t1_lib.c revision 331638
1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58/* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core@openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112#include <stdio.h> 113#include <openssl/objects.h> 114#include <openssl/evp.h> 115#include <openssl/hmac.h> 116#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 117#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 118# include <openssl/ec.h> 119#endif 120#endif 121#include <openssl/ocsp.h> 122#include <openssl/rand.h> 123#include "ssl_locl.h" 124 125const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 126 127#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 128static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 130 SSL_SESSION **psess); 131static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); 132int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); 133#endif 134 135#define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \ 136 (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val)) 137 138SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { 139 tls1_enc, 140 tls1_mac, 141 tls1_setup_key_block, 142 tls1_generate_master_secret, 143 tls1_change_cipher_state, 144 tls1_final_finish_mac, 145 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 146 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 147 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 148 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 149 tls1_alert_code, 150 tls1_export_keying_material, 151 0, 152 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 153 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 154 ssl3_handshake_write 155}; 156 157SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { 158 tls1_enc, 159 tls1_mac, 160 tls1_setup_key_block, 161 tls1_generate_master_secret, 162 tls1_change_cipher_state, 163 tls1_final_finish_mac, 164 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 165 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 166 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 167 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 168 tls1_alert_code, 169 tls1_export_keying_material, 170 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, 171 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 172 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 173 ssl3_handshake_write 174}; 175 176SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { 177 tls1_enc, 178 tls1_mac, 179 tls1_setup_key_block, 180 tls1_generate_master_secret, 181 tls1_change_cipher_state, 182 tls1_final_finish_mac, 183 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 184 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 185 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 186 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 187 tls1_alert_code, 188 tls1_export_keying_material, 189 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 190 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, 191 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 192 ssl3_set_handshake_header, 193 ssl3_handshake_write 194}; 195 196long tls1_default_timeout(void) 197{ 198 /* 199 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for 200 * http, the cache would over fill 201 */ 202 return (60 * 60 * 2); 203} 204 205int tls1_new(SSL *s) 206{ 207 if (!ssl3_new(s)) 208 return (0); 209 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 210 return (1); 211} 212 213void tls1_free(SSL *s) 214{ 215#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 216 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { 217 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 218 } 219#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 220 ssl3_free(s); 221} 222 223void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 224{ 225 ssl3_clear(s); 226 s->version = s->method->version; 227} 228 229#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 230 231static int nid_list[] = { 232 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 233 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 234 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 235 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 236 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 237 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 238 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 239 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 240 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 241 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 242 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 243 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 244 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 245 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 246 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 247 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 248 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 249 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 250 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 251 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 252 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 253 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 254 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 255 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 256 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 257 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 258 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 259 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 260}; 261 262static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { 263 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, 264 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, 265 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 266}; 267 268/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */ 269static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = { 270 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 271 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 272 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 273 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 274 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 275 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 276 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 277 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 278 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 279# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 280 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 281 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 282 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 283 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 284 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 285 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 286 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 287# endif 288}; 289 290static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { 291 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ 292 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 293 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 294 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 295 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 296 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 297 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 298 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 299 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 300# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 301 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 302 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 303 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 304 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 305 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 306 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 307 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 308# endif 309 /* 310 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set 311 * via an explicit callback or parameters. 312 */ 313 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 314 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 315 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 316 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 317 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 318 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 319 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 320# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 321 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 322 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 323 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 324 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 325 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 326 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 327 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 328 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 329# endif 330}; 331 332static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 333 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 334 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 335}; 336 337# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 338/* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */ 339static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = { 340# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 341 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 342 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 343# endif 344 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 345# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 346 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 347 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 348# endif 349 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 350# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 351 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 352 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 353# endif 354 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 355 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 356# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 357 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 358 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 359 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 360# endif 361 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 362 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 363# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 364 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 365 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 366# endif 367 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 368 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 369# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 370 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 371 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 372 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 373# endif 374 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 375 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 376 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 377}; 378# endif 379 380int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 381{ 382 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 383 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 384 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 385 return 0; 386 return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; 387} 388 389int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 390{ 391 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ 392 switch (nid) { 393 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 394 return 1; 395 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 396 return 2; 397 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 398 return 3; 399 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 400 return 4; 401 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 402 return 5; 403 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 404 return 6; 405 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 406 return 7; 407 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 408 return 8; 409 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 410 return 9; 411 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 412 return 10; 413 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 414 return 11; 415 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 416 return 12; 417 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 418 return 13; 419 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 420 return 14; 421 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 422 return 15; 423 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 424 return 16; 425 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 426 return 17; 427 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 428 return 18; 429 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 430 return 19; 431 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 432 return 20; 433 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 434 return 21; 435 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 436 return 22; 437 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 438 return 23; 439 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 440 return 24; 441 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 442 return 25; 443 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 444 return 26; 445 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 446 return 27; 447 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 448 return 28; 449 default: 450 return 0; 451 } 452} 453 454/* 455 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise 456 * preferred list. 457 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e., 458 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves. 459 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format. 460 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such 461 * lists in the first place. 462 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly 463 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility 464 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) 465 */ 466static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, 467 const unsigned char **pcurves, 468 size_t *num_curves) 469{ 470 size_t pcurveslen = 0; 471 if (sess) { 472 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 473 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 474 } else { 475 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ 476 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 477 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 478 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 479 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); 480 break; 481 482 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 483 *pcurves = suiteb_curves; 484 pcurveslen = 2; 485 break; 486 487 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 488 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; 489 pcurveslen = 2; 490 break; 491 default: 492 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 493 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 494 } 495 if (!*pcurves) { 496# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 497 if (FIPS_mode()) { 498 *pcurves = fips_curves_default; 499 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default); 500 } else 501# endif 502 { 503 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 504 *pcurves = eccurves_auto; 505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto); 506 } else { 507 *pcurves = eccurves_all; 508 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all); 509 } 510 } 511 } 512 } 513 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */ 514 if (pcurveslen & 1) { 515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 516 *num_curves = 0; 517 return 0; 518 } else { 519 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; 520 return 1; 521 } 522} 523 524/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */ 525int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) 526{ 527 const unsigned char *curves; 528 size_t num_curves, i; 529 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 530 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) 531 return 0; 532 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */ 533 if (suiteb_flags) { 534 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 535 if (p[1]) 536 return 0; 537 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { 538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 539 return 0; 540 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { 541 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 542 return 0; 543 } else /* Should never happen */ 544 return 0; 545 } 546 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) 547 return 0; 548 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) { 549 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1]) 550 return 1; 551 } 552 return 0; 553} 554 555/*- 556 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match. 557 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches 558 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for 559 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. 560 */ 561int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) 562{ 563 const unsigned char *pref, *supp; 564 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; 565 int k; 566 /* Can't do anything on client side */ 567 if (s->server == 0) 568 return -1; 569 if (nmatch == -2) { 570 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 571 /* 572 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know 573 * these are acceptable due to previous checks. 574 */ 575 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; 576 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 577 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ 578 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 579 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ 580 /* Should never happen */ 581 return NID_undef; 582 } 583 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ 584 nmatch = 0; 585 } 586 /* 587 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int 588 * but s->options is a long... 589 */ 590 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 591 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, 592 &num_supp)) 593 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ 594 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 595 if (!tls1_get_curvelist 596 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, 597 &num_pref)) 598 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; 599 600 /* 601 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them 602 * are allowed. 