 have_dsa = 1; 1183 break; 1184# endif 1185# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1186 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 1187 have_ecdsa = 1; 1188 break; 1189# endif 1190 } 1191 } 1192 /* 1193 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate 1194 * signature algorithms. 1195 */ 1196 if (!have_rsa) { 1197 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; 1198 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr; 1199 } 1200 if (!have_dsa) { 1201 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; 1202 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; 1203 } 1204 if (!have_ecdsa) { 1205 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; 1206 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; 1207 } 1208# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1209 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) { 1210 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; 1211 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; 1212 } 1213# endif 1214# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1215 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ 1216 if (!s->psk_client_callback) { 1217 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; 1218 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; 1219 } 1220# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1221# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1222 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { 1223 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; 1224 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; 1225 } 1226# endif 1227 c->valid = 1; 1228} 1229 1230unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1231 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1232{ 1233 int extdatalen = 0; 1234 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1235 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1236# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1237 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ 1238 int using_ecc = 0; 1239 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1240 int i; 1241 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1242 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1243 1244 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { 1245 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1246 1247 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1248 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1249 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) 1250 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 1251 using_ecc = 1; 1252 break; 1253 } 1254 } 1255 } 1256# endif 1257 1258 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 1259 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1260 return orig; 1261 1262 ret += 2; 1263 1264 if (ret >= limit) 1265 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1266 1267 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1268 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 1269 size_t size_str; 1270 1271 /*- 1272 * check for enough space. 1273 * 4 for the servername type and entension length 1274 * 2 for servernamelist length 1275 * 1 for the hostname type 1276 * 2 for hostname length 1277 * + hostname length 1278 */ 1279 size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname); 1280 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit)) 1281 return NULL; 1282 1283 /* extension type and length */ 1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret); 1286 1287 /* length of servername list */ 1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret); 1289 1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 1292 s2n(size_str, ret); 1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 1294 ret += size_str; 1295 } 1296 1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 1298 if (s->renegotiate) { 1299 int el; 1300 1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1303 return NULL; 1304 } 1305 1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1307 return NULL; 1308 1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1310 s2n(el, ret); 1311 1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1314 return NULL; 1315 } 1316 1317 ret += el; 1318 } 1319# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the 1322 * Client Hello message */ 1323 1324 size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { 1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1327 return NULL; 1328 } 1329 1330 /*- 1331 * check for enough space. 1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length 1333 * 1 for the srp user identity 1334 * + srp user identity length 1335 */ 1336 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit)) 1337 return NULL; 1338 1339 /* fill in the extension */ 1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); 1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret); 1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; 1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 1344 ret += login_len; 1345 } 1346# endif 1347 1348# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1349 if (using_ecc) { 1350 /* 1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message 1352 */ 1353 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; 1354 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; 1355 1356 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); 1357 1358 if (num_formats > 255) { 1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1360 return NULL; 1361 } 1362 /*- 1363 * check for enough space. 1364 * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length 1365 * 1 byte for the length of the formats 1366 * + formats length 1367 */ 1368 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit)) 1369 return NULL; 1370 1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1372 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ 1373 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); 1374 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; 1375 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); 1376 ret += num_formats; 1377 1378 /* 1379 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message 1380 */ 1381 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1382 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 1383 return NULL; 1384 1385 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { 1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1387 return NULL; 1388 } 1389 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves; 1390 /*- 1391 * check for enough space. 1392 * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length 1393 * 2 bytes for the curve list length 1394 * + curve list length 1395 */ 1396 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + curves_list_len, limit)) 1397 return NULL; 1398 1399 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); 1400 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); 1401 s2n(curves_list_len, ret); 1402 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len); 1403 ret += curves_list_len; 1404 } 1405# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1406 1407 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1408 size_t ticklen; 1409 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 1410 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 1411 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1412 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { 1413 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 1414 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 1415 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 1416 return NULL; 1417 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 1418 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); 1419 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 1420 } else 1421 ticklen = 0; 1422 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1423 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 1424 goto skip_ext; 1425 /* 1426 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for 1427 * ticket 1428 */ 1429 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit)) 1430 return NULL; 1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1432 s2n(ticklen, ret); 1433 if (ticklen > 0) { 1434 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 1435 ret += ticklen; 1436 } 1437 } 1438 skip_ext: 1439 1440 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1441 size_t salglen; 1442 const unsigned char *salg; 1443 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); 1444 1445 /*- 1446 * check for enough space. 1447 * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length 1448 * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length 1449 * + sigalg list length 1450 */ 1451 if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit)) 1452 return NULL; 1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); 1454 s2n(salglen + 2, ret); 1455 s2n(salglen, ret); 1456 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen); 1457 ret += salglen; 1458 } 1459# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1460 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1461 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 1462 1463 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 1464 return NULL; 1465 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1466 return NULL; 1467 1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1469 s2n(col + 2, ret); 1470 s2n(col, ret); 1471 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 1472 ret += col; 1473 } 1474# endif 1475 1476 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 1477 int i; 1478 size_t extlen, idlen; 1479 int lentmp; 1480 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1481 1482 idlen = 0; 1483 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1484 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1485 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 1486 if (lentmp <= 0) 1487 return NULL; 1488 idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2; 1489 } 1490 1491 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 1492 lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 1493 if (lentmp < 0) 1494 return NULL; 1495 extlen = (size_t)lentmp; 1496 } else 1497 extlen = 0; 1498 1499 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 1500 return NULL; 1501 /* 1502 * 2 bytes for status request type 1503 * 2 bytes for status request len 1504 * 1 byte for OCSP request type 1505 * 2 bytes for length of ids 1506 * 2 bytes for length of extensions 1507 * + length of ids 1508 * + length of extensions 1509 */ 1510 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit)) 1511 return NULL; 1512 1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1514 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 1515 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 1516 s2n(idlen, ret); 1517 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1518 /* save position of id len */ 1519 unsigned char *q = ret; 1520 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1521 /* skip over id len */ 1522 ret += 2; 1523 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 1524 /* write id len */ 1525 s2n(lentmp, q); 1526 } 1527 s2n(extlen, ret); 1528 if (extlen > 0) 1529 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 1530 } 1531# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1532 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 1533 1534 /*- 1535 * check for enough space. 1536 * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length 1537 * 1 byte for the mode 1538 */ 1539 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) 1540 return NULL; 1541 1542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1543 s2n(1, ret); 1544 /*- 1545 * Set mode: 1546 * 1: peer may send requests 1547 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1548 */ 1549 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1550 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1551 else 1552 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1553# endif 1554 1555# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1556 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1557 /* 1558 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support 1559 * for Next Protocol Negotiation 1560 */ 1561 1562 /*- 1563 * check for enough space. 1564 * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length 1565 */ 1566 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) 1567 return NULL; 1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1569 s2n(0, ret); 1570 } 1571# endif 1572 1573 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1574 /*- 1575 * check for enough space. 1576 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length 1577 * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length 1578 * + ALPN protocol list length 1579 */ 1580 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit)) 1581 return NULL; 1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1583 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1584 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1585 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); 1586 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; 1587 s->cert->alpn_sent = 1; 1588 } 1589# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { 1591 int el; 1592 1593 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1594 1595 /*- 1596 * check for enough space. 1597 * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length 1598 * + SRTP profiles length 1599 */ 1600 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) 1601 return NULL; 1602 1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1604 s2n(el, ret); 1605 1606 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1608 return NULL; 1609 } 1610 ret += el; 1611 } 1612# endif 1613 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); 1614 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ 1615 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) 1616 return NULL; 1617 1618 /* 1619 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See 1620 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this 1621 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always 1622 * appear last. 1623 */ 1624 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { 1625 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1626 /* 1627 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the 1628 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c 1629 * does not. 1630 */ 1631 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1632 hlen -= 5; 1633 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { 1634 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 1635 if (hlen >= 4) 1636 hlen -= 4; 1637 else 1638 hlen = 0; 1639 1640 /*- 1641 * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already 1642 * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200, 1643 * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer 1644 * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway. 1645 * 1646 * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length 1647 * + padding length 1648 */ 1649 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit)) 1650 return NULL; 1651 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 1652 s2n(hlen, ret); 1653 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 1654 ret += hlen; 1655 } 1656 } 1657 1658 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1659 return orig; 1660 1661 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1662 return ret; 1663} 1664 1665unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1666 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1667{ 1668 int extdatalen = 0; 1669 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1670 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1671# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1672 int next_proto_neg_seen; 1673# endif 1674# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1675 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1676 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1677 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 1678 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1679 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1680# endif 1681 /* 1682 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation 1683 */ 1684 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1685 return orig; 1686 1687 ret += 2; 1688 if (ret >= limit) 1689 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1690 1691 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 1692 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1693 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 1694 return NULL; 1695 1696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1697 s2n(0, ret); 1698 } 1699 1700 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { 1701 int el; 1702 1703 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1705 return NULL; 1706 } 1707 1708 /*- 1709 * check for enough space. 1710 * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length 1711 * + reneg data length 1712 */ 1713 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) 1714 return NULL; 1715 1716 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1717 s2n(el, ret); 1718 1719 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1721 return NULL; 1722 } 1723 1724 ret += el; 1725 } 1726# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1727 if (using_ecc) { 1728 const unsigned char *plist; 1729 size_t plistlen; 1730 /* 1731 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message 1732 */ 1733 1734 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); 1735 1736 if (plistlen > 255) { 1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1738 return NULL; 1739 } 1740 1741 /*- 1742 * check for enough space. 1743 * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length 1744 * 1 byte for the points format list length 1745 * + length of points format list 1746 */ 1747 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit)) 1748 return NULL; 1749 1750 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1751 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); 1752 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; 1753 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); 1754 ret += plistlen; 1755 1756 } 1757 /* 1758 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves 1759 * extension 1760 */ 1761# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1762 1763 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1764 /*- 1765 * check for enough space. 1766 * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length 1767 */ 1768 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) 1769 return NULL; 1770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1771 s2n(0, ret); 1772 } else { 1773 /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */ 1774 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 1775 } 1776 1777 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { 1778 /*- 1779 * check for enough space. 1780 * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length 1781 */ 1782 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) 1783 return NULL; 1784 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1785 s2n(0, ret); 1786 } 1787# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1788 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1789 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 1790 1791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 1792 return NULL; 1793 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1794 return NULL; 1795 1796 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1797 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 1798 s2n(sol, ret); 1799 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 1800 ret += sol; 1801 } 1802# endif 1803 1804# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1805 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { 1806 int el; 1807 1808 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1809 1810 /*- 1811 * check for enough space. 1812 * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length 1813 * + length of the SRTP profiles list 1814 */ 1815 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) 1816 return NULL; 1817 1818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1819 s2n(el, ret); 1820 1821 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1823 return NULL; 1824 } 1825 ret += el; 1826 } 1827# endif 1828 1829 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 1830 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) 1831 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { 1832 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 1833 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 1834 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 1835 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 1836 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 1837 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 1838 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 1839 }; 1840 1841 /* check for enough space. */ 1842 if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit)) 1843 return NULL; 1844 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext)); 1845 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext); 1846 1847 } 1848# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1849 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 1850 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { 1851 /*- 1852 * check for enough space. 1853 * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length 1854 * 1 byte for the mode 1855 */ 1856 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) 1857 return NULL; 1858 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1859 s2n(1, ret); 1860 /*- 1861 * Set mode: 1862 * 1: peer may send requests 1863 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1864 */ 1865 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1867 else 1868 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1869 1870 } 1871# endif 1872 1873# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1874 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 1875 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1876 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { 1877 const unsigned char *npa; 1878 unsigned int npalen; 1879 int r; 1880 1881 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 1882 s-> 1883 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 1884 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1885 /*- 1886 * check for enough space. 1887 * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length 1888 * + length of protocols list 1889 */ 1890 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit)) 1891 return NULL; 1892 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1893 s2n(npalen, ret); 1894 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 1895 ret += npalen; 1896 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1897 } 1898 } 1899# endif 1900 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) 1901 return NULL; 1902 1903 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 1904 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; 1905 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 1906 1907 /*- 1908 * check for enough space. 1909 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length 1910 * 2 bytes for ALPN data length 1911 * 1 byte for selected protocol length 1912 * + length of the selected protocol 1913 */ 1914 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit)) 1915 return NULL; 1916 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1917 s2n(3 + len, ret); 1918 s2n(1 + len, ret); 1919 *ret++ = (unsigned char)len; 1920 memcpy(ret, selected, len); 1921 ret += len; 1922 } 1923 1924 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1925 return orig; 1926 1927 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1928 return ret; 1929} 1930 1931# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1932/*- 1933 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 1934 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 1935 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 1936 * SNI, 1937 * elliptic_curves 1938 * ec_point_formats 1939 * 1940 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 1941 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 1942 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 1943 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 1944 */ 1945static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 1946 const unsigned char *limit) 1947{ 1948 unsigned short type, size; 1949 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 1950 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 1951 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 1952 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 1953 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 1954 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 1955 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 1956 1957 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 1958 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 1959 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 1960 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 1961 }; 1962 1963 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 1964 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 1965 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 1966 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 1967 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 1968 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 1969 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 1970 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 1971 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 1972 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 1973 }; 1974 1975 if (limit - data <= 2) 1976 return; 1977 data += 2; 1978 1979 if (limit - data < 4) 1980 return; 1981 n2s(data, type); 1982 n2s(data, size); 1983 1984 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1985 return; 1986 1987 if (limit - data < size) 1988 return; 1989 data += size; 1990 1991 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1992 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 1993 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 1994 1995 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) 1996 return; 1997 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 1998 return; 1999 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 2000 return; 2001 } else { 2002 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 2003 2004 if (limit - data != (int)(len)) 2005 return; 2006 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 2007 return; 2008 } 2009 2010 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 2011} 2012# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2013 2014/* 2015 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a 2016 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type 2017 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the 2018 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on 2019 * success. 2020 */ 2021static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 2022 unsigned data_len, int *al) 2023{ 2024 unsigned i; 2025 unsigned proto_len; 2026 2027 if (data_len < 2) 2028 goto parse_error; 2029 2030 /* 2031 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, 2032 * length-prefixed strings. 