603 */ 604 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { 605 supp = eccurves_all; 606 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 607 } else if (num_pref == 0 && 608 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { 609 pref = eccurves_all; 610 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; 611 } 612 613 k = 0; 614 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { 615 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; 616 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { 617 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { 618 if (nmatch == k) { 619 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; 620 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); 621 } 622 k++; 623 } 624 } 625 } 626 if (nmatch == -1) 627 return k; 628 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ 629 return NID_undef; 630} 631 632int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 633 int *curves, size_t ncurves) 634{ 635 unsigned char *clist, *p; 636 size_t i; 637 /* 638 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve 639 * ids < 32 640 */ 641 unsigned long dup_list = 0; 642# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 643 EC_GROUP *curve; 644# endif 645 646 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); 647 if (!clist) 648 return 0; 649 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { 650 unsigned long idmask; 651 int id; 652 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); 653# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 654 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */ 655 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) { 656 OPENSSL_free(clist); 657 return 0; 658 } 659# endif 660# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M 661 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]); 662 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve)) 663 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { 664 if (curve) 665 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 666 OPENSSL_free(clist); 667 return 0; 668 } else 669 EC_GROUP_free(curve); 670# endif 671 idmask = 1L << id; 672 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { 673 OPENSSL_free(clist); 674 return 0; 675 } 676 dup_list |= idmask; 677 s2n(id, p); 678 } 679 if (*pext) 680 OPENSSL_free(*pext); 681 *pext = clist; 682 *pextlen = ncurves * 2; 683 return 1; 684} 685 686# define MAX_CURVELIST 28 687 688typedef struct { 689 size_t nidcnt; 690 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; 691} nid_cb_st; 692 693static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 694{ 695 nid_cb_st *narg = arg; 696 size_t i; 697 int nid; 698 char etmp[20]; 699 if (elem == NULL) 700 return 0; 701 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) 702 return 0; 703 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 704 return 0; 705 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 706 etmp[len] = 0; 707 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); 708 if (nid == NID_undef) 709 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); 710 if (nid == NID_undef) 711 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); 712 if (nid == NID_undef) 713 return 0; 714 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) 715 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) 716 return 0; 717 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; 718 return 1; 719} 720 721/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ 722int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, 723 const char *str) 724{ 725 nid_cb_st ncb; 726 ncb.nidcnt = 0; 727 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) 728 return 0; 729 if (pext == NULL) 730 return 1; 731 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); 732} 733 734/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ 735static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, 736 EC_KEY *ec) 737{ 738 int is_prime, id; 739 const EC_GROUP *grp; 740 const EC_METHOD *meth; 741 if (!ec) 742 return 0; 743 /* Determine if it is a prime field */ 744 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); 745 if (!grp) 746 return 0; 747 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); 748 if (!meth) 749 return 0; 750 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) 751 is_prime = 1; 752 else 753 is_prime = 0; 754 /* Determine curve ID */ 755 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); 756 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); 757 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ 758 if (id) { 759 curve_id[0] = 0; 760 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; 761 } else { 762 curve_id[0] = 0xff; 763 if (is_prime) 764 curve_id[1] = 0x01; 765 else 766 curve_id[1] = 0x02; 767 } 768 if (comp_id) { 769 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) 770 return 0; 771 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { 772 if (is_prime) 773 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 774 else 775 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 776 } else 777 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 778 } 779 return 1; 780} 781 782/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ 783static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, 784 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) 785{ 786 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves; 787 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i; 788 int j; 789 /* 790 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is 791 * supported (see RFC4492). 792 */ 793 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 794 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 795 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 796 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { 797 if (*comp_id == *pformats) 798 break; 799 } 800 if (i == num_formats) 801 return 0; 802 } 803 if (!curve_id) 804 return 1; 805 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ 806 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { 807 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 808 return 0; 809 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) { 810 /* 811 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check. 812 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension 813 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. 814 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves 815 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension. 816 */ 817 break; 818 } 819 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { 820 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1]) 821 break; 822 } 823 if (i == num_curves) 824 return 0; 825 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ 826 if (!s->server) 827 return 1; 828 } 829 return 1; 830} 831 832static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, 833 size_t *num_formats) 834{ 835 /* 836 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default 837 */ 838 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 839 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 840 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 841 } else { 842 *pformats = ecformats_default; 843 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ 844 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 845 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; 846 else 847 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); 848 } 849} 850 851/* 852 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC 853 * certificates have compatible curves and compression. 854 */ 855static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 856{ 857 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; 858 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 859 int rv; 860 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); 861 if (!pkey) 862 return 0; 863 /* If not EC nothing to do */ 864 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { 865 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 866 return 1; 867 } 868 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); 869 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 870 if (!rv) 871 return 0; 872 /* 873 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported 874 * curves extension. 875 */ 876 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); 877 if (!rv) 878 return 0; 879 /* 880 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or 881 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary. 882 */ 883 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { 884 int check_md; 885 size_t i; 886 CERT *c = s->cert; 887 if (curve_id[0]) 888 return 0; 889 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ 890 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) 891 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; 892 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) 893 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; 894 else 895 return 0; /* Should never happen */ 896 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 897 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 898 break; 899 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen) 900 return 0; 901 if (set_ee_md == 2) { 902 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) 903 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256(); 904 else 905 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384(); 906 } 907 } 908 return rv; 909} 910 911# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 912/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ 913int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) 914{ 915 unsigned char curve_id[2]; 916 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; 917# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 918 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ 919 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) 920 return 1; 921# endif 922 /* 923 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other 924 * curves permitted. 925 */ 926 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 927 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ 928 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) 929 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; 930 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) 931 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; 932 else 933 return 0; 934 curve_id[0] = 0; 935 /* Check this curve is acceptable */ 936 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) 937 return 0; 938 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */ 939 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 940 return 1; 941 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */ 942 else { 943 unsigned char curve_tmp[2]; 944 if (!ec) 945 return 0; 946 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) 947 return 0; 948 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1]) 949 return 1; 950 return 0; 951 } 952 953 } 954 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { 955 /* Need a shared curve */ 956 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) 957 return 1; 958 else 959 return 0; 960 } 961 if (!ec) { 962 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) 963 return 1; 964 else 965 return 0; 966 } 967 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec)) 968 return 0; 969/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ 970# if 0 971 return 1; 972# else 973 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); 974# endif 975} 976# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ 977 978#else 979 980static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) 981{ 982 return 1; 983} 984 985#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 986 987#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 988 989/* 990 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 991 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 992 */ 993 994# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 995# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 996# else 997# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 998# endif 999 1000# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1001# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 1002# else 1003# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 1004# endif 1005 1006# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1007# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1008 /* */ 1009# else 1010# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 1011# endif 1012 1013# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 1014 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 1015 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 1016 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 1017 1018static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 1019# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 1020 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1022# endif 1023# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 1024 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 1026# endif 1027# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 1028 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 1029# endif 1030}; 1031 1032# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1033static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { 1034 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 1035 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 1036}; 1037# endif 1038size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs) 1039{ 1040 /* 1041 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other 1042 * preferences. 1043 */ 1044# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1045 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1046 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: 1047 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1048 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); 1049 1050 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: 1051 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; 1052 return 2; 1053 1054 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: 1055 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; 1056 return 2; 1057 } 1058# endif 1059 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ 1060 if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { 1061 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; 1062 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; 1063 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { 1064 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; 1065 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; 1066 } else { 1067 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; 1068 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 1069 } 1070} 1071 1072/* 1073 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature 1074 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. 1075 */ 1076int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, 1077 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) 1078{ 1079 const unsigned char *sent_sigs; 1080 size_t sent_sigslen, i; 1081 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); 1082 /* Should never happen */ 1083 if (sigalg == -1) 1084 return -1; 1085 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ 1086 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { 1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1088 return 0; 1089 } 1090# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1091 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { 1092 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; 1093 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ 1094 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) 1095 return 0; 1096 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { 1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); 1098 return 0; 1099 } 1100 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ 1101 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { 1102 if (curve_id[0]) 1103 return 0; 1104 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { 1105 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { 1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1107 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1108 return 0; 1109 } 1110 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { 1111 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { 1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, 1113 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); 1114 return 0; 1115 } 1116 } else 1117 return 0; 1118 } 1119 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) 1120 return 0; 1121# endif 1122 1123 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ 1124 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs); 1125 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { 1126 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) 1127 break; 1128 } 1129 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ 1130 if (i == sent_sigslen 1131 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 1132 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); 1134 return 0; 1135 } 1136 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); 1137 if (*pmd == NULL) { 1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); 1139 return 0; 1140 } 1141 /* 1142 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. 1143 */ 1144 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert) 1145 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd; 1146 return 1; 1147} 1148 1149/* 1150 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't 1151 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike 1152 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global 1153 * settings. 1154 */ 1155void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) 1156{ 1157 CERT *c = s->cert; 1158 const unsigned char *sigalgs; 1159 size_t i, sigalgslen; 1160 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; 1161 c->mask_a = 0; 1162 c->mask_k = 0; 1163 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ 1164 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) 1165 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; 1166 else 1167 c->mask_ssl = 0; 1168 /* 1169 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for 1170 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. 