2033 */ 2034 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]); 2035 data_len -= 2; 2036 data += 2; 2037 if (data_len != i) 2038 goto parse_error; 2039 2040 if (data_len < 2) 2041 goto parse_error; 2042 2043 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) { 2044 proto_len = data[i]; 2045 i++; 2046 2047 if (proto_len == 0) 2048 goto parse_error; 2049 2050 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len) 2051 goto parse_error; 2052 2053 i += proto_len; 2054 } 2055 2056 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) 2057 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); 2058 s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len); 2059 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) { 2060 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2061 return -1; 2062 } 2063 memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len); 2064 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len; 2065 return 0; 2066 2067 parse_error: 2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2069 return -1; 2070} 2071 2072/* 2073 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. 2074 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. 2075 * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al set only on failure 2076 */ 2077static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al) 2078{ 2079 const unsigned char *selected = NULL; 2080 unsigned char selected_len = 0; 2081 2082 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) { 2083 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 2084 s->cert->alpn_proposed, 2085 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len, 2086 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); 2087 2088 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2089 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2090 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 2091 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { 2092 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2093 return 0; 2094 } 2095 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); 2096 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2097# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2098 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 2099 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2100# endif 2101 } 2102 } 2103 2104 return 1; 2105} 2106 2107static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2108 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 2109{ 2110 unsigned short type; 2111 unsigned short size; 2112 unsigned short len; 2113 unsigned char *data = *p; 2114 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 2115 2116 s->servername_done = 0; 2117 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 2118# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2119 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2120# endif 2121 2122 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2123 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2124 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 2125 } 2126 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; 2127 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) { 2128 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); 2129 s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL; 2130 } 2131 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0; 2132# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2133 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 2134 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 2135# endif 2136 2137# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2138 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 2139 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); 2140# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2141 2142 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ 2143 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 2144 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs); 2145 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; 2146 } 2147# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2148 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { 2149 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); 2150 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; 2151 } 2152# endif 2153 2154 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 2155 2156 if (data == limit) 2157 goto ri_check; 2158 2159 if (limit - data < 2) 2160 goto err; 2161 2162 n2s(data, len); 2163 2164 if (limit - data != len) 2165 goto err; 2166 2167 while (limit - data >= 4) { 2168 n2s(data, type); 2169 n2s(data, size); 2170 2171 if (limit - data < size) 2172 goto err; 2173# if 0 2174 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); 2175# endif 2176 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2177 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2178/*- 2179 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 2180 * 2181 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 2182 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 2183 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 2184 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 2185 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 2186 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 2187 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 2188 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 2189 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 2190 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 2191 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 2192 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 2193 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 2194 * the value of the Host: field. 2195 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 2196 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 2197 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 2198 * extension. 2199 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 2200 * 2201 */ 2202 2203 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2204 unsigned char *sdata; 2205 int servname_type; 2206 int dsize; 2207 2208 if (size < 2) 2209 goto err; 2210 n2s(data, dsize); 2211 size -= 2; 2212 if (dsize > size) 2213 goto err; 2214 2215 sdata = data; 2216 while (dsize > 3) { 2217 servname_type = *(sdata++); 2218 n2s(sdata, len); 2219 dsize -= 3; 2220 2221 if (len > dsize) 2222 goto err; 2223 2224 if (s->servername_done == 0) 2225 switch (servname_type) { 2226 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 2227 if (!s->hit) { 2228 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) 2229 goto err; 2230 2231 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 2232 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2233 return 0; 2234 } 2235 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = 2236 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { 2237 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2238 return 0; 2239 } 2240 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 2241 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; 2242 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 2243 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 2244 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 2245 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2246 return 0; 2247 } 2248 s->servername_done = 1; 2249 2250 } else 2251 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 2252 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 2253 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, 2254 (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 2255 2256 break; 2257 2258 default: 2259 break; 2260 } 2261 2262 dsize -= len; 2263 } 2264 if (dsize != 0) 2265 goto err; 2266 2267 } 2268# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { 2270 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) 2271 goto err; 2272 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 2273 goto err; 2274 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) 2275 return -1; 2276 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 2277 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; 2278 2279 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 2280 goto err; 2281 } 2282# endif 2283 2284# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2286 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2287 int ecpointformatlist_length; 2288 2289 if (size == 0) 2290 goto err; 2291 2292 ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2293 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 2294 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 2295 goto err; 2296 if (!s->hit) { 2297 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 2298 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2299 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 2300 } 2301 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2302 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2303 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2304 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2305 return 0; 2306 } 2307 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2308 ecpointformatlist_length; 2309 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2310 ecpointformatlist_length); 2311 } 2312# if 0 2313 fprintf(stderr, 2314 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", 2315 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 2316 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2317 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2318 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2319 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2320# endif 2321 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { 2322 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2323 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 2324 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 2325 2326 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 2327 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || 2328 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ 2329 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) 2330 goto err; 2331 2332 if (!s->hit) { 2333 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 2334 goto err; 2335 2336 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 2337 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 2338 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 2339 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2340 return 0; 2341 } 2342 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 2343 ellipticcurvelist_length; 2344 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, 2345 ellipticcurvelist_length); 2346 } 2347# if 0 2348 fprintf(stderr, 2349 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", 2350 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 2351 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 2352 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 2353 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2354 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2355# endif 2356 } 2357# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2358# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2359 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2360 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2361 2362 if (size < 2) { 2363 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2364 return 0; 2365 } 2366 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2367 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2369 return 0; 2370 } 2371 2372 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2373 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2374 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2375 } 2376 2377 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2378 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 2379 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2380 else 2381 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 2382 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2383 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2384 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2385 return 0; 2386 } 2387 } 2388# endif 2389 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2390 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2391 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2392 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2393 { 2394 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2395 return 0; 2396 } 2397 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2398 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2399 return 0; 2400 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2401 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { 2402 int dsize; 2403 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 2404 goto err; 2405 n2s(data, dsize); 2406 size -= 2; 2407 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) 2408 goto err; 2409 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 2410 goto err; 2411 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && !s->hit) { 2412 if (size < 5) 2413 goto err; 2414 2415 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 2416 size--; 2417 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 2418 const unsigned char *sdata; 2419 int dsize; 2420 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 2421 n2s(data, dsize); 2422 size -= 2; 2423 if (dsize > size) 2424 goto err; 2425 2426 /* 2427 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake 2428 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 2429 */ 2430 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, 2431 OCSP_RESPID_free); 2432 if (dsize > 0) { 2433 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); 2434 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { 2435 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2436 return 0; 2437 } 2438 } else { 2439 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; 2440 } 2441 2442 while (dsize > 0) { 2443 OCSP_RESPID *id; 2444 int idsize; 2445 if (dsize < 4) 2446 goto err; 2447 n2s(data, idsize); 2448 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 2449 size -= 2 + idsize; 2450 if (dsize < 0) 2451 goto err; 2452 sdata = data; 2453 data += idsize; 2454 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); 2455 if (!id) 2456 goto err; 2457 if (data != sdata) { 2458 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2459 goto err; 2460 } 2461 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { 2462 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2463 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2464 return 0; 2465 } 2466 } 2467 2468 /* Read in request_extensions */ 2469 if (size < 2) 2470 goto err; 2471 n2s(data, dsize); 2472 size -= 2; 2473 if (dsize != size) 2474 goto err; 2475 sdata = data; 2476 if (dsize > 0) { 2477 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 2478 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 2479 X509_EXTENSION_free); 2480 } 2481 2482 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 2483 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); 2484 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) 2485 goto err; 2486 } 2487 } 2488 /* 2489 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. 2490 */ 2491 else 2492 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 2493 } 2494# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2495 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2496 switch (data[0]) { 2497 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 2498 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2499 break; 2500 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 2501 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2502 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2503 break; 2504 default: 2505 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2506 return 0; 2507 } 2508 } 2509# endif 2510# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2511 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2512 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2513 /*- 2514 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 2515 * renegotiation. 2516 * 2517 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 2518 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 2519 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 2520 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 2521 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 2522 * anything like that, but this might change). 2523 * 2524 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 2525 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 2526 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 2527 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 2528 * Finished message could have been computed.) 2529 */ 2530 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2531 } 2532# endif 2533 2534 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && 2535 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2536 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0) 2537 return 0; 2538 } 2539 2540 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 2541# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2542 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 2543 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2544 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2545 return 0; 2546 } 2547# endif 2548 2549 data += size; 2550 } 2551 2552 /* Spurious data on the end */ 2553 if (data != limit) 2554 goto err; 2555 2556 *p = data; 2557 2558 ri_check: 2559 2560 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 2561 2562 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 2563 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2564 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 2566 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2567 return 0; 2568 } 2569 2570 return 1; 2571err: 2572 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2573 return 0; 2574} 2575 2576/* 2577 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data 2578 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking. 2579 */ 2580 2581static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, 2582 const unsigned char *data, 2583 const unsigned char *limit, 2584 int *al) 2585{ 2586 unsigned short type, size, len; 2587 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */ 2588 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) 2589 return 1; 2590 2591 if (limit - data <= 2) 2592 return 1; 2593 n2s(data, len); 2594 2595 if (limit - data < len) 2596 return 1; 2597 2598 while (limit - data >= 4) { 2599 n2s(data, type); 2600 n2s(data, size); 2601 2602 if (limit - data < size) 2603 return 1; 2604 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2605 return 0; 2606 2607 data += size; 2608 } 2609 2610 return 1; 2611} 2612 2613int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2614 unsigned char *limit) 2615{ 2616 int al = -1; 2617 unsigned char *ptmp = *p; 2618 /* 2619 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled 2620 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically 2621 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions 2622 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure. 2623 */ 2624 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2625 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2626 return 0; 2627 } 2628 2629 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 2630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 2631 return 0; 2632 } 2633 2634 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); 2635 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2636 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2637 return 0; 2638 } 2639 2640 return 1; 2641} 2642 2643# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2644/* 2645 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 2646 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly 2647 * fill the length of the block. 2648 */ 2649static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 2650{ 2651 unsigned int off = 0; 2652 2653 while (off < len) { 2654 if (d[off] == 0) 2655 return 0; 2656 off += d[off]; 2657 off++; 2658 } 2659 2660 return off == len; 2661} 2662# endif 2663 2664static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2665 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 2666{ 2667 unsigned short length; 2668 unsigned short type; 2669 unsigned short size; 2670 unsigned char *data = *p; 2671 int tlsext_servername = 0; 2672 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 2673 2674# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2675 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2676# endif 2677 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2678 2679 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2680 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2681 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 2682 } 2683# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2684 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 2685 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 2686# endif 2687 2688 if ((d + n) - data <= 2) 2689 goto ri_check; 2690 2691 n2s(data, length); 2692 if ((d + n) - data != length) { 2693 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2694 return 0; 2695 } 2696 2697 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { 2698 n2s(data, type); 2699 n2s(data, size); 2700 2701 if ((d + n) - data < size) 2702 goto ri_check; 2703 2704 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2705 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2706 2707 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2708 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { 2709 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2710 return 0; 2711 } 2712 tlsext_servername = 1; 2713 } 2714# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2715 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2716 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2717 int ecpointformatlist_length; 2718 2719 if (size == 0) { 2720 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2721 return 0; 2722 } 2723 2724 ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2725 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { 2726 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2727 return 0; 2728 } 2729 if (!s->hit) { 2730 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2731 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2732 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2733 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2734 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2735 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2736 return 0; 2737 } 2738 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2739 ecpointformatlist_length; 2740 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2741 ecpointformatlist_length); 2742 } 2743# if 0 2744 fprintf(stderr, 2745 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 2746 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2747 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2748 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2749 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2750# endif 2751 } 2752# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2753 2754 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2755 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2756 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2757 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2758 { 2759 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2760 return 0; 2761 } 2762 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2763 || (size > 0)) { 2764 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2765 return 0; 2766 } 2767 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2768 } 2769# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2770 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2771 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2772 2773 if (size < 2) { 2774 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2775 return 0; 2776 } 2777 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2778 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2779 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2780 return 0; 2781 } 2782 2783 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2784 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2785 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 2786 } 2787 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2788 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2789 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2790 } else { 2791 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 2792 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2793 } 2794 2795 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2796 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2797 return 0; 2798 } 2799 } 2800# endif 2801 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { 2802 /* 2803 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status 2804 * request message. 2805 */ 2806 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { 2807 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2808 return 0; 2809 } 2810 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 2811 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 2812 } 2813# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2814 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2815 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2816 unsigned char *selected; 2817 unsigned char selected_len; 2818 2819 /* We must have requested it. */ 2820 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { 2821 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2822 return 0; 2823 } 2824 /* The data must be valid */ 2825 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { 2826 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2827 return 0; 2828 } 2829 if (s-> 2830 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, 2831 size, 2832 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != 2833 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2834 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2835 return 0; 2836 } 2837 /* 2838 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in 2839 * a single Serverhello 2840 */ 2841 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); 2842 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 2843 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 2844 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2845 return 0; 2846 } 2847 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 2848 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 2849 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2850 } 2851# endif 2852 2853 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { 2854 unsigned len; 2855 2856 /* We must have requested it. */ 2857 if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) { 2858 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2859 return 0; 2860 } 2861 if (size < 4) { 2862 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2863 return 0; 2864 } 2865 /*- 2866 * The extension data consists of: 2867 * uint16 list_length 2868 * uint8 proto_length; 2869 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; 2870 */ 2871 len = data[0]; 2872 len <<= 8; 2873 len |= data[1]; 2874 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) { 2875 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2876 return 0; 2877 } 2878 len = data[2]; 2879 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) { 2880 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2881 return 0; 2882 } 2883 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 2884 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2885 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); 2886 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2887 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2888 return 0; 2889 } 2890 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); 2891 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; 2892 } 2893 2894 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2895 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2896 return 0; 2897 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2898 } 2899# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2900 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2901 switch (data[0]) { 2902 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 2903 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2904 break; 2905 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 2906 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2907 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2908 break; 2909 default: 2910 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2911 return 0; 2912 } 2913 } 2914# endif 2915# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2916 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2917 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2918 return 0; 2919 } 2920# endif 2921 /* 2922 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a 2923 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback 2924 */ 2925 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2926 return 0; 2927 2928 data += size; 2929 } 2930 2931 if (data != d + n) { 2932 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2933 return 0; 2934 } 2935 2936 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { 2937 if (s->tlsext_hostname) { 2938 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { 2939 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 2940 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { 2941 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2942 return 0; 2943 } 2944 } else { 2945 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2946 return 0; 2947 } 2948 } 2949 } 2950 2951 *p = data; 2952 2953 ri_check: 2954 2955 /* 2956 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid 2957 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello 2958 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. 