1171 */ 1172 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs); 1173 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { 1174 switch (sigalgs[1]) { 1175# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1176 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 1177 have_rsa = 1; 1178 break; 1179# endif 1180# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1181 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 1182 have_dsa = 1; 1183 break; 1184# endif 1185# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 1186 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 1187 have_ecdsa = 1; 1188 break; 1189# endif 1190 } 1191 } 1192 /* 1193 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate 1194 * signature algorithms. 1195 */ 1196 if (!have_rsa) { 1197 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; 1198 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr; 1199 } 1200 if (!have_dsa) { 1201 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; 1202 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; 1203 } 1204 if (!have_ecdsa) { 1205 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; 1206 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; 1207 } 1208# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 1209 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) { 1210 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; 1211 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; 1212 } 1213# endif 1214# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1215 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ 1216 if (!s->psk_client_callback) { 1217 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; 1218 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; 1219 } 1220# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1221# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1222 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { 1223 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; 1224 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; 1225 } 1226# endif 1227 c->valid = 1; 1228} 1229 1230unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1231 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1232{ 1233 int extdatalen = 0; 1234 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1235 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1236# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1237 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ 1238 int using_ecc = 0; 1239 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1240 int i; 1241 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1242 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1243 1244 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { 1245 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1246 1247 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1248 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1249 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) 1250 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 1251 using_ecc = 1; 1252 break; 1253 } 1254 } 1255 } 1256# endif 1257 1258 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 1259 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1260 return orig; 1261 1262 ret += 2; 1263 1264 if (ret >= limit) 1265 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1266 1267 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1268 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 1269 size_t size_str; 1270 1271 /*- 1272 * check for enough space. 1273 * 4 for the servername type and entension length 1274 * 2 for servernamelist length 1275 * 1 for the hostname type 1276 * 2 for hostname length 1277 * + hostname length 1278 */ 1279 size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname); 1280 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit)) 1281 return NULL; 1282 1283 /* extension type and length */ 1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret); 1286 1287 /* length of servername list */ 1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret); 1289 1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 1292 s2n(size_str, ret); 1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 1294 ret += size_str; 1295 } 1296 1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 1298 if (s->renegotiate) { 1299 int el; 1300 1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1303 return NULL; 1304 } 1305 1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) 1307 return NULL; 1308 1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1310 s2n(el, ret); 1311 1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1314 return NULL; 1315 } 1316 1317 ret += el; 1318 } 1319# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the 1322 * Client Hello message */ 1323 1324 size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { 1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1327 return NULL; 1328 } 1329 1330 /*- 1331 * check for enough space. 1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length 1333 * 1 for the srp user identity 1334 * + srp user identity length 1335 */ 1336 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit)) 1337 return NULL; 1338 1339 /* fill in the extension */ 1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); 1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret); 1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; 1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 1344 ret += login_len; 1345 } 1346# endif 1347 1348# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1349 if (using_ecc) { 1350 /* 1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message 1352 */ 1353 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; 1354 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; 1355 1356 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); 1357 1358 if (num_formats > 255) { 1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1360 return NULL; 1361 } 1362 /*- 1363 * check for enough space. 1364 * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length 1365 * 1 byte for the length of the formats 1366 * + formats length 1367 */ 1368 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit)) 1369 return NULL; 1370 1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1372 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ 1373 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); 1374 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; 1375 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); 1376 ret += num_formats; 1377 1378 /* 1379 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message 1380 */ 1381 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1382 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) 1383 return NULL; 1384 1385 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { 1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1387 return NULL; 1388 } 1389 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves; 1390 /*- 1391 * check for enough space. 1392 * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length 1393 * 2 bytes for the curve list length 1394 * + curve list length 1395 */ 1396 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + curves_list_len, limit)) 1397 return NULL; 1398 1399 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); 1400 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); 1401 s2n(curves_list_len, ret); 1402 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len); 1403 ret += curves_list_len; 1404 } 1405# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1406 1407 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1408 size_t ticklen; 1409 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 1410 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 1411 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1412 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { 1413 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 1414 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 1415 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 1416 return NULL; 1417 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 1418 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); 1419 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 1420 } else 1421 ticklen = 0; 1422 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 1423 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 1424 goto skip_ext; 1425 /* 1426 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for 1427 * ticket 1428 */ 1429 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit)) 1430 return NULL; 1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1432 s2n(ticklen, ret); 1433 if (ticklen > 0) { 1434 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 1435 ret += ticklen; 1436 } 1437 } 1438 skip_ext: 1439 1440 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 1441 size_t salglen; 1442 const unsigned char *salg; 1443 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); 1444 1445 /*- 1446 * check for enough space. 1447 * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length 1448 * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length 1449 * + sigalg list length 1450 */ 1451 if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit)) 1452 return NULL; 1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); 1454 s2n(salglen + 2, ret); 1455 s2n(salglen, ret); 1456 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen); 1457 ret += salglen; 1458 } 1459# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1460 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1461 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 1462 1463 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 1464 return NULL; 1465 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1466 return NULL; 1467 1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1469 s2n(col + 2, ret); 1470 s2n(col, ret); 1471 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 1472 ret += col; 1473 } 1474# endif 1475 1476 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 1477 int i; 1478 size_t extlen, idlen; 1479 int lentmp; 1480 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1481 1482 idlen = 0; 1483 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1484 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1485 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 1486 if (lentmp <= 0) 1487 return NULL; 1488 idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2; 1489 } 1490 1491 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 1492 lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 1493 if (lentmp < 0) 1494 return NULL; 1495 extlen = (size_t)lentmp; 1496 } else 1497 extlen = 0; 1498 1499 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 1500 return NULL; 1501 /* 1502 * 2 bytes for status request type 1503 * 2 bytes for status request len 1504 * 1 byte for OCSP request type 1505 * 2 bytes for length of ids 1506 * 2 bytes for length of extensions 1507 * + length of ids 1508 * + length of extensions 1509 */ 1510 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit)) 1511 return NULL; 1512 1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1514 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 1515 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 1516 s2n(idlen, ret); 1517 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { 1518 /* save position of id len */ 1519 unsigned char *q = ret; 1520 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 1521 /* skip over id len */ 1522 ret += 2; 1523 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 1524 /* write id len */ 1525 s2n(lentmp, q); 1526 } 1527 s2n(extlen, ret); 1528 if (extlen > 0) 1529 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 1530 } 1531# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1532 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 1533 1534 /*- 1535 * check for enough space. 1536 * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length 1537 * 1 byte for the mode 1538 */ 1539 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) 1540 return NULL; 1541 1542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1543 s2n(1, ret); 1544 /*- 1545 * Set mode: 1546 * 1: peer may send requests 1547 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1548 */ 1549 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1550 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1551 else 1552 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1553# endif 1554 1555# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1556 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1557 /* 1558 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support 1559 * for Next Protocol Negotiation 1560 */ 1561 1562 /*- 1563 * check for enough space. 1564 * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length 1565 */ 1566 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) 1567 return NULL; 1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1569 s2n(0, ret); 1570 } 1571# endif 1572 1573 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { 1574 /*- 1575 * check for enough space. 1576 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length 1577 * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length 1578 * + ALPN protocol list length 1579 */ 1580 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit)) 1581 return NULL; 1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1583 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1584 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); 1585 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); 1586 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; 1587 s->cert->alpn_sent = 1; 1588 } 1589# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { 1591 int el; 1592 1593 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1594 1595 /*- 1596 * check for enough space. 1597 * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length 1598 * + SRTP profiles length 1599 */ 1600 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) 1601 return NULL; 1602 1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1604 s2n(el, ret); 1605 1606 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1608 return NULL; 1609 } 1610 ret += el; 1611 } 1612# endif 1613 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); 1614 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ 1615 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) 1616 return NULL; 1617 1618 /* 1619 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See 1620 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this 1621 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always 1622 * appear last. 1623 */ 1624 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { 1625 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1626 /* 1627 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the 1628 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c 1629 * does not. 1630 */ 1631 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 1632 hlen -= 5; 1633 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { 1634 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 1635 if (hlen >= 4) 1636 hlen -= 4; 1637 else 1638 hlen = 0; 1639 1640 /*- 1641 * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already 1642 * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200, 1643 * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer 1644 * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway. 1645 * 1646 * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length 1647 * + padding length 1648 */ 1649 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit)) 1650 return NULL; 1651 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 1652 s2n(hlen, ret); 1653 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 1654 ret += hlen; 1655 } 1656 } 1657 1658 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1659 return orig; 1660 1661 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1662 return ret; 1663} 1664 1665unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 1666 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 1667{ 1668 int extdatalen = 0; 1669 unsigned char *orig = buf; 1670 unsigned char *ret = buf; 1671# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1672 int next_proto_neg_seen; 1673# endif 1674# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1675 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1676 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1677 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 1678 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1679 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1680# endif 1681 /* 1682 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation 1683 */ 1684 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1685 return orig; 1686 1687 ret += 2; 1688 if (ret >= limit) 1689 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 1690 1691 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 1692 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { 1693 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) 1694 return NULL; 1695 1696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); 1697 s2n(0, ret); 1698 } 1699 1700 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { 1701 int el; 1702 1703 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { 1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1705 return NULL; 1706 } 1707 1708 /*- 1709 * check for enough space. 1710 * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length 1711 * + reneg data length 1712 */ 1713 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) 1714 return NULL; 1715 1716 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); 1717 s2n(el, ret); 1718 1719 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1721 return NULL; 1722 } 1723 1724 ret += el; 1725 } 1726# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1727 if (using_ecc) { 1728 const unsigned char *plist; 1729 size_t plistlen; 1730 /* 1731 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message 1732 */ 1733 1734 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); 1735 1736 if (plistlen > 255) { 1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1738 return NULL; 1739 } 1740 1741 /*- 1742 * check for enough space. 1743 * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length 1744 * 1 byte for the points format list length 1745 * + length of points format list 1746 */ 1747 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit)) 1748 return NULL; 1749 1750 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); 1751 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); 1752 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; 1753 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); 1754 ret += plistlen; 1755 1756 } 1757 /* 1758 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves 1759 * extension 1760 */ 1761# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1762 1763 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { 1764 /*- 1765 * check for enough space. 