2959 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which 2960 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on 2961 * initial connect only. 2962 */ 2963 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 2964 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2965 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 2967 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2968 return 0; 2969 } 2970 2971 return 1; 2972} 2973 2974int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2975{ 2976 2977# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2978 { 2979 int r = 1; 2980 2981 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 2982 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 2983 s-> 2984 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 2985 if (!r) 2986 return -1; 2987 } 2988 2989 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2990 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2991 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2992 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2993 } 2994 2995 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2996 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2997 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2998 } else { 2999 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 3000 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 3001 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 3002 } 3003 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 3005 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3006 return -1; 3007 } 3008 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = 3009 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 3010 } 3011 3012 if (r == 2) 3013 /* 3014 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate 3015 * server opaque PRF input 3016 */ 3017 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 3018 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 3019 } 3020# endif 3021 3022 s->cert->alpn_sent = 0; 3023 return 1; 3024} 3025 3026int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 3027{ 3028 return 1; 3029} 3030 3031static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 3032{ 3033 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 3034 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 3035 3036# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3037 /* 3038 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely 3039 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 3040 */ 3041 /* 3042 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely 3043 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 3044 */ 3045# endif 3046 3047 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3048 ret = 3049 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3050 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3051 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 3052 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3053 ret = 3054 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3055 s-> 3056 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3057 3058# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 3059 { 3060 /* 3061 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we 3062 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this 3063 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). 3064 */ 3065 3066 int r = 1; 3067 3068 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 3069 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 3070 s-> 3071 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 3072 if (!r) { 3073 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3074 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3075 goto err; 3076 } 3077 } 3078 3079 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 3080 /* shouldn't really happen */ 3081 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 3082 } 3083 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 3084 3085 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 3086 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 3087 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 3088 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { 3089 /* 3090 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF 3091 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! 3092 */ 3093 3094 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 3095 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 3096 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 3097 } else { 3098 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 3099 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 3100 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 3101 } 3102 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3103 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3104 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3105 goto err; 3106 } 3107 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 3108 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 3109 } 3110 } 3111 3112 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3113 /* 3114 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we 3115 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the 3116 * handshake. 3117 */ 3118 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3119 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3120 } 3121 } 3122 3123 err: 3124# endif 3125 switch (ret) { 3126 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3127 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3128 return -1; 3129 3130 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3131 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3132 return 1; 3133 3134 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3135 s->servername_done = 0; 3136 default: 3137 return 1; 3138 } 3139} 3140 3141int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3142{ 3143 int al; 3144 size_t i; 3145 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ 3146 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 3147 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); 3148 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 3149 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 3150 } 3151 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ 3152 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { 3153 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; 3154 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; 3155 } 3156 3157 /* If sigalgs received process it. */ 3158 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 3159 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { 3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3161 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3162 goto err; 3163 } 3164 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ 3165 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, 3167 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); 3168 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3169 goto err; 3170 } 3171 } else 3172 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert); 3173 return 1; 3174 err: 3175 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3176 return 0; 3177} 3178 3179/* 3180 * Upon success, returns 1. 3181 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert. 3182 */ 3183int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al) 3184{ 3185 3186 /* 3187 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 3188 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, 3189 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may 3190 * influence which certificate is sent 3191 */ 3192 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3193 int ret; 3194 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 3195 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 3196 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 3197 if (certpkey != NULL) { 3198 /* 3199 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 3200 * et al can pick it up. 3201 */ 3202 s->cert->key = certpkey; 3203 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3204 switch (ret) { 3205 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 3206 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3207 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3208 break; 3209 /* status request response should be sent */ 3210 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 3211 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 3212 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 3213 break; 3214 /* something bad happened */ 3215 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3216 default: 3217 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3218 return 0; 3219 } 3220 } 3221 } 3222 3223 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) { 3224 return 0; 3225 } 3226 3227 return 1; 3228} 3229 3230int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 3231{ 3232 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 3233 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 3234 3235# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3236 /* 3237 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 3238 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it 3239 * must contain uncompressed. 3240 */ 3241 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3242 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3243 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3244 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3245 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3246 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3247 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 3248 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 3249 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 3250 size_t i; 3251 unsigned char *list; 3252 int found_uncompressed = 0; 3253 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 3254 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { 3255 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { 3256 found_uncompressed = 1; 3257 break; 3258 } 3259 } 3260 if (!found_uncompressed) { 3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 3262 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 3263 return -1; 3264 } 3265 } 3266 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 3267# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 3268 3269 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3270 ret = 3271 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3272 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3273 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 3274 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3275 ret = 3276 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3277 s-> 3278 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3279 3280# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 3281 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { 3282 /* 3283 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on 3284 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a 3285 * value from the server too. 3286 */ 3287 3288 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3289 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3290 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3291 } 3292 3293 /* 3294 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to 3295 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. 3296 */ 3297 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 3298 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != 3299 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { 3300 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3301 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3302 } 3303 } 3304# endif 3305 3306 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 3307 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 3308 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 3309 /* 3310 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the 3311 * callback 3312 */ 3313 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 3314 && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3315 int r; 3316 /* 3317 * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback 3318 * knows there is no response 3319 */ 3320 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3321 if (r == 0) { 3322 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 3323 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3324 } 3325 if (r < 0) { 3326 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3327 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3328 } 3329 } 3330 3331 switch (ret) { 3332 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3333 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3334 return -1; 3335 3336 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3337 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3338 return 1; 3339 3340 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3341 s->servername_done = 0; 3342 default: 3343 return 1; 3344 } 3345} 3346 3347int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 3348 int n) 3349{ 3350 int al = -1; 3351 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) 3352 return 1; 3353 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) { 3354 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3355 return 0; 3356 } 3357 3358 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 3360 return 0; 3361 } 3362 return 1; 3363} 3364 3365/*- 3366 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 3367 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 3368 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 3369 * 3370 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 3371 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 3372 * extension, if any. 3373 * len: the length of the session ID. 3374 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 3375 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3376 * point to the resulting session. 3377 * 3378 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 3379 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 3380 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 3381 * 3382 * Returns: 3383 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3384 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 3385 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 3386 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 3387 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 3388 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 3389 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 3390 * 3391 * Side effects: 3392 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 3393 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 3394 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 3395 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 3396 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 3397 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 3398 */ 3399int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 3400 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 3401{ 3402 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 3403 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 3404 unsigned short i; 3405 3406 *ret = NULL; 3407 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 3408 3409 /* 3410 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful 3411 * resumption. 3412 */ 3413 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 3414 return 0; 3415 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 3416 return 0; 3417 if (p >= limit) 3418 return -1; 3419 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 3420 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3421 i = *(p++); 3422 3423 if (limit - p <= i) 3424 return -1; 3425 3426 p += i; 3427 } 3428 /* Skip past cipher list */ 3429 n2s(p, i); 3430 if (limit - p <= i) 3431 return -1; 3432 p += i; 3433 3434 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 3435 i = *(p++); 3436 if (limit - p < i) 3437 return -1; 3438 p += i; 3439 3440 /* Now at start of extensions */ 3441 if (limit - p <= 2) 3442 return 0; 3443 n2s(p, i); 3444 while (limit - p >= 4) { 3445 unsigned short type, size; 3446 n2s(p, type); 3447 n2s(p, size); 3448 if (limit - p < size) 3449 return 0; 3450 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 3451 int r; 3452 if (size == 0) { 3453 /* 3454 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have 3455 * one. 3456 */ 3457 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3458 return 1; 3459 } 3460 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 3461 /* 3462 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than 3463 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger 3464 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to 3465 * calculate the master secret later. 3466 */ 3467 return 2; 3468 } 3469 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 3470 switch (r) { 3471 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 3472 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3473 return 2; 3474 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 3475 return r; 3476 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 3477 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3478 return 3; 3479 default: /* fatal error */ 3480 return -1; 3481 } 3482 } 3483 p += size; 3484 } 3485 return 0; 3486} 3487 3488/*- 3489 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 3490 * 3491 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 3492 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 3493 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 3494 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 3495 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3496 * point to the resulting session. 3497 * 3498 * Returns: 3499 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3500 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 3501 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 3502 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 3503 */ 3504static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, 3505 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, 3506 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) 3507{ 3508 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3509 unsigned char *sdec; 3510 const unsigned char *p; 3511 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 3512 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 3513 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3514 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3515 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3516 3517 /* Need at least keyname + iv */ 3518 if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) 3519 return 2; 3520 3521 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 3522 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3523 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3524 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3525 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 3526 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 3527 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 3528 if (rv < 0) 3529 goto err; 3530 if (rv == 0) { 3531 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3532 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3533 return 2; 3534 } 3535 if (rv == 2) 3536 renew_ticket = 1; 3537 } else { 3538 /* Check key name matches */ 3539 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 3540 return 2; 3541 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3542 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 3543 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3544 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 3545 etick + 16) <= 0) { 3546 goto err; 3547 } 3548 } 3549 /* 3550 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity 3551 * checks on ticket. 3552 */ 3553 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 3554 if (mlen < 0) { 3555 goto err; 3556 } 3557 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ 3558 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { 3559 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3560 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3561 return 2; 3562 } 3563 3564 eticklen -= mlen; 3565 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 3566 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 3567 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { 3568 goto err; 3569 } 3570 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3571 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { 3572 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3573 return 2; 3574 } 3575 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 3576 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 3577 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3578 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3579 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 3580 if (sdec == NULL 3581 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { 3582 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3583 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3584 return -1; 3585 } 3586 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { 3587 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3588 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3589 return 2; 3590 } 3591 slen += mlen; 3592 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3593 p = sdec; 3594 3595 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 3596 slen -= p - sdec; 3597 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3598 if (sess) { 3599 /* Some additional consistency checks */ 3600 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) { 3601 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3602 return 2; 3603 } 3604 /* 3605 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect 3606 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session 3607 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by 3608 * standard. 3609 */ 3610 if (sesslen) 3611 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 3612 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 3613 *psess = sess; 3614 if (renew_ticket) 3615 return 4; 3616 else 3617 return 3; 3618 } 3619 ERR_clear_error(); 3620 /* 3621 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. 3622 */ 3623 return 2; 3624err: 3625 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3626 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3627 return -1; 3628} 3629 3630/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 3631 3632typedef struct { 3633 int nid; 3634 int id; 3635} tls12_lookup; 3636 3637static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 3638 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 3639 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 3640 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 3641 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 3642 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 3643 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 3644}; 3645 3646static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 3647 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 3648 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 3649 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 3650}; 3651 3652static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3653{ 3654 size_t i; 3655 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3656 if (table[i].nid == nid) 3657 return table[i].id; 3658 } 3659 return -1; 3660} 3661 3662static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3663{ 3664 size_t i; 3665 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3666 if ((table[i].id) == id) 3667 return table[i].nid; 3668 } 3669 return NID_undef; 3670} 3671 3672int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, 3673 const EVP_MD *md) 3674{ 3675 int sig_id, md_id; 3676 if (!md) 3677 return 0; 3678 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 3679 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3680 if (md_id == -1) 3681 return 0; 3682 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 3683 if (sig_id == -1) 3684 return 0; 3685 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 3686 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 3687 return 1; 3688} 3689 3690int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 3691{ 3692 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 3693 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3694} 3695 3696const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 3697{ 3698 switch (hash_alg) { 3699# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 3700 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: 3701# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 3702 if (FIPS_mode()) 3703 return NULL; 3704# endif 3705 return EVP_md5(); 3706# endif 3707# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 3708 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 3709 return EVP_sha1(); 3710# endif 3711# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 3712 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 3713 return EVP_sha224(); 3714 3715 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 3716 return EVP_sha256(); 3717# endif 3718# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 3719 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 3720 return EVP_sha384(); 3721 3722 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 3723 return EVP_sha512(); 3724# endif 3725 default: 3726 return NULL; 3727 3728 } 3729} 3730 3731static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) 3732{ 3733 switch (sig_alg) { 3734# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3735 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 3736 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 3737# endif 3738# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3739 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 3740 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 3741# endif 3742# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3743 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 3744 return SSL_PKEY_ECC; 3745# endif 3746 } 