1766 * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length 1767 */ 1768 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) 1769 return NULL; 1770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); 1771 s2n(0, ret); 1772 } else { 1773 /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */ 1774 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 1775 } 1776 1777 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { 1778 /*- 1779 * check for enough space. 1780 * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length 1781 */ 1782 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) 1783 return NULL; 1784 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 1785 s2n(0, ret); 1786 } 1787# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1788 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 1789 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 1790 1791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 1792 return NULL; 1793 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 1794 return NULL; 1795 1796 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 1797 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 1798 s2n(sol, ret); 1799 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 1800 ret += sol; 1801 } 1802# endif 1803 1804# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1805 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { 1806 int el; 1807 1808 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 1809 1810 /*- 1811 * check for enough space. 1812 * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length 1813 * + length of the SRTP profiles list 1814 */ 1815 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) 1816 return NULL; 1817 1818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); 1819 s2n(el, ret); 1820 1821 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { 1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1823 return NULL; 1824 } 1825 ret += el; 1826 } 1827# endif 1828 1829 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 1830 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) 1831 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { 1832 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 1833 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 1834 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 1835 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 1836 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 1837 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 1838 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 1839 }; 1840 1841 /* check for enough space. */ 1842 if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit)) 1843 return NULL; 1844 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext)); 1845 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext); 1846 1847 } 1848# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1849 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 1850 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { 1851 /*- 1852 * check for enough space. 1853 * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length 1854 * 1 byte for the mode 1855 */ 1856 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) 1857 return NULL; 1858 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); 1859 s2n(1, ret); 1860 /*- 1861 * Set mode: 1862 * 1: peer may send requests 1863 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 1864 */ 1865 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 1866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1867 else 1868 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1869 1870 } 1871# endif 1872 1873# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1874 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 1875 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1876 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { 1877 const unsigned char *npa; 1878 unsigned int npalen; 1879 int r; 1880 1881 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 1882 s-> 1883 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 1884 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1885 /*- 1886 * check for enough space. 1887 * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length 1888 * + length of protocols list 1889 */ 1890 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit)) 1891 return NULL; 1892 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); 1893 s2n(npalen, ret); 1894 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 1895 ret += npalen; 1896 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1897 } 1898 } 1899# endif 1900 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) 1901 return NULL; 1902 1903 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 1904 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; 1905 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; 1906 1907 /*- 1908 * check for enough space. 1909 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length 1910 * 2 bytes for ALPN data length 1911 * 1 byte for selected protocol length 1912 * + length of the selected protocol 1913 */ 1914 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit)) 1915 return NULL; 1916 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); 1917 s2n(3 + len, ret); 1918 s2n(1 + len, ret); 1919 *ret++ = (unsigned char)len; 1920 memcpy(ret, selected, len); 1921 ret += len; 1922 } 1923 1924 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) 1925 return orig; 1926 1927 s2n(extdatalen, orig); 1928 return ret; 1929} 1930 1931# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1932/*- 1933 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 1934 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 1935 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 1936 * SNI, 1937 * elliptic_curves 1938 * ec_point_formats 1939 * 1940 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 1941 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 1942 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 1943 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 1944 */ 1945static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 1946 const unsigned char *limit) 1947{ 1948 unsigned short type, size; 1949 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 1950 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 1951 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 1952 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 1953 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 1954 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 1955 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 1956 1957 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 1958 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 1959 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 1960 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 1961 }; 1962 1963 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 1964 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 1965 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 1966 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 1967 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 1968 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 1969 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 1970 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 1971 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 1972 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 1973 }; 1974 1975 if (limit - data <= 2) 1976 return; 1977 data += 2; 1978 1979 if (limit - data < 4) 1980 return; 1981 n2s(data, type); 1982 n2s(data, size); 1983 1984 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1985 return; 1986 1987 if (limit - data < size) 1988 return; 1989 data += size; 1990 1991 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 1992 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 1993 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 1994 1995 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) 1996 return; 1997 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 1998 return; 1999 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 2000 return; 2001 } else { 2002 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 2003 2004 if (limit - data != (int)(len)) 2005 return; 2006 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 2007 return; 2008 } 2009 2010 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 2011} 2012# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2013 2014/* 2015 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a 2016 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type 2017 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the 2018 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on 2019 * success. 2020 */ 2021static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 2022 unsigned data_len, int *al) 2023{ 2024 unsigned i; 2025 unsigned proto_len; 2026 2027 if (data_len < 2) 2028 goto parse_error; 2029 2030 /* 2031 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, 2032 * length-prefixed strings. 2033 */ 2034 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]); 2035 data_len -= 2; 2036 data += 2; 2037 if (data_len != i) 2038 goto parse_error; 2039 2040 if (data_len < 2) 2041 goto parse_error; 2042 2043 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) { 2044 proto_len = data[i]; 2045 i++; 2046 2047 if (proto_len == 0) 2048 goto parse_error; 2049 2050 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len) 2051 goto parse_error; 2052 2053 i += proto_len; 2054 } 2055 2056 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) 2057 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); 2058 s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len); 2059 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) { 2060 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2061 return -1; 2062 } 2063 memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len); 2064 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len; 2065 return 0; 2066 2067 parse_error: 2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2069 return -1; 2070} 2071 2072/* 2073 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. 2074 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. 2075 * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al set only on failure 2076 */ 2077static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al) 2078{ 2079 const unsigned char *selected = NULL; 2080 unsigned char selected_len = 0; 2081 2082 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) { 2083 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, 2084 s->cert->alpn_proposed, 2085 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len, 2086 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); 2087 2088 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2089 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2090 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 2091 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { 2092 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2093 return 0; 2094 } 2095 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); 2096 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; 2097# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2098 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ 2099 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2100# endif 2101 } 2102 } 2103 2104 return 1; 2105} 2106 2107static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2108 unsigned char *limit, int *al) 2109{ 2110 unsigned short type; 2111 unsigned short size; 2112 unsigned short len; 2113 unsigned char *data = *p; 2114 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 2115 2116 s->servername_done = 0; 2117 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 2118# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2119 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2120# endif 2121 2122 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2123 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2124 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 2125 } 2126 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; 2127 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) { 2128 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); 2129 s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL; 2130 } 2131 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0; 2132# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2133 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 2134 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 2135# endif 2136 2137# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2138 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 2139 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); 2140# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2141 2142 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ 2143 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 2144 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs); 2145 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; 2146 } 2147# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2148 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { 2149 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); 2150 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; 2151 } 2152# endif 2153 2154 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 2155 2156 if (data == limit) 2157 goto ri_check; 2158 2159 if (limit - data < 2) 2160 goto err; 2161 2162 n2s(data, len); 2163 2164 if (limit - data != len) 2165 goto err; 2166 2167 while (limit - data >= 4) { 2168 n2s(data, type); 2169 n2s(data, size); 2170 2171 if (limit - data < size) 2172 goto err; 2173# if 0 2174 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); 2175# endif 2176 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2177 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2178/*- 2179 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 2180 * 2181 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 2182 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 2183 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 2184 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 2185 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 2186 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 2187 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 2188 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 2189 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 2190 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 2191 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 2192 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 2193 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 2194 * the value of the Host: field. 2195 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 2196 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 2197 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 2198 * extension. 2199 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 2200 * 2201 */ 2202 2203 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2204 unsigned char *sdata; 2205 int servname_type; 2206 int dsize; 2207 2208 if (size < 2) 2209 goto err; 2210 n2s(data, dsize); 2211 size -= 2; 2212 if (dsize > size) 2213 goto err; 2214 2215 sdata = data; 2216 while (dsize > 3) { 2217 servname_type = *(sdata++); 2218 n2s(sdata, len); 2219 dsize -= 3; 2220 2221 if (len > dsize) 2222 goto err; 2223 2224 if (s->servername_done == 0) 2225 switch (servname_type) { 2226 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 2227 if (!s->hit) { 2228 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) 2229 goto err; 2230 2231 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 2232 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2233 return 0; 2234 } 2235 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = 2236 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { 2237 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2238 return 0; 2239 } 2240 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 2241 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; 2242 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 2243 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 2244 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 2245 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2246 return 0; 2247 } 2248 s->servername_done = 1; 2249 2250 } else 2251 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 2252 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 2253 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, 2254 (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 2255 2256 break; 2257 2258 default: 2259 break; 2260 } 2261 2262 dsize -= len; 2263 } 2264 if (dsize != 0) 2265 goto err; 2266 2267 } 2268# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { 2270 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) 2271 goto err; 2272 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 2273 goto err; 2274 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) 2275 return -1; 2276 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 2277 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; 2278 2279 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 2280 goto err; 2281 } 2282# endif 2283 2284# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2286 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2287 int ecpointformatlist_length; 2288 2289 if (size == 0) 2290 goto err; 2291 2292 ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2293 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 2294 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 2295 goto err; 2296 if (!s->hit) { 2297 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { 2298 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2299 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 2300 } 2301 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2302 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2303 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2304 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2305 return 0; 2306 } 2307 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2308 ecpointformatlist_length; 2309 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2310 ecpointformatlist_length); 2311 } 2312# if 0 2313 fprintf(stderr, 2314 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", 2315 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 2316 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2317 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2318 