3747 return -1; 3748} 3749 3750/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ 3751static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, 3752 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) 3753{ 3754 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; 3755 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) 3756 return; 3757 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3758 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, 3759 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3760 if (phash_nid) 3761 *phash_nid = hash_nid; 3762 } 3763 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3764 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, 3765 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3766 if (psign_nid) 3767 *psign_nid = sign_nid; 3768 } 3769 if (psignhash_nid) { 3770 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef 3771 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, 3772 sign_nid) <= 0) 3773 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; 3774 } 3775} 3776 3777/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ 3778static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, 3779 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, 3780 const unsigned char *allow, 3781 size_t allowlen) 3782{ 3783 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; 3784 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; 3785 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { 3786 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ 3787 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL) 3788 continue; 3789 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) 3790 continue; 3791 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { 3792 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { 3793 nmatch++; 3794 if (shsig) { 3795 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; 3796 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; 3797 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, 3798 &shsig->sign_nid, 3799 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); 3800 shsig++; 3801 } 3802 break; 3803 } 3804 } 3805 } 3806 return nmatch; 3807} 3808 3809/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ 3810static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3811{ 3812 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; 3813 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; 3814 size_t nmatch; 3815 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; 3816 CERT *c = s->cert; 3817 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); 3818 if (c->shared_sigalgs) { 3819 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); 3820 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 3821 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 3822 } 3823 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ 3824 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3825 conf = c->client_sigalgs; 3826 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; 3827 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3828 conf = c->conf_sigalgs; 3829 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; 3830 } else 3831 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf); 3832 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { 3833 pref = conf; 3834 preflen = conflen; 3835 allow = c->peer_sigalgs; 3836 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3837 } else { 3838 allow = conf; 3839 allowlen = conflen; 3840 pref = c->peer_sigalgs; 3841 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3842 } 3843 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3844 if (nmatch) { 3845 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); 3846 if (!salgs) 3847 return 0; 3848 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3849 } else { 3850 salgs = NULL; 3851 } 3852 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; 3853 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; 3854 return 1; 3855} 3856 3857/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 3858 3859int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 3860{ 3861 CERT *c = s->cert; 3862 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ 3863 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 3864 return 1; 3865 /* Should never happen */ 3866 if (!c) 3867 return 0; 3868 3869 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 3870 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); 3871 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); 3872 if (!c->peer_sigalgs) 3873 return 0; 3874 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize; 3875 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); 3876 return 1; 3877} 3878 3879int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3880{ 3881 int idx; 3882 size_t i; 3883 const EVP_MD *md; 3884 CERT *c = s->cert; 3885 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; 3886 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) 3887 return 0; 3888 3889# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 3890 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 3891 /* 3892 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest, 3893 * ignoring any peer preferences. 3894 */ 3895 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; 3896 if (s->server) 3897 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; 3898 else 3899 sigs = c->client_sigalgs; 3900 if (sigs) { 3901 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); 3902 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); 3903 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3904 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3905 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3906 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3907 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3908 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3909 } 3910 } 3911 } 3912# endif 3913 3914 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; 3915 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { 3916 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); 3917 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { 3918 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); 3919 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3920 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3921 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3922 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3923 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3924 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3925 } 3926 } 3927 3928 } 3929 /* 3930 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use 3931 * the certificate for signing. 3932 */ 3933 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 3934 /* 3935 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 3936 * supported it stays as NULL. 3937 */ 3938# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3939 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 3940 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3941# endif 3942# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3943 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { 3944 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3945 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3946 } 3947# endif 3948# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3949 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 3950 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3951# endif 3952 } 3953 return 1; 3954} 3955 3956int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3957 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3958 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3959{ 3960 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs; 3961 if (psig == NULL) 3962 return 0; 3963 if (idx >= 0) { 3964 idx <<= 1; 3965 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) 3966 return 0; 3967 psig += idx; 3968 if (rhash) 3969 *rhash = psig[0]; 3970 if (rsig) 3971 *rsig = psig[1]; 3972 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); 3973 } 3974 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2; 3975} 3976 3977int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3978 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3979 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3980{ 3981 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; 3982 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) 3983 return 0; 3984 shsigalgs += idx; 3985 if (phash) 3986 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; 3987 if (psign) 3988 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; 3989 if (psignhash) 3990 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; 3991 if (rsig) 3992 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; 3993 if (rhash) 3994 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; 3995 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; 3996} 3997 3998# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 3999int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 4000{ 4001 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 4002 unsigned short hbtype; 4003 unsigned int payload; 4004 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 4005 4006 if (s->msg_callback) 4007 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 4008 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 4009 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 4010 4011 /* Read type and payload length first */ 4012 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 4013 return 0; /* silently discard */ 4014 hbtype = *p++; 4015 n2s(p, payload); 4016 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 4017 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 4018 pl = p; 4019 4020 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { 4021 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 4022 int r; 4023 4024 /* 4025 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, 4026 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding 4027 */ 4028 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 4029 if (buffer == NULL) 4030 return -1; 4031 bp = buffer; 4032 4033 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 4034 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 4035 s2n(payload, bp); 4036 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 4037 bp += payload; 4038 /* Random padding */ 4039 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { 4040 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 4041 return -1; 4042 } 4043 4044 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 4045 3 + payload + padding); 4046 4047 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 4048 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 4049 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 4050 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 4051 4052 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 4053 4054 if (r < 0) 4055 return r; 4056 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { 4057 unsigned int seq; 4058 4059 /* 4060 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 4061 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number 4062 */ 4063 n2s(pl, seq); 4064 4065 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { 4066 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 4067 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 4068 } 4069 } 4070 4071 return 0; 4072} 4073 4074int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 4075{ 4076 unsigned char *buf, *p; 4077 int ret = -1; 4078 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 4079 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 4080 4081 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 4082 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 4083 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { 4084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 4085 return -1; 4086 } 4087 4088 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 4089 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 4090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 4091 return -1; 4092 } 4093 4094 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 4095 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { 4096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 4097 return -1; 4098 } 4099 4100 /* 4101 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 4102 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 4103 */ 4104 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 4105 4106 /*- 4107 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 4108 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 4109 * some random stuff. 4110 * - Message Type, 1 byte 4111 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 4112 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 4113 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 4114 * - Padding 4115 */ 4116 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 4117 if (buf == NULL) 4118 return -1; 4119 p = buf; 4120 /* Message Type */ 4121 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 4122 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 4123 s2n(payload, p); 4124 /* Sequence number */ 4125 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 4126 /* 16 random bytes */ 4127 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { 4128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4129 goto err; 4130 } 4131 p += 16; 4132 /* Random padding */ 4133 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { 4134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4135 goto err; 4136 } 4137 4138 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 4139 if (ret >= 0) { 4140 if (s->msg_callback) 4141 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 4142 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 4143 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 4144 4145 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 4146 } 4147 4148err: 4149 OPENSSL_free(buf); 4150 4151 return ret; 4152} 4153# endif 4154 4155# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) 4156 4157typedef struct { 4158 size_t sigalgcnt; 4159 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; 4160} sig_cb_st; 4161 4162static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 4163{ 4164 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; 4165 size_t i; 4166 char etmp[20], *p; 4167 int sig_alg, hash_alg; 4168 if (elem == NULL) 4169 return 0; 4170 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) 4171 return 0; 4172 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 4173 return 0; 4174 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 4175 etmp[len] = 0; 4176 p = strchr(etmp, '+'); 4177 if (!p) 4178 return 0; 4179 *p = 0; 4180 p++; 4181 if (!*p) 4182 return 0; 4183 4184 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA")) 4185 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA; 4186 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA")) 4187 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA; 4188 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA")) 4189 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC; 4190 else 4191 return 0; 4192 4193 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p); 4194 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4195 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p); 4196 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4197 return 0; 4198 4199 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { 4200 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg) 4201 return 0; 4202 } 4203 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg; 4204 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg; 4205 return 1; 4206} 4207 4208/* 4209 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the 4210 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 4211 */ 4212int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) 4213{ 4214 sig_cb_st sig; 4215 sig.sigalgcnt = 0; 4216 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) 4217 return 0; 4218 if (c == NULL) 4219 return 1; 4220 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); 4221} 4222 4223int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, 4224 int client) 4225{ 4226 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; 4227 int rhash, rsign; 4228 size_t i; 4229 if (salglen & 1) 4230 return 0; 4231 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); 4232 if (sigalgs == NULL) 4233 return 0; 4234 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { 4235 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, 4236 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4237 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, 4238 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4239 4240 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) 4241 goto err; 4242 *sptr++ = rhash; 4243 *sptr++ = rsign; 4244 } 4245 4246 if (client) { 4247 if (c->client_sigalgs) 4248 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); 4249 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4250 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; 4251 } else { 4252 if (c->conf_sigalgs) 4253 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); 4254 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4255 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; 4256 } 4257 4258 return 1; 4259 4260 err: 4261 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); 4262 return 0; 4263} 4264 4265static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) 4266{ 4267 int sig_nid; 4268 size_t i; 4269 if (default_nid == -1) 4270 return 1; 4271 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 4272 if (default_nid) 4273 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; 4274 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 4275 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 4276 return 1; 4277 return 0; 4278} 4279 4280/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ 4281static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) 4282{ 4283 X509_NAME *nm; 4284 int i; 4285 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 4286 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { 4287 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) 4288 return 1; 4289 } 4290 return 0; 4291} 4292 4293/* 4294 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by 4295 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before 4296 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before 4297 * attempting to use them. 4298 */ 4299 4300/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ 4301 4302# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ 4303 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) 4304/* Strict mode flags */ 4305# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ 4306 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ 4307 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) 4308 4309int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 4310 int idx) 4311{ 4312 int i; 4313 int rv = 0; 4314 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; 4315 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; 4316 CERT *c = s->cert; 4317 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 4318 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ 4319 if (idx != -1) { 4320 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ 4321 if (idx == -2) { 4322 cpk = c->key; 4323 idx = cpk - c->pkeys; 4324 } else 4325 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4326 x = cpk->x509; 4327 pk = cpk->privatekey; 4328 chain = cpk->chain; 4329 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; 4330 /* If no cert or key, forget it */ 4331 if (!x || !pk) 4332 goto end; 4333# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 4334 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ 4335 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 4336 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | 4337 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4338 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4339 return rv; 4340 } 4341# endif 4342 } else { 4343 if (!x || !pk) 4344 return 0; 4345 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); 4346 if (idx == -1) 4347 return 0; 4348 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4349 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) 4350 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; 4351 else 4352 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; 4353 strict_mode = 1; 4354 } 4355 4356 if (suiteb_flags) { 4357 int ok; 4358 if (check_flags) 4359 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4360 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); 4361 if (ok == X509_V_OK) 4362 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4363 else if (!check_flags) 4364 goto end; 4365 } 4366 4367 /* 4368 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature 4369 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. 4370 */ 4371 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { 4372 int default_nid; 4373 unsigned char rsign = 0; 4374 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 4375 default_nid = 0; 4376 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ 4377 else { 4378 switch (idx) { 4379 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: 4380 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: 4381 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: 4382 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; 4383 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; 4384 break; 4385 4386 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: 4387 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: 4388 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; 4389 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; 4390 break; 4391 4392 case SSL_PKEY_ECC: 4393 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; 4394 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; 4395 break; 4396 4397 default: 4398 default_nid = -1; 4399 break; 4400 } 4401 } 4402 /* 4403 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set 4404 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. 4405 */ 4406 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { 4407 size_t j; 4408 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; 4409 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { 4410 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) 4411 break; 4412 } 4413 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { 4414 if (check_flags) 4415 goto skip_sigs; 4416 else 4417 goto end; 4418 } 4419 } 4420 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ 4421 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { 4422 if (!check_flags) 4423 goto end; 4424 } else 4425 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; 4426 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4427 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4428 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { 4429 if (check_flags) { 4430 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4431 break; 4432 } else 4433 goto end; 4434 } 4435 } 4436 } 4437 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ 4438 else if (check_flags) 4439 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4440 skip_sigs: 4441 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ 4442 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) 4443 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; 4444 else if (!check_flags) 4445 goto end; 4446 if (!s->server) 4447 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4448 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ 4449 else if (strict_mode) { 4450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4451 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4452 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4453 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { 4454 if (check_flags) { 4455 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4456 break; 4457 } else 4458 goto end; 4459 } 4460 } 4461 } 4462 if (!s->server && strict_mode) { 4463 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; 4464 int check_type = 0; 4465 switch (pk->type) { 4466 case EVP_PKEY_RSA: 4467 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; 4468 break; 4469 case EVP_PKEY_DSA: 4470 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; 4471 break; 4472 case EVP_PKEY_EC: 4473 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; 4474 break; 4475 case EVP_PKEY_DH: 4476 case EVP_PKEY_DHX: 4477 { 4478 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); 4479 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA) 4480 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; 4481 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA) 4482 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; 4483 } 4484 } 4485 if (check_type) { 4486 const unsigned char *ctypes; 4487 int ctypelen; 4488 if (c->ctypes) { 4489 ctypes = c->ctypes; 4490 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num; 4491 } else { 4492 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; 4493 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; 4494 } 4495 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) { 4496 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) { 4497 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4498 break; 4499 } 4500 } 4501 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) 4502 goto end; 4503 } else 4504 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4505 4506 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; 4507 4508 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) 4509 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4510 4511 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4512 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) 4513 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4514 } 4515 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4516 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4517 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4518 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { 4519 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4520 break; 4521 } 4522 } 4523 } 4524 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) 4525 goto end; 4526 } else 4527 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4528 4529 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) 4530 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; 4531 4532 end: 4533 4534 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 4535 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) 4536 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4537 else if (cpk->digest) 4538 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4539 } else 4540 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4541 4542 /* 4543 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the 4544 * chain is invalid. 4545 */ 4546 if (!check_flags) { 4547 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) 4548 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4549 else { 4550 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ 4551 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4552 return 0; 4553 } 4554 } 4555 return rv; 4556} 4557 4558/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ 4559void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) 4560{ 4561 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); 4562 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); 4563 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); 4564 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA); 4565 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA); 4566 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); 4567} 4568 4569/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ 4570int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 4571{ 4572 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); 4573} 4574 4575#endif 4576