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2319 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2320# endif 2321 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { 2322 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2323 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 2324 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 2325 2326 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 2327 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || 2328 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ 2329 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) 2330 goto err; 2331 2332 if (!s->hit) { 2333 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 2334 goto err; 2335 2336 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 2337 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = 2338 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { 2339 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2340 return 0; 2341 } 2342 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 2343 ellipticcurvelist_length; 2344 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, 2345 ellipticcurvelist_length); 2346 } 2347# if 0 2348 fprintf(stderr, 2349 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", 2350 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 2351 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 2352 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 2353 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2354 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2355# endif 2356 } 2357# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2358# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2359 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2360 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2361 2362 if (size < 2) { 2363 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2364 return 0; 2365 } 2366 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2367 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2369 return 0; 2370 } 2371 2372 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2373 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2374 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2375 } 2376 2377 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2378 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 2379 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2380 else 2381 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 2382 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 2383 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2384 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2385 return 0; 2386 } 2387 } 2388# endif 2389 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2390 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2391 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2392 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2393 { 2394 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2395 return 0; 2396 } 2397 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2398 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2399 return 0; 2400 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2401 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { 2402 int dsize; 2403 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 2404 goto err; 2405 n2s(data, dsize); 2406 size -= 2; 2407 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) 2408 goto err; 2409 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 2410 goto err; 2411 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { 2412 2413 if (size < 5) 2414 goto err; 2415 2416 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 2417 size--; 2418 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 2419 const unsigned char *sdata; 2420 int dsize; 2421 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 2422 n2s(data, dsize); 2423 size -= 2; 2424 if (dsize > size) 2425 goto err; 2426 2427 /* 2428 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake 2429 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 2430 */ 2431 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, 2432 OCSP_RESPID_free); 2433 if (dsize > 0) { 2434 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); 2435 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { 2436 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2437 return 0; 2438 } 2439 } else { 2440 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; 2441 } 2442 2443 while (dsize > 0) { 2444 OCSP_RESPID *id; 2445 int idsize; 2446 if (dsize < 4) 2447 goto err; 2448 n2s(data, idsize); 2449 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 2450 size -= 2 + idsize; 2451 if (dsize < 0) 2452 goto err; 2453 sdata = data; 2454 data += idsize; 2455 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); 2456 if (!id) 2457 goto err; 2458 if (data != sdata) { 2459 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2460 goto err; 2461 } 2462 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { 2463 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 2464 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2465 return 0; 2466 } 2467 } 2468 2469 /* Read in request_extensions */ 2470 if (size < 2) 2471 goto err; 2472 n2s(data, dsize); 2473 size -= 2; 2474 if (dsize != size) 2475 goto err; 2476 sdata = data; 2477 if (dsize > 0) { 2478 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { 2479 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 2480 X509_EXTENSION_free); 2481 } 2482 2483 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 2484 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); 2485 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) 2486 goto err; 2487 } 2488 } 2489 /* 2490 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. 2491 */ 2492 else 2493 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 2494 } 2495# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2496 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2497 switch (data[0]) { 2498 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 2499 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2500 break; 2501 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 2502 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2503 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2504 break; 2505 default: 2506 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2507 return 0; 2508 } 2509 } 2510# endif 2511# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2512 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2513 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2514 /*- 2515 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 2516 * renegotiation. 2517 * 2518 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 2519 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 2520 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 2521 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 2522 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 2523 * anything like that, but this might change). 2524 * 2525 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 2526 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 2527 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 2528 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 2529 * Finished message could have been computed.) 2530 */ 2531 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2532 } 2533# endif 2534 2535 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && 2536 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2537 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0) 2538 return 0; 2539 } 2540 2541 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 2542# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2543 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) 2544 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2545 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2546 return 0; 2547 } 2548# endif 2549 2550 data += size; 2551 } 2552 2553 /* Spurious data on the end */ 2554 if (data != limit) 2555 goto err; 2556 2557 *p = data; 2558 2559 ri_check: 2560 2561 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 2562 2563 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 2564 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2565 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 2567 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2568 return 0; 2569 } 2570 2571 return 1; 2572err: 2573 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2574 return 0; 2575} 2576 2577/* 2578 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data 2579 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking. 2580 */ 2581 2582static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, 2583 const unsigned char *data, 2584 const unsigned char *limit, 2585 int *al) 2586{ 2587 unsigned short type, size, len; 2588 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */ 2589 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) 2590 return 1; 2591 2592 if (limit - data <= 2) 2593 return 1; 2594 n2s(data, len); 2595 2596 if (limit - data < len) 2597 return 1; 2598 2599 while (limit - data >= 4) { 2600 n2s(data, type); 2601 n2s(data, size); 2602 2603 if (limit - data < size) 2604 return 1; 2605 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2606 return 0; 2607 2608 data += size; 2609 } 2610 2611 return 1; 2612} 2613 2614int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2615 unsigned char *limit) 2616{ 2617 int al = -1; 2618 unsigned char *ptmp = *p; 2619 /* 2620 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled 2621 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically 2622 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions 2623 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure. 2624 */ 2625 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2626 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2627 return 0; 2628 } 2629 2630 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { 2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); 2632 return 0; 2633 } 2634 2635 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); 2636 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) { 2637 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 2638 return 0; 2639 } 2640 2641 return 1; 2642} 2643 2644# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2645/* 2646 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 2647 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly 2648 * fill the length of the block. 2649 */ 2650static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 2651{ 2652 unsigned int off = 0; 2653 2654 while (off < len) { 2655 if (d[off] == 0) 2656 return 0; 2657 off += d[off]; 2658 off++; 2659 } 2660 2661 return off == len; 2662} 2663# endif 2664 2665static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, 2666 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 2667{ 2668 unsigned short length; 2669 unsigned short type; 2670 unsigned short size; 2671 unsigned char *data = *p; 2672 int tlsext_servername = 0; 2673 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 2674 2675# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2676 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 2677# endif 2678 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2679 2680 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2681 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2682 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; 2683 } 2684# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2685 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 2686 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 2687# endif 2688 2689 if ((d + n) - data <= 2) 2690 goto ri_check; 2691 2692 n2s(data, length); 2693 if ((d + n) - data != length) { 2694 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2695 return 0; 2696 } 2697 2698 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { 2699 n2s(data, type); 2700 n2s(data, size); 2701 2702 if ((d + n) - data < size) 2703 goto ri_check; 2704 2705 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 2706 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); 2707 2708 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { 2709 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { 2710 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2711 return 0; 2712 } 2713 tlsext_servername = 1; 2714 } 2715# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2716 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { 2717 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2718 int ecpointformatlist_length; 2719 2720 if (size == 0) { 2721 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2722 return 0; 2723 } 2724 2725 ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 2726 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { 2727 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2728 return 0; 2729 } 2730 if (!s->hit) { 2731 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 2732 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 2733 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 2734 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = 2735 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { 2736 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2737 return 0; 2738 } 2739 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 2740 ecpointformatlist_length; 2741 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, 2742 ecpointformatlist_length); 2743 } 2744# if 0 2745 fprintf(stderr, 2746 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 2747 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2748 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2749 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); 2750 fprintf(stderr, "\n"); 2751# endif 2752 } 2753# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2754 2755 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 2756 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 2757 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, 2758 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 2759 { 2760 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2761 return 0; 2762 } 2763 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2764 || (size > 0)) { 2765 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2766 return 0; 2767 } 2768 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2769 } 2770# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2771 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { 2772 unsigned char *sdata = data; 2773 2774 if (size < 2) { 2775 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2776 return 0; 2777 } 2778 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2779 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { 2780 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2781 return 0; 2782 } 2783 2784 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2785 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2786 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 2787 } 2788 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2789 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2790 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2791 } else { 2792 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 2793 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 2794 } 2795 2796 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 2797 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2798 return 0; 2799 } 2800 } 2801# endif 2802 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { 2803 /* 2804 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status 2805 * request message. 2806 */ 2807 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { 2808 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2809 return 0; 2810 } 2811 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 2812 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 2813 } 2814# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 2815 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 2816 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { 2817 unsigned char *selected; 2818 unsigned char selected_len; 2819 2820 /* We must have requested it. */ 2821 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { 2822 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2823 return 0; 2824 } 2825 /* The data must be valid */ 2826 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { 2827 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2828 return 0; 2829 } 2830 if (s-> 2831 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, 2832 size, 2833 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != 2834 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 2835 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2836 return 0; 2837 } 2838 /* 2839 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in 2840 * a single Serverhello 2841 */ 2842 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); 2843 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 2844 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { 2845 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2846 return 0; 2847 } 2848 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 2849 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 2850 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 2851 } 2852# endif 2853 2854 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { 2855 unsigned len; 2856 2857 /* We must have requested it. */ 2858 if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) { 2859 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 2860 return 0; 2861 } 2862 if (size < 4) { 2863 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2864 return 0; 2865 } 2866 /*- 2867 * The extension data consists of: 2868 * uint16 list_length 2869 * uint8 proto_length; 2870 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; 2871 */ 2872 len = data[0]; 2873 len <<= 8; 2874 len |= data[1]; 2875 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) { 2876 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2877 return 0; 2878 } 2879 len = data[2]; 2880 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) { 2881 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2882 return 0; 2883 } 2884 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) 2885 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); 2886 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); 2887 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { 2888 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2889 return 0; 2890 } 2891 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); 2892 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; 2893 } 2894 2895 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { 2896 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2897 return 0; 2898 renegotiate_seen = 1; 2899 } 2900# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2901 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { 2902 switch (data[0]) { 2903 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 2904 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2905 break; 2906 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 2907 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 2908 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 2909 break; 2910 default: 2911 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2912 return 0; 2913 } 2914 } 2915# endif 2916# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 2917 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { 2918 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) 2919 return 0; 2920 } 2921# endif 2922 /* 2923 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a 2924 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback 2925 */ 2926 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) 2927 return 0; 2928 2929 data += size; 2930 } 2931 2932 if (data != d + n) { 2933 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2934 return 0; 2935 } 2936 2937 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { 2938 if (s->tlsext_hostname) { 2939 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { 2940 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 2941 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { 2942 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2943 return 0; 2944 } 2945 } else { 2946 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 2947 return 0; 2948 } 2949 } 2950 } 2951 2952 *p = data; 2953 2954 ri_check: 2955 2956 /* 2957 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid 2958 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello 2959 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. 2960 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which 2961 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on 2962 * initial connect only. 2963 */ 2964 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 2965 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { 2966 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 2968 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 2969 return 0; 2970 } 2971 2972 return 1; 2973} 2974 2975int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2976{ 2977 2978# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2979 { 2980 int r = 1; 2981 2982 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 2983 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 2984 s-> 2985 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 2986 if (!r) 2987 return -1; 2988 } 2989 2990 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2991 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 2992 /* shouldn't really happen */ 2993 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 2994 } 2995 2996 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 2997 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 2998 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 2999 } else { 3000 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = 3001 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 3002 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 3003 } 3004 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 3006 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3007 return -1; 3008 } 3009 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = 3010 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 3011 } 3012 3013 if (r == 2) 3014 /* 3015 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate 3016 * server opaque PRF input 3017 */ 3018 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 3019 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 3020 } 3021# endif 3022 3023 s->cert->alpn_sent = 0; 3024 return 1; 3025} 3026 3027int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 3028{ 3029 return 1; 3030} 3031 3032static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 3033{ 3034 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 3035 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 3036 3037# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3038 /* 3039 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely 3040 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 3041 */ 3042 /* 3043 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely 3044 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 3045 */ 3046# endif 3047 3048 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3049 ret = 3050 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3051 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3052 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 3053 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3054 ret = 3055 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3056 s-> 3057 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3058 3059# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 3060 { 3061 /* 3062 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we 3063 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this 3064 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). 3065 */ 3066 3067 int r = 1; 3068 3069 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { 3070 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, 3071 s-> 3072 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 3073 if (!r) { 3074 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3075 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3076 goto err; 3077 } 3078 } 3079 3080 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 3081 /* shouldn't really happen */ 3082 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 3083 } 3084 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 3085 3086 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { 3087 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 3088 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 3089 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { 3090 /* 3091 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF 3092 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! 3093 */ 3094 3095 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { 3096 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 3097 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); 3098 } else { 3099 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = 3100 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, 3101 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 3102 } 3103 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3104 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3105 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3106 goto err; 3107 } 3108 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = 3109 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 3110 } 3111 } 3112 3113 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3114 /* 3115 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we 3116 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the 3117 * handshake. 3118 */ 3119 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3120 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3121 } 3122 } 3123 3124 err: 3125# endif 3126 switch (ret) { 3127 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3129 return -1; 3130 3131 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3132 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3133 return 1; 3134 3135 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3136 s->servername_done = 0; 3137 default: 3138 return 1; 3139 } 3140} 3141 3142int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3143{ 3144 int al; 3145 size_t i; 3146 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ 3147 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 3148 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); 3149 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 3150 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 3151 } 3152 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ 3153 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { 3154 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; 3155 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; 3156 } 3157 3158 /* If sigalgs received process it. */ 3159 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { 3160 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { 3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3162 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3163 goto err; 3164 } 3165 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ 3166 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { 3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, 3168 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); 3169 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3170 goto err; 3171 } 3172 } else 3173 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert); 3174 return 1; 3175 err: 3176 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3177 return 0; 3178} 3179 3180/* 3181 * Upon success, returns 1. 3182 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert. 3183 */ 3184int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al) 3185{ 3186 3187 /* 3188 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be 3189 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, 3190 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may 3191 * influence which certificate is sent 3192 */ 3193 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3194 int ret; 3195 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 3196 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 3197 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 3198 if (certpkey != NULL) { 3199 /* 3200 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate 3201 * et al can pick it up. 3202 */ 3203 s->cert->key = certpkey; 3204 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3205 switch (ret) { 3206 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 3207 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3208 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 3209 break; 3210 /* status request response should be sent */ 3211 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 3212 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 3213 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 3214 break; 3215 /* something bad happened */ 3216 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3217 default: 3218 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3219 return 0; 3220 } 3221 } 3222 } 3223 3224 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) { 3225 return 0; 3226 } 3227 3228 return 1; 3229} 3230 3231int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 3232{ 3233 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 3234 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 3235 3236# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 3237 /* 3238 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 3239 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it 3240 * must contain uncompressed. 3241 */ 3242 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 3243 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 3244 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3245 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3246 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) 3247 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) 3248 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) 3249 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { 3250 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 3251 size_t i; 3252 unsigned char *list; 3253 int found_uncompressed = 0; 3254 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 3255 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { 3256 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { 3257 found_uncompressed = 1; 3258 break; 3259 } 3260 } 3261 if (!found_uncompressed) { 3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 3263 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 3264 return -1; 3265 } 3266 } 3267 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 3268# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 3269 3270 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3271 ret = 3272 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3273 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3274 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL 3275 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 3276 ret = 3277 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, 3278 s-> 3279 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 3280 3281# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 3282 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { 3283 /* 3284 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on 3285 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a 3286 * value from the server too. 3287 */ 3288 3289 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { 3290 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3291 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 3292 } 3293 3294 /* 3295 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to 3296 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. 3297 */ 3298 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 3299 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != 3300 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { 3301 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3302 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 3303 } 3304 } 3305# endif 3306 3307 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 3308 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 3309 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 3310 /* 3311 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the 3312 * callback 3313 */ 3314 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 3315 && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { 3316 int r; 3317 /* 3318 * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback 3319 * knows there is no response 3320 */ 3321 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 3322 if (r == 0) { 3323 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 3324 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3325 } 3326 if (r < 0) { 3327 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 3328 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 3329 } 3330 } 3331 3332 switch (ret) { 3333 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 3334 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3335 return -1; 3336 3337 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 3338 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); 3339 return 1; 3340 3341 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 3342 s->servername_done = 0; 3343 default: 3344 return 1; 3345 } 3346} 3347 3348int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, 3349 int n) 3350{ 3351 int al = -1; 3352 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) 3353 return 1; 3354 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) { 3355 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); 3356 return 0; 3357 } 3358 3359 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { 3360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); 3361 return 0; 3362 } 3363 return 1; 3364} 3365 3366/*- 3367 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 3368 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 3369 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 3370 * 3371 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 3372 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 3373 * extension, if any. 3374 * len: the length of the session ID. 3375 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 3376 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3377 * point to the resulting session. 3378 * 3379 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 3380 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 3381 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 3382 * 3383 * Returns: 3384 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3385 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 3386 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 3387 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 3388 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 3389 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 3390 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 3391 * 3392 * Side effects: 3393 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 3394 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 3395 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 3396 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 3397 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 3398 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 3399 */ 3400int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 3401 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 3402{ 3403 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 3404 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 3405 unsigned short i; 3406 3407 *ret = NULL; 3408 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 3409 3410 /* 3411 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful 3412 * resumption. 3413 */ 3414 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 3415 return 0; 3416 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 3417 return 0; 3418 if (p >= limit) 3419 return -1; 3420 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 3421 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { 3422 i = *(p++); 3423 3424 if (limit - p <= i) 3425 return -1; 3426 3427 p += i; 3428 } 3429 /* Skip past cipher list */ 3430 n2s(p, i); 3431 if (limit - p <= i) 3432 return -1; 3433 p += i; 3434 3435 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 3436 i = *(p++); 3437 if (limit - p < i) 3438 return -1; 3439 p += i; 3440 3441 /* Now at start of extensions */ 3442 if (limit - p <= 2) 3443 return 0; 3444 n2s(p, i); 3445 while (limit - p >= 4) { 3446 unsigned short type, size; 3447 n2s(p, type); 3448 n2s(p, size); 3449 if (limit - p < size) 3450 return 0; 3451 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { 3452 int r; 3453 if (size == 0) { 3454 /* 3455 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have 3456 * one. 3457 */ 3458 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3459 return 1; 3460 } 3461 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { 3462 /* 3463 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than 3464 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger 3465 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to 3466 * calculate the master secret later. 3467 */ 3468 return 2; 3469 } 3470 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 3471 switch (r) { 3472 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 3473 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3474 return 2; 3475 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 3476 return r; 3477 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 3478 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 3479 return 3; 3480 default: /* fatal error */ 3481 return -1; 3482 } 3483 } 3484 p += size; 3485 } 3486 return 0; 3487} 3488 3489/*- 3490 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 3491 * 3492 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 3493 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 3494 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 3495 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 3496 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 3497 * point to the resulting session. 3498 * 3499 * Returns: 3500 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 3501 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 3502 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 3503 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 3504 */ 3505static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, 3506 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, 3507 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) 3508{ 3509 SSL_SESSION *sess; 3510 unsigned char *sdec; 3511 const unsigned char *p; 3512 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 3513 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 3514 HMAC_CTX hctx; 3515 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 3516 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 3517 3518 /* Need at least keyname + iv */ 3519 if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) 3520 return 2; 3521 3522 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 3523 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 3524 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 3525 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { 3526 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 3527 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 3528 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 3529 if (rv < 0) 3530 goto err; 3531 if (rv == 0) { 3532 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3533 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3534 return 2; 3535 } 3536 if (rv == 2) 3537 renew_ticket = 1; 3538 } else { 3539 /* Check key name matches */ 3540 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 3541 return 2; 3542 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 3543 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 3544 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 3545 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 3546 etick + 16) <= 0) { 3547 goto err; 3548 } 3549 } 3550 /* 3551 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity 3552 * checks on ticket. 3553 */ 3554 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 3555 if (mlen < 0) { 3556 goto err; 3557 } 3558 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ 3559 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { 3560 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3561 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3562 return 2; 3563 } 3564 3565 eticklen -= mlen; 3566 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 3567 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 3568 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { 3569 goto err; 3570 } 3571 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3572 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { 3573 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3574 return 2; 3575 } 3576 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 3577 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 3578 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3579 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 3580 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 3581 if (sdec == NULL 3582 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { 3583 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3584 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3585 return -1; 3586 } 3587 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { 3588 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3589 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3590 return 2; 3591 } 3592 slen += mlen; 3593 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3594 p = sdec; 3595 3596 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 3597 slen -= p - sdec; 3598 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 3599 if (sess) { 3600 /* Some additional consistency checks */ 3601 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) { 3602 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 3603 return 2; 3604 } 3605 /* 3606 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect 3607 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session 3608 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by 3609 * standard. 3610 */ 3611 if (sesslen) 3612 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 3613 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 3614 *psess = sess; 3615 if (renew_ticket) 3616 return 4; 3617 else 3618 return 3; 3619 } 3620 ERR_clear_error(); 3621 /* 3622 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. 3623 */ 3624 return 2; 3625err: 3626 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 3627 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 3628 return -1; 3629} 3630 3631/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 3632 3633typedef struct { 3634 int nid; 3635 int id; 3636} tls12_lookup; 3637 3638static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 3639 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 3640 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 3641 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 3642 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 3643 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 3644 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 3645}; 3646 3647static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 3648 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 3649 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 3650 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 3651}; 3652 3653static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3654{ 3655 size_t i; 3656 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3657 if (table[i].nid == nid) 3658 return table[i].id; 3659 } 3660 return -1; 3661} 3662 3663static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 3664{ 3665 size_t i; 3666 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { 3667 if ((table[i].id) == id) 3668 return table[i].nid; 3669 } 3670 return NID_undef; 3671} 3672 3673int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, 3674 const EVP_MD *md) 3675{ 3676 int sig_id, md_id; 3677 if (!md) 3678 return 0; 3679 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 3680 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3681 if (md_id == -1) 3682 return 0; 3683 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 3684 if (sig_id == -1) 3685 return 0; 3686 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 3687 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 3688 return 1; 3689} 3690 3691int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 3692{ 3693 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 3694 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3695} 3696 3697const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 3698{ 3699 switch (hash_alg) { 3700# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 3701 case TLSEXT_hash_md5: 3702# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS 3703 if (FIPS_mode()) 3704 return NULL; 3705# endif 3706 return EVP_md5(); 3707# endif 3708# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 3709 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 3710 return EVP_sha1(); 3711# endif 3712# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 3713 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 3714 return EVP_sha224(); 3715 3716 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 3717 return EVP_sha256(); 3718# endif 3719# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 3720 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 3721 return EVP_sha384(); 3722 3723 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 3724 return EVP_sha512(); 3725# endif 3726 default: 3727 return NULL; 3728 3729 } 3730} 3731 3732static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) 3733{ 3734 switch (sig_alg) { 3735# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3736 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 3737 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 3738# endif 3739# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3740 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 3741 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 3742# endif 3743# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3744 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 3745 return SSL_PKEY_ECC; 3746# endif 3747 } 3748 return -1; 3749} 3750 3751/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ 3752static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, 3753 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) 3754{ 3755 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; 3756 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) 3757 return; 3758 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3759 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, 3760 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3761 if (phash_nid) 3762 *phash_nid = hash_nid; 3763 } 3764 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { 3765 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, 3766 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 3767 if (psign_nid) 3768 *psign_nid = sign_nid; 3769 } 3770 if (psignhash_nid) { 3771 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef 3772 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, 3773 sign_nid) <= 0) 3774 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; 3775 } 3776} 3777 3778/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ 3779static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, 3780 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, 3781 const unsigned char *allow, 3782 size_t allowlen) 3783{ 3784 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; 3785 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; 3786 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { 3787 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ 3788 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL) 3789 continue; 3790 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) 3791 continue; 3792 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { 3793 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { 3794 nmatch++; 3795 if (shsig) { 3796 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; 3797 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; 3798 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, 3799 &shsig->sign_nid, 3800 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); 3801 shsig++; 3802 } 3803 break; 3804 } 3805 } 3806 } 3807 return nmatch; 3808} 3809 3810/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ 3811static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3812{ 3813 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; 3814 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; 3815 size_t nmatch; 3816 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; 3817 CERT *c = s->cert; 3818 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); 3819 if (c->shared_sigalgs) { 3820 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); 3821 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; 3822 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; 3823 } 3824 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ 3825 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3826 conf = c->client_sigalgs; 3827 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; 3828 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { 3829 conf = c->conf_sigalgs; 3830 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; 3831 } else 3832 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf); 3833 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { 3834 pref = conf; 3835 preflen = conflen; 3836 allow = c->peer_sigalgs; 3837 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3838 } else { 3839 allow = conf; 3840 allowlen = conflen; 3841 pref = c->peer_sigalgs; 3842 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; 3843 } 3844 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3845 if (nmatch) { 3846 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); 3847 if (!salgs) 3848 return 0; 3849 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); 3850 } else { 3851 salgs = NULL; 3852 } 3853 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; 3854 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; 3855 return 1; 3856} 3857 3858/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 3859 3860int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 3861{ 3862 CERT *c = s->cert; 3863 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ 3864 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 3865 return 1; 3866 /* Should never happen */ 3867 if (!c) 3868 return 0; 3869 3870 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 3871 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); 3872 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); 3873 if (!c->peer_sigalgs) 3874 return 0; 3875 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize; 3876 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); 3877 return 1; 3878} 3879 3880int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) 3881{ 3882 int idx; 3883 size_t i; 3884 const EVP_MD *md; 3885 CERT *c = s->cert; 3886 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; 3887 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) 3888 return 0; 3889 3890# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 3891 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 3892 /* 3893 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest, 3894 * ignoring any peer preferences. 3895 */ 3896 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; 3897 if (s->server) 3898 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; 3899 else 3900 sigs = c->client_sigalgs; 3901 if (sigs) { 3902 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); 3903 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); 3904 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3905 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3906 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3907 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3908 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3909 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3910 } 3911 } 3912 } 3913# endif 3914 3915 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; 3916 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { 3917 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); 3918 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { 3919 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); 3920 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 3921 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3922 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { 3923 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = 3924 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 3925 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 3926 } 3927 } 3928 3929 } 3930 /* 3931 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use 3932 * the certificate for signing. 3933 */ 3934 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { 3935 /* 3936 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 3937 * supported it stays as NULL. 3938 */ 3939# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3940 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 3941 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3942# endif 3943# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 3944 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { 3945 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3946 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3947 } 3948# endif 3949# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 3950 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 3951 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 3952# endif 3953 } 3954 return 1; 3955} 3956 3957int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3958 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3959 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3960{ 3961 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs; 3962 if (psig == NULL) 3963 return 0; 3964 if (idx >= 0) { 3965 idx <<= 1; 3966 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) 3967 return 0; 3968 psig += idx; 3969 if (rhash) 3970 *rhash = psig[0]; 3971 if (rsig) 3972 *rsig = psig[1]; 3973 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); 3974 } 3975 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2; 3976} 3977 3978int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, 3979 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, 3980 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) 3981{ 3982 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; 3983 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) 3984 return 0; 3985 shsigalgs += idx; 3986 if (phash) 3987 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; 3988 if (psign) 3989 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; 3990 if (psignhash) 3991 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; 3992 if (rsig) 3993 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; 3994 if (rhash) 3995 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; 3996 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; 3997} 3998 3999# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 4000int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 4001{ 4002 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 4003 unsigned short hbtype; 4004 unsigned int payload; 4005 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 4006 4007 if (s->msg_callback) 4008 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 4009 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 4010 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 4011 4012 /* Read type and payload length first */ 4013 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 4014 return 0; /* silently discard */ 4015 hbtype = *p++; 4016 n2s(p, payload); 4017 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 4018 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 4019 pl = p; 4020 4021 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { 4022 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 4023 int r; 4024 4025 /* 4026 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, 4027 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding 4028 */ 4029 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 4030 if (buffer == NULL) 4031 return -1; 4032 bp = buffer; 4033 4034 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 4035 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 4036 s2n(payload, bp); 4037 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 4038 bp += payload; 4039 /* Random padding */ 4040 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { 4041 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 4042 return -1; 4043 } 4044 4045 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 4046 3 + payload + padding); 4047 4048 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 4049 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 4050 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 4051 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 4052 4053 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 4054 4055 if (r < 0) 4056 return r; 4057 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { 4058 unsigned int seq; 4059 4060 /* 4061 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 4062 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number 4063 */ 4064 n2s(pl, seq); 4065 4066 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { 4067 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 4068 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 4069 } 4070 } 4071 4072 return 0; 4073} 4074 4075int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 4076{ 4077 unsigned char *buf, *p; 4078 int ret = -1; 4079 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 4080 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 4081 4082 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 4083 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 4084 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { 4085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 4086 return -1; 4087 } 4088 4089 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 4090 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { 4091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 4092 return -1; 4093 } 4094 4095 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 4096 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { 4097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 4098 return -1; 4099 } 4100 4101 /* 4102 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 4103 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 4104 */ 4105 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 4106 4107 /*- 4108 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 4109 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 4110 * some random stuff. 4111 * - Message Type, 1 byte 4112 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 4113 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 4114 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 4115 * - Padding 4116 */ 4117 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 4118 if (buf == NULL) 4119 return -1; 4120 p = buf; 4121 /* Message Type */ 4122 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 4123 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 4124 s2n(payload, p); 4125 /* Sequence number */ 4126 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 4127 /* 16 random bytes */ 4128 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { 4129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4130 goto err; 4131 } 4132 p += 16; 4133 /* Random padding */ 4134 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { 4135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 4136 goto err; 4137 } 4138 4139 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 4140 if (ret >= 0) { 4141 if (s->msg_callback) 4142 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 4143 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 4144 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 4145 4146 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 4147 } 4148 4149err: 4150 OPENSSL_free(buf); 4151 4152 return ret; 4153} 4154# endif 4155 4156# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) 4157 4158typedef struct { 4159 size_t sigalgcnt; 4160 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; 4161} sig_cb_st; 4162 4163static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) 4164{ 4165 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; 4166 size_t i; 4167 char etmp[20], *p; 4168 int sig_alg, hash_alg; 4169 if (elem == NULL) 4170 return 0; 4171 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) 4172 return 0; 4173 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) 4174 return 0; 4175 memcpy(etmp, elem, len); 4176 etmp[len] = 0; 4177 p = strchr(etmp, '+'); 4178 if (!p) 4179 return 0; 4180 *p = 0; 4181 p++; 4182 if (!*p) 4183 return 0; 4184 4185 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA")) 4186 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA; 4187 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA")) 4188 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA; 4189 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA")) 4190 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC; 4191 else 4192 return 0; 4193 4194 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p); 4195 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4196 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p); 4197 if (hash_alg == NID_undef) 4198 return 0; 4199 4200 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { 4201 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg) 4202 return 0; 4203 } 4204 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg; 4205 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg; 4206 return 1; 4207} 4208 4209/* 4210 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the 4211 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 4212 */ 4213int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) 4214{ 4215 sig_cb_st sig; 4216 sig.sigalgcnt = 0; 4217 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) 4218 return 0; 4219 if (c == NULL) 4220 return 1; 4221 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); 4222} 4223 4224int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, 4225 int client) 4226{ 4227 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; 4228 int rhash, rsign; 4229 size_t i; 4230 if (salglen & 1) 4231 return 0; 4232 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); 4233 if (sigalgs == NULL) 4234 return 0; 4235 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { 4236 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, 4237 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4238 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, 4239 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 4240 4241 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) 4242 goto err; 4243 *sptr++ = rhash; 4244 *sptr++ = rsign; 4245 } 4246 4247 if (client) { 4248 if (c->client_sigalgs) 4249 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); 4250 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4251 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; 4252 } else { 4253 if (c->conf_sigalgs) 4254 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); 4255 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; 4256 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; 4257 } 4258 4259 return 1; 4260 4261 err: 4262 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); 4263 return 0; 4264} 4265 4266static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) 4267{ 4268 int sig_nid; 4269 size_t i; 4270 if (default_nid == -1) 4271 return 1; 4272 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); 4273 if (default_nid) 4274 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; 4275 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) 4276 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) 4277 return 1; 4278 return 0; 4279} 4280 4281/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ 4282static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) 4283{ 4284 X509_NAME *nm; 4285 int i; 4286 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); 4287 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { 4288 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) 4289 return 1; 4290 } 4291 return 0; 4292} 4293 4294/* 4295 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by 4296 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before 4297 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before 4298 * attempting to use them. 4299 */ 4300 4301/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ 4302 4303# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ 4304 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) 4305/* Strict mode flags */ 4306# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ 4307 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ 4308 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) 4309 4310int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, 4311 int idx) 4312{ 4313 int i; 4314 int rv = 0; 4315 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; 4316 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; 4317 CERT *c = s->cert; 4318 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); 4319 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ 4320 if (idx != -1) { 4321 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ 4322 if (idx == -2) { 4323 cpk = c->key; 4324 idx = cpk - c->pkeys; 4325 } else 4326 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4327 x = cpk->x509; 4328 pk = cpk->privatekey; 4329 chain = cpk->chain; 4330 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; 4331 /* If no cert or key, forget it */ 4332 if (!x || !pk) 4333 goto end; 4334# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL 4335 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ 4336 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { 4337 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | 4338 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4339 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4340 return rv; 4341 } 4342# endif 4343 } else { 4344 if (!x || !pk) 4345 return 0; 4346 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); 4347 if (idx == -1) 4348 return 0; 4349 cpk = c->pkeys + idx; 4350 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) 4351 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; 4352 else 4353 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; 4354 strict_mode = 1; 4355 } 4356 4357 if (suiteb_flags) { 4358 int ok; 4359 if (check_flags) 4360 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4361 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); 4362 if (ok == X509_V_OK) 4363 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; 4364 else if (!check_flags) 4365 goto end; 4366 } 4367 4368 /* 4369 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature 4370 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. 4371 */ 4372 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { 4373 int default_nid; 4374 unsigned char rsign = 0; 4375 if (c->peer_sigalgs) 4376 default_nid = 0; 4377 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ 4378 else { 4379 switch (idx) { 4380 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: 4381 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: 4382 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: 4383 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; 4384 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; 4385 break; 4386 4387 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: 4388 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: 4389 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; 4390 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; 4391 break; 4392 4393 case SSL_PKEY_ECC: 4394 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; 4395 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; 4396 break; 4397 4398 default: 4399 default_nid = -1; 4400 break; 4401 } 4402 } 4403 /* 4404 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set 4405 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. 4406 */ 4407 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { 4408 size_t j; 4409 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; 4410 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { 4411 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) 4412 break; 4413 } 4414 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { 4415 if (check_flags) 4416 goto skip_sigs; 4417 else 4418 goto end; 4419 } 4420 } 4421 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ 4422 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { 4423 if (!check_flags) 4424 goto end; 4425 } else 4426 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; 4427 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4428 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4429 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { 4430 if (check_flags) { 4431 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4432 break; 4433 } else 4434 goto end; 4435 } 4436 } 4437 } 4438 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ 4439 else if (check_flags) 4440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; 4441 skip_sigs: 4442 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ 4443 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) 4444 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; 4445 else if (!check_flags) 4446 goto end; 4447 if (!s->server) 4448 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4449 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ 4450 else if (strict_mode) { 4451 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4452 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4453 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4454 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { 4455 if (check_flags) { 4456 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; 4457 break; 4458 } else 4459 goto end; 4460 } 4461 } 4462 } 4463 if (!s->server && strict_mode) { 4464 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; 4465 int check_type = 0; 4466 switch (pk->type) { 4467 case EVP_PKEY_RSA: 4468 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; 4469 break; 4470 case EVP_PKEY_DSA: 4471 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; 4472 break; 4473 case EVP_PKEY_EC: 4474 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; 4475 break; 4476 case EVP_PKEY_DH: 4477 case EVP_PKEY_DHX: 4478 { 4479 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); 4480 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA) 4481 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; 4482 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA) 4483 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; 4484 } 4485 } 4486 if (check_type) { 4487 const unsigned char *ctypes; 4488 int ctypelen; 4489 if (c->ctypes) { 4490 ctypes = c->ctypes; 4491 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num; 4492 } else { 4493 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; 4494 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; 4495 } 4496 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) { 4497 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) { 4498 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4499 break; 4500 } 4501 } 4502 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) 4503 goto end; 4504 } else 4505 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4506 4507 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; 4508 4509 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) 4510 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4511 4512 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4513 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) 4514 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4515 } 4516 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { 4517 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { 4518 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 4519 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { 4520 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; 4521 break; 4522 } 4523 } 4524 } 4525 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) 4526 goto end; 4527 } else 4528 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; 4529 4530 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) 4531 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; 4532 4533 end: 4534 4535 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { 4536 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) 4537 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4538 else if (cpk->digest) 4539 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; 4540 } else 4541 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4542 4543 /* 4544 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the 4545 * chain is invalid. 4546 */ 4547 if (!check_flags) { 4548 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) 4549 cpk->valid_flags = rv; 4550 else { 4551 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ 4552 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; 4553 return 0; 4554 } 4555 } 4556 return rv; 4557} 4558 4559/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ 4560void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) 4561{ 4562 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); 4563 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); 4564 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); 4565 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA); 4566 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA); 4567 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); 4568} 4569 4570/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ 4571int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) 4572{ 4573 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); 4574} 4575 4